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Abstract 
The study develops a framework for improving corporate governance mechanisms in Libya that 
takes into account its specific environment of weak formal enforcement and its corporate 
ownership structure, which is based on concentrated state ownership. The central goal of the 
research is to establish an adequate protection system for minority shareholders that can contribute 
to the development of an efficient and healthy commercial environment in Libya.  To do so, the 
study examines the current solution for dealing with the conflict of interests between shareholders 
adopted by Libyan law under art 159 of Libyan Economic Activity Act (LEAA 2010): the minority 
shareholders’ actions. Using a social and economic analysis and a black letter approach, this study 
presents a novel analytical framework that formulates an appropriate solution for controlling 
conflict of interests between shareholders in Libya. To that end, the study addresses the following 
questions: how effective is the current mechanism for dealing with the conflict of interest between 
shareholders in Libya? What are the economic and social implications of the different proposed 
approaches? What elements determine which approach is preferable in Libya? And, finally, what 
are the challenges that the proposed law reform may face?  
To answer these questions, firstly, it is necessary to consider the general framework of 
corporate governance in Libya, examine the country’s current position as an economy in the early 
stages of transformation and analyse the potential impact of this transformation on corporate 
governance. Following this, I locate the dimensions of the conflict of interest problem between the 
minority and majority shareholders in Libya through analysing literature of corporate governance 
with regard to the minority-majority shareholder problem and applying it to the case of Libya. 
After that, I examine the efficacy of the current mechanism available in Libyan law (minority 
shareholders actions) as a solution for dealing with the conflict of interests between the minority 
shareholders and the majority shareholders in Libyan companies. However, the current approach is 
not appropriate for Libya for several reasons that relate to either the efficiency of the approach 
itself or its application and enforcement in Libya.  
After examining other possible solutions (e.g. a prohibition strategy), I propose the self-
enforcing model as the most appropriate solution since it contributes to companies being able raise 
capital from investors, and it also lowers the number of conflict of interest transactions and makes a 
company’s transactions more efficient. Finally, the self-enforcing model does away with the need 
for external monitoring. However, this is not the end of the story; adopting such a model will 
inevitably lead to some potential risks (such as the risk that the minority shareholders may abuse 
their rights), which will require the formulation and adoption of new and specific strategies of 
corporate governance that are appropriate to Libya. 
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Introduction 
Since countries with transition economies do not enjoy long established financial 
institutional infrastructure associated with more established economies, corporate 
governance issues are of particular significance.  The importance of corporate governance 
in transition economies has become increasingly significant in recent times, as it has 
become obvious that privatisation and liberalisation alone are not sufficient to ensure the 
improved performance of firms and, in some cases, are even responsible for a dramatic 
worsening of performance.1   
In Libya, itself a transition economy, corporate governance is still in its infancy as 
the state is in the early stage of transition, as discussed later. Corporate governance first 
became an issue in Libya in early 2001, when the state implemented a programme of 
economic reform and restructuring through a massive privatisation programme which 
aimed to move the country from socialist oriented policies towards a free-market economy.  
At that time the debate focussed on the need for strong corporate governance in order to 
attract local and foreign investment and enhance the role of the private sector in the 
economy. Although many positive measures and procedures were implemented in the 
2000s towards the free market economy, which successfully established new institutions of 
corporate governance in Libya, many difficulties and challenges still face the state. One of 
the most significant issues facing Libya, as it attempts to develop an economic and 
financial environment in which a free market economy can operate, is the adoption of an 
efficient minority shareholders protection system. 
Therefore, the main concern of this study is to establish a robust system of minority 
shareholder protection in Libya. Prior to discussing this issue, it is useful to provide a very 
                                                 
1 For more details see Burno   Dallago, 'Corporate Governance in Transformation Economies: a Comparative 
Perspective' in B Dallago and I Iwasaki (eds), Corporate Governance Restructuring and Governance in 
Transition Economies (Palgrave 2007) 16. 
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brief definition of what constitutes a minority shareholder. Simply put, a minority 
shareholder is a shareholder who is not a controlling shareholder.  Most of the literature on 
corporate governance assumes that a system in which controlling shareholders are 
commonly found, a large shareholder has control over the company, a large shareholder 
has control over the company, as he owns a majority of shares. In other words, voting 
rights and cash flow rights are generally aligned. This kind of controlling shareholder 
ownership is referred to as a ‘controlled structure’. 2  However, this is not the only type of 
controlling shareholder ownership. The other type occurs when a controlling shareholder 
exercises a significant percentage of voting rights even though he only holds a small 
percentage of equity. This means that the controlling shareholder may be also a minority 
shareholder. This system is known as the ‘controlling minority structure’ (“CMS”).  In 
such a system, the minority shareholder can exercise his control over the company, as 
Bebchuk et al. explains, in three principal ways: through dual-class share structures, stock 
pyramids, and cross-ownership ties. 3 
To explain this briefly: in terms of a dual-class share structure, companies may have 
two or more classes of shares with different rights attached.4  These shares can be divided 
into two kinds of shares: preference shares and conditional shares. Preference shares may 
give ‘a preferential right as to dividend only or as to return of capital only, or both as to 
dividend and to return of capital’.5 They may also provide their holders with no right to 
vote.6    Conditional shares, on the other hand, are ordinary shares that are restricted by 
certain privileges or limitations. For example, the company may seek to attract particular 
investment or induce particular persons to enter into the company. To achieve this, the 
company may enhance voting rights for those potential investors and make their votes 
                                                 
2 See  Lucian A Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis, 'Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Du
al Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights' in Randal
l K. Morck (ed) Concentrated Corporate Ownership (University of Chicago Press, 2000) 295 – 318 
3 For more information, see ibid.  
4  See e.g. Geoffrey Morse and others, Charlesworth & Morse company law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) 177-8.   
5 John Birds and others, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (Jordan Publishing Limited, 2011) 249. 
6 See ibid 252; Richard M Buxbaum, 'The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance' California 
Law Review 1671,  1684. 
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multiple. 7  On the other hand, the company may issue non-voting shares to allow the 
holders of the ordinary shares to maintain control or to enhance the role of the founder of 
the company.8  
Secondly, a stock pyramid occurs when a controlling-minority shareholder holds a 
controlling share in a holding company that, in turn, holds a controlling stake in an 
operating company (a pyramid of two companies). 9 In addition, cross-ownership structures 
can establish a CMS as well. In such a structure, firms ‘are linked by horizontal cross-
holdings of shares that reinforce and entrench the power of central controllers’.10 Here, the 
voting rights used to control a group are distributed over the entire group rather than 
owned by a single company or shareholder.11  
It should be noted that even though holding a majority of common shares does not 
necessarily lead to control of the company, as seen in the CMS, the CMS structure is not 
applicable to Libya and so is not considered within this study. This is because a dual-class 
share structure is not possible under the self-enforcing model (which forms the main focus 
of this thesis) the central feature of which is the adoption of a one share one vote rule, as 
discussed in Ch.4.12 Further, the other two CMS structures are not common in Libya.  This 
is because the Libyan state, as discussed later in Ch.2, in most cases directly owns the 
majority of corporate assets in Libya. Thus, in this study, for the purpose of simplicity, a 
“controller” is defined as a shareholder with more than 50 percent of the voting rights. 
The central concern that underpins this study is that majority shareholders (those 
who control the company with their voting power) can cause harm to minority 
                                                 
7 Bushell v. Faith [1970] 1 All ER 53. 
8 Such shares are rare in the UK. See Marc Goergen and Luc Renneboog, 'Strong Managers and Passive 
Institutional Investors in the UK' '1998' Available at SSRN, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=137068> accessed 04-04-2015’ 16. 
9   Bebchuk and others (n 2) 289. 
10 ibid 299. 
11 ibid.  
12 See (4.3.2.1) 189. 
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shareholders and so require workable legal remedies. In general, the voting system is 
widely accepted as a collective decision-making mechanism in which the will of the 
majority is expressed, and it is often the best means of maximising the expected return for 
any given group (the ‘group preference’). 13  The voting mechanism assumes that the 
majority opinion expresses the ‘group preference,’ that is, the optimal choice for the group 
as a whole.14 Therefore, gaining the majority of the shareholder’s consent is the best tool 
for establishing transaction-efficiency.15 This is supported by the fact that each member's 
vote is cast based upon an appraisal of his best interests as a member of the group (sincere 
voting).16 However, when the voter’s personal interests conflict with the interest of the 
company or another group in the company, as is often the case in Libya, the transaction 
will be questionable. Thus, ‘an absence of sincere voting results in distorted decision-
making’.17 
To demonstrate this issue: in a concentrated ownership system such as Libya the 
agency problem involves the conflict between the majority of the shareholders (agents) and 
the minority or non- controlling owners (principals), rather than between shareholders and 
managers.   Here the shareholders with a high ownership share are capable of using their 
position to acquire private benefits by using their voting rights to consume corporate 
resources to their advantage, an option that is not available to other shareholders. On the 
other hand, in such a system, large shareholders can address the managerial agency 
problem through monitoring the management more effectively than small shareholders as 
they can accommodate a larger part of the monitoring costs, have sufficient voting power 
to influence corporate decisions and a general interest in profit maximization. Also, the 
                                                 
13 See Ronald J Gilson and Reinier H Kraakman, 'The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency' (1984) 70 Virginia 
Law Review 549. 
14 See Shmuel Nitzan and Uriel Procaccia, 'Optimal Voting Procedures for Profit Maximizing Firms' 51 
Public Choice 191. 
15  Zohar Goshen, 'Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule' (1996) 70 Southern 
California Law Review 741, 744. 
16 See  Amartya Sen, 'Behavior and the Concept of Preference' (1973) 40 Economica 241. 
17  Goshen,  (n 15) 797. 
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controlling shareholder generally takes an active interest in running the company through 
choosing the management and sometimes directly taking executive positions. Thus, the 
impact of the first agency problem (shareholders vs. managers) is minimal. 
In Libya, the situation is further problematised by Libyan Company Law, which 
provides controlling shareholders with unrestricted control over the company, thereby 
allowing for abuses and injustices towards minority shareholders. Indeed, the statutory 
provisions in Libyan Company Law that deal specifically with the protection of minority 
shareholders are very few and those that do exist are incomplete, ambiguous and 
unbalanced. In reality, they afford little protection to minority shareholders since they grant 
overall power in most circumstances to the majority shareholders who have the ultimate 
say on almost all issues.  
In this light, this study examines the current solution adopted by Libyan law under 
art 159 of Libyan Economic Activity Act (LEAA 2010) to deal with the conflict of 
interests between shareholders: the minority shareholders’ actions (Liability Action and 
Nullification Action). Here it should be noted that a large amount of majority-minority 
shareholders’ conflicts are resolved by actions that the minority shareholders brings against 
the controlling shareholders, the exploration of which will be our focus in this thesis. 
Examining other solutions, which afford protection for minority shareholders, such as 
appraisal rights and pre-emptive rights, will be our task in future (not in this thesis).   
Using a social and economic analysis and a black letter approach, this study 
presents a novel analytical framework in order to investigate a possible solution that could 
contribute to solving the problem of conflict between shareholders in Libya. To that end, 
the study addresses the following questions: how effective is the current mechanism for 
dealing with the conflict of interest between shareholders in Libya? What are the economic 
and social implications of the different proposed approaches? What elements determine 
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which approach is preferable in Libya? And, finally, what are the challenges that the 
proposed law reform may face?  
There is a strong need to establish a robust system of minority shareholders 
protection in Libya for both economic and social reasons.  Firstly, the protection of 
minority shareholders is considered a core mechanism for attracting both foreign and 
domestic investors. This is because effective minority protection provides a degree of 
confidence that is necessary for investors to make an investment decision.  In this way, 
minority protection enhances the development of financial markets, as minority 
shareholders will be incentivised to pay a greater sum for shares if there is strong 
protection for them and their investments. This in turn provides increased capital for 
companies when the shares are first issued.18 La Porta, et al., in a series of studies, assert 
that effective shareholder protection laws and strong enforcement results in larger stock 
market capitalization, initial public offerings (IPOs) and a greater number of publicly 
traded companies. 19  Further, it has been argued that countries that protect minority 
shareholders have more effective stock markets, larger numbers of listed shares and higher 
rates of capital demand in the market than countries where protection is lacking.20  In 
addition, La Porta, et al, found that there is evidence of firms enjoying a higher valuation 
in countries with better protection for minority shareholders.21 Beck and Levine confirm 
that strong legal protection of shareholders and strong accounting standards are positively 
correlated with stock market capitalization,22 and, recently, Rathinam and Raja found that 
                                                 
18  Rafael La Porta and others, 'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' (2000) 58 Journal of Financial 
Economics 3, 15.   
19 Rafael La Porta and others, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance' (1997) 53 Journal of Finance 1131; 
Rafael La Porta and others, 'Law and Finance' (1998) 106  Journal of Political Economy 1113; Rafael La 
Porta and others, 'The Quality of Government' (1999) 15 Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 222. 
20 La Porta and others,  ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (n 18). 
21 Rafael La Porta and others, 'Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation' (2002) LVII The Journal of 
Finance 1147. 
22 Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine and Norman Loayza, 'Finance and the Sources of Growth' (2000) 58 Journal 
of Financial Economics 261. 
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developments in law and investor protection actually cause market capitalization. 23  
MacNeil claims that the failure to provide adequate protection for investors has a negative 
effect on confidence in the operation of capital markets, which is one category of securities 
markets, and, subsequently, undermines economic growth.24   
However, it is worth mentioning that the relationship between legal minority 
protection for shareholders and the development of financial markets is a controversial area 
in academic discourse. For example, John Armour, et al found ‘no evidence of a long-run 
impact of legal change on stock market development. Possible explanations are that laws 
have been overly protective of shareholders; that transplanted laws have not worked as 
expected; and, more generally, that the effects of legal origin are not as strong as widely 
supposed’. 25    It should be noted that even though the relationship between minority 
protection and growth is empirically controversial and the impact of an effective system of 
minority shareholders protection on market development may differ from one country to 
another, depending on other contributory factors, there is no doubt that protection of 
minority shareholders can solve the agency problem between the minority shareholders 
against both the management and the majority shareholders. As Cheffins notes, a country 
that has an effective mechanism for the protection of minority shareholders against the 
controlling shareholders can regulate transactions between companies and their ‘insiders’ 
(directors and key shareholders) by  deterring controlling shareholders from extracting 
private benefits. 26 Such a protective mechanism can both encourage minority shareholder 
to buy equity27 and facilitate access to external finance.28  
                                                 
23 Francis Xavier Rathinam and A. V. Raja, 'Stock Market and Shareholder Protection: Are They Important 
for Economic Growth?' (2010) 3 The Law and Development Review 306. 
24 Iain G MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment (2nd edn Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2012) 290. 
25 John Armour, Simon Deakin and Prabirjit Sarkar, 'Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: 
An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis' ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 108/2008 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1094355> accessed 01/07/2013. 
26 Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control (Oxford University Press, 2008) 34. 
27 ibid. 
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Secondly, justice and fairness necessitate protection for the minority shareholder 
for two reasons. First, minority and majority shareholders must be treated equally. This 
does not mean that the majority has no sole control over the company. Rather, it means the 
majority shareholders must not directly or indirectly extract private benefits at the expense 
of the minority shareholders. If the majority shareholder is free to unfairly exploit their 
position in the company and escape liability, then potential minority shareholders will be 
reticent to invest if there are no legal provisions that safeguard their investment.29 Further, 
to a large extent, minority shareholders are more vulnerable (especially when there is a 
strong connection between the directors and majority shareholders) and more dependent on 
the law than either the company’s employees or suppliers who, due to their usefulness, are 
less likely to be mistreated.30   Therefore, the main goal of a protection system for the 
minority shareholders should be to ensure that majority shareholders do not abuse their 
corporate powers and that minority shareholders always have a means to obtain some kind 
of remedy where it is warranted. 
The study is important to the case of Libya for several reasons. Firstly, corporate 
governance in Libya generally, and minority shareholders protection particularly, have not 
been adequately discussed by researchers. There has been a lack of attention paid thus far 
to such topics in Libya, particularly at the level of legal reform. Also, the need to address 
such a topic has increased following the move from socialist oriented policies toward a 
free-market economy and the establishment of the Libyan Stock Market in 2007. In other 
words, the most important step in achieving a free-market economy is through enhancing 
privatisation programmes and attracting both foreign and national investors to participate 
in Libyan businesses. This cannot be achieved without establishing efficient protection for 
                                                                                                                                                    
28 See e.g. Raghuram G Rajan and Luigi Zingales, 'Financial Dependence and Growth' [ ] 88 American 
Economic Review 559; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, 'Law, Finance, and Firm Growth' 53 
The Journal of Finance 2107; Jeffrey Wurgler, 'Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital' 58 Journal of 
Financial Economics 187; Stijn Claessens and Luc Laeven, 'Financial Development, Property Rights, and 
Growth' 58 The Journal of Finance 2401.   
29 Themistokles Lazarides, 'Minority Shareholder Choices and Rights in the New Market Environment' '2009' 
(2009) SSRN, <http://ssm.com!abstract=1432672> accessed 20/07/2013, 5. 
30 La Porta and others,  ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (n 18) 4. 
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minority shareholders in private companies. Further, Libya needs to diversify its economy.  
Though Libya is a hydrocarbon rich country, it is still ‘one of the least diversified 
economies in the Maghreb region and among the oil producing countries’.31 This means 
Libya is still dependent on hydrocarbons, which, according to the 2013 IMF report, 
‘account for over 65 percent of GDP and 96 percent of revenue’.32 However, it is likely 
that when Libya establishes an adequate system of corporate governance and provides 
robust protection for the minority shareholder, this will help the revival of the private 
sector, which in turn will contribute to economic diversification. 
Having identified the problem of the study and the importance of tackling it, the 
core question here is what is the appropriate means by which an effective protection 
system for the minority shareholders in Libya can be provided?  The departure point to 
answer this question is the fact that Libya is extremely deficient in terms of effective court 
enforcement. Therefore any solution provided must take this into account.  In other words, 
the focus on reforming the minority shareholders’ actions (laws on paper) to protect the 
minority shareholders against the controlling shareholders in Libya will be incomplete, at 
least at this stage of market transformation. This is because, as Opper and Serger claim: 
‘legal rules which are not enforced and do not influence an individual's behaviours are not 
even regarded as a part of an institution’.33  In the same way, Pistor et al. found that though 
credit market development benefited from improvements in the law on the books (focusing 
on shareholder rights and creditors’ rights), the effectiveness of legal institutions has a 
much stronger impact on external finance (the ability to raise equity, for example). This 
conclusion supports the argument that the proposition of legal transplants and extensive 
legal reforms are not in themselves adequate to establish effective legal and market 
                                                 
31 International Monetary Fund-IMF,'The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: 2006 Article IV 
Consultation-Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; 
and Statement by the Executive Director for The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,' (IMF Country 
Report No. 07/149, International Monetary Fund  2007) 4.  
32 International Monetary Fund,  ,'Libya 2013 Article IV Consultation' (IMF Country Report No. 13/150, 
International Monetary Fund  2013) 4. 
33 Sonja Opper and Sylvia Schwaag-Serger, 'Institutional Analysis of Legal Change: The Case of Corporate 
Governance in China' 26 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy  245, 247.   
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institutions.34 Indeed, if there is no competent authority that is capable of enforcing the 
laws, any reform of the law on the books will not deliver real world change or address the 
majority-minority problem effectively. As Coffee points out, massive expropriation by the 
majority shareholders can still occur even when the law on the books is nearly optimal.35  
Accordingly, this study examines a model that takes into account the lack of 
effective court enforcement in Libya and investigates to what extent it is appropriate for 
the Libyan case. The model is known as the self-enforcing model and was elaborated by 
Black and Kraakman in their 1996 article: A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law.36 
The model may provide appropriate solutions for corporate governance problems in 
emerging economies as it takes into account these countries’ environmental features. 
Generally, these are characterized by weak judicial enforcement, the existence of market 
forces that encourage law avoidance, and cultural norms and constraints that inhibit free 
market dynamics.  Therefore, the model provides a solution that minimizes reliance on 
official enforcement by primarily relying on a combination of voting rules and 
transactional rights. The voting elements include shareholder approval for broad classes of 
major transactions and self-interested transactions (supermajority shareholder approval for 
central business decisions and majority of minority rule for self-interested transactions). 
Transactional rights include pre-emptive rights, appraisal rights, and sell-out rights.  These 
primary procedural mechanisms replace the largely absent mechanisms of formal 
enforcement, and generally allow the minority shareholders to police the opportunism of 
the controlling shareholders.  
In addition to the self-enforcing model, this study attempts to take some lessons 
from UK company law as long as they are consistent with Libya’s social, cultural and 
                                                 
34 Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser and Stanislaw Gelfer, 'Law and Finance in Transition Economies' (2000) 8 
Economics of Transition 325. 
35 Jr. Jack C. Coffee, 'Privitization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure' 
(1999) 25 Journal of Corporation Law 1, 6. 
36 Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, 'A SELF-ENFORCING MODEL OF CORPORATE LAW' (1996) 
109 Harvard Law Review 1911. 
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economic environments and do not contradict Sharia principles or fundamental 
foundations of Libyan society. Here it should be noted that the study does not rely heavily 
on a comparative analysis between Libya and the UK. This is because the study mainly 
argues for the self-enforcing model and simultaneously against the current approach 
adopted in Libya: the minority shareholders’ actions. This necessitates adopting an 
economic and social approach, which cannot be drawn from the UK.  Nevertheless, UK 
law does offer some key lessons that are useful in addressing specific issues in Libya.  
Firstly, the UK is a common law jurisdiction and therefore it differs from Libya 
that has a civil law system. The variation between the two legal systems may contribute to 
enriching the study as laws from other legal origins can provide different ways of dealing 
with legal problems in Libya. The importance of seeking solutions from other legal origins 
is made clear by the fact that, in the case of minority shareholder protection, states that 
share the same legal origin (e.g. civil law countries) provide the same solutions as Libya.   
In the case of minority shareholders protection, as discussed, French and Egyptian legal 
systems (the root of Libyan Law)37 provide the same solution in relation to many issues 
relating to minority shareholders protection. For example, the three countries adopt 
Personal Liability action and abuse of rights principle to deal with the problem between the 
majority shareholders and he minority shareholders.38   As such, UK law may provide a 
valuable model for upcoming reform of Libyan law in regard to the minority shareholders 
protection due to the fact that it tackles the issue from a very different legal perspective. 
Secondly, the UK has an effective law for regulating the relationship between the 
minority shareholders and the majority shareholders. This is because, initially, it has been 
dealing with the issue of minority shareholders for nearly one hundred and seventy years.39 
                                                 
37 See (1.1.1) 21. 
38 See (3.1.1.2) 115ff and (3.1.2.3) 117ff. 
39 The oldest case in this matter was in 1843 which is Foss v. Harbottle [1843] 2 Hara 461. Here it should be 
noted that English law was a guide for common law jurisdictions such as the United States, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand until at least the beginning of the 20th Century.  English case decisions were commonly 
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Furthermore, the UK has a common law system where judges are able to interpret statute 
when there is an area of ambiguity, thus enabling the courts to remedy statutory gaps.40 As 
a result, such a system can offer comprehensive analysis provided by judges in the area of 
minority shareholders protection.41Libya, on the other hand, lacks such experience and 
development. The first statute in Libya to protect minority shareholders was introduced in 
1953 as part of the Libyan Commercial Act (Libyan CA 1953) (art 543 for a Company 
Action and arts 546 and 557 for Personal Actions). In 2010, the new Company Act was 
issued under the name Libyan Economic Activity Act (LEAA 2010), and the same 
provisions of LCA 1953 are included (art 159).42 In other words, the Company Act in 
Libya only underwent minor changes from 1953 to 2010. This was despite the fact that the 
economic system in Libya as a whole underwent major developments during this period 
(as discussed in Ch.1). Therefore, the LEAA 2010 can still be characterised as an 
underdeveloped law that lacks the level of detail that is required in an effective legal 
instrument in the modern commercial climate. As an example of this: LEAA 2010 fails to 
address many of the issues that relate to the shareholders' position and rights. Significantly, 
                                                                                                                                                    
cited as precedents and almost invariably followed in these countries. See Len Sealy, 'Shareholders' 
Remedies in the Common Law World' (1997) 2 Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review 172, 172. 
40 See Derek French, Stephen Mayson and Christopher Ryan, Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law 
(28 edn Oxford University Press, 2012)  0.3.2.3. In this context, it has been argued that statute law is often 
inefficient. See e.g. Paul H  Rubin, 'On the Form of Special Interest Legislation' (1975) 21 Public Choice 79;   
Paul H. Rubin, 'Why Is the Common Law Efficient?' (1977) 6 The Journal of Legal Studies 51. 
41 Here the study does not claim that common law is better equipped than civil law to provide protection for 
the minority shareholders as argued by La Porta et al. (see La Porta and others,  ‘Law and Finance’ (n 19)) or 
North who argues that Britain has better institutions than those in France. Consequently, British colonies are 
likely to inherit better institutions than French colonies with positive ramifications on financial development 
(See Douglass C North, 'Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction' 17 World 
Development 1319). This claim is controversial as there are some studies that claim that civil law countries 
provide more protection for minority shareholders than common law countries. See e.g. Prabirjit Sarkar, 
'Common Law vs. Civil Law: Which System Provides More Protection to Shareholders and Creditors and 
Promotes Financial Development' '2011' <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1913624> 
accessed 06-04-2015.Here we should note that though a comparison between the two systems and the 
colonial legacy of British and French legal systems is certainly interesting and relevant in a broader sense, it 
falls outside the specific scope of the topic addressed in this thesis.  
42 Though the LEAA 2010 replaced the first Commercial Act that was introduced in 1953, it includes 
minimal changes since the main purpose of the Act was to collect multiple, scattered provisions that relate to 
business and commercial issues into a single act, rather than introducing major reforms to commercial 
activities.  Specifically, LEAA 2010 abrogated 21 commercial laws that were diffused within several Acts 
and Codes and placed them in LEAA 2010. For example, LEAA 2010, art 1358 abrogated 21 laws, including 
Law No.40 for 1956 Concerning Commercial Brand Law and its amendments, Law No. 2 for 1962 
Concerning Commercial Data, Law No. 38 for 1968 Concerning Imports and Exports, Law No. 110 for 1975 
Concerning State-Owned Companies, Law No.9 for 1992 Concerning Economic Activities, Law No.6 for 
1972 Concerning Commercial Agencies and Law No. 4 for 1974 Concerning Chambers of Commerce.  
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the law completely ignores the link between concentrated ownership structures and weak 
protection of minority shareholders and fails to sufficiently clarify the duties of the board 
of directors, thus leaving shareholders exposed to exploitation by the management.   
Thirdly, although there are obvious differences between the Libyan and UK 
business environment (e.g. different legal origins and different ownership structures, 
namely dispersed ownership in the UK and concentrated ownership in Libya), both 
systems share similar corporate aspects, which suggests there may be some similarity to be 
found in the types of provisions that apply to minority shareholders protection. Specifically, 
both systems adopt the “shareholder primacy” theory, in which shareholders are provided 
with stronger powers at the expense of the board of directors.43 Also both countries have 
the same limited Liability companies   (in Libya “JSCs” and in the UK “limited Liability 
companies by shares”).44 In addition, the Libyan system follows the UK system in regard 
to making a distinction between public and private companies.45 Therefore, aspects of UK 
company law can be taken as a model for improving the Libyan Company Act in relation 
to minority shareholders protection. 
Fourthly, the relationship between the UK and State of Libya, in terms of the 
corporate environment, started a long time ago. According to Bait El Mal, the general 
structure of corporate managements and auditing and accounting systems in Libya comes 
from the UK.46 Furthermore, the legal forms of business organisation in use in both the UK 
and Libya are similar. These can be arranged into four major categories: Sole trader, 
Partnership, Companies and Public Companies. This is because after World War II, the UK 
and French shared control over Libya until the Libyan Government declared Libya’s 
                                                 
43 The most important debates regarding the primacy theories (shareholders primacy and board of directors’ 
primacy theories) are presented in a series of articles between Bebchuk and Bainbridge. See: Lucian 
Bebchuk, 'The Case for Increasing Shareholders Power' (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 833 and 
Bainbridge’s response in Stephen M. Bainbridge, 'Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance' (2003) 97 Northwestern University Law Review 547 to which Bebchuk in turn responded in 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, 'Letting Shareholders Set the Rules' (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1784. 
44 See (2.1.1) 53-4. 
45 See (2.1.1) 54-5. 
46 M. Bait El-Mal, C.  Smith and M.  Taylor, 'The Development of Accounting in Libya' (1973) 8 The 
International Journal of Accounting, Education and Research 83. 
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independence in 1951. Accordingly, there is a historical link between these two countries, 
which may be useful in terms of drawing ideas of best practice from UK law and applying 
them to Libya.      
Finally, the UK, unlike Libya and other undeveloped countries, has numerous 
publications and reference books in the field of companies generally and in the minority 
shareholders protection particularly. These will prove a very useful source of information 
within this study.  
The approach adopted in the study (the combination of the self-enforcing model 
and the lessons taken from the UK long experience in the minority shareholders protection) 
is aligned with the literature on law transplantation theory in corporate law. Many scholars 
have written about the concept of legal transplants, especially in the area of corporate 
law. The majority47 adopt the view that the legal transplantation in corporate law differs 
significantly across countries due to the differences in economic, cultural, social, political 
and legal systems predominant in a country. As a result, the differences between societies 
must be taken into account in these matters since any law that is not suited to the needs of 
the recipient is unlikely to be effective.48 In this regard Black and Kraakman state that: 
                                                 
47 It should be noted that there is a trend towards the view that laws can be simply transferred and history 
suggests that transferred laws exist in many countries. Watson argues that law is independent since there is no 
relationship between it and society and as such laws are transferable and there is no need to undertake a 
systemic analysis. See Alan  Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University of 
Georgia Press 1993) 111. See also, Alan Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture' [1983] 
131 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1121. However, this view has been criticized by many scholars, 
see for example, Matteo   Solinas, Legal Evolution and Hybridization: The Law of Shares Transfer in 
England (Intersentia 2014) 14-6; Gail Edwards, 'Legal Transplants and Economics: the World Bank and 
Third World Economies in the 1980s-A Case Study of Jamaica, the Republic of Kenya and the Philippines' 
(2007) 9 European Journal of Law Reform  243.   
48 I believe that there should be a distinction between two types of laws: laws that aim to deliver fairness 
between two parties (e.g. shareholders) and other laws that provides economic efficiency. In the former 
instance, the transplantation should be easy and there is no need to take into account the differences or the 
similarities between the countries. However, in the latter instance, when the goal of the law is to provide 
economic efficiency and not to deliver fairness, there is a need to look at whether the transplanted law can 
obtain economic efficiency or not. To illustrate this: in regard to addressing issues that relate to justice, equity 
or fairness such as the appropriateness of a concept of legitimate expectation for inclusion in the Libyan legal 
system, we should ignore the specificities of the environment (that we would take into account when 
considering a law has pure economic goals e.g. takeover) but rather focus on how fairness and justice can be 
maximized within this system.  However, to examine to what extent the  law that has pure economic goal e.g. 
whether the takeover legal system in the UK is appropriate for Libya, we should look at the position of the 
markets in the these countries. No doubt we will draw a conclusion that the takeover legal system in the UK 
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Emerging economies cannot simply copy the corporate laws of 
developed economies. These laws depend upon highly evolved market, 
legal and governmental institutions and cultural norms that often do not 
exist in emerging economies. Developed country corporate laws also 
reflect the idiosyncratic history of their country of origin. They are not 
necessarily efficient at home, let alone when transplanted to foreign soil. 
Moreover, in many emerging markets, corporate law must serve a 
second central goal that is less pressing in mature market economies: 
fostering public confidence in capitalism and in private ownership of 
large business enterprises.49 
In the same context, Black and Kraakman argue that ‘corporate law must be 
designed substantially from scratch to work within the infrastructure available in an 
emerging market’. 50  Similarly, Pistor and Xu claim that solutions that may work 
reasonably well in developed market economies with a long history of commercial law 
development may not work as well in transition economies because ‘transition economies 
face conditions that render enforcement by both courts and regulators ineffective’. 51  
Further, Gail Edwards argues that transferring laws between systems may not be successful 
when both systems do not share similar political or social environments. 52  Freund claims 
that ‘any attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its original country 
entails a risk of rejection [...] its use requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law but 
also of its social and above all the political, contexts’. 53 Further, many scholars (e.g. 
Frankel54 and Smith55) argue that legal transplants that are not consistent with local culture 
                                                                                                                                                    
is not appropriate for Libya since the market in the UK is a takeover market, whereas the market in Libya is 
not.  Therefore, the problems encountered in the two systems, in this specific case, are different and cannot 
be addressed by a single system of law.     
49 Black and Kraakman,  (n 36) 1913.  Black and Kraakman continue by stating that  
the law that works for a developed economy, when transplanted to an emerging economy, 
will not achieve a sensible balance among company managers' need for flexibility to meet 
rapidly changing business conditions, companies' need for low-transaction-cost access to 
capital markets, large investors' need to monitor what managers do with the investors' 
money, and small investors' need for protection against self-dealing by managers and large 
investors. The defects in the law will increase the cost of capital and reduce its availability. 
(ibid 1914). 
50 ibid 1913. 
51 Katharina  Pistor and Cheng-Gang  Xu, 'Beyond Law Enforcement: Governing Financial Markets in China 
and Russia' in J Kornai, B Rothstein and S Rose-Ackerman (eds), Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist 
Transition (Political Evolution and Institutional Change, 2004) 167. They identify two key circumstances 
that undermine law enforcement:  the level of incomplete law, and the absence of reliable information.   
52 Edwards,  (n 47). 
53 Otto Kahn-Freund, 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' 37 The Modern Law Review 1, 33. 
54Tamar Frankel, ' A Recipe for Effecting Institutional Changes to Achieve Privatization' (1995) 13 Boston 
University International Law Journal 295. 
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will fail.56 This is because, as Solinas claims, ‘law is itself a form of culture’.57 Thus any 
attempts to import a law must take into account the special environment of the recipient 
country. 
 Before starting to discuss the issues of the study, it is worth indicating that 
examining such an  area is made more difficult by a lack of both English and Arabic 
resources on Libyan corporate governance. Additionally, the poor state of Libya’s 
statistical system generally 58  results in serious deficiencies that affect the ability to 
comprehensively analyse the issues covered in the study.  
To structure this study, it is necessary to provide an overview of the general 
framework of corporate governance in Libya, examine the country’s current position as an 
economy in the early stages of transformation and analyse the potential impact of this 
transformation on corporate governance (Chapter. 1). Following this, in Chapter 2, I locate 
the dimensions of the conflict of interest problem between the minority and majority 
shareholders in Libya through analysing literature of corporate governance with regard to 
the minority-majority shareholder problem and applying it to the case of Libya. After that, 
in Chapter 3, I examine the efficacy of the current mechanism available in Libyan law (a 
liability action) as a solution for dealing with the conflict of interests between the minority 
shareholders and the majority shareholders in Libyan companies. Here, I conclude that the 
                                                                                                                                                    
55 James F Smith, 'Confronting Differences in the United States and Mexican Legal Systems in the Era of 
NAFTA' (1993) 1 U.S.-Mexico Law Journal 85. 
56  For a greater literature review in this matter see  Curtis J Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, Law & 
Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and Economic Development around the 
World (University of Chicago Press, 2008), 208. 
57 Solinas (n 47) 17. 
58 According to the 2006 IMF Report, Libya is in need of establishing a strong and reliable statistical system. 
To do so, the report suggests the following reforms:  
(i) establishing a National Statistical Council to ensure coordination among data-producing 
agencies, discuss and approve the national statistical work program, and monitor progress in 
building a high quality statistical system; (ii) creating a National Statistical Agency with the 
authority to produce and disseminate official statistics and coordinate the national statistical 
work program; (iii) increasing development and training; and (iv) participating in the Fund’s 
General Data Dissemination Standards (GDDS), and using the GDDS as a framework for  
statistical development.  
See International Monetary Fund-IMF,'The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Selected Issue— 
Medium-Term Economic Reform Strategy, and Statistical Appendix' (IMF Country Report No. 06/137, 
International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund 2006) 15.      
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current approach is not appropriate for the Libyan Law for several reasons that relate to 
either the efficiency of the approach itself or its application in Libya (for instance, I argue 
that the Libyan courts are ineffective and inefficient at providing predictable and timely 
judgments). Accordingly, I argue that there is a strong need to adopt an alternative solution. 
Thus in Chapter 4, after examining other possible solutions (e.g. a prohibition strategy), I 
propose the self-enforcing model as the most appropriate solution for reasons that relate to, 
for example, capital market and the efficiency of the market. However, this is not the end 
of the story; adopting such a model will inevitably lead to some potential risks (such as the 
risk that the minority shareholders may abuse their rights), which will require the 
formulation and adoption of new and specific strategies of corporate governance that are 
appropriate to the Libyan case (Chapter. 5). 
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Chapter 1: The General Framework of Corporate 
Governance in Libya’s ‘Transition Economy’ 
Introduction 
The term ‘transition economy’ relates to the period in which a country’s economy 
transitions from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.  This process has 
already taken place in a large number of countries. For example, in Asia the transformation 
process began in the late 1970s and in Europe in the late 1980s. 1 However, in Libya this 
process only began in the early 2000s, the reasons for which I will return to later. Prior to 
Libya’s economy entering the transition stage, corporate governance, from 1970s to the 
end of 1990s, was a marginal issue due to the fact that under the centrally planned 
economy most large equities were owned by the State.2 In this context, as János Kornai 
claims, enterprises under central planning were not concerned with raising external finance 
and, hence, the concepts of financial discipline or accountability were absent. 3 In such a 
system, instead of the management being required to perform according to corporate 
governance best practice to attract more investment, the state assumes the role of 
monitoring the management to ensure that the managers of socialist enterprises act 
according to the targets set by the central plan.4 Thus, in a case like Libya where the 
                                                 
1 For more information, see  Marie Lavigne, The Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to 
Market Economy (2nd edn, Macmillan London 1999); Joachim Ahrens, ‘Governance in the Process of 
Economic Transformation’ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-development/37791185.pdf> accessed 11-
11-2013, 3. 
2  Andreas Heinrich, Aleksandra Lis and Heiko Pleines, ‘Factors Influencing Corporate Governance in 
Postsocialist Companies: An Analytical Framework’ William Davidson Institute Working Paper No 896, 
October 2007 <http://papers.ssrn.com/Sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1087348> accessed 09/11/2013, 3; 
Robert W. McGee, ‘Corporate Governance in Transition Economies’ in Robert W. McGee (ed), Corporate 
Governance in Transition Economies (Springer 2008) 3. 
3  János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton University Press 
1992) 69. 
4 Ibid See also,  Vito Tanzi, ‘Fiscal Policy and the Economic Restructuring of Economies in Transition’ IMF 
Working Paper No 93/22 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=883452> accessed 13-11-
2013. 
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government owned 88% of national investments between 1970 to1999,5  strong corporate 
governance was not relevant to the state.  
There are several possible points of departure for an analysis of corporate 
governance in Libya’s transition economies that the study will briefly mention prior to 
addressing the main focus of the chapter: corporate governance in Libya. First, many 
researchers have attempted to analyse corporate governance mechanisms in transition 
economies.6  However, few of them have considered the changes in corporate governance 
that happen in such countries during a cycle transformation (transforming from one stage 
to another),7 which is our approach in the chapter. Second, in Libya (as in any developing 
country), small unlisted companies make up the overwhelming majority of companies and 
shares of large family-owned, state-owned and/or foreign-owned companies are not 
commonly traded locally.8 Third, Libya only moved from a planned economy to a free 
market economy in 2000 and from socialism to capitalism in 2011, following the recent 
revolution. These recent changes are suggestive of why corporate governance has been 
ignored for so long and so why Libya is still in the very early stage of establishing 
effective corporate governance.  
                                                 
5  S Ganous, Libyan Revolution in 30 Years, Political, Economic and Social Transformations, 1969-1999 
(Dar Al Jamahiriya for Publication, Distribution and Advertising 1999) 57 (in Arabic) cited in Hesham F. 
Shernanna, ‘Critical Perspectives on the Efficient Implementation of Privatisation Policies in Libya: 
Assessing Financial, Economic, Legal, Administrative and Social Requirements’ (Durham University 2013) 
86. 
6 See e.g. Bavi Dharwadkar, Gerald George and Pamela Brandes, ‘Privatization in Emerging Economies: An 
Agency Theory Perspective’ (2000) 25 Academy of Management Review 650;  K Hung Chan, Kenny Z Lin 
and Fang Zhang, ‘On the Association between Changes in Corporate Ownership and Changes in Auditor 
Quality in a Transitional Economy’ (2007) 6 Journal of International Accounting Research 19. 
7  Some studies indicate that different forms of corporate governance emerge at different stages of the 
transformation from centrally planned to market-based systems in transition economies See e.g. John 
McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order’ (2000) 98 Michigan 
Law Review 2421;  Lawrence P King, The basic features of postcommunist capitalism in Eastern Europe: 
firms in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (Greenwood Publishing Group 2001); Son A.  Le, Mark 
J.  Kroll and Bruce A.  Walters, ‘ The Impact of Institutional Changes on Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
in Transition Economies’ (2003) 28 The Academy of Management Review 275;  Mike W Peng, ‘Institutional 
Transitions and Strategic Choices’ (2003) 28 Academy of Management Review 275; Son A. Le, Mark J. 
Kroll and Bruce A. Walters, ‘Stages of Corporate Governance in Transition Economies’ (2011) 28 Journal of 
Business Strategies 151. 
8  Charles Oman, Steven Fries and Willem Buiter, ‘Corporate Governance in Developing, Transition and 
Emerging-Market Economies’ OECD Development Centre Policy Brief No 23, 2004 <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/corporate-governance-in-developing-transition-and-emerging-market-
economies_604227826337> accessed 21-11-2013, 7. 
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The purpose of this chapter, as an introductory chapter that lays the foundation for 
the remainder of this thesis, is to provide an overview of the general framework of 
corporate governance in Libya and to examine its current position which, I argue, is still in 
the early stages of transformation. This can be achieved by examining the development of 
the Libyan economy and institutions of corporate governance in Libya (including formal 
constraints such as legal, regulatory, and judicial systems, and also informal constraints 
such as beliefs and norms, financial systems, and economic structures) and, further, by 
analysing how those institutions influence governance and its dynamics in Libya during the 
transition process.    
To that end, this chapter provides a general overview of the Libyan Legal system in 
(1.1). Since a few introductory words are necessary to understand the Libyan legal 
corporate system, the first sub-section outlines briefly the civil law system in Libya (1.1.1). 
Then in (1.1.2), I provide a general overview of Libyan Corporate Law and in (1.1.3), I 
summarise a general idea of Libyan corporate governance. 
In order to effectively analyse the current situation of Libyan corporate governance, 
I discuss the economic context in which laws of economy in Libya developed. In (1.2) I go 
on to provide a brief introduction to Libya’s economic transition. In order to do so, (1.2.1) 
discusses the pre-transaction economy in Libya and (1.2.2) analyses the steps already taken 
in Libya towards a market economy. This section provides the foundation for many of the 
arguments that follow as it explores the development of the Libyan economy and its 
current environment. 
Section (1.3) analyses the institutions of corporate governance in Libya within the 
context of the transformation process. In this section, I examine how those institutions 
influence governance and its dynamics in process of economic transition. In order to do so, 
first there is a need to understand briefly the stages (bureaucratic stage; relationships stage; 
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and free market stage) that any transition economy takes in order to achieve a market 
economy (1.3.1), following which I examine the institutions of corporate governance in 
Libya (1.3.2). 
1.1.  General overview of Libyan Legal system 
 In this section, the study outlines the legal system in Libya as a civil law country (1.1.1); it 
then provides an overview of corporate law in Libya (1.1.2) and finally, an overview of 
corporate governance in Libya (1.1.3). 
1.1.1.  Libya as a Civil Law country 
Before discussing the corporate governance system in Libya, a few introductory words are 
necessary to understand its legal corporate system. To begin with, it is important to note 
that Libya is a civil law country, and its civil law system, including corporate law, was 
inspired by the 1948 Egyptian Civil Code, which, in turn, is based on the French Civil 
Code.9 These laws transferred to the Libyan legal system Western commercial ideas and 
practices which were combined with existing principles of Islamic Law.10 In this regard, 
Gaman Badr states that: 
Libya naturally turned to its immediate neighbour, Egypt, with which it 
shares a common historical, cultural and religious background as well as a 
common frontier. Egyptian legislation was the source of not only the Libyan 
civil code but also of all the other codes promulgated by the Libyan 
Government: commercial, penal, and civil and commercial procedure.11 
                                                 
9 Mohamed Al badawi, Law of Economic Activities: General Principles and Rules vol 1 (3 edn, Al Maftoha 
University 2013) 32 (in Arabic). Al Badawi indicates that the French Commercial Code of 1807 was the 
historical source of the Egyptian Commercial Code which, in turn, was the historical source of the Libyan 
Commercial Code.  ibid. 
10 Waniss Otman and Erling Karlberg, The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International 
Repositioning (Springer 2007) 63. Interestingly, Libyan law is not based on Italian Law (except Criminal 
Law) although Libya was an Italian colony. I believe that this may be because the Italian colony began in the 
1910s and lasted until February 1947. As such, the Italians left Libya before the start of enacting laws in 
Libya which, as Gamal Badr noted, started in the 1950s. (see Gaman Moursi Badr, ‘The New Egyptian Civil 
Code and the Unification of the Laws of the Arab Countries’ (1956) 30 Tulane Law Review 299, 303).   
Further, after World War II, the UK and French shared control over Libya until the Libyan Government 
declared Libya’s independence in 1951. Accordingly, it is clear that the emergence of Libya’s modern legal 
system has been far more influenced  by France than Italy. This is because the emergence of legal system was 
accompanied by the presence of UK and France in Libya. 
11  ibid 303. 
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Since Libya is a civil law country, as in other civil law countries, there is a 
hierarchy of legislative texts. This system consists of the constitution at the top, followed 
by laws (including various codes), executive regulations (laeha),12 and, finally, executive 
and ministerial decisions.13 In such a system, judges must observe the legal authority 
enshrined in this hierarchy of legal rules and, in cases where there is a conflict between one 
or more of the legal rules, ensure that the rules of the lower level do not conflict with the 
rule of the higher level. For example, ministerial decisions must not conflict with laws or 
executive regulations (Laeha), and nothing must conflict with the constitution. 14 
Furthermore, judges in Libya have access to secondary sources of law.  In cases 
where there is an absence of applicable legal provisions of Civil statutes, judges can refer 
to sources of law that are mentioned in the first article of the Libyan Civil Code, these 
include Islamic principles, custom, principles of natural law and rules of equity. However, 
in commercial law, the secondary sources of law are different. When there is no applicable 
commercial statute, a judge must look at civil law statutes first for an applicable statute. 15 
If neither a commercial statute nor a civil law statute can be applied to the case, the judge 
can apply judicial precedents or fairness principles.16 
                                                 
12 An executive regulation (Laeha) is sometimes referred to as a secondary law (Le Reglement in French). 
This source of law is issued by an executive power such as a cabinet or a minister. It often details an existing 
law that has been issued by the Libyan Legislature (this type of Laeha known as Implementation Laeha). 
However, it can also create new rules that do not relate to existing laws (this is called an Independent Laeha).  
The policy behind the existence of Laeha derives from the fact that an executive power deals with people 
directly in a variety of areas. Hence it is more capable than a legislative power of responding to the needs of 
the people and enacting rules aligned with those needs.  Also, as some issues are characterized as technical 
complexity, an executive power is more capable than the legislative authority of regulating such issues 
because they require a great deal of expertise that may not be available to the parliament. For more details 
about the definition of Laeha and its types, see Hasan Kera, Entrance to Law (Al maaref 1969) 235-9 (in 
Arabic); Alkoni Aboda, Basics of Libyan Law: Theory of Law, vol 1 (Naser University 1993) 189-203 (in 
Arabic). 
13  Aboda (n 12) 68. 
14 For information about the structure of the Libyan court system and their function, see  Mahmud R. 
Mukhtar and others, Libya : A Guide to Commercial Law, Banking Law and Accounting (Philadelphia : 
GMB Publishing Ltd 2008)13-21. 
15 LEAA 2010, art 2. 
16 LEAA 2010, art 3. 
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1.1.2. General overview of Libyan Corporate Law   
The first Commercial Act in Libya was introduced in 1953 and replaced in 2010 by the 
Libyan Economic Activity Act (referred to hereafter as LEAA 2010). The Act sets down 
the three types of companies permitted in the State of Libya:17 ‘persons companies’,18 
‘funds companies’, 19  and ‘mixed companies’. 20  Persons companies are based on 
partnerships between people and are composed of General Partnerships (Tadamun 
Company)21 (arts. 51-76), Limited Partnerships  (Tawssiyah Bassita Company) 22 (arts. 77-
90), and Joint Ventures (Mohassa Company)23 (arts. 91-97). Funds companies, on the 
other hand, are based on capital and include joint stock companies (JSC) that are either 
private or state-owned companies (arts. 98-260). Mixed companies are a combination of 
the two and include Limited partnerships by shares (Tawssiyah beashom Company) 24 (arts. 
261-270) and Limited Liability Companies25 (arts. 271-291). LEAA 2010 explains all the 
details needed for establishing, registering, governing, managing, bankrupting and 
dissolving all these different types of companies. It also describes the sanctions established 
for any failure to fulfil these requirements.  
The most common form of company in Libya, and thus the focus of this research, is 
the JSC. LEAA 2010 art.98 defines a JSC as ‘a company in which the capital is divided 
                                                 
17 The forms of companies are covered in LEAA 2010 Book.1, Ch. 3 
18 Translated verbatim from the original Arabic: Sharekat Al ashkas ﺹﺎﺨﺷﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻛﺮﺷ 
19 Translated verbatim from the original Arabic: Sharekat Al amwal ﻝﺍﻮﻣﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻛﺮﺷ 
20 Translated verbatim from the original Arabic: Sharekat Al moktalata ﺔﻄﻠﺘﺨﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻛﺮﺸﻟﺍ 
21  A general partnership is established between two or more persons under a certain title to carry out 
commercial activities. It is a company in which all members will be responsible by solidarity and 
interdependence towards the company’s commitments and every agreement contradicting this will not be 
valid in facing the others (art 51 of LEAA 2010). 
22 A limited partnership has two kinds of partners: firstly, a partner who enjoys limited liability and will be 
responsible for the debts and obligations of the company within the limit of what they provided from shares.  
He must be banned from participating in the management of the company. The other type of partners is a 
worker    will be responsible by solidarity and interdependence to the company’s commitments. In other 
words, he is personally, severally and jointly liable for the debts and obligations of the company. (art 77 of 
LEAA 2010). 
23 A Joint Venture Company is an agreement entered into by two or more parties for the purpose of carrying 
out limited operations. Every partner in this company shares with the others a particular dividend as a 
condition of buying a particular share. (art 91 of LEAA 2010). 
24 Limited partnership by share is similar to the Limited partnership company but the capital of the company 
is divided between the partners as shares (art 261 of LEAA 2010). 
25 A Limited Liability Company is formed by two or more persons, but not more than 25 persons, each of 
which is liable only to the extent of his contribution to capital. (art 271 of LEAA). 
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into equal and transferable shares and in which the shareholders are liable for company 
debts only to the extent of the value of their shares’. LEAA 2010 (arts 101-118) explains 
the processes and procedures necessary for establishing a JSC. According to LEAA 2010 
art 99, a JSC can be established through one of the following mechanisms: (1) a decision 
made by the board of directors of a holding company; (2) an agreement between two or 
more JSCs; (3) an agreement between individuals or entities or both in which the portion 
of shares is determined by a resolution of the Cabinet; and (4) a decision issued by the a 
competent public authority in regard to state owned companies.  
The LEAA 2010 also stipulates that the capital of a JSC shall not be less than the 
amount determined by a resolution of the Cabinet26 which is currently LD 100,00027 in 
accordance with resolution No 186 of the Libyan Cabinet, 2012. 28 The founders of the 
company must be at least 10 persons, except in cases when a JSC is established by a board 
of directors’ decision of a holding company or another JSC.29 The procedure to establish a 
JSC can remain open for a maximum period of 30 days and subscription of shares 
normally takes place through one or more of the approved banks.30 However, if a JSCs 
capital exceeds LD 5 million, subscription of the original issue of corporate shares must 
take place through the Libyan Stock Market.31 To ensure the integrity of the founders, 
LEAA 2010 requires the founders to deposit at least 30% of the value of the subscribed 
shares at any Libyan bank.32 When the subscription operation has finished, the founder, 
within 20 days, must serve an announcement to the subscribers to attend the constituent 
meeting33 at which the board of directors and the internal auditors are elected.34 
                                                 
26 LEAA 2010, art 107. 
27 Approximately £45,000. 
28 See Libyan Cabinet Resolution No. 186 for 2012, s 1. 
29 ibid, s 3. 
30 LEAA 2010, art108.     
31 Libyan Cabinet Resolution No. 186 for 2012, s 4. 
32  LEAA 2010, art 108. 
33 ibid. 
34 LEAA 2010, art 109. 
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1.1.3.  Overview of Libyan corporate governance in JSCs  
In Libya, corporate governance rules are distributed across the strata of law described at 
the beginning of the chapter. Within the first category, there are two applicable Acts: 
LEAA No. 23/2010 and the Libyan Stock Market Act No. 10 /2010. In the second category 
are executive regulations (Laeha), which are issued either by the Cabinet of Libyan 
ministries or the Libyan Ministry of Economy. These include, amongst others, the 
Executive Regulation (Code) of corporate governance (known as the Regulation of 
Rational (or wise) management), Disclosure Executive Regulation, and so on. In the last 
category are executive decisions, such as Economic Minister Decision No. 103/2012 
Concerning Foreign Ownership of Libyan corporations, Economic Minister Decision No. 
86/2012 concerning corporate affairs, and so forth.  
  Here the study will provide some brief details concerning how corporate 
governance in Libya works within this stratified legal system. Particularly, it will provide a 
short description concerning the roles of both shareholders at general meetings (1.1.3.1) 
and the board of directors (1.1.3.2). 
1.1.3.1.  Shareholders and the general meeting of the JSC 35  
In a JSC, shareholders hold two types of meetings: 36 ordinary meetings, which must be 
held on a regular annual basis and should take place at least once a year within the first 
four months of the business organisation’s fiscal year,37 and extraordinary meetings that 
can be held at any time. 38  The board of directors can call a general meeting 39 and 
shareholders who hold 10% of the company’s capital have a right to call a meeting of 
shareholders.40 Furthermore, to provide more opportunities to shareholders to participate in 
                                                 
35 Provisions relating to the shareholders and their meetings are set down in Ch. 2, Branch. 2 of LEAA 2010 
(arts 153-171).   
36 LEAA 2010, art 153.  
37 LEAA 2010, art 163 (b). 
38 LEAA 2010, art 167. 
39 LEAA 2010, art 154.   
40 LEAA2010, art 155. 
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the company’s decision making processes, LEAA 2010 allows shareholders the right to 
represent others on their behalf in the general meeting.41    
  Within the context of general meetings, art 163 of LEAA 2010 requires of 
shareholders certain mandatory duties. The shareholders in general meetings are 
‘exclusively responsible’42 for the appointment of board members and an external auditor 
and determining their remuneration. They are also responsible for ratifying financial 
statements, ratifying the board’s declaration of dividends, reviewing and making decisions 
regarding all affairs concerning the company, looking at any issues that the board of 
directors may present, and discussing reports of the board of directors, the watchdog 
committee and/or the external auditors. In order for the resolutions of shareholders in 
ordinary general meetings to be valid, shareholders representing at least half of the 
company's shares are required to attend the meeting with a majority of the shareholders 
present voting in favour of the resolution.43 
 In extraordinary meetings, the shareholders are ‘exclusively responsible’ 44  for 
amendments to the constitution of the company, issuing bonds, hiring a liquidator for the 
company and determining their powers, and approving the board of directors action to sell 
more than a half of the company’s assets. 45 In addition, shareholders at extraordinary 
meeting are responsible for deciding capital increases, capital reductions or share 
buybacks. 46 The approval of shareholders at an extraordinary meeting is required for 
central transactions such as mergers, divisions, changes of form and voluntary dissolution 
of the company. 47 In order to take place, an extraordinary general meeting requires the 
presence of shareholders representing at least three-quarters of the company's capital and 
                                                 
41 LEAA  2010, art 158. 
42 LEAA 2010, art 163. 
43 LEAA 2010, art 164. 
44 LEAA  2010, art 167. 
45 LEAA  2010, art 167. 
46 LEAA 2010, arts151 and 141. 
47 See LEAA 2010, art 31 (dissolution), art 301(merger). For more information about the power of the 
shareholders in   an extraordinary general meeting, see  subsections (4.4.1.1), (4.4.2.1) and (4.4.3.1).   
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the enactment of shareholders resolution requires an approval of more than half of the 
attendees.48 
In terms of shareholders’ rights, it is worth mentioning that the Libyan Stock 
Market Act No. 10/2010 does not include any provision regarding the shareholders or even 
the board of directors (except in relation to disclosure issues). 49 However, the Libyan 
Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) 50  articulates the rights of shareholders in listed 
companies to ensure that such companies adhere to the best practices of shareholder 
protection.51 According to LCGC, the shareholders have certain core rights.  Specifically, 
they have the right to attend general meetings,52 the right to vote,53 the right to a share of 
the distributed profits,54and the right to a share of the company’s assets upon liquidation.55 
Further, shareholders have the right to participate in the company’s deliberations and vote 
on resolutions, the right to dispose of shares, the right to monitor the management and sue 
the board of directors, the right of inquiry and the right to request information that does not 
compromise the interests of the company and is consistent with the market system and the 
company’s implementing regulations. 56  It should be noted that although some of the 
previous rights are also set out in LEAA 2010 (e.g. the right to attend the general meetings 
and to vote (art. 154), the right to participate in decisions concerning fundamental 
corporate changes (art. 167),   and the right to sue (arts. 160-161)), most of the provisions 
                                                 
48 LEAA 2010, art 168. 
49 Libyan Stock Market Act No. 10/2010 includes 8 chapters that cover the following areas: Capital Market 
Authority (Ch.1, arts 8-15), Issuing Securities (Ch.2, arts 16-24), Company of Stock Market (Ch.3, arts 25-
31), Organisations Listed in the Market (Ch.4, arts 32-46), Investment Funds (Ch.5, arts 47-55), Settlement 
of Disputes (Ch.6, arts 57-61), Sanctions (Ch.7, arts 62-67), and General Provisions (Ch.8, arts 68-100).  
50 LCGC is an Exacutive Regulation (Laeha) issued by the Authority of the Stock Market. According to 
Libyan Stock Market Act, art 4 (10), the Authority of the Stock Market has the power to enact corporate 
governance rules for listed companies. 
51 Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) 2007, art 2 (a). The rules of LCGC 2007 are not mandatory 
and not applicable to non-listed corporations. See   LCGC 2007, art 2 (b). 
52 LCGC 2007, art 5. 
53 LCGC 2007, art 6. 
54 LCGC 2007, art 7. 
55 LCGC 2007, art 3. 
56 LCGC 2007, art 3. 
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set out in LCGC 2007 contain additional provisions and clauses concerning best practice 
that are not present in LEAA 2010.  
1.1.3.2. The Board of Directors 
In Libya, the board of directors is based on the unitary board model.57 It is responsible for 
managing the company in line with its interests58 through taking decision that achieve the 
company's purpose.59 The term of the board, as a default rule, is three years, although this 
is renewable for an unlimited number of times. 60 Additionally, though the LEAA 2010 
does not specify the size of a company’s board but leaves this decision to the shareholders, 
the LCGC 2007 recommends that the number of directors should be between three and 
eleven with a majority of non-executives. 61  Moreover, the law bans anyone (either 
personally or on behalf of another) from sitting on the board of more than three JSCs. 62    
Regarding the remuneration of the directors, art 183 of LEAA 2010 empowers the 
shareholders to monitor remuneration. The board must provide a report for the 
shareholders at least one week before the general meeting that must include: (1), a full 
statement of the board’s remuneration during the financial year and any salaries or any 
other compensation that have been given to the board. Similarly, the statement must 
include any remuneration that has been given to board members in their work as 
employees or executives in the company or for any services or consultations they provided. 
(2) A full statement of the board’s remuneration during the financial year in the form of 
                                                 
57 Some European states adopt a two –tier board structure. For example, in Germany, Netherlands and 
Denmark firms have a management board that runs the business and a supervisory board that appoints and 
supervises the management board. In France, a firm can choose between having a one tier or two tier board 
structure but most choose the one-tier board. See Stephen W. Mayson, Derek French and Christopher L. 
Ryan, Company Law (21th edn, Oxford University Press 2004) 458. 
58 See LEAA 2010, arts 172 and 182. According to LCGC 2007, the functions of the board of directors must 
include the adoption of a strategic direction and key objectives of the company, and oversee their 
implementation. The board must also set systems of internal control and supervision, establish a governance 
system, set clear and specific policies, standards and procedures of board membership, and put them into 
effect after approval by the general meeting. Finally, they must issue a written policy governing the 
relationship with stakeholders for their protection and preservation of their rights. (See art 10 of LCGC). 
59 LEAA 2010, art 172 (b). 
60 LEAA 2010, art 174 (a). 
61 LCGC 2007, art 12 (a) and (c). 
62 LEAA 2010, art 175. 
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cars, houses, etc. (3) A full statement of any remuneration or percentage of net profit that 
the board of directors suggests should be distributed to its members and a full statement of 
any remuneration that has been provided to current or former members such as salary or 
any remuneration. (4) A list of donations with a full statement of all donors.63 
In regard to the duties of the board directors, the LEAA 2010 limits its 
requirements on the directors to a single sentence.64 Art 182 entitled “duties of the board of 
directors” states that ‘a chairman and members of the board shall undertake their duties as 
stated by the constitution of the company and as required by legal rules of agency.’ 65 In a 
separate article, the LEAA 2010 does set down that the board of directors must not enter 
into conflict transactions that may occur in one of two circumstances.66  The first is when a 
director wants to independently enter into a transaction to which the company is a party. 
Here the general principle is to ensure that the director avoids becoming involved in any 
conflict with the company, unless he gains the shareholders’ approval. The second is when 
there is an interest in a particular transaction ‘for a director or his relatives or his agent or 
his principal 67 that is in conflict with the company’s interests. Here he must disclose the 
conflict to the board of directors of the company at a board meeting or a watchdog 
committee and also stop participating in the negotiation of the transaction.  The breach of 
this rule results in the director being held responsible for any losses resulting from the 
transaction. However, despite the fact that these two circumstances are accounted for, 
LEAA 2010 does not cover other significant areas that may also result in a conflict, such as 
when a director (or other senior management), as a result of his position, takes a business 
opportunity that by right is the reserve of the company.  
                                                 
63 LEAA 2010, art 183. 
64 In the UK, there is a full chapter which sets down the duties of the directors (See CA 2006 part. 10 Ch. 2 ss 
170-181). 
65 Provisions of agency are covered in Ch. 3 of the Libyan Civil Code (arts 699-717). For example, according 
to s 704 of the Civil Code, a wrongdoing director bears responsibility when a reasonable person would think 
that the conduct in question was wrong (this referred to as the Test of a Reasonable Person). Also, the agent 
must not take a personal interest while he is using the assets of his principal (Civil Code, s 706). 
66 LEAA 2010, art 181. 
67 ibid. 
30 
 
1.2. The Libyan transition economy  
As corporate law development cannot be studied without reference to the economic and 
political ideas that have influenced it, here the study provides a brief introduction to the 
economic development of Libya in order to effectively analyse the current situation of 
Libyan corporate governance. To that end, this section discusses the pre-transition 
economy in Libya (1.2.1) and analyses what steps Libya has taken towards achieving a 
sophisticated market economy (1.2.2).   
1.2.1. Pre-transition economy in Libya (1970s-1990s)  
Libya became an independent country on 24 December 1951. During the period from 
independence to the establishment of the Qaddafi’s regime in 1969, the Libyan economic 
system was mostly capitalist. 68    As such, private ownership existed with minimum 
governmental intervention. In the early of 1970s, a new political, administrative and 
legislative system was introduced that established a socialist state. This resulted in 
nationalizing the foreign companies that were operating in Libya, 69  restructuring the 
economy with regard to the new socialist principles through establishing public-owned 
companies and eliminating private and foreign companies. 70  The 2006 International 
Monetary Fund Report describes the situation in the following terms: ‘in the early 1970s, 
Libya opted for a command economy with essentially state-driven investment, a strictly 
                                                 
68 It should be noted that Libyan economic development was extremely bleak until 1959 when it first 
discovered oil, and economic prospects changed dramatically.  See M. Bait El-Mal, C.  Smith and M.  
Taylor, ‘The Development of Accounting in Libya’ (1973) 8 The International Journal of Accounting, 
Education and Research 83, 84. 
69 A numbers of laws were enacted in this regard. For example, Law No 80/1970 Concerning Nationalizing 
Insurance Companies and Law No15/ 1970 Concerning Nationalizing the foreign portion of Banks Operating 
in Libya. By these laws and others, the government nationalized Roma Bank (after nationalisation: AL Oma 
Bank), Barclays Bank (Al jomhoria Bank) and Napoli Bank (Al Estekllal Bank). 
70 For example, see Law No 86/ 1975 Concerning Organising the Automobile Trade (distribution and spare 
parts, restricted to six state-owned companies, later merged into just two companies); Law No 4 of 1978 
Concerning Specifying Certain Provisions for Real Estate Ownership (according to this law, no one can own 
more than one property for the purpose of investment); Law No 31 of 1970, Concerning Insurance 
Companies (the aim of this law was to keep insurance companies under state control);  Law No.87/1975 
Concerning Regulating Commercial Agencies (the aim of the law was to limit Commercial agencies within 
state-owned companies); Cabinet Resolution No 11/1979 (which limited the import of consumer goods to 
public companies). Cabinet Resolution No 125/1979 Concerning National Market Company (limited 
providing Libyans for goods retail).   
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controlled external trade, widespread price controls and subsidies, and an almost 
nonexistent private sector’.71 According to Vandewalle, the state ownership structure in 
Libya started in the early 1970s, gained momentum in the mid-1970s and reached its peak 
in the 1980s, 72 by which time businesses such as manufacturing, foreign and domestic 
retail and banking and insurance services were all directly owned by the State. 73    
However, during the late 1980s, the Libyan economy saw various important 
economic developments. Perhaps the most significant of these developments occurred 
when Libya adopted the first privatisation programme and a policy of openness. The new 
privatisation policy was adopted by the Resolution of the Libyan Cabinet No. 447/1987 
concerning the transfer of ownership of government. The policy was the first step in the 
Libyan government’s privatisation programme, which consisted of transferring the 
ownership of public sector companies from the state to employees working for those 
companies, with the intention of enlarging the companies’ ownership base. From the 
perspective of the state, the goal of this measure was to reduce public expenditure by 
promoting private investor initiatives in various sectors. Economic liberalization was 
further encouraged in 1988 by the issuing of law No 8 /1988 which allowed private 
business to operate in the retail trade and small-scale industries.  
During the period of the planned economy of the 1970s and early 1980s, the Libyan 
government focused on diversifying productivity across the industrial sector. This resulted 
in an increase in the numbers of industrial enterprises74 which, by the end of the 1980s 
                                                 
71 International Monetary Fund-IMF, The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Selected Issue— 
Medium-Term Economic Reform Strategy, and Statistical Appendix (IMF Country Report No 06/137, 2006) 
3. 
72 For example, in this period, the Libyan legislature issued Law No 8/1983 Concerning Commercial Actions 
that prohibited any individuals from entering into commercial actions and Brokerage actions; during this 
period the Government issued some cabinet regulations to dominate and control the distribution of clothes, 
cloth, shoes, hardware and building materials (28/3/1981), meat trades (30/4/1981) and grocery businesses 
(31/8/1981).  
73  Dirk J. Vandewalle, Libya since Independence: Oil and State-Building  (Cornell University Press 1998) 
84ff. 
74  Assonosy AL Besecry, Documents in the Libyan Economy: Evaluating the Libyan Economy  (1973-2007)  
(Maktabet ALwahba 2008) 125 (in Arabic).  
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suffered substantial losses as a result of, amongst other things, the monopoly policy 
employed by the government, underperformance of the management of stated owned 
companies and irrational changes of corporate policies that resulted from haphazard 
changes in the management.75 As a result, since the early 1990s, all economic policies 
adopted by the government have attempted to address these issues.76  
During the 1990s the Libyan state began to adopt new macro-economic reforms 
that provided greater liberalization of economic activities to help the country reduce the 
pressure on the government’s general budget, which was suffering from a combination of 
losses by state-owned companies and the global decline in oil prices.77 Consequently, as 
Alqadhafi notes, ‘[s]ome kind of limited economic openness took place during the period 
from 1990-1999, as the private activities were allowed to participate in certain fields such 
as trade and some light industries and fishing, etc’. 78  In the early 1990s the Libyan 
Legislature passed a number of new laws aimed at improving economic development. For 
example, Privatisation Law No 2/ 1992 Concerning Economic Activities, which permits 
the sale of state property to non-governmental Libyan interests. Also, Law No 9/1992, 
which encourages and regulates private sector activities in the national economy, and 
opens the door to the privatisation of a number of public sector enterprises. Further, 
Banking Law No. 1/1993 concerning banks and credit finance, which replaced the banking 
law of 1963, permits the establishment of commercial banks owned by the private sector. It 
also permits foreign banks to establish their representative agencies and offices in Libya 
and allows foreigners to acquire and maintain bank accounts in a foreign currency. 
                                                 
75 For more details about these factors see  ibid 125-8. 
76 In fact, not only Libya adopted a reform policy during the period of 1990s, but also all Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) countries - in particular Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Saudi Arabia began similar reform 
programmes aimed at achieving the stabilisation of their economies. See  Susan Creane and others, ‘Financial 
Sector Development in the Middle East and North Africa’ IMF Working Paper, WP/04/201 
<http://faculty.som.yale.edu/mushfiqmobarak/papers/financial%20sector%20development.pdf> accessed 28-
08-2014. 
77 The price of a barrel of oil was $36 in 1980; it declined to $12.5 in 1998. See   Yones Al Barakthy, The 
Effect of Financial and Commercial Policies in the Performance of Libyan Economy (Jamia  Kanat Al Swis 
2006) 7 (in Arabic).   
78  Saif-Aleslam M.  Alqadhafi, Libya and the XXI Century (Editar Spa 2002) 22. 
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The second stage of economic reform started in the late 1990s after UN sanctions79 
were imposed. These reforms were aimed at decentralizing the Libyan economy by 
minimising the size and role of the public sector and giving the private sector a leading role 
in a market-based economy.  In this period, Law 5/ 1997 Concerning Foreign Capital 
Investment, provided the Libyan Central Bank with the authority to issue licenses to 
foreign banks and free the interest rates on deposits, and this is maintained in Libyan 
Banking Law No. 1/2005. This policy led to the re-structuring of commercial banks owned 
by the government and transformed them into corporate organisations.     
The changes that occurred in 1990s can be attributed to two main reasons: firstly, 
the Libyan economy declined due to the decrease in oil prices and the enforcing of 
international sanctions by the UN. 80  The 2006 IMF report states that ‘[e]conomic 
conditions started [in Libya] to deteriorate in the mid-1980s with the fall in world oil 
prices, and worsened in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions.’ 81 The decline of 
the oil price resulted in cash flow problems and had negative consequences for the Libyan 
economy (e.g. the decline in total exports and the currency of Libya). 82  Second, the poor 
performance of publicly owned companies, resulting from socialist policies, created 
general apathy toward state-owned assets because of a general lack of monitoring by the 
state.83 This situation forced Libya to relax controls on the non-state sector.  
 The dominance of the public sector in the Libyan economy over such a prolonged 
period resulted in a number of negative consequences, such as market deterioration and a 
                                                 
79 In1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution no.731 and 748 which imposed a ban on civil 
aviation. In1993, the UN Security Council tightened the sanctions against Libya with Resolution no.883.  
80 IMF, 'The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Selected Issue— Medium-Term Economic Reform 
Strategy, and Statistical Appendix' (n 71) 5; Besecry (n 74) 136. 
81 IMF, 'The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Selected Issue— Medium-Term Economic Reform 
Strategy, and Statistical Appendix' (n 71) 8. At the start of the 1980s Libya faced economic problems 
resulting from the reduction in oil prices and the fact that the US stopped importing oil from Libya which had 
previously constituted 40% of Libyan oil exports.  See  Salah Abidah, ‘The Libyan Economy: Historical 
Perspective’ (2005) 3 Journal of Economy and Trade 23 (in Arabic). 
82  N  Baryun, ‘The Impact of The Main Factors on the Value of Libyan Currency’ (Conference of the 
Exchange of the Libyan Currency, Benghazi, Libya, 1993) (in Arabic). 
83  See (2.3.2.2.) 83. 
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decrease in its growth generally. This, in turn, contributed to the lowering of standards of 
living for individuals, the weakening of total economic conditions and the increase of 
external threats to the economy. 84  Further, the public budget, which relied substantially 
on oil revenues, was a key financier of most economic activities in Libya which resulted in 
the central employer of labour force becoming the public sector. Additionally, there was 
little correlation between the value of the massive state investment and companies’ returns. 
The public sector struggled to achieve the minimum objectives of investment since it 
suffered too many substantial losses.85 To explore this slightly further: Futaisi suggests that 
public sector enterprises suffer as a result of state ownership in three significant ways: 86(1) 
public sector enterprises depended mainly on public resources to fund investments, causing 
inflation in asset size and inefficiency in investment; (2) weakness in marketing 
capabilities of most public companies lead to the accumulation of commodity stocks and 
lack of liquidity; (3) managerial issues result from the dominance of the public sector, such 
as  poor  management and low levels of training of company employees. This can result in 
such negative consequences as increased costs, low profits, a lack of competitiveness, an 
inability to renew assets, and weak capacity and productivity.  
In addition, the performance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) was below the 
desired level. According to the 1999 study by the Ministry of Planning and Finance in 
regard to the value, performance and productivity of SOEs, there was a 50% loss of capital 
in SOEs in engineering and metal industries, an 89% loss of capital in the food industry 
made by SOEs, and a 100% loss of capital in SOEs in the industry of construction 
                                                 
84  Michael E.  Porter and Daniel  Yergin, ‘ National Economic Strategy: An Assessment of the 
Competitiveness of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ General Planning Council of Libya,Tripoli 2006 
<http://www.isc.hbs.edu/pdf/2006-0127_Libya_NES_report.pdf> accessed 9/12/2012.11-2; IMF, ‘The 
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85 A Tapoli, ‘The Transition from Public Sector to Private Sector and the Productive Efficiency’ (Conference 
of Privatization in the Libyan economy, organised by Garyounis University on 19th and 20th of June 2004, 
Benghazi, Libya) (in Arabic) cited in Shernanna (n 5) 2. 
86  M.   Futaisi, ‘Privatization and International Conditionality ’ ( The Annual Cultural Season, organised by 
International Centre for Studies and Research on 10th October 2005, Tripoli, Libya)cited in  Shernanna (n 5) 
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materials.87 Since SOEs dramatically failed to achieve satisfactory results and failed to 
contribute to the process of economic and social development, there was a need to move 
toward a market economy by enhancing the private sector and adopting an economic 
reform policy; as mentioned, this process began in the 2000s.   
1.2.2. The move towards a market economy   
Following twenty years of political chaos88 and nearly three decades of economic central 
planning control, the move towards a market economy in Libya began in the early 2000s 
with the adoption of an economic reform programme and the launch of privatisation. 
Having failed to effectively instigate and regulate the privatisation programme of the late 
1980s and 1990s,89 the government recognised the need to establish an independent and 
autonomous privatization board. As a result, in 2000, the first organisation for supporting 
the privatization programme was established by Decision No. 198/ 2000 under the name of 
the General Board of Ownership Transfer (GBOT). 90  The board was a sovereign, 
independent state body that occupied a position similar to that of other ministries, which 
put it under the direct supervision of the Libyan Legislature. In 2003,91 the first Laeha in 
relation to the privatisation programme (No. 31 of 2003) was issued which included the 
responsibilities of the GBOT. According to this resolution, listed among the duties of the 
GBOT, is the responsibility to perform initial studies into companies targeted for 
privatization, list the company’s surplus assets, estimate their value according to normal 
                                                 
87  General People’s Committee for Planning and Finance, 'Observations on the Economic Reality and 
Economic Policies ' (General People's Committee of Planning and Finance, Tripoli, 1999) (in Arabic). 
88 The US, in 1982, declared an embargo of the Libyan economy that was extended in 1986. In June 1986 the 
US government banned exports to third nations of goods and technology destined for use in the Libyan oil 
industry. In the 1990s the disagreement between Libya and the US increased after Pan Am flight 103 
exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland. In April 1992, Resolution no.731 and 748 were adopted by the UN 
Security Council; these imposed a ban on civil aviation, a worldwide embargo on arms purchases and a 
reduction in Libyan diplomatic missions abroad. These sanctions were tightened in November 1993, with the 
adoption of Resolution no.883.  For more information about this, see Luis Martinez, The Libyan Paradox (C. 
Hurst and Co 2007) 1-39. 
89 See (2.1.2) 53ff. 
90 The name of the General Board of Ownership Transfer was changed by Decision No. 364/2012 to the 
Public Institution for Investment and Privatization (PIIP). 
91 In June of 2003, Gadhafi admitted that the country’s public sector had failed and should be eliminated, and 
called for the privatization of the country’s oil sector.  See  Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 184. 
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financial practices, and present these findings to the government.  The GBOT is also tasked 
with following up on the consequence of privatisation in the target companies, and for 
arranging for payment for privatization to be made to a special account opened for that 
purpose. In the same year, the government issued Resolution No. 92 of 2003, amended by 
Resolution No. 64 of 2004. This resolution established the Higher Committee for 
Administrating the Programme of Transformation of Property and detailed its 
responsibilities, which include implementing the privatisation strategy and determining 
which SOEs should be privatized.  The last piece of legislation is Laeha No. 118 of 2007, 
which provides comprehensive provisions concerning the evaluation of the target 
companies and the methods of transferring ownership.   
In 2004, in a step to stimulate the private sector and make the business environment 
more attractive to investors, the Libyan government declared its aim to transfer ownership 
of 360 enterprises to the private sector in just 4 years.92 The duration of the programme 
was extended under Cabinet Resolution No 99/ 2005, until 2015, and data available in the 
report of the Privatisation Agency (Public Institution for Investment and Privatization-
PIIP) indicates that, as of 2012, only 115 companies have been privatised through various 
methods.93   
In order to provide funding for economic activities, the state realised that reform of 
the banking sector was essential in order to increase the role of the private sector, shift the 
economic burden off the state and diversify sources of income in the Libyan economy.94 
Consequently, in 2002 the Central Bank of Libya adopted a new monetary policy to 
liberalise and reform the banking sector. The most important objective of this policy was to 
encourage the entry of foreign banks into Libya.95 The government started to privatise 
                                                 
92 See  Public Institution for Investment and Privatization-PIIP, Report of Public Institution of Investment  
and Privatisation (2012) (PIIP, 2012)  2 (in Arabic). 
93  ibid. 
94  Libyan Central Bank-LCB, Executive Position for Monetary and Banking Policy During the Period 2002 - 
2010 (Central Bank of Libya, Tripoli, 2010) (in Arabic). 
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these banks in 2007 when the government sold 19% of shares in Sahara Bank to BNP 
Paribas and delegated management rights to the foreign bank. Further, the government 
allowed BNP Paribas to buy additional shares of up to 51% within 5 years. 96 In 2008, the 
government sold the Wahda Bank to the Arab Bank of Jorden. In 2010, the Central Bank 
of Libya offered 15% of shares of both the Gumhouria Bank and the National Commercial 
Bank on the Libyan stock market.97 In the context of the policy of financial reform, it is 
worth mentioning that recently Islamic banking is allowed by Law No. 46 of 2012 
Concerning Banks and Islamic Banking, which amended the Law No. 1 of 2005 
Concerning Banks. 
Within the context of the transition from socialist oriented policies toward a free-
market economy,98 it was necessary to take appropriate measures to reform the financial 
sector by establishing a stock market. Accordingly, in 2006 the Libyan Stock Market was 
established by Cabinet Resolution No.134/ 2006 in the form of a joint stock company and 
was controlled by the Ministry of Economy until 2007. However, in July 2008 control of 
the Libyan stock market passed to the Social Economic Development Fund which includes 
about 47 companies from various sectors of the Libyan Economy. The market is regulated 
by several laws including: (1) Law No.11 of 2010 Concerning the Libyan Stock Market, 
which sets down several provisions relating to the management of the Market, the issuance 
process of securities, the activity of the Market and its entities, investment funds and the 
settlement of disputes; (2) Laeha of Trading Operations which sets forth shares trade; (3) 
Laeha of Listing and Disclosure that details provisions relating to conditions of listing and 
                                                 
96 International Monetary Fund-IMF, Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: 2008 Article IV 
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the Executive Director for the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (IMF Country Report No 08/302, 
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delisting, national and foreign securities in the Market and disclosure provisions; (4) Laeha 
of Investment Funds;  (5) Laeha of Shares; (6) Laeha of Non-Resident Investors; and (7) 
Laeha of Corporate governance. 
In short, following the change from capitalism to socialism in 1969, which resulted 
in a planned economy until the late 1990s, the government took control of both the 
production and services sectors. However, in the early of 2000s, there was a marked trend 
towards a free market policy that represented a move towards a new corporate system in 
Libya and a desire to rectify the accumulated economic problems and difficulties that 
occurred as a result of the socialist era. During this time the state adopted various 
economic reform measures (e.g. restructuring of banking rules, a privatisation programme, 
and establishing a stock market) which have had a profound effect on corporate 
governance in Libya, as discussed below. 
1.3. Institutions of corporate governance in Libya’s transition economy 
Having established in the previous section that Libya is moving toward a free market 
economy, this section examines the institutions of corporate governance in Libya and 
analyses the extent to which those institutions influence governance and the dynamics of 
governance in the transition process in Libya. In order to explicate this, there is a need to 
understand the stages (bureaucratic stage, relationships stage, and market stage) that any 
transition economy goes through in order to achieve a market economy (1.3.1). Following 
which, I go on to examine the institutions of corporate governance in Libya and determine 
which stage Libya has achieved (1.3.2). 
1.3.1. The stages of transition economies 
There are three recognized stages that a transition economy takes when transforming into a 
market economy.99 The first stage is known as the Bureaucratic Stage. This comes directly 
after the end of a planned economic system and therefore is characterized by hierarchical 
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and bureaucratic structures and controls associated with state administrative power.100  At 
this stage, the state and its agencies, such as banks, state property agencies, and investment 
funds, directly control firms still using bureaucratic regulations.101 The Bureaucratic Stage 
is largely influenced by the characteristics and constraints of the former centrally planned 
system, such as state control, state ownership, favourable contacts with the state, 
managerial risk aversion, and rule avoidance.102 Thus, in this stage the dominant sources of 
control power and resources that affect a firm are still likely to be the state. However, 
during the transition, the state attempts to dismantle the formal constraints of the central 
paling regime and adopt the formal constraints of a market-based economy.103   
The second stage is a Networks (or a Relationship) Stage where the dominant 
sources of control power and resources are associated with networks and 
relationships. 104  This stage is considered as an intermediate stage since there are still 
several steps required to move from the Bureaucratic stage to a market economy.105 This 
phase develops gradually (since transition states are expected to develop a market 
institutional framework and abandon bureaucratic control over time) as the institutional 
framework that supports bureaucratic control weakens. 106  In fact, this stage is made 
possible by the increasing weakness of state bureaucratic control and the absence of 
practical formal rules or third-party enforcement. Together, these factors lead shareholders 
to create their own control power or seek control power from networks and relationships in 
                                                 
100 Le, Kroll and Walters(n 7) 162. See also, Max  Boisot and John  Child, ‘The Iron Law of Fiefs: 
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order to protect their interests.107 When a market’s institutional framework is strong, it can 
effectively provide investors with the information and mechanisms that permit firms to 
trade with unknown parties (external investors).108 This is not the case when there is a 
weakness in the institutional framework as companies rely on relationships with traditional 
customers, suppliers, and banks for resources rather than unknown parties. 109    
Market Economy is the final stage and it occurs when there is a perfect market 
institutional framework. Formal rules and state enforcement are more effective and can 
facilitate impersonal relationships between companies and external investors. Financial 
systems such as Stock markets and banks are more sophisticated since they can provide 
flawless services for firms and investors. 110  This stage derives from the fact that 
transaction-based relationships can lead to significant problems in the economy, such as 
inefficiency, corruption, social unfairness, and disorder. For that reason, the state and 
investors will be inclined to move toward a more sustainable legal system and formal 
enforcement mechanisms in order to deal with the deficiencies of transactions based 
relationships.111 In this system, companies can obtain their sources from the market, and 
stakeholders will increasingly employ control power derived from the market instead of the 
state (as in a Bureaucratic Stage) or relationships (as in a Network Stage). 112   
1.3.2. The shift from the bureaucratic stage to the relationship stage and its 
effect on corporate governance: the current position of Libya 
Despite the economic reform that has taken place so far, Libya is yet to achieve a 
minimum system of market economy. Instead, it is currently moving from a bureaucratic 
stage to a relationship stage.  Such an early stage of transition necessarily has a significant 
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influence on the development of corporate governance and its dynamics, which I discuss 
below. 
1.3.2.1. Lack of viable formal institutions leading to a reliance on informal 
constraints 
Moving toward a free economic market by a transition country requires two things: firstly, 
the weakening of the institutional frameworks that promote the state’s bureaucratic control 
and administrative power over firms and, secondly, enhancing the institutional framework 
of a market economy. This can be done by enacting a number of new laws and altering or 
abolishing existing laws that do not align with the development of a free market 
economy. 113 As Lim et al. suggest: ‘a decentralized market economy cannot function 
properly without a comprehensive system of commercial laws’.114 
In Libya, in addition to the laws enacted by the state discussed in (1.2.2), by the end 
of 2010, the State had enacted significant pieces of legislation that were necessary for 
removing obstacles to market entry and facilitating the private sector’s contribution to the 
economy.  Specifically, the Libyan Legislative Authority passed a new commercial law 
that includes a set of provisions aimed at preventing monopolistic practices and helping to 
protect the consumer. In the same year there were a number of laws enacted related to 
Customs Law, Income Tax Law, Labour Law, Communications Law, Land Registry Law, 
and laws regulating the activities of the Libyan Investment Authority. Furthermore, despite 
the fact that the Libyan government began to privatise public sector companies at the end 
of 1980s, the competition law and Stock Market Law were only issued in 2010.115 In 2011, 
following the revolution that toppled the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the 
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Transitional National Council (the legislature Authority in 2011 and 2012) abolished 
certain laws that reflected socialist ideology, which had imposed restrictions on the private 
ownership of property. 116  
Despite these reforms, there remains a need in Libya to address the performance of 
the state’s bureaucratic institutions, since it is acknowledged that such institutions play a 
crucial role in determining economic development.117 In 2009, the IMF indicated that there 
is a need in Libya to improve the performance of the administrative system and regulatory 
framework in order to improve the business environment and progress economic, financial 
and accounting standards in line with international practices.118 In June 2010, the Prime 
Minister, Shokri Ganem, acknowledged the problem, stating that ‘Libyan bureaucracy is a 
complicated and slow acting because it is not as fast as the decision makers in Libya’.  
Though corporate institutions in Libya are currently still effected by the poor 
standard of Libya’s bureaucratic system, the institutional framework that supports the 
bureaucratic system will inevitably weaken as Libya continues to move towards a market 
economy. Examples of this institutional weakening are already evident in Libya, for 
instance, in order to facilitate the administrative procedures for the registration and issuing 
of licenses of private companies, Resolution No. 171 of 2006 on Laeha of Law No. 21 of 
2001, as amended by Law No. 1 of 2004, facilitates both the establishment procedures and 
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the granting of licenses for companies. It also established 51 offices in major Libyan cities 
in order to provide these services to investors. In addition, the Economy Ministry 
established a specialist programme called One-step Window through which every major 
city in Libya has an independent office (called one window office) 119  that can establish 
and register companies, oversee licensing offices, and help the private sector to engage in 
economic activity.  The IMF noted that the One-step Window initiative facilitated the 
creation and establishment of companies and complimented its efficiency as investors only 
have to wait thirty days for approval of their request to establish companies.120 In 2010, the 
Ministry of Economy issued Resolution No. 644, which indicates that license applications 
should be submitted to one of licensing offices in the cities directly, after which the license 
will be issued within just 8 hours.   
Despite these significant changes in Libyan law that are aimed at establishing a 
viable market-supporting institutional framework, it is still very costly or even impossible 
for economic actors to conduct rule-based, impersonal exchange. Creane et al. found that 
most Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, of which Libya is one, have poor 
quality institutions, including the judicial system, bureaucracies, and property rights 
protection. 121 It should be noted that numerous developing and transition economies such 
as Libya have dysfunctional legal systems due to a lack of effective laws and enforcement 
mechanisms.122 In other words, enforcement that is likely to enable unfamiliar parties to 
trade with each other123 is still weak and is costly to develop. Formal rules such as those 
relating to minority protection, merger, takeover and competition are still undeveloped and 
                                                 
119 Public Institution for Investment and  Privatization-PIIP, ‘One-Step Window’ (2013)  
<http://investinlibya.ly/index.php/ar/> accessed 20-11-2013. 
120  IMF, The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya-2005 Article IV Consultation (Country Report No 
06/136, 2006). 
121 Creane and others (n 76). 
122 McMillan and Woodruff (n 7) 2421. 
123 Simon Johnson, John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Courts and Relational Contracts’ (2002) 18 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 221. 
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are incapable of facilitating impersonal exchanges. 124  Moreover, certain laws and 
regulations still exist in Libya that are in line with socialist ideology and a planned 
economy, such as the pricing system of a very large number of goods. 
Currently, therefore, notwithstanding legislative advancements, in the case of Libya 
informal institutions play a key role in shaping company behaviour, 125where ‘bilateral 
relationships, communal norms, trade associations, or market intermediaries […] work in 
place of the legal system’. 126  Accordingly, corporate governance in Libya can be   
characterised by the following features: Firstly, personal relations and family ties, as 
Agnaia indicates, play a key role in selecting managers in Libya instead of formal 
qualifications or experience. Accordingly, Libyan managers are concerned with 
establishing strong social networks. 127  To overcome the obstacles of a bureaucratic 
system, Libyan investors, as Ahmed claims, prefer to enter into a business contract with 
their family, friends, clans or tribes rather than investors that they do not know. 128  
Accordingly, the competitiveness of various Libyan corporations is regularly ‘built on 
personal networks which allows them to win contracts’.129 
Furthermore, when the enforcement climate of courts and other institutions is weak, 
companies may choose to rely merely on internal funds or contributions from closely 
                                                 
124 See (2.3.1.2) 76-8. 
125  Verica Babic, Corporate Governance Problems in Transition Economies (2003) 11; See also, Roderick 
Martin, ‘ Politicized Managerial Capitalism: Enterprise Structures in Post-Socialist Central and Eastern 
Europe’ (2002) 39 Journal of management studies 823;  Michael N Young and others, ‘Governing The 
Corporation In Emerging Economies: A Principal-Principal Perspective ’ (2002) 2002 Academy of 
Management Proceedings E1;  Peng (n 7) 292. 
126 McMillan and Woodruff (n 7) 2422. See also Peng, Business Strategies in Transition Economies 43 and 
51ff. 
127  Almehdi A. Agnaia, ‘Management Training and Development within its Environment: The Case of 
Libyan Industrial Companies’ (1997) 21 Journal of European Industrial Training 117, 120. This is generally 
the case in Arab societies where management procedures are frequently influenced by personal connections, 
nepotism, sectarian and ideological affiliations. See    Abbas J Ali, ‘Management Theory in a Transitional 
Society: The Arab's Experience’ (1990) 1990 (20) International Studies of Management & Organization 7. 
128 Zainab Abdussalam Ahmed, ‘The Barriers to Effective Marketization of Corporate Equity in Libya’ (PhD, 
Faculty of Business, Education and Professional Studies, University Of Gloucestershire 2009) 60. 
129 Porter and Yergin (n 84) 46. 
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related investors.130  This possibility increases in the case of Libya because of the weak 
system of bank monitoring.131 For instance, loans are regulated by personal relationship 
rules rather than corporate governance mechanisms and it has been identified that Libyan 
banks distribute loans to customers whom bank employees know personally.132 As such, 
investors in Libya rely on a social relationship to borrow and this may reduce the cash flow 
which managers might misallocate and enhances the network's coordination and control 
over the firm. 133  
To protect the minority shareholders, it has been suggested that relational 
governance mechanisms can help stakeholders to use their control power to enforce, a 
multiple blockholders mechanism which can mitigate the majority-minority problem by 
deterring one of the blockholders from attempting to expropriate other shareholders' 
wealth.134  Also, under such a system shareholders may create their own control power or 
seek control power from networks and relationships to protect their interests. Employees 
and minority shareholders who do not have sufficient power and protection are likely sell 
their positions to either managers or other powerful shareholders.135   
1.3.2.2. Libya’s undeveloped banking system and small, illiquid security 
market  
The Libyan financial sector is divided into two parts: the banking system and financial and 
investment institutions. Whilst the banking sector is composed of the central bank, 
specialised banks and the commercial banks, 136  the other financial and investment 
                                                 
130 Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens, ‘Corporate Governance and Enforcement’ World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3409, September 2004 <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-3409> 
accessed 29-10-2013, 12. 
131 This is because the external finances provided by the banks represent only a small part of corporate 
financing and, as such, banks may not feel motivated to monitor clients effectively. Additionally, the banks 
are poor governance agents and have distorted incentives. See (2.3.2.2) 85-6. 
132 For more information see (2.3.2.2) 85-6. 
133 Dharwadkar, George and Brandes(n 6) 553. 
134 See (2.3.1.1).  
135 King (n 7) 6. For more information see (4.1.1) 151ff. 
136  Libyan Central Bank-LCB, Report of Libyan Central Bank : 2010-2011 (Central Bank of Libya, 2012) 7. 
(in Arabic).  This is the last report available online. See the Libyan Central Bank Website at 
http://cbl.gov.ly/ar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=296&Itemid=175. 
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institutions consist of the insurance sector, the Social and Economic Development Fund, 
the Libyan Stock Market and three state-owned investment companies (Libyan Arab 
African Investment Company,  National Investments Company, Libyan Arab Foreign 
Investment Company).137 
The financial sector in Libya, like any transition country, is dominated by the 
banking sector138 which, in turn, is dominated by four state-owned commercial banks.139 
However, it should be noted that the contribution of the banking sector in economic 
activities is still limited140 since it offers low loan availability to the private sector, and the 
majority of commercial banks’ assets are in short-term deposits or cash, though the 
banking system is characterized by high liquidity. 141 
The other financial institutions, such as the insurance sector and the social security 
fund, have a very narrow role and make a minor contribution to the Libyan 
economy.142 Similarly, the Libyan Stock market is still very small and illiquid 143 (which is 
                                                 
137 Libyan Central Bank-LCB, Libyan Central Bank Report: 2006 ( Central Bank of Libya, 2006) (in Arabic). 
138 Fumikazo Sugiura, ‘Economic Transformation and Corporate Finance in the Post-Communist World’ in 
Bruno dallago and Ichiro Iwasaki (eds), Corporate Restructuring and Governance in Transition Economies 
(palgrave 2007) 44. 
139 Libyan Central Bank-LCB, Report of Libyan Central Bank : 2010-2011 (n 136)  25;  Patricia D Brenner, 
Amor Tahari and Marina Moretti, Financial Sector Reforms and Prospects for Financial Integration in 
Maghreb Countries (International Monetary Fund 2007) 125. Maghreb Countries are Libya, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria.  
140  Libyan Central Bank-LCB, Report of Libyan Central Bank : 2010-2011 (n 137) 7. 
141 Brenner, Tahari and Moretti (n 139);  LCB, Report of Libyan Central Bank : 2010-2011 (n 136) 7. 
142 Libya's insurance industry is small with the ratio of premiums accounting for less than 1% of GDP. See 
LCB, Libyan Central Bank Report: 2006 ( n 138). In Addition, according to International Monetary Fund, 
the insurance sector ‘is small and largely underdeveloped, with total market premium income at LD 190 
million in 2006’. See IMF, Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: 2008 Article IV Consultation-Staff 
Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive 
Director for the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (n 96) 7. 
143 According to the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) Annual Reports, in 2006, there were only three listed 
companies in the banking and insurance sectors, which increased to 6 in 2007. In 2008, there were 8 
companies listed in the Market. Then, in 2009, the number of companies increased to 10 on the main list, and 
14 on the sub-list of the market. In 2010, the number of listed companies increased to 12 on the main list and 
13 on the sub-list of the market. In 2013, the companies decreased to 10 companies on the main list and 10 
companies on the sub-list of the market. Regarding the liquidity of the LSM, in 2007, the number of shares 
for allotment was 4 million at 7 L.D per share. In the event, 3,365,327 shares were allotted. The total value of 
such transactions was 254 Milion D.L. In 2009, the trading volume increased to 6,166,718 shares and their 
value was almost 72 Million. See available reports of LSM available at  
<http://www.lsm.ly/Arabic/Media/Pages/PeriodicReports.aspx> (in Arabic).  
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the case with most transition economies in the early stages)144 and has not reached an 
appropriate level of maturity to make a significant contribution to the Libyan economy. As 
Creane et al note, the financial system generally in Libya is still undeveloped and plays a 
limited role in the overall economy. They found that in comparison to other MENA 
countries in 2002/03, Libya had the lowest average of financial development index which 
includes the banking sector, nonbank financial sector, regulation and supervision, 
monetary sector and policy, financial openness, institutional environment.145    
 In addressing governance in small, illiquid security market and undeveloped 
banking system, there are two points that we should consider. First, the financial system 
determines, to a large extent, the mechanisms of corporate governance.146 Second, Libya, 
as all transition countries, has a bank based system, in which banks, in theory, are 
supposed to play a leading role in mobilizing savings, allocating capital and overseeing the 
investment decisions of corporate managers.147   Therefore, in a transition economy, the 
weakness of financial institutions and the poor enforcement of property rights results in 
strong insider control 148  and in the absence of significant outside investors or an 
institutional framework that supports corporate governance. Consequently, managers are 
unable to raise the capital needed for investments 149  or it is expensive to raise new 
capital.150 Further, the monitoring cost for shareholders is higher than in that of market 
based system because the former cannot offer information which can substitute for 
                                                 
144 Sugiura (n 138) 43.   
145 Creane and others (n 22)  6. 
146 See e.g.  John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of 
Industrial Change, vol 15 (Cornell University Press 1983).  
147    Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, ‘Bank-Based and Market-Based Financial Systems: Cross-
Country Comparisons’ World Bank Policy Working Paper No 2143, 1999 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569255> accessed 27-11-2013, 2. 
148 Erik  Berglöf, ‘Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: The Theory and Its Policy Implications’ 
in Masahiko  Aoki and Hyung Ki Kim (eds), Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies (The World 
Bank 1995) 47. 
149 ibid 45. 
150  Yingyi  Qian, ‘Reforming Corporate Governance and Finance in China’ in Masahiko  Aoki and Hyung 
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disclosure requirements.151 Additionally, in a transition economy, the stock market plays a 
limited role in corporate control through takeovers or proxy fights due to illiquidity of the 
market, as detailed in Ch.4.152     
Furthermore, banks have a monitoring capacity as a governance mechanism which 
requires complete disclosure from firms.153 Though lacking monitoring capacity in the 
bureaucracy stage, state-owned banks can rely on state legitimacy to control managers, 
whereas in the relationships stage foreign and private banks are more capable of evaluating 
and monitoring borrowers. 154 However, despite a lack of data, it may be argued that, 
though banks are the main providers of external finance to Libyan companies and the 
relationships between banks and enterprises are naturally close,155 the monitoring by banks 
in Libya is too weak.  This is because the external sources represent only a small part of 
corporate financing and, as such, banks may not feel motivated to monitor clients 
effectively.156  
1.3.2.3. Economic Structure   
It should be noted that the privatisation programme, in Libya, is still not completed. So far 
only 115 SOEs out of 360 companies have been privatised as part of the government’s 
programme. 157 Therefore, the debate has not shifted completely from traditional measures 
for the economic transformation (e.g. privatisation of state-owned companies) to how to 
shape the existing business firms into a market economy.  In other words, despite the 
previous developments in the privatisation programme, this development is still 
insufficient because the vast majority of Libyan firms are still owned by the state. This, in 
                                                 
151 Steven Clark, Tao-Hsien King and Cinder Xinde Zhang, ‘Idiosyncratic Risk, Governance and Equity 
Performance’ (23rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, 2010). 
152 See (4.4.4.1) 192-3. 
153 Rahul   Vashishtha, ‘The Role of Bank Monitoring in Borrowers’ Discretionary Disclosure: Evidence 
from Covenant Violations’ Duke University, May 28, 2013 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2115637> accessed 24-11-2013. 
154 Dharwadkar, George and Brandes (n 6) 660. 
155 See (2.3.2.2) 85-8. 
156  Berglöf (n 131) 61. 
157 For more details see (2.1.2) 53. 
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turn, raises two problems that will be considered further in the next chapter. First, the 
dominance of concentrated ownership in Libya which, though it can prevent opportunistic 
managerial behaviour in the sense of using corporate control for their own benefit, allows 
blockholders to appropriate private benefit from the company at the expense of the 
minority shareholders. Second, since company ownership is concentrated in the hands of 
the State, this leads to a problem of corporate governance between the minority 
shareholders and the state as the controlling shareholder.  
In short, Libya is still at an early stage of transition and this has had clear and 
significant effects on the development of corporate governance and its dynamics. This is 
due to a combination of factors, including an absence of adequate and effective 
institutional framework with appropriate laws that could enhance the institutional 
framework of a market economy and so weaken the state’s bureaucratic framework.  This 
situation has led to informal institutions, rather than formal institutions, playing a key role 
in shaping company behaviour in Libya.  
 
Conclusion 
Following the change from capitalism to socialism in 1969 and the adoption of a planned 
economy until the late 1990s, the government owned both the production and services 
sectors. However, in the early of 2000s, there was a marked trend towards a free market 
policy that represented a new corporate system in Libya which sought to rectify the 
accumulated economic problems and difficulties that occurred as a result of the socialist 
era. During this period, the state adopted various economic reform measures which, as 
discussed, have had a profound effect on corporate governance in Libya. 
Although many positive measures and procedures were implemented, which 
established new institutions of corporate governance in Libya, many difficulties and 
challenges still face the new Libyan government in developing an economic and financial 
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environment in which a free market economy can operate. This situation, without doubt, 
affects the corporate governance system generally, as discussed in this chapter, and 
particularly the minority- majority shareholders relationship, as discussed in the following 
chapter.   
This chapter argued that the Libyan economy is currently moving from a 
bureaucratic stage to a relationship stage which means that it is still in an early stage of 
transition. Firstly, this is because there is an absence of an adequate and effective formal 
institutional framework with appropriate laws that could enhance the institutional 
framework of a market economy and so weaken the state’s bureaucratic framework.  As 
mentioned, this has led to informal institutions playing a key role in shaping company 
behaviour in Libya, rather than formal institutions. Secondly, the weakness of financial 
institutions affects to a large extent the mechanisms of corporate governance in Libya 
which result in strong insider control and in the absence of significant outside investors. 
Also, since the stock market is still illiquid and small, it can only play a limited role in 
corporate control through takeovers or proxy fights.  Finally, non-complication of 
privatisation programme affects corporate structure of the ownership in Libya. This, in turn, 
raises two problems, a majority-minority problem and the problem between minority 
shareholders and state-owned companies being controlling shareholders, both of which 
will be covered in depth in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 2: Defining the Issues: Dimensions of the 
Relationship between Concentrated Corporate Ownership 
and the Principal-Agent Problem 
Introduction 
The principal-agent problem is a central issue of comparative corporate governance 
research.1 One of the major factors that influence the principal-agent problem is the nature 
of corporate ownership. When there is concentrated share ownership, the principal-agent 
problem takes the form of a conflict of interests between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders. Conversely, when there is dispersed share ownership, the principal-
agent problem takes the form of a conflict between the management and shareholders. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, ownership structures in transition economies, 
such as Libya, are not well established and its transition to a market economy and a 
functioning capitalistic system is still in its infancy due to the lack of effective minority 
shareholder protection. The Libyan economy is dominated by controlling shareholders. In 
most cases it is the government who retain a large ownership position in many sectors of 
the economy and remain a significant owner of both public and large private commercial 
enterprises across several sectors.   
Accordingly, the main corporate governance problem in Libya is the conflict of 
interests between minority and majority shareholders, which also constitutes one of the 
typical corporate governance problems within companies globally. This is in contrast to 
Anglo-Saxon corporations where conflicts result from the prevailing dispersed ownership 
structures. In this light, this thesis focusses on how to solve the majority-minority problem 
within the ‘controlling shareholder’ structure. To that end, through analysing the literature 
of corporate governance with regard to minority-majority shareholder issues and applying 
                                                 
1  Traditionally, the literature of corporate governance has overwhelmingly focussed on the dispersed 
shareholders system which is common in the U.S and the UK, despite the fact that the controlling shareholder 
structure is the dominant system in the rest of the world. 
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it to the case of Libya,2 this chapter determines the contours of the problem that will be 
addressed.  
Defining the structures of ownership is crucial as different structures affect the 
nature of governance problems and thus the corresponding formulation of corporate 
governance strategies.   In order to define the issue, section (2.1) begins by discussing 
structures of corporate ownership as described in literature (2.1.1) and manifested in Libya 
(2.1.2).   
The following section, (2.2) outlines the relationship between the patterns of 
ownership and the nature of the principal-agent problem, which constitutes the 
fundamental rationale for this study. In this section, I explore the fact that in dispersed 
corporate ownership, the conflict of interests is between the shareholders as whole and the 
management. However, in concentrated ownership, the conflict exists between the majority 
shareholders and the minority shareholders.  
Section (2.3) explores the issue of the conflict between the majority shareholders 
and the minority shareholders in theory and then its application in Libya (2.3.1). 
Additionally, as the state owns most of the public and large private equities in Libya, this 
section examines how this conflict is manifested when the state is a controlling shareholder 
(2.3.2).   
2.1. Structures of corporate ownership   
In order to locate the major issue that this thesis will address, I will begin by discussing 
structures of corporate ownership. These structures are considered by several 
commentators to be a highly significant element of the corporate governance system 3 as 
                                                 
2 The literature on the principal-agent problem and corporate ownership is large. To summarize this disparate 
body of work in this chapter would be an insurmountable task.  Therefore, the chapter instead will focus only 
on the most important points that serve our arguments. 
3 See e.g. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 Journal of 
Finance 737. It should be noted that Berle & Means identified ownership structure as a key issue in 1931.See 
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they influence the nature of governance problems and thus the formulation of corporate 
governance strategies.4 Initially I briefly outline the two patterns of corporate ownership 
structure: the dispersed ownership structure and the concentrated ownership structure 
(2.2.1), following which, I examine the corporate ownership structure in Libya (2.2.2). 
2.1.1. The patterns of corporate ownership: General discussion 
Under CA 2006, there are three main types of companies: companies limited by shares, 
companies limited by guarantee and unlimited companies.5 Also, as discussed in (1.1.2), 
LEAA 2010 sets down the three types of companies permitted in the State of Libya: (1) 
‘Persons Companies’ which includes General Partnerships (Tadamun Company), Limited 
Partnerships (Tawssiyah Bassita Company), and Joint Ventures (Mohassa Company); (2) 
‘Funds Companies’ include Joint Stock Companies (JSC) that are either private or state-
owned companies; (3) Mixed Companies include Limited partnerships by shares 
(Tawssiyah beashom Company) and Limited Liability Companies by guarantee.6 However, 
this research focuses solely on JSCs, both private and public, as they are the most common 
form of company in Libya and in the UK and, simply, because corporate governance 
largely focuses on JSCs. 
Here it should be noted that JSCs in Libya is similar to limited Liability companies 
(by shares) in the UK. This is because both companies are limited liability companies. This 
means partners/members (i.e. either natural or artificial persons) are not responsible for the 
company’s debt other than their contributions in the company’s capital. 7  Also, both 
companies have transferable shares to either a member or a non-member of the company. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Aldolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property ( 5th edn 
Transaction Publisher, 2005). 
4 See e.g.   RafaelLa Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership Around 
the World' (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471; Lucian A Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, 'The Elusive Quest for 
Global Governance Standards' (2009) 157 University of Pennsylvania law review 1263;   Brian L Connelly 
and others, 'Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance' (2010) 47 Journal of Management Studies 1561. 
5 CA 2006, s 3. 
6 For more the definitions and details of this study, see (1.1.2) 23. 
7 See e.g. Paul Davies, Introduction to Company Law (Oxford University Press, 2002) 10-11 and 60ff. 
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According to art 98 of LEAA 2010, a JSC is ‘a company in which the capital is divided 
into equal and transferable shares and in which the shareholders are liable for company 
debts only to the extent of the value of their shares’. Similarly, under s 3 of the UK CA 
2006, a company is a “limited company” when the liability of its members is limited by its 
constitution,8 and such a liability may be limited ‘to the amount, if any, unpaid on the 
shares held by them’.9 Regarding the Transferability of shares, ‘the shares or other interest 
of any member in a company are transferable in accordance with the company’s articles’.10 
Thus JSCs in Libya is similar to limited Liability companies by shares in the UK. 
Moreover, the Libyan system follows the UK in regard to making a distinction 
between public and private companies.   In the UK, the CA 2006 makes a distinction 
between public and private companies. S 4 of CA 2006 states that ‘a ‘private company’ is a 
company which is not public company’11 and ‘a “public company” is a company limited 
by shares or limited by guarantee and having a share capital whose certificate of 
incorporating states that it is a public company’. 12  In addition, it has completed the 
requirements of the Companies Acts in regard to public company.13 Here it should be 
noted that the vast majority of public companies are companies limited by shares. This is 
because limited by guarantee companies that have a share capital cannot be formed 
anymore. According to CA 2006, s 5 (1), ‘a company cannot be formed as, or become, a 
company limited by guarantee with a share capital.14   Similarly, in Libya, even though 
LEAA 2010 and the abrogated old Commercial Act 1953 do not set out any provisions 
                                                 
8 CA 2006, s 3 (1). 
9 CA 2006, s 3 (2). 
10 CA 2006, s544 (1). 
11 CA 2006, s 4 (1). 
12 CA 2006, s 4 (2) (a). 
13 For information about  the UK laws requirements in regard to public company, see Paul Davies, Principles 
of Modern Company Law (9th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 104ff. 
14 According to CA 2006 s 5 (2), ‘provision to this effect has been in force (a) in Great Britain since 22nd 
December 1980, and (b) in Northern Ireland since 1st July 1983’. 
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relating to public companies,15 the Libyan Stock Act 2010 recognizes public companies. 
This is because such companies are still a new form of business associations in Libya. The 
first law (Libyan Stock Market Act 2010) that regulates public companies was issued in 
2010, although the Libyan Stock Market itself was established in 2006. Thus both legal 
systems recognize the distinction between public and private companies.16  
It is worth mentioning that despite the fact that in practice the vast majority of 
companies in Libya and the UK are private companies,17  in UK corporate governance 
there is much more focus on public limited companies by shares both listed and unlisted 
companies.18 This is because the UK has a market based system where stock markets are 
more active and efficient than banks.19 In such a system, ‘securities markets share centre 
stage with banks in terms of getting society’s savings to firms, exerting corporate control, 
and easing risk management.’20 In addition, the countries that follow this system (e.g. the 
UK and the US) are characterized by the existence of a relatively large number of widely 
held companies which are listed companies.21   
                                                 
15 It is worthy indicating that despite the fact that LEAA 2010 does not recognize public companies, it does 
recognise SOEs. Many articles in the Act impose special provisions regarding these companies. This is 
because of the current corporate ownership structure in Libya which is based on state ownership.   
16   The both legal corporate system imposes extra statutory requirements on public companies. For example, 
in the case of Libya accounting and audit requirements on public companies are more detailed. See (5.1.1) 
223 ff. 
17  As of July 2014, there were 3,103,821 Private limited companies and 7,821 Public limited companies. 
Companies House, Statistical Release: Companies Register Activities 2013 - 2014 ( Companies House, July 
2014) 7. 
18 For example, in the UK, there are a lot of  regulatory legal  rules for corporate governance regulate public 
companies: For example, in addition to some parts of the Companies Act 2006; many law set forth provisions 
relating to provisions associate to public companies such as  the Listing Rules (the LR), the Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules (the DTR) and the Prospectus Rules (the PR), which are made and enforced by the 
Financial Services Authority as the UK Listing Authority (UKLA); the UK Corporate Governance Code (the 
Code which ‘applies to all Main Market companies, both UK and international, with a Premium Listing of 
equity shares in London’. ) and the UK Stewardship Code for institutional shareholders, which are the 
responsibility of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC); and the Takeover Code, which is issued and 
administered by the Takeover Panel.  
19 ibid 5. 
20 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, 'Bank-Based and Market-Based Financial Systems: Cross-Country 
Comparisons' '1999' World Bank Policy Working Paper No. 2143, 1999, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569255> accessed 27-11-2013, 2. 
21 The central characteristics of the market-based outsider model of corporate governance are:  
Diffuse equity ownership with institutions having very large shareholdings; shareholder 
interests are considered the primary focus of company law; there is an emphasis on 
effective minority shareholder protection in securities law and regulation; there is a 
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The corporate governance problem in public companies is more complicated than the 
problem in private companies. Most public companies (especially listed companies) have 
large numbers of outside minority shareholders and are run by professional managers who 
may not own shares of the company.22 The significant issue resulting from such a situation 
is that based on the separation of control and ownership.  Where the ownership here is 
dispersed and the directors have control of the company, the latter may use their position to 
expropriate some private benefits rather than maximising profits for the shareholders, as 
discussed in details in (2.2). This justifies the attention paid by the state in regard to 
regulating legal issues facing listed companies.  Most of the legal governance   regulations 
in the UK focus on listed companies rather than private companies such as the Listing 
Rules (LRs), the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTRs), and the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. This is unlike the normal situation (in private companies) where 
‘owners continue to play a significant direct role in management’. 23  
Therefore, corporate ownership structures of JSCs around the world can be placed 
into two broad categories. The first category is dispersed corporate ownership, and the 
second category is concentrated ownership.  The former category is dominant in the U.S 
and the UK where most public companies do not have a controlling shareholder.24 Instead 
the shareholders own small fractions of shares and, consequently, lack influence over the 
control of the company.25 In such countries, large companies often trade on the stock 
                                                                                                                                                    
stringent requirement for continuous disclosure to inform the market’. See Thomas Clarke, 
International Corporate Governance: A comparative Approach (Routledge, 2007) 129. 
 
For more details about a market based system, see Arnoud WA Boot and Anjan V Thakor, 'Financial System 
Architecture' (1997) 10 Review of Financial studies 693; Ross Levine, 'Bank-Based or Market-Based 
Financial Systems: Which Is Better?' (2002) 11 Journal of Financial Intermediation 398; Franklin Allen and 
Douglas Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, Mass. ; London : MIT Press, 2000); Colin Mayer 
and Oren Sussman, 'The assessment: Finance, Law, and Growth' (2001) 17 Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 457. 
22 Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control (Oxford University Press, 2008) 27. 
23 ecoDa Working Group, Corporate Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted Companies in the 
UK (Institute of Directors, 2010) 10. 
24 See e.g. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer,  ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (n 4). They 
argue that most firms in the US and UK are widely held. 
25 See e.g. Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control (n 22) 5. 
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market and so have ‘moved away from dependence on wealthy individuals, bankers, and 
financial institutions for a supply of capital’.26  
It should be noted that the structure of corporate ownership in the UK is similar to 
that in the U.S.  In the UK, a majority of equity is held by institutional investors such as 
financial institutions, predominantly pension funds and life assurance companies. This is 
because there was a major move in the second half of the 20th century27 in corporate 
ownership companies from individual investors (retail investors) to institutional 
investors.28 Since 1963, when individuals owned 54.0% of UK quoted shares in terms of 
total value, the amount of shares held by individuals has declined at the expense of 
institutional shareholders to 10.7% in 2012.29 Therefore, today institutional investors own 
most of the shares of listed UK companies.  Similarly, in the U.S, institutional shareholders 
are more widespread and they hold the majority of shares.30 
Though dispersed ownership is predominant in the U.S and UK, concentrated 
ownership is dominant in the rest of the world. Here, companies have large shareholders 
who own blocks of shares that are large enough to give them control over the company.31 
In such a structure, stock market listings are less common. The first study 32  into 
                                                 
26  Margaret M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First 
Century (the Brookings Institution, 1995) 29. 
27 Brian R Cheffins, 'Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom' 
(2001) 30 The Journal of Legal Studies 459, 476. He stated that ‘although a separation of ownership and 
control possibly occurred in the United Kingdom by the 1950s, the Berle-Means Corporation may in fact not 
have become dominant until the 1970s or even the 1980s’. See ibid 476. 
28 For more information about UK share ownership, see Cheffins’ studies, for example: Brian Cheffins, 
‘Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom’ (2001) 30 The Journal 
of Legal Studies 459;   Brian R Cheffins, 'Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Separation of 
Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom' (2006) 63 Washington and Lee Law Review 1273; Brian R. 
Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control (Oxford University Press 2008). 
29  See Office of National Statistics-ONS,'Ownership of UK Quoted Shares, 2012' (Office for National 
Statistics, 2012) available at <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_327674.pdf.> 
30 John Armour and Jeffrey N Gordon, 'The Berle-Means Corporation in the 21st Century' '2009', 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu> accessed 05-04-2015, 4. 
31 See e.g. Cheffins ‘Corporate Ownership and Control’ (n 22) 5. 
32 This has been noted by  Christoph Van der Elst, 'The Equity Markets, Ownership Structures and Control: 
Towards an International Harmonisation' '2003' Financial Law Institute, Working Paper Series, September 
2000, <http://www.law.ugent.be/fli/wps/showwps.php?wpsid=32> accessed 02/01/2014, p13. See also  
Fabrizio Barca and Marco Becht, The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford University Press, 2001) 2.  
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concentrated ownership structures was published by Franks and Mayer in 199733 who 
noted that the ownership of Continental European companies is primarily concentrated in 
the hands of two groups: families and other companies.34 This was emphasised by La Porta 
et al. in 1997 and 1999 when they extended Franks and Mayer's study to many more 
countries and revealed that concentrated ownership applies widely around the world.35 To 
give a brief illustration of the difference between the two structures: Becht and Mayer 
indicate that in more than 50% of European companies there is a single blockholder that 
owns a majority of shares; 36 in contrast this figure in the UK and the U.S is only 3%.37 
Faccio and Lang studied 5232 firms in Western Europe and found that dispersed 
ownership widely exists in the U.K and Ireland, whilst concentrated ownership dominates 
in the companies of continental Europe. They observed that whilst most non-financial and 
small firms are controlled by families, financial institutions usually have dispersed 
ownership. 38 Furthermore, Claessens et al., indicate that more than two-thirds of East 
Asian firms are controlled by a single shareholder. 39 Additionally, Prowse found that 
concentrated ownership is very common in Japan where companies are controlled by 
financial institutions. 40  
                                                 
33  Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, 'Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany, and France' 
(1997) 9 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 30. This study has been reprinted in   Julian Franks and Colin 
Mayer, 'Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany, and France' in D Chew (ed) Studies in 
International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems: A Comparison of the US, Japan, and Europe 
(OUP Catalogue, 1997) 281. 
34 According to Frank and Mayer, most European countries have concentrated ownership. In 1990, almost 
85% of the German and 80% of the French large listed non-financial companies had at least one shareholder 
with 25% of the shares. See ibid.   
35 Rafael La Porta and others, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance' (1997) 53 Journal of Finance 1131; 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership Around the World' 
(1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471. 
36   Marco Becht and Colin P. Mayer, 'Introduction' in F Barca and M Becht (eds), The Control of Corporate 
Europe (Oxford University Press, 2001)16. 
37 ibid.   
38 Mara Faccio and Larry HP Lang, 'The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations' (2002) 65 
Journal of Financial Economics 365. It is worth mentioning that only around 37% of Western European firms 
are widely held. See ibid. 
39 Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Larry HP Lang, 'The Separation of Ownership and Control in East 
Asian Corporations' (2000) 58 ibid.81.  Their study included 2980 companies in 9 East Asian countries. 
40 Stephen D Prowse, 'The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan' (1992) 47 The Journal of Finance 
1121. 
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In transition economies ownership structures are still not well established and 
widely held firms are extremely rare, even in countries that opted for early mass 
privatization.41 In other words, though most transition economies carried out some large 
scale privatization, ownership in transition economies tends to be highly concentrated, as 
they have underdeveloped financial markets and lack institutional reforms. For example, 
Lazareva et al found that firms in Russia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan are characterized by 
high ownership concentration in the hands of managers and large outside shareholders. 42 
This is also the case in the Czech Republic43 and Hungary.44  Additionally, Gang Wei 
notes that in China there is a ‘heavily concentrated equity ownership in the hands of large 
state-owned shareholders’.45  
A significant explanation afforded for the difference between concentrated and 
dispersed ownership structures is the ‘law matters theory’ introduced in series of articles 
by La Porta et al in the 1990s.46 The articles emphasise the importance of the law by 
                                                 
41  Erik Berglöf and Von Thadden, 'The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for 
Transition and Developing Countries' (Conference Paper, Annual World Bank Conference on Development 
Economics, 1999 1999)  4;  Olga Lazareva, Andrei Rachinsky and Sergey Stepanov, 'Corporate Governance, 
Ownership Structures and Investment in Transition Economies: The Case of Russia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan' 
'2008', <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102610> accessed 02-01-2014, 2. 
 Boycko et al.,  in regard  to mass privatization, stipulate that:   
Mass privatization […] can take a variety of forms that can also be combined with 
each other. It can take the form of free grants of some shares to workers and managers 
in their own enterprises (almost all countries). It can also take the form of the 
distribution of vouchers to the whole population, with the subsequent exchange of 
these vouchers for shares in state enterprises (Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Lithuania, 
and Russia). Finally, mass privatization may involve a direct allocation of shares to 
specially-organized mutual funds, followed by the distribution of shares in these funds 
to the population (Poland). Mass privatization has also been typically combined with 
sales of some assets through cash auctions or investment tenders (all countries).  See 
Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, 'Voucher Privatization' (1994) 
35 Journal of Financial Economics 249, 251. 
42 Lazareva, Rachinsky and Stepanov (n 41). 
43 Robert Cull, Jana Matesova and Mary Shirley, 'Ownership and the Temptation to Loot: Evidence from 
Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic' (2002) 30 Journal of Comparative Economics 1. 
44 Zsolt  Bedo and Eva Ozsvald, 'Corporate Restructuring and the Role of Foreign Direct Investment in 
Hungary ' in B Dallago and I Ichiro (eds), Corporate Restructuring and Governance in Transition Economies 
(palgrave, 2007) 178-203. 
45 Gang Wei and Mingzhai Geng, 'Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in China: Some Current 
Issues' (2008) 34 Managerial Finance 934, 934. 
46 See, e.g. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, , Corporate Ownership Around the World (n 4); La Porta 
and others,  ‘Legal Determinants of Outside Finance’ (n 35); Rafael La Porta and others, 'Law and Finance' 
(1998) 106  Journal of Political Economy 1113; Rafael La Porta and others, 'Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance' (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 3.  
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pointing out that the extent of legal protection afforded to outside investors differs 
enormously across countries. Crucially, they suggest that controlling shareholders exist in 
jurisdictions where legal systems do not protect minority shareholders from controlling 
shareholders' diversion of private benefits of control. Also, they show that common law 
countries, such as the U.S and the UK, appear to have the best legal protection for minority 
shareholders and enforce the law more effectively, whereas civil law countries, and most 
conspicuously the French civil law countries (of which Libya is one),47 have the weakest 
protection and weak enforcement. 48 In addition to law matters theory, Roe introduces the 
‘politics matters theory’ and argues that countries that adopt strong social democracy have 
concentrated ownership and fewer publicly traded firms when compared to countries that 
have a weak social democracy. 49  One of the most significant reasons behind this, he 
suggests, is that democratic governments prefer employees to investors. Accordingly, they 
enact regulations that increase the leverage workers possess at the expense of the 
shareholders.50   
However, it is important to note that though the empirical work on the relationship 
between law/policy and ownership structure done by La Porta at el. and Roe is significant, 
both theories have been criticized as they fail to provide the kind of comprehensive 
analysis that would support a correlation between the structure of corporate ownership and 
law/policy. For example, ‘law matters theory’ fails to take into account jurisdictions that 
provide strong protection for minority shareholders whilst simultaneously having a 
concentrated ownership structure, such as is the case in Sweden, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand. 51  Further, it has been observed that controlling shareholder regimes exist in 
                                                 
47 The study does not include Libya. 
48 La Porta and others,  ‘Law and finance’ (n 46); See also,  Katharina Pistor and others, 'Evolution of 
Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison' (2002) 23 The University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law 791. 
49 See  Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 2003).  
50  ibid.. 
51  For more flaws and drawbacks see e.g. Ronald J Gilson, 'Controlling Shareholders and Corporate 
Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy' (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1641. He argues 
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countries without a serious social democratic movement. Coffee points out that the Roe’s 
social-democratic thesis does not clarify the origins of concentrated ownership in any other 
country, and certainly does not fit the situations in Asia or in much of the Third World.52 
As such it is unlikely that Roe’s politics theory can be relied upon to provide a 
comprehensive explanation.53 
2.1.2. The Current Corporate Ownership Structure in Libya: Domination of 
the State over economic activities  
As discussed previously, ownership structures of JSCs in transition economies are not well 
established and Libya is no exception. 54  As pointed out in the previous chapter, Libya is 
relatively early in its transition to a market economy and a functioning capitalistic system. 
As a result, the Libyan economy is still dominated by the government, which retains a 
large ownership position in many sectors of the economy and remains a significant owner 
of both public and large private commercial enterprises across several sectors.   
Currently, the Libyan government controls, directly or indirectly, the majority of 
assets and enterprises through a substantial portfolio consisting of industries, financial 
institutions and real estate, which constitute the overwhelming majority of economic 
                                                                                                                                                    
that ‘there should be a distinction between the two situations where there is a functionally good law and 
where the law is functionally bad. The first situation can lead to both widely held corporations and 
concentrated ownership while the latter situation only allows concentrated ownership to exist’. See also 
Cheffins ‘Corporate Ownership and Control’ (n 22) 39 ; Roe ‘Political Determinants of Corporate 
Governance’ (n 49) 192; Pistor and others,   'The Evolution of Corporate Law ,A Cross-Country Comparison. 
(n 30); John C Coffee Jr, 'Do Norms Matter--A Cross-Country Evaluation' (2000) 149 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 2151, 2154-2165. He suggests that despite LLSV having shown a statistically 
significant relationship between strong capital markets and certain specific legal protections that tend to 
characterize common law legal systems, such a relationship does not prove causation;   See, also,  Curtis J 
Milhaupt, 'Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance' 
(2001) ibid.2083.   
52 John C Coffee, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control' (2001) 111 The Yale Law Journal 1, 74. 
53 For further flaws and drawbacks see e.g. Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy’  (n 51); Cheffins ‘Corporate Ownership and Control’ (n 22) 47. 
He argued that ‘Roe’s Politics theory, as with his financial services regulation theory, does not fit the facts 
well in the UK’. ibid 47. 
54 It should be noted that there is not enough data or studies available to reveal a clear picture about how high 
state concentrated corporate ownership is.  
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activity in the country. 55  Practically, the state controls hundreds of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) across the energy sector (oil, gas and electricity), telecommunication 
systems, and the main systems of transport. Furthermore, the state owns the majority of 
equity in the banking sector (see table no.1). It is the controlling shareholder in five banks 
which together dominate about 90% of bank equities in Libya.56 In addition, the state 
controls three specialized banks, two specialized investment vehicles, and the insurance 
sector. Furthermore, it possesses a large real estate portfolio. The responsibility for 
managing the portfolio of all of these economic institutions is ‘spread across a wide 
number of different institutions and ministries including the Central Bank, Inspectorate for 
Industry, the Social Security Fund, Inspectorate for Education, Inspectorate for Health, 
Civil Aviation Department, the Authority for Transportation, and a range of Ministries’.57 
The Libyan Insurance Company, for example, is owned by three state owned institutions, 
the Economic and Social Development Fund (60% of the shares), the Social Security Fund 
Investment Company (10%) and Gumhouria Bank (7.7%) and private sector and 
individuals own only 23.3% of shares, making the state the controlling shareholder.58   
Table no.1 The Structure of ownership in Libyan commercial banks 
 
Banks Public Sector Private Sector Foreign 
shareholders 
Gumhouria Bank 83.0% 17.0% 0.0% 
Al Sahara Bank 59.0% 22.0% 19.0% 
Commercial 
National Bank 
85% 15% 0.0% 
Al Wehda Bank 54.0% 27.0% 19.0% 
                                                 
55 Michael E.  Porter and Daniel  Yergin, ' National Economic Strategy: An Assessment of the 
Competitiveness of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya' '2006' General Planning Council of Libya,Tripoli. 2006, 
<http://www.isc.hbs.edu/pdf/2006-0127_Libya_NES_report.pdf> accessed 9/12/2012, 69. 
56 Central Bank of Libya (CBL),'Central Bank of Libya Report 2010-2011' (Central Bank of Libya, 2010-
2011) (in Arabic). 
57 Porter and Yergin (n 55) 69. 
58 Libya Insurance Company-LIC, ' Shareholders of Libya Insurance Company' (Libya Insurance Company 
2014) <http://libtamin.ly/ar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18&Itemid=117> accessed 
14-01-2014 (in Arabic). 
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Al Commerce and 
Growth Bank 
82.0% 18.0% 0.0% 
Source: Libyan Central Bank Report, 2010-201159 
The major contributing factor in shaping the current structure of corporate 
ownership in Libya is the socialist policy adopted by the Libyan government under 
Gaddafi, which resulted in the issuing of laws and resolutions that contributed to 
expanding the role of the public sector in the Libyan economy.60 As discussed in Ch.1, 
during the early 1970s the private sector played an important role in economic activity as 
its contribution to investment exceeded 30% of the total investment over that period. 
However, this picture changed significantly and from 1970-1999 the government owned 
88% of national investments as the public sector came to dominate all economic activity in 
the country. 61   
Though the socialist policies adopted by the Libyan government during this period 
had a significant effect on forming the current structure of corporate ownership in Libya, 
since 1987 the government has made several attempts to change the structure of corporate 
ownership by adopting privatisation programmes. As discussed in Ch. 1, the privatisation 
agenda was raised and resumed several times during the 1990s and 2000s. However, the 
multiple privatisation programmes had no impact on corporate ownership structures and 
they have thus far been unable to shift Libya from the bureaucratic stage, which is based 
on state ownership, to the relationship stage, which is based on private ownership. This 
lack of impact is due, in large part, to the lack of efficiency and effectiveness of the 
privatization programmes in Libya. During the mid-1980s and 1990s, 4845 companies 
were privatised under government programmes, all of which were small and medium-sized 
enterprises. As seen in the data available in table no.2 below, the value of the targeted 
                                                 
59 Libyan Central Bank-LCB,'Report of Libyan Central Bank : 2010-2011' (Central Bank of Libya, 2012) (in 
Arabic). 
60 See (1.2.1) 23. 
61 S Ganous, Libyan Revolution in 30 Years, Political, Economic and Social Transformations, 1969-1999 
(Dar Al Jamahiriya for Publication, Distribution and Advertising, 1999) 225 (in Arabic). 
64 
 
privatised companies was only about 168 million LD (equivalent to approximately £80 
million). The small value of these companies, relative to the overall Libyan economy, leads 
us to conclude that the privatisation programme had very little impact on the structure of 
corporate ownership and, accordingly, very little influence on the economy. 
Table no. Public Projects Privatised from 1987 to 2001 
Activity No of projects The value( LD) Instalments 
paid 
% paid to 
value 
Industry 145 51,556,426 22,556,668         43.7 
 
livestock 45 16,809,229 5,353,806         31.8 
Marine 219 32,816,329 6,009,020         18.3 
Agricultural 4436 66,640,346 9,268,300         13.9 
Total 4845 167,822,330 43,177,794         25.7 
 
 Source: Shernanna and Elfergani.62 
During the same period, all attempts to implementing privatisation programmes 
(which were intended to transfer the ownership of state small and medium-sized 
enterprises to the employees who worked in them) were either very slow or stopped 
completely. 63 The failure of these programmes can be attributed to several contributory 
factors. For example, the deterioration in performance and production in targeted 
companies was similar to, if not worse than, their output when they were part of the public 
sector.64 This was largely because the ownership of the companies was transferred to the 
management and/ or employees. Although transferring corporate ownership to employees 
of privatised companies may be desirable (because, for example, they are familiar with the 
operation of the firm and will be incentivised by the opportunity to exercise governance, 
                                                 
62 Hesham Shernanna and S Elfergani, Privatisation and Broaden the Ownership Base "A Step Towards the 
Application of the People’s Socialist (International Centre for Studies and Research, 2006) 7 cited in Hesham 
F. Shernanna, Critical Perspectives on the Efficient Implementation of Privatisation Policies in Libya: 
Assessing Financial, Economic, Legal, Administrative and Social Requirements (Durham University, 
2013)111. 
63 See e.g. Libya Audit Bureau-LAB,' Annual Report of  the Libya Audit Bureau -2012' ( Libya Audit Bureau  
Libya Audit Bureau 2012) 16 (in Arabic).   
64 Saif-Aleslam M.  Alqadhafi, Libya and the XXI Century (Editar Spa, 2002) 124. 
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with the added bonus that employee ownership would reduce the principle-agent 
separation),65 employee ownership may face big drawbacks. For example, employees in 
most cases, as Brada and Singh argue, cannot provide either new capital or new business 
skills. In many cases, the firms studied by them require infusions of capital to survive and 
employees cannot provide this. 66  This is also applicable in the case of Libya where 
privatised units faced many financial and technical problems, such as a lack of technically 
qualified and trained staff in the areas of management and finance, with the result that most 
privatised companies ceased production and went bankrupt.67 As can be seen in the table 
above, the production units were worth about LD 168 million at the time of privatisation 
and the instalments that were paid amounted to only LD 43 million, which represents just 
25.74% of the total value.68 This means that most of the privatized companies were unable 
to pay their instalments.69  
A further important factor in the lack of success of the privatisation programme at 
that time was the absence of core elements necessary for the effective implementation of 
the privatisation programme, such as a stock market70 and an efficient data and information 
collection and dissemination system. 71 In addition, the slowness and periodic termination 
of the privatisation programmes in Libya was due to the lack of a support system for these 
                                                 
65 Josef C. Brada and Inderjit Singh, Corporate Governance in Central Eastern Europe: Case Studies of 
Firms in Transition (M.E.Sharpe, 1999) 34. 
66 ibid 43 and see also p12ff where Brada and Singh criticize insider privatisation.  
67 See Libya Audit Bureau-LAB, Annual Report of  the Libya Audit Bureau -2012 (n 63) 16.   
68 The non-payment of instalments has continued although the Government issued Decision no.427 in 1989, 
which stipulated that each shareholder must pay 20% of the shares’ value before receiving an ownership 
certificate, and the remaining instalments shall be paid through a direct debit of revenues of the privatised 
project. 
69 This conclusion is supported by Frydman et al. who found that the effect of privatization differs depending 
on the types of owners to whom it gives control. They found that privatization to outside investors is better 
than insiders as outsiders can provide significant affective performance.  For more information see  Roman 
Frydman and others, 'When Does Privatization Work? The Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate 
Performance in the Transition Economies' (1999) 114 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1153. 
70 The Libyan Stock Market was established in 2006 and began its operations in 2008. However, the Stock 
Market Act was only issued in 2010. 
71  See  M. H.   Hamdo, ' Privatization Program in Libya: Requirements and Constraints of Assessment and 
Methods, an Analytical Study"' (2004) 6 University of Garyounis Jurnal 45 (in Arabic); M. M.  Paddy and M. 
H.  Zwai, 'The Role of the Financial Market in the Activation of the Privatization Program ' (Conference of 
Financial Markets‟ Role in the Economic Development “experiences - visions”, Tripoli, Libya,  11th 
December 2005 2005)  (in Arabic). 
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units, either before or after transfer from the public sector. In this context Saif Al Islam 
Alqadhafi states that: 
Perhaps the methods followed in the transfer of ownership were partly 
responsible for [the failure] because these foundations had not been 
restructured before the appropriation process in such a way that secures 
good performance afterwards. Furthermore, these foundations continued to 
work under the umbrella of the public foundations. Add to that the fact 
that the transfer of ownership was limited only to the people working in 
the foundations.72  
 
Regarding the current privatisation programme, in 2004, as a means of stimulating 
the private sector and making the business environment more attractive to investors, the 
Libyan government aimed to transfer ownership of 360 enterprises to the private sector in 
just 4 years.73 The duration of the programme was extended under Cabinet Resolution No 
99/ 2005, until 2015, and data available in the report of the Privatisation Agency (Public 
Institution for Investment and Privatisation) (PIIP) indicates that, as of 2012, only 115 
companies have been privatised through various methods of privatisation. 74   
Consequently, the privatisation programme in Libya is still not complete and so the debate 
has not moved on from traditional measures for the economic transformation (e.g. 
privatisation of state-owned companies) to how to shape the existing business firms into a 
market economy.   
The most recent report issued by PIIP in 2012,75 sets down about thirty points that 
hinder the progress of the current privatisation programme in Libya. The most important  
points raised in this report are: 76 (1) the privatised companies lack the capital to help them 
to run the companies; (2) most of the privatised companies were looted during the 
revolution in Libya in 2011; (3) some of these companies have been taken over by rebels 
for use as offices for their militia; (4) most of them lack specialized technical workers; (5) 
                                                 
72 Alqadhafi (n 64) 124. 
73 See PIIP,'Report of Public Institution of Investment  and Privatisation (2012)' (PIIP, 2012)  2 (in Arabic).   
74 ibid. 
75 The most recent PIIP  report was issued in 2012 which is available at   
http://www.investinlibya.ly/index.php/ar/component/content/article?id=72  
76 PIIP (n 73) 36-7. 
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there is a lack of internal regulation (bylaws), and (6) a lack of administrative experience 
from managers and directors; (7) most privatised companies rely on renting their estates to 
raise profits, instead of relying on production; (8) some company owners have been rehired 
in the public sector and as a result they are no longer interested in the success of their 
privatised companies; (9) studies conclude that some loss-making companies that are 
expected to continue to lose money have been privatised and will face bankruptcy; and 
finally (10) these companies, once privatised, lack ongoing government supervision. 
As a result of this report, the head of PIIP issued Decision No. 26/2012, which 
created the Committee of Developing the Privatisation Programme in Libya with a 
mandate to address these obstacles. This committee made an agreement with the Economic 
Studies Centre in Banqazi, Libya in 2012 and both parties have agreed that Libya should 
seek to gain similar benefits from the privatisation programme to those experienced in the 
Balkan countries, such as Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia, which have successfully negotiated 
large-scale privatisation programmes. In pursuit of this, PIIP entered into an agreement 
with IMAPSEE Company to provide consulting services.77 
Based on the previous evidence, it may be expected that the current structure of 
corporate ownership in Libya will not change soon as there remains evident deficiencies in 
the current privatisation program. However, there is a further consideration that should be 
taken into account: the importance of the role of the law in influencing structures of 
corporate ownership within an economy. As the law in both the U.S and the UK has had a 
hand in changing the structure of corporate ownership in their respective jurisdictions from 
concentrated to dispersed ownership,78 the Libyan law may also have the same effect on 
the structure of corporate ownership as laws have been adopted in Libya that lead logically 
                                                 
77  See Committee of Developing the Privatisation Programme in Libya-CDPP,'Report of Committee of 
Developing the Privatisation Programme in Libya in 2012' (PIIP, 2012) 6 (in Arabic). 
78 See e.g. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer,  (n 4);  Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control (n 
22) 29-40. 
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to a dispersed ownership model or, at least, should mitigate its high concentration. For 
instance, according to the Bank Act no. 1/2005, banks can no longer own more than 10% 
of a joint stock company 79 and as of 2012 the same rule applies to individuals.80 The 
policy behind this limitation on ownership of shares is one of diversification, which means 
reducing risk by investing in a variety of assets or shares.81 
In summary, while the UK and the U.S have a dispersed corporate ownership 
structure, the rest of the world has structures of concentrated corporate ownership. The 
latter model differs from one country to another. In Libya, the government retains a large 
ownership position in many sectors of the economy and remains a significant owner of 
both public and large private commercial enterprises. This situation is the result of the 
socialist policies adopted during the period from 1970 to the 1990s.  Despite the 
developments in the privatisation programme, the ownership model has not changed and 
these developments remain insufficient as they are neither comprehensive nor efficient, 
and thus the vast majority of Libyan firms are still owned by the state. 
2.2. The rationale for the thesis:  Ownership structures as determinates of 
the nature of the principal-agent problem 
Having discussed corporate ownership and identified two types of corporate ownership, 
here I discuss the relationship between the patterns of ownership and the nature of the 
principal-agent problem, which constitutes the fundamental rationale for this study. 
The principal-agent problem82 arises when there is a conflict of interest inherent in 
any relationship where one party (agent) is expected to act in another's (principal) best 
                                                 
79 See Libyan Bank Act No. 1/2005, art 77 (c). 
80 See Resolution of the Libyan Cabinet no. 186/2012, s (3).  
81 Arthur O'Sullivan and Steven M. Sheffrin, Economics: Principles in Action (Pearson Prentice Hall, 2003) 
273. 
82 The agency problem is based on a contractual view of the firm, developed by Coase,  Jensen and Meckling. 
See Ronald H Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm' (1973) 4 Economica 386; Michael C. Jensen and William H. 
Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost, and Capital Structure' (1976) 3 Journal 
of Financial Economic 305.   
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interests. The problem comes when the agent, who is supposed to act in the best interests 
of the principal, is instead motivated by personal interests which may differ from the 
principal's best interests. 83  This is also known as the ‘agency problem’. In principle, 
corporate governance ‘focuse[s] on identifying situations in which the principal and agent 
are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the governance mechanisms that 
limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour’.84 The issue that underpins the agency problem is 
that the principals are often unaware of the details of the business activities of the agents 
(this is referred to as the asymmetric information problem).  
Though it has been argued that the best way to solve the agent-principal problem is 
to structure the contractual relation between the principal and agent to provide appropriate 
incentives for the agent to make choices that will maximize the principal's welfare,85 the 
fact remains that a well-drafted agreement between an agent and a principal is not always 
in place and such an agreement is not always able to cover all potential areas of dispute.86 
Therefore, as is widely recognized, contracts are often incomplete and cannot provide 
sufficient protection for the principal or be the sole source of protection.87  Accordingly, 
limitations on the agent must be imposed by the law, since the presence of mandatory rules 
will assist in solving the problem of contractual incompleteness. 88 As MacNeil notes, 
                                                 
83 See e.g. Stephen A Ross, 'The Economic Theory of Agency: The principal's Problem' 63 The American 
Economic Review 134; Reinier R. Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford University 
press, 2009) 35. 
84  Katheen M. Eisenhardt, 'Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review' (1989) 14 Academy of Managemnt 
Review 57, 59. 
85 Armen A Alchian and Harold Demsetz, 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization' 
(1972) 62 The American Economic Review 777;  Jensen and Meckling,  (n 82).  
86  Erik Berglöf, 'A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance' (1994) 10 Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 247;  Rafael La Porta and others, 'Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World' 
(1999) LV The Journal of Finance   1, 5.   
87 This is referred to as an incomplete contract theory. For information see Sanford Grossman and Oliver 
Hart, 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration' (1986) 94 Journal 
of Political Economy 691;  Oliver Hart and John Moore, 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm' (1990) 
ibid.1119; Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford University Press, 1995) 22; Jean 
Tirole, 'Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?' (1999) 67 Econometrica 741, 743-44;  lain MacNeil, 
'Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory' (2001) 1J 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 107. 
88 According to Schwartz, the view of incompleteness can be an issue in any situation in which contract terms 
are vague or ambiguous, or no terms expressly govern the dispute at hand. See. A Schwartz, 'Legal Contract 
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‘within the field of application of the mandatory rules […] the application of such rules is 
not dependent on the knowledge or consent of the contracting parties’. 89 The key question 
that arises here is who are the principal and agent? 
The answer is not straight forward, but is dependent on the pattern of corporate 
ownership within the jurisdiction. In the UK and the U.S where dispersed ownership is 
very common, the principal-agent problem is based on the separation of control and 
ownership, as explored by Berle and Means in `The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property’. 90  Berle and Means argued that where the ownership is dispersed and the 
directors have control of the company, the latter may use their position to expropriate some 
private benefits rather than maximising profits for the shareholders.91    In the same context, 
Jensen and Meckling point out that the relationship between owners and managers is 
similar to that between a principal and an agent and consists of: 
 a contract under which one or more persons (the principals ‘shareholders’) 
engage another (the agent, ‘the management’) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is 
good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal. 92 
However, this kind of problem is not prevalent throughout the world. Instead, many 
countries are characterized by concentrated ownership structures, where corporations have 
a controlling shareholder or multiple shareholders. 93 Within this structure, the agency 
problem consists of a conflict between the majority shareholders (agents) and the minority 
or non- controlling owners (principals), rather than between shareholders and managers. La 
Porta et al. point out that ‘the central agency problem in large corporations around the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Theories and Incomplete Contracts' in L Werin and H Wijkander (eds), Contract Economics (Cambridge, 
MA, Blackwcll, 1992). 
89 MacNeil, ‘Company Law Rules’ (n 87) 109. 
90 See Berle and Means (n 3). 
91  ibid. 
92 Jensen and Meckling,  (n 82) 308. 
93  See e.g. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer,  ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (n 4);     
Michael N Young and others, 'Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–
Principal Perspective' 45 Journal of Management Studies 196. 
71 
 
world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling 
shareholder’.94 This is termed variously as the majority-minority problem,95  the horizontal 
agency problem,96and the second97  agency problem.98    
The separation of ownership from control that results from dispersed ownership 
leads to high agency costs between management and shareholders. 99 This is because of the 
weakness of the de-facto control right of shareholders over the management, which results 
from a lack of incentives for shareholders to monitor their investments.100 The inability of 
shareholders to monitor the management is due to the inherent limitations on collective 
action and the free rider problem, which explains the collective action problem. In other 
words, when the company is a widely held company, shareholders do not have any real 
voice in how the corporation is run.  For example, an active shareholder who owns only a 
small portion of shares has no incentive to monitor the management as this will involve a 
cost of money and time that is disproportionate to the potential benefit to a shareholder. 101 
In this situation, a shareholder (Rationally Apathetic) who wants to make a change that 
benefits the shareholders as a whole, including himself, would have to persuade his fellow 
shareholders who have similar incentives to act but prefer to take no action and so not 
incur a cost (free riders). 102 Therefore, in countries with a structure of dispersed ownership, 
the management are capable of using their position to exploit dispersed shareholders in 
                                                 
94 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer,  ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’ (n 4), abstract. 
95 Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, 'The Structure of Corporate Ownership : Causes and Consequences' 
(1985) 93 Journal of Political Economy 1155; Shleifer and Vishny,  (n 3).  
96  Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American corporate Finance 
(Princeton University Press, 1994).  
97 The third agency problem involves a conflict between the firm itself (including, shareholders) and the other 
parties with whom the firm contracts, such as creditors and employees. 
98 Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, 'Formal and Real Authority in Organizations' (1997) 105 Journal of 
Political Economy 29. 
99 See e.g. Jensen and Meckling,  (n 82);  Aghion and Tirole,  (n 98). 
100 See e.g.  Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi, 'Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value 
of the Firm' (1997) 112 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 693, 694. 
101 See e.g. Jensen and Meckling,   (n 82);  Sanford J Grossman and Oliver D Hart, 'Takeover Bids, the Free-
Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation' (1980) 11 The Bell Journal of Economics 42. Davies139-
44; Mahmoud Ezzamel and Robert Watson, 'Boards of Directors and the Role of non-Executive directors in 
the Governance of Corporations' in K Keasey, S Thompson and M Wright (eds), Corporate Governance: 
Accountability, Enterprise and International comparisons (John Wiley & Son Ltd, 2005) 97; David 
Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2012) 174-5. 
102 See ibid 175.   
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order to acquire private benefits, which can take several different forms. For example, the 
management may use their position to gain excessive remuneration or use their control 
rights to engage in self-dealing transactions or corporate opportunities that benefit 
managers rather than the shareholders. Also, the management are able to build a larger 
empire, which serves their private interests, which can be either monetary or non-
monetary.103   
However, in a concentrated ownership structure, this situation is not possible. In 
this structure, large shareholders are able to monitor the management more effectively than 
small shareholders as they can accommodate a larger part of the monitoring costs and have 
sufficient voting power to influence corporate decisions.104 Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 
point out that controlling shareholders are able to monitor the management and directly 
manage firms, whereas other, smaller shareholders lack the incentive and power to monitor 
the controlling shareholder.  105Additionally, large shareholders can mitigate asymmetric 
information problems. This is because, as Chidambaran and John indicate, large 
shareholders can gradually collect information on managers’ investment through “relation 
investing” co-operation and then use this information to mitigate against irrational short 
term investments.106 Accordingly, the free-rider problem and the collective action problem 
of shareholders encountered in dispersed structures are not present in concentrated 
ownership structures.  Instead the controlling shareholder generally takes an active interest 
                                                 
103 See  Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 'Large Shareholders and Corporate Control' (1986) 94 Journal 
of Political Economy 461, 461. 
104 See e.g.  Eugene F Fama and Michael C Jensen, 'Agency Problems and Residual Claims' (1983) 26 
Journal of Law and Economics 327; Bernard S. Black, 'Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of 
Institutional Investor' (1992) 39 UCLA  Law Review  811 , 822;  Shleifer and Vishny,  ‘Large Shareholders 
and Corporate Control' (n 103). 
105  Morten Bennedsen and Daniel Wolfenzon, 'The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations' (2000) 
58 Journal of Financial Economics 113. 
106  N.K.  Chidambaran and Kose  John, 'Relationship Investing: Large Shareholder Monitoring with 
Managerial Cooperation' NYU Working Paper, 1998, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297123> accessed 06-01-2014. 
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in the running of the company by choosing the management and sometimes directly taking 
executive positions by hiring themselves as managers.107  
Consequently, concentrated ownership transforms the principal-agent problem into 
a problem of conflict of interests between the minority and majority shareholders.108 This 
is because minorities are vulnerable to exploitation and fraud by the majority. Further, the 
shareholders with a high ownership share are capable of using their position to acquire 
private benefits by using their voting rights to consume corporate resources to their 
advantage,109 an option that is not available to other shareholders. I will now go on to 
explore the forms that this conflict of interests can take between the majority shareholders 
and minority shareholders. 
2.3. Basic dilemmas connected with the agent-principle problem in Libya’s 
transition economy 
In the previous sections I discussed the principal-agent problem and identified that the 
recent corporate governance literature indicates that the current central agency problem in 
corporate governance around the world (except in the UK and the U.S) is how to restrict 
the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders.  Here I explore the 
issue of the conflict between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders, both 
in theory and as it occurs in Libya (2.3.1). Additionally, as the state owns most of public 
and large private equities in Libya, I examine how this conflict is manifested when the 
state is a controlling shareholder (2.3.2) 
                                                 
107 Kershaw (n 101) 650. 
108 See e.g. La Porta and others, `Investor Protection’ (n 46) 15. M. Pagano and A. Roell, 'The Choice of 
Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring and the Decision to Go Public' (1998) 113 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 187, 188. 
109 See  Michael J. Barclay and Clifford G. Holderness, 'Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations 
' (1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 371; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 'A Rent-Protection Theory of 
Corporate Ownership and Control' '1999' Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, , 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203> accessed 9/7/2012. 
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2.3.1. Conflict of interests between the majority shareholders and the 
minority shareholders 
Here the study discusses the conflict of interests between the majority shareholders and the 
minority shareholders in theory (2.3.1.1) and then explore how this theoretical analysis 
corresponds with the conflict as it occurs in Libya (2.3.1.2). 110   
2.3.1.1. A theoretical analysis of the conflict of interests between the 
majority shareholders and the minority shareholders 111 
Though controlling shareholders can mitigate managerial agency problems to improve firm 
value, 112  another type of agency problem can result from their tunneling behaviour. 
Controlling shareholders (insiders) can extract (tunnel) wealth from firms through 
engaging in expropriating or tunneling practices. This behaviour is most likely to occur in 
emerging and transition countries113 like Libya, where concentrated corporate ownership is 
very high and shareholder protection is very low. In such a structure, majority shareholders 
are more likely to exploit minority shareholders by pursuing their own interests.114 Many 
                                                 
110 It is important to indicate that this chapter will not discuss the solution for such conflict as this will be 
covered in the following chapters.   
111 Surprisingly, it has been noted that although the conflict of interest between the majority and the minority 
shareholders conflict is overwhelmingly dominant in most of countries in the world, the extensive legal 
literature deals with conflicts of interest between the management and the shareholders instead of the 
majority-minority problem. 
112 See (2.2) 61ff.  
113  There are several studies that examine tunneling in transition and emerging countries. See for example, 
Kee‐Hong Bae, Jun‐Koo Kang and Jin‐Mo Kim, 'Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by 
Korean Business Groups' (2002) 57 The Journal of Finance 2695; Marianne Bertrand, Paras Mehta and 
Sendhil Mullainathan, 'Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups' (2002) 117 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 121; An Buysschaert, Marc Deloof and Marc Jegers, 'Equity Sales in 
Belgian Corporate Groups: Expropriation of Minority Shareholders? ' (2004) 10 Journal of Corporate 
Finance 81; Vladimir Atanasov, 'How Much Value Can Blockholders Tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian 
Mass Privatization Auctions' (2005) 76 Journal of Financial Economics 191;   Yan-Leung Cheung, P 
Raghavendra Rau and Aris Stouraitis, 'Tunneling, Propping, and Expropriation: Evidence from Connected 
Party Transactions in Hong Kong' (2006) 82 ibid.343; Jae‐Seung Baek, Jun‐Koo Kang and Inmoo Lee, 
'Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols' (2006) 61 
The Journal of Finance 2415; Henk Berkman, Rebel A Cole and Lawrence J Fu, 'Expropriation through Loan 
Guarantees to Related Parties: Evidence from China' (2009) 33 Journal of Banking & Finance 141; Vladimir 
A Atanasov and others, 'How Does Law Affect Finance? An Examination of Financial Tunneling in an 
Emerging Market' '2007', < http://ssrn.com/abstract=902766> accessed 24-01-2014. 
114   See the previous section. See also Raj M. Desai and Katharina Pistor, 'Financial Institutions and 
Corporate Governance: A Survey of Six Transition Economies' in IW Lieberman, SS Nestor and RM Desai 
(eds), Between State and Market: Mass Privatization in Transition Economies (Studies of Economies in 
Transformation) (World Bank Publications, 1997); Katharina Pistor, 'Patterns of Legal Change: shareholder 
and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies' (2000) 1 European Business Organization Law Review 59; 
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scholars, such as La Porta, et al.,115 Johnson, et al., 116 Glaeser, et al., 117  Friedman, et 
al.118   Burkart, et al.,119 Nenova,120 Dyck and Zingales,121 and others, focus on the conflict 
of interests among different shareholders. They found that in countries with weak legal 
protection for investors, there is strong evidence to indicate that large shareholders may 
abuse their controlling powers by appropriating corporate resources and exploiting other 
shareholders’ interests.  
The recent literature on corporate governance indicates a firm’s value can be 
affected by the majority shareholders when they pursue private benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders.122  However, when there are several large shareholders, they may 
be able to provide appropriate checks and balances to this sort of behaviour. In this context, 
Maury and Pajuste, 123 Pagano and Röell, 124 and Young et al.125found that the presence of 
a few large shareholders can mitigate tunneling transactions and so lead to the increase of 
corporate value.  
                                                                                                                                                    
Domagoj Hruška, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests in Post-Privatization Economies (DAAAM 
International, Vienna, Austria 2010). 
115 See for example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer,  ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’ (n 
4). 
116  Simon Johnson and others, 'Tunnelling' '2000' Working Paper,  2000, 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w7523> accessed 08-01-2014. 
117  Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, 'Coase versus the Coasians' (2001) 116 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 853.  
118   Eric Friedman, Simon Johnson and Todd Mitton, 'Propping and Tunneling' (2003) 31 Journal of 
Comparative Economics 732. 
119 Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi,  ‘Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm’ (n 100). 
120  Tatiana Nenova, 'The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis' (2003) 
68 Journal of Financial Economics 325 
121  Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, 'Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison' (2004) 
59 The Journal of Finance 537. 
122 See e.g. Shleifer and Vishny,  ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (n 3);  Claessens, Djankov and Lang,   
‘The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations’  (n 39);  Dyck and Zingales,  (n 121); 
Nenova,  (n 120); Bae, Kang and Kim,  (n 113). 
123   Benjamin Maury and Anete Pajuste, 'Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value' (2005) 29 Journal of 
Banking & Finance 1813. 
124  Pagano and Roell,  (n 116). 
125  Michael N Young and others, 'Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the 
Principal–Principal Perspective' [Academy of Management] 45 Journal of Management Studies 196, 214. 
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The conflict of interests between the majority and the minority of shareholders can 
include the diversion of corporate assets.126 This conflict arises whenever the controlling 
shareholders use their powers over corporate assets to divert the firm’s cash flow into their 
own pockets.127 Johnson et al. describe the process by which a controlling shareholder 
diverts a firm’s assets and profits for their personal enrichment as “tunneling”. They 
indicate that through these tunneling activities controlling shareholders can obtain more 
private benefits than they are entitled to according to their cash flow rights. 128 It is worth 
noting that the possibility of tunneling increases, and is more likely to take place, in firms 
that are directly managed by controlling shareholders.129 
Opportunities in which majority shareholders can tunnel wealth from companies 
and gain personal benefits at the expenses of the minority shareholders can be divided into 
two categories: 130  firstly, the majority-minority shareholder conflict in related-party 
                                                 
126  Alessio M. Pacces, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The law and econmmics control powers 
(Routledge, 2012) 237. For more discussion relating to defining conflict of interest transactions see e.g. 
Lynne L Dallas, 'Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems' 71 North Carolina Law Review 1, 73ff. 
127 Bernard Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets' (2001) 48 UCLA 
Law Review 781. 
128 Johnson and others (n 116).2. 
129 Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura, 'Banks and Corporate Control in Japan' (1999) 54 The Journal of 
Finance 319. 
130 Atanasov, et al divide tunneling into three basic types: cash flow tunneling, asset tunneling, and equity 
tunneling (see Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black and Conrad Ciccotello, 'Unbundling and Measuring 
Tunneling' '2008' U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper, SSRN, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030529> accessed 29/08/2013; Vladimir Atanasov, 
Bernard Black and Conrad Ciccotello, 'Law and Tunneling' (2011) 37 Journal of Corporation Law 1.  
Atanasov, et al treat asset tunneling as separate from cash flow tunneling for several main reasons mentioned 
in their study. (See Atanasov and others (n 130) 8-9). Additionally, Gilson and Gordon divided expropriation 
of private benefits of control by controlling shareholders into three categories:   taking a disproportionate 
amount of the corporation's ongoing earnings,   freezing out the minority, and selling control. See  Ronald J 
Gilson and Jeffrey N Gordon, 'Controlling Controlling Shareholders' (2003) 152 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 785. However, Johnson et al. combine the asset tunneling with cash flow tunneling into a single 
category, which is ‘self-dealing transactions’.   Accordingly, tunneling, as Johnson et al. suggest, is divided 
into two categories. The first one is self-dealing transactions where a controlling shareholder transfers 
resources from the firm to himself. The second category of financial transactions that ‘discriminate against 
minorities’ comes from the ability of the controlling shareholder to increase his share of the firm without 
transferring any assets through dilutive share issues, minority freezeouts, insider trading, creeping 
acquisitions or other financial transactions. (see Johnson and others ‘Tunnelling’ (n 116)). This division is 
what I adopt in this study as it is very common in legal studies. See for example, Pacces (n 126) and 
Kraakman and others (n 83) which covers related party transactions in chapter 6, and the restructuring of 
corporate ownership transactions in chapters 7,8 and 9.  
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transactions and, secondly, the majority-minority shareholder conflict in restructuring 
ownership transactions that discriminate against minorities.131 
1. The majority-minority shareholder conflict in related-party transactions  
A related-party transaction constitutes a common conflict of interests 132 and includes 
transactions in which a controlling shareholder engages in transactions in which a related 
party (in our case a controlling shareholder) deals with himself in the company’s name. 
This is called a self-dealing transaction.133 Such a transaction can result in the diversion of 
corporate assets when a controlling shareholder transacts with the company ‘on terms less 
favourable than could be obtained in an arm’s length negotiation.’ 134  In other words, 
controlling shareholders with discretionary powers may naturally tend to set the transaction 
terms in such a way as to favour their own interest at the expense of the company and the 
minority shareholders. 135   For example, a controlling shareholder may transact with the 
company at off-market prices 136 (e.g. the company buys goods or services from the 
controlling shareholders for an above-market price or sells them to him for a below-market 
price, or gives him loans at below-market rates). In cases where all shareholders participate 
in the management, for example in small companies, the agent-principal problem may not 
arise as shareholder-managers seek to receive the profits through their salaries rather than 
as dividends. However, when a shareholder does not participate in the management and 
other shareholders do, the excessive remuneration paid to those shareholder-mangers will 
                                                 
131 It is worth indicating that the forms of the conflict of interest between the majority and the minority 
shareholders are not limited. Instead they vary according to the transactions that the controlling shareholders 
can make according to the constitution of the company.   
132 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 'The Structure of Corporation Law' (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1461, 1471. 
133 See Pacces (n 126) 234. According to Atanasov, et al, ‘Cash flow tunneling can be loosely defined as self-
dealing transactions which divert what would otherwise be operating cash flow from the firm to insiders (a 
controlling shareholder…)’. (See Atanasov, Black and Ciccotello (n 112) 7). Additionally, Atanasov, et al. 
note that cash flow tunneling ‘does not affect the remaining stock of long-term productive assets, and thus 
does not directly impair the firm’s value to all investors, including the controller’. Also they note that the 
transaction may be classified as asset tunneling when the transaction is large. See ibid. 4 and10. 
134  Kraakman and others (n 83) 154. 
135  It is worth mentioning that such transactions between a firm and its controlling shareholders can 
sometimes benefit the firm. This is called ‘propping’ which is out of the scope of our study. (For information 
see e.g. Friedman, Johnson and Mitton,  (n 118); Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis,  (n 113)).   
136 See  Atanasov, Black and Ciccotello (n 112) 10. 
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reduce the profit available as dividends for the shareholders.137 . In other words, in many 
close corporations, only a few shareholders will act as active managers, while the others 
are passive investors. In such a situation, the manager-shareholders may have an incentive 
to maximize management compensation at the expense of dividends or share appreciation 
even though all shareholders share in profits and losses.138 
Another potential related party transaction occurs when a related party (in our case 
a controlling shareholder) appropriates value belonging to the corporation by taking its 
corporate opportunities. The controlling shareholders may identify a new business 
opportunity and exploit it at the expense of the company (thus at the expense of the 
minority shareholders). It is evident that the problem here is straightforward: if the 
controlling shareholder exploits an opportunity that the company is interested in, the 
company loses a potentially significant revenue opportunity. 
The third instance of exclusionary misappropriation by the corporate controller is 
trading in the company’s shares (insider trading).139  Insider trading can impact negatively 
on the minority shareholders’ interests in two ways. First, the controller (e.g. a controlling 
shareholder) can extract value by taking advantage of his access to information to trade 
with less-informed investors in public securities markets at advantageous prices, thus 
extracting value from their counterparties. 140 Second, insiders can increase their fractional 
ownership at the expense of minority shareholders by using their inside information to 
trade the company’s shares, which may lead to easy profits at the expenses of minority 
shareholders.141   The means of prohibiting such transactions is grounded in fairness or 
                                                 
137 See Kershaw (n 101) 648. 
138 Alison Grey Anderson, 'Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure' 25 UCLA Law 
Reveiw 738, 772-3. 
139 Insider trading is a form of equity tunneling, because ‘it transfers value from uninformed investors to 
insiders without directly affecting firm value’. Atanasov, Black and Ciccotello,  (n 112) 10. 
140 ibid 22-3. 
141 Pacces (n 126) 236. 
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equity,142 since, for example, ‘controlling shareholders appropriate part of the value of yet 
undisclosed company information by selling or buying before it is reflected in stock 
prices’.143  
It should be noted that related-party transactions, in order to take place, do not need 
to directly involve the controlling shareholders since the same issue of insider trading can 
occur in a much broader set of transactions in which, even though they are formally third-
party transactions, the controller is personally interested in the outcome. In such cases the 
third party may be a family member of the controller or his representative (his agent) or his 
principal.144 
2. The majority-minority shareholder conflict in restructuring ownership transactions that discriminate against minorities 145  
The conflict problem between majority and minority shareholders may not consist of the 
direct diversion of assets or cash flow from the company. Instead, it might come from 
corporate restructurings such as share issues, mergers, divisions, winding-up and the like. 
In this case, such transactions can result in the dilution of minority shareholders’ shares in 
favour of the controlling shareholders or the other related party ‘through dilutive share 
issues, minority freeze-outs, creeping acquisitions, or other financial transactions that 
discriminate against minorities’.146   
                                                 
142  Stephen Bainbridge, 'Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma, The' (1986) [ ] 38 
University of Florida Law Review 35, 36. 
143 Kraakman and others (n 83) 154. 
144  See for example, art 159 of LEAA 2010, which states that  
‘Any shareholder shall not vote on a resolution when he has a direct or indirect interest for 
himself, his representative (his agent) or his principal, and the personal interest conflicts with the 
interest of the company. The violation of this rule by the shareholder makes the shareholders’ 
issued resolution actionable when (1) the resolution harms the company and (2) there is evidence 
that the vote of the interested shareholders was necessary to issue the resolution’. 
145 This is also known as ‘equity tunneling’ and it increases the controller’s share of the firm’s value at the 
expense of minority shareholders without directly affecting the firm’s operations.  Examples of equity 
tunneling include dilutive equity issuances and freeze-outs of minority shareholders. Atanasov, Black and 
Ciccotello  (n 112)10. 
146 Johnson and others (n 116) 3. 
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Specifically, tunneling in restructuring ownership transactions can take a variety of 
forms including. Firstly, the majority-minority conflict in share issuance (increasing capital 
transactions), in which minority shareholders’ interests may be appropriated by the 
controlling shareholders when the latter issues a number of shares that either dilute the 
voting power of the minority shareholders 147 or sets the price “at less than their value”. 148  
The risk that minority shareholders face in this scenario is serious since they are not 
protected by shareholders decision rights. Instead, they have to rely on other legal 
mechanisms such as pre-emptive rights.149 In a transaction such as the one described above, 
the controlling shareholders, to a large extent, can make it difficult for minority 
shareholders to defend themselves by making subscribing a difficult and costly process. 
This renders participation in new issues prohibitive for shareholders with small shares. 
Alternatively, the controlling shareholder ‘may deliberately cause the new shares to be 
issued at a time when a minority shareholder is in financial straits and cannot raise funds to 
buy his part’.150 In addition to increasing capital transactions, the conflict between the 
majority shareholders and the minority shareholders can occur in decreasing capital 
transaction. For example, the majority shareholders may decrease the capital of the 
company for purposes that serve his interest rather than the company’s interests, for 
example, to save money to establish a new company rather than there being a need to 
decrease the capital of the company. 
The second scenario is the majority-minority conflict in mergers (Freezeouts). Here 
the conflict between the minority and the majority can occur in several ways. For example,   
controlling shareholders are able to eliminate the minority shareholders either for cash or 
                                                 
147 Kraakman and others (n 83) 195.   
148 F Hodge O'Neal, 'Arrangements which Protect Minority Shareholders against Squeeze-Outs' 45 Minnesota 
Law Review 537, 541. 
149 Kraakman and others (n 83) 195. 
150 O'Neal,  (n 148) 541. See also Kohli v Lit [2009] EWHC 2893. 
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stock through freezeout mechanisms 151  ‘at a market price that reflects a discount 
equivalent to the private benefits of control available from operating the controlled 
corporation’. 152   In such a transaction, the minority shareholders may either miss an 
opportunity to sell their share at a high price, or be forced to sell at too low a price because 
of the illiquidity of the market.153  Also, a minority shareholder may find himself, after the 
merger transaction, under new terms that he does not like (e.g. a term that reduces the 
minority shareholders’ participation in decision making or that deprives them unfairly of 
income or advantages).154  
In addition to the conflict of interest between the shareholders in merger 
transactions, the conflict between shareholders can occur in voluntary liquidation. For 
example, ‘a firm may be liquidated by controlling shareholders who wish to take corporate 
opportunities for itself or the shareholders as a whole may wish to rid themselves of a 
contingent liability’.155 Conflict of interests may also occur during the transformation of 
the company into another type of legal entity, such as a partnership and the sale or 
purchase of assets, which may be in the interest of only controlling shareholders and not 
the minority.  
Finally, the majority-minority conflict in sales of control occurs when the acquirer 
enters into an agreement with the controlling shareholders of the target company first, and 
so is able to choose to what extent a general offer to the non-controlling shareholders 
should be made.156 For instance, a controlling shareholder may extract private benefits of 
control by selling their controlling shares at a premium that reflects the capitalized value of 
                                                 
151 Although most of jurisdictions generally facilitate minority buyouts when a controlling shareholder owns 
more than 90% of the company’s shares, standards here play an important role in regulating conflicted 
transactions. UK (under unfair prejudice) and Libya (under abuse of power principle) offer the minority 
shareholders the right to sue. Additionally, appraisal rights can also work as a mechanism to protect the 
minority shareholders. See Kraakman and others (n 83) 202-8.   
152 See Gilson and Gordon,  (n 130) 796. 
153 Kraakman and others (n 83) 202-8. 
154  O'Neal,  (n 130) 537. 
155 Kraakman and others, (n 83) 218. 
156 ibid 229. 
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the private benefits of control, rather than at the market value; a transaction that is 
detrimental to the minority shareholders as they are obliged to accommodate the added 
premium through accepting a lower share value.157   
Finally, the conflict of interests between the majority and the minority of 
shareholders may not include the diversion of corporate assets or take either of the two 
forms of tunneling described above. Instead the conflict between the majority and the 
minority may occur when the controlling shareholders use their votes to amend the terms 
of the constitution of the company in their interest at the expense of the minority 
shareholders. For example, they may use their control to make changes to the balance of 
corporate power between the shareholders and the board of directors, or to amend the 
rights attached to minority shareholders’ shares.    Additionally, conflict occurs when the 
controlling shareholders support the management to build an empire, seeking greater 
personal status at the expense of the minority shareholders. In such cases, a controlling 
shareholder may aim to maximize the value that comes from non-pecuniary benefits, such 
as social prestige, reputation and social influence, including political power. 158  
2.3.1.2. Analysing the problematic of the conflict of interests between the 
majority shareholders and the minority shareholders in the case of Libya  
As discussed above, Libya has a concentrated ownership structure which regularly leads to 
conflicts between the majority shareholders (in most cases the state) and the minority 
shareholders.  This is because in such a structure the majority shareholders have incentives 
to extract private benefits from the company at the expense of the minority shareholders.  
                                                 
157 Gilson and Gordon, (n 130) 793.  Many jurisdictions require that buyers make an equal offer to all 
shareholders.(See Kraakman and others (n 83) 229). Also, some countries (such as Bulgaria) require majority 
of minority approval for the transfer of control. See  Vladimir Atanasov, Conrad S Ciccotello and Stanley B 
Gyoshev, 'Learning from the General Principles of Company Law for Transition Economies: The Case of 
Bulgaria' ( ) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 1003. (The article discusses minority approvals of tender offers 
in going-private transactions). 
158 Gilson and Gordon,  (n 130). 
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Such benefits can be gained in two ways: either directly through control of decisions made 
at a general meeting, or indirectly through exerting influence over the board of directors.159  
The conflict of interests between the majority shareholders and the minority 
shareholders is particularly problematic in Libya since the Libyan law provides controlling 
shareholders with unrestricted control over the company, thereby allowing for abuses and 
injustices towards minority shareholders. Indeed, the statutory provisions in Libyan 
Company Law that deal specifically with the protection of minority shareholders are very 
few and those   that do exist are incomplete, ambiguous and unbalanced, as discussed later. 
This is due to the fact that the Libyan legal system generally, and the corporate legal 
system particularly, tend to protect the control of the state over the economy at the expense 
of other shareholders. The existence of the state as a controlling shareholder in most large 
companies in Libya made, in the words of MacNeil, the ‘adoption of a "shareholder 
primacy" model of corporate governance relatively attractive’, since it provided a way for 
the state to directly own and control its companies.160 The application of such a model 
would allow the relevant state to pursue a socialist market objective by exercising 
controlling interests in most companies.161    
The other crucial reason that the conflict of interests between the majority 
shareholders and the minority shareholders is pervasive and particularly problematic in 
Libya is the widespread nature of corruption within the private and public sectors. The 
empirical studies undertaken by Caron et al, found that in countries with high levels of 
corruption, firms lack efficient corporate governance practices. 162  Further, XUN WU 
indicates that low corporate governance standards can have a deep impact on the 
                                                 
159 Kershaw (n 101) 646.   
160 This is noted by MacNeil in the case of China but is equally applicable to the Libyan case. See Iain 
MacNeil, 'Adaptation and Convergence in Corporate Governance: The Case of Chinese Listed Companies' 
(2002) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 289, 309. 
161 ibid. 
162 Michelle I. Caron, Aysun Ficici and Christopher L. Richte, ' The Influence of Corruption on Corporate 
Governance Standards: Shared Characteristics of Rapidly Developing Economies' 2 Emerging market 
Journal 21. 
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effectiveness of the global anti-corruption campaign. 163  Accordingly, since Libya is 
characterized by high levels of corruption (according to the last annual report on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2014 issued by Transparency International, Libya 
ranked 166th among 174 countries in the word), 164  Libya’s firms lack the efficient 
corporate governance mechanisms capable of contributing to a resolution in the majority-
minority conflict. Thus the combination of widespread corruption, combined with a lack of 
minority shareholders protection, makes the conflict of interests between the majority 
shareholders and the minority shareholders a significant issue in Libya.  
However, the conflict problem that derives from corporate restructurings, 
especially mergers and takeovers, which result in the dilution of minority shareholders’ 
shares, are significantly less frequent in Libya for several reasons. Regarding the majority-
minority conflict in mergers (Freezeouts), it is worth mentioning that minority freezeouts 
are not an issue in the Libyan economy since the law does not even allow controlling 
shareholders who own more than 90% of a company’s shares to freezeout or eliminate the 
minority shareholders. However, Libyan law does allow the elimination of minority 
shareholders in three cases: (1) when a shareholder does not pay the instalments of his 
shares; (2) when the company sees, in capital decreasing processes, that it is necessary to 
decrease the amount of shares; and (3) when there is an agreement between the 
shareholders that allows the company to eliminate particular shareholders in particular 
circumstances. 165  
Moreover, regarding the majority-minority conflict in a sale of control, it should be 
noted that takeover transactions generally, in emerging market economies that has a 
                                                 
163  See XUN WU, 'Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis' (2005) 18 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions , 151, 155. 
164 See Ch.3 (n 126).  
165 For details see Mohamed Tibar, The Theory of Shareholders' Rights in Joint Stock  Companies (Arab 
Union Madbaha, 1998) 913-26 (in Arabic). 
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concentrated ownership structure, are rare. This is because the market is illiquid166  and 
such markets have low transparency and poor quality information disclosure, both of 
which are required to encourage potential acquirer companies to enter in to takeover 
transactions. By contrast, in the UK and the U.S, where controlling shareholders are 
unlikely, the market for corporate control is very active, which in turn facilitates takeovers 
that function as a disciplining device.167  
Though today takeover transactions in countries with a concentrated ownership 
structure have become much more commonplace, this is not the case in Libya due to 
factors that relate to the specific environment of Libya. Firstly, the Libyan government 
follows a policy that prevents it from selling profitable equities. This is evident in the 
previous discussion on the Libyan privatisation programme where the government 
privatized only the non-profitable companies.  Secondly, despite the fact that there is no 
official data or empirical study which confirm that merger and takeover transitions are rare 
in Libya, it is clear that the lack of a competitive environment in the Libyan market (which 
is one of the most important requirements for frequent merger and takeover transactions) is 
due to the fact that the state owns most enterprises in Libya. 168  Thirdly, takeover 
transactions in an environment like Libya are almost impossible since there is a complete 
absence of loan-financed purchases 169  that may help investors to enter into takeover 
transactions. Finally, currently the Libyan Stock Market has only ten listed companies, so 
public takeover has not taken place so far and is unlikely to occur in the near future.   
This situation arguably justifies the present inadequacy of provisions (or a separate 
laws or acts) that set down takeover and even merger transactions in Libya. In other words, 
                                                 
166 Iain G MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment (2nd edn Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2012) 356, Kraakman and others (n 83) 308.     
167 If the management extracts too many private benefits, the share price drops and the company becomes a 
takeover target. In order to get control over the firm, an acquirer has to buy the majority of both cash flow 
and control rights. See Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, 'One-share-one-vote and the Market for Corporate 
Control,' 20 Journal of Financial Economic 175. 
168 It should be noted that even the competition law was not enacted in Libya until 2010. 
169 Alqadhafi (n 46) 65.  
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as merger and takeover transactions are not yet an issue in Libya, there are very few legal 
clauses that regulate merger and takeover transactions. For example, the Libyan Law only 
speaks to merger transaction in arts 294-305 of LEAA 2010 (about two pages)170 and there 
are only a very few clauses that relate to takeover transactions.171   Though, the general 
rules of civil law address the issue of coordination between the acquirer and the non-
controlling shareholders, this is a wholly inadequate mechanism for to the regulation of 
such transactions.     
 2.3.2. The corporate governance problems of state ownership: Agency 
theory applied to a state owned enterprises 
State ownership was common among developed nations in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, 
and in developing nations throughout the post-war period. In developing nations, state 
ownership was justified in terms of facilitating economic independence, planned 
development,172 and delivering social justice.173 In the case of Libya, the state remains a 
                                                 
170 Branch 4 of Book 1 of LEAA 2010 entitled ‘Changing a Company, its Merger, its Divisions and its 
Combination’. 
171 Takeover, in Libya, is only regulated under holding companies (arts.249-255 of LEAA 2010) (almost 2 
pages). art. 249 of LEAA 2010 entitled ‘The Structure of Holding Companies’ identifies a holding company 
as a company that acquires one or more companies financially and administratively by owning the majority 
of their shares. The same article states that ‘a JSC is not allowed to acquire more than 50% of another 
company unless it changes its shape to a holding company’. Additionally, art 250 of LEAA 2010 sets down 
the goals of the companies, art 251, covers the financial relationship of holding companies, art 252 sets down 
the capital of the company, art 253 addresses the hiring of the representatives of holding companies, and art 
254 sets down the budget and financial statements of holding companies. Accordingly, there is no provision 
that regulates the relationship between the minority and the majority shareholders, or protects minority 
shareholders against the majority shareholders. However, general civil laws must be applicable, in such 
cases. This is the case in most Arab World countries such as Egypt and Iraq. See Ismael  Ibrahem and Nofl 
Rehman  AL-Jbouri, 'The Legal Responsibility to Acquired on Participation Company: Comparative Study' 
(2010) 1/year 4 Journal of Legal and Political Sciences 9 (in Arabic). Additionally, there is no any regulation 
of takeover transactions in the Libyan Stock Market Act no.11/2010. However, it should be noted that Art 
71(3) states that ‘the Executive Regulation of the Stock Market Act regulates purchases of shares within the 
Stock Market’. Thus far the Executive Regulation has not been issued. (Executive regulations of the stock 
market acts usually regulate takeover transactions and the minority shareholders protection in this regard. See 
for example the Executive Regulation of Kuwait Stock Market no 7/2010, Ch.7 art.247-292). 
172  Mary Shirley and Patrick Walsh, 'Public vs. Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate' '2001' 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2420, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=261854> accessed 28-10-
2013, 3. 
173 Alqadhafi noted that the existence of the public sector interpreted for conditions related to achieving 
social justice. See Alqadhafi (n 46) 21-4. 
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key player despite the extensive privatisation programmes, a situation that can be found in 
many countries around the world,174 such as China.175  
Since most listed and large private companies are directly or indirectly controlled 
by the government or its agencies, there are many problems created by state shareholders, 
particularly in terms of the relationships between the minority-majority shareholders.176 
Here I argue that the structure of state-owned concentrated ownership in Libya and the 
political influence exerted on corporate governance, contributes directly to the poor quality 
of corporate governance of Libyan companies.  Specifically, the problems are essentially 
attributable to the conflict between the state as a controlling shareholder and the other 
dispersed shareholders, which results in agency issues (2.3.2.1). Moreover, the poor quality 
of corporate governance is compounded by a lack of monitoring by representatives of the 
state (2.3.2.2).     
2.3.2.1. The conflict between the state as controlling shareholders and the 
minority shareholders 
In transition countries, there is a common phenomenon of so-called insider control in 
corporate governance, where insiders, managers and /or employees as new owners, gain 
                                                 
174 Sunita Kikeri and Aishetu Kolo, 'Privatization: Trends and Recent Developments' '2005' World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, 2005, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=849344> 
accessed 13-01-2014.  This study examines the recent privatization trends and investigates the extent to 
which government ownership is still dominant in developing countries. The study also suggests that despite 
widespread privatization, government ownership in state enterprises is still dominant in some regions and 
countries, and in certain sectors in virtually all regions. See also Oleh   Havrylyshyn and Donal  McGettigan, 
'Privatization in Transition Countries: A Sampling of the Literature' '1999' MF Working Paper No. 99/6, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880533> accessed 13-01-2014. 
175  The Chinese Government are still the owner of most of enterprises in China. Privatization and 
restructuring of SOEs mostly relates to small and medium sized firms. This is similar to the case of Libya as 
discussed in (2.1.2). Today, China's SOEs still owns more than one-quarter of national production, two-thirds 
of total assets, more than half of urban employment and almost three-quarters of investment. See e.g.  Yan 
Wang and Xiaonian Xu, 'Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance: The Case 
of Chinese Stock Companies' (1999) 10 China Economic Review 75; Harry G Broadman, 'The Business (es) 
of the Chinese State' (2001) 24 The World Economy 849;  Donald Clarke, 'Corporate Governance in China: 
An Overview' (2003) 14 China Economic Review 494;  ;  Henk Berkman, Rebel A Cole and Lawrence J Fu, 
'Improving Corporate Governance Where the State is the Controlling Block Holder: Evidence from China' 
[2012] 20 The European Journal of Finance 1. 
176 See  e.g. Chen Qintai, 'State Shareholders Should Become an Active Force in Promoting and  Establishing 
Effective Corporate Governance' '2004', <http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-
ownedenterprises/31452400.pdf> accessed 14-01-2014. 
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substantial control rights during the process of privatization.177 In such economies the main 
issue facing corporate governance is how to design a mechanism which deals effectively 
with insider control problems that give rise to conflicts between the managers and/or 
employees who are controlling shareholders and other, minority, shareholders.   However, 
this is not the case in Libya since the privatisation programme has not been completed. The 
main corporate governance problem arising within SOEs in Libya is the conflict of 
interests between minority shareholders and the bureaucrats and politicians who represent 
SOEs. 
In principle, the main dilemma faced by Libyan SOEs is the conflicting objectives 
that result in agency issues (political interference).178 In the structure of state concentrated 
share ownership, the state, as the biggest shareholder in both listed and large private 
companies, pursues its political goals (usually social welfare maximisation) at the expense 
of other shareholders rather than pursuing profit maximization or efficiency, 179 which 
should usually be given priority in a market economy. In other words, SOEs not only have 
commercial goals but they are also obligated to serve social objectives, such as providing 
jobs, serving public interests and providing basic necessities. As a result of these various 
demands, SOEs can be prevented from competing with their private counterparts for 
profits; a situation which hinders the development of a free, competitive system.180  
The principal-agent issue that is considered one of the SOEs major problems has 
two dimensions. Firstly, in such a system, the management and also bureaucrats, and 
                                                 
177 See e.g. Aoki Masahiko, 'Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition 
Econornies' in M Aoki and HK Kim (eds), Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies (The World 
Bank 1995). 
178 These problems are, in fact, the main problem of any SOE in any country. However, there are other 
problems of corporate governance found in SOEs, such as unprofessional boards of directors and the 
underperformance of the management, which are not relevant to this study.  For more information see e.g.  
Simon Wong, 'Improving Corporate Governance in SOEs: An Integrated Approach' (2004) 7 Corporate 
Governance International 6. 
179 See .e.g. Maria Vagliasindi, 'Governance Arrangements for State Owned Enterprises' '2008' World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4542, 2008, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102837> accessed 13-01-2014;   Shirley and Walsh (n 
172) 20. 
180 See  Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, 'Law, Endowments, and Finance' (2003) 70 
Journal of Financial Economics 137. 
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politicians who represent the state as an owner, act as loyal agents of the citizens,181 
especially when political markets are assumed to be working efficiently.182  In this respect, 
even in fully competitive environments, SOEs will be inefficient because politicians use 
them to deal with political goals such as over-employment.183Accordingly, the conflict of 
interest arises in corporate governance between the state as a controlling shareholder (even 
though its goal is to achieve social welfare maximisation) and the minority shareholders, 
since ‘in many countries, it has been recognised that business operations, even if publicly 
owned, have to be run according to a commercial rather than an administrative cycle’. 184 
As an example of such a conflict, currently the Libyan government is tending to grant 
Libyan rebels investment loans from commercial banks in which the state is the controlling 
shareholder, in order to encourage them to leave their militias and enter civil society. No 
doubt there is a social goal behind this policy. However, this strategy may prove 
detrimental to the minority shareholders in those banks since such loans may be not 
profitable as most of the rebels have no experience of running businesses.   
Secondly, the principal-agent issue may come from the assumption that politicians 
and bureaucrats, as representatives of the state, may not perform their work either in the 
interests of the company itself or as loyal agents of the citizens. Instead they may run the 
company for their personal interest as opposed to the owner’s (the state’s) interest. The 
traditional example of this is when officials who control the SOE move the SOE's assets to 
another company, which is either owned directly by himself or a related party (e.g. friends 
or relatives).  Even when this is not the case, it may be that the politicians and bureaucrats 
will not run the company seriously, since they have no direct interest in the SOE. More 
                                                 
181 All people of the state are the owner of an SOE's assets, but they are controlled by the government and its 
agencies. Unlike private shareholders, the government’s role in corporate governance is largely dependent on 
political incentives and individual utility maximisation instead of shareholders' value.  
182 Shirley and Walsh (n 172). 
183 These arguments are verified by research documenting political influence over SOEs. For criticism of 
SOEs documenting the influence of politicians see  Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, 'Politicians and 
Firms' (1994) 109 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 995; Shirley and Walsh (n 172). 
184 OECD, Corporate Governance, State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation (OECD, 1998) 15. 
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than that, they can potentially be blamed if the SOE gains high profits as it would be 
regarded as too commercial an SOE.185 In other words, SOEs are controlled by politicians 
who are supposed to implement the state’s policy. However, this is not always the case 
since politicians and bureaucrats are known to act in their own interests as well. For 
instance, when SOEs request higher budgets, it can be the case that managers offer the 
politicians something in return. Shleifer and Vishny examine such a situation, linking the 
results of different assumptions to the prevalence of bribes. They found that SOE managers 
create employment that is politically desirable and economically inefficient, and in return 
politicians grant managers budget increases.186   
Empirical evidence has proved that politicians in charge of SOEs do, in fact, act in 
ways that benefit themselves at the expense of general welfare of the society (and so at the 
expense of the minority shareholders as well). Shleifer and Vishny list a number of cases 
of SOE inefficiency that result from political intervention, such as excess employment, 
above-market wages, investment in projects that benefit politicians rather than consumers, 
and allocative distortions resulting from skewed pricing schemes.187 Also, Frydman et al 
examined state ownership in transition economies and found that “politicization” prevents 
SOEs from restructuring and in particular e.g. they show that political pressures prevent 
layoffs.188 Similar processes are described in the works of Jones.189       
Furthermore, even though there are no studies or data available, it is commonly 
understood in Libya that the state often enters into related-party transactions as intra-group 
transactions. The state, as a shareholder (usually the Libyan Economic Ministry), controls 
a number of companies, both listed and delisted. In such cases, quite apart from outright 
theft, the Economy Ministry, for example, may have one company providing accounting 
                                                 
185  Wong,  (n 178) 9. 
186  Shleifer and Vishny,  ‘Politicians and Firms’ (n 183). 
187 ibid 995-6; See also  Leroy P Jones, 'Public Enterprise for Whom? Perverse Distributional Consequences 
of Public Operational Decisions' (1985) 33 Economic Development and Cultural Change 333 387-41 
188  Frydman and others,  (n 69) 1177. 
189 Jones,  (n 189) 337ff. 
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services to the rest of the companies that it owns even though it provides a poor service. 
Also, the Ministry may transfer cash from a company to another that it owns.   This allows 
the Ministry to redistribute profits or resources from one member firm to another member 
firm at the expense of the minority shareholders. While this kind of coordination may serve 
legitimate business purposes, each inter-firm transaction clearly provides opportunities for 
expropriation from minority shareholders.190 It should be noted that Libyan law neither 
provides provisions to separate the social and business functions of SOEs, nor eliminates 
the problems that derive from political interference despite the fact that political 
interference in SOEs has the potential to prevent companies from being competitive in the 
open market.  
2.3.2.2. The state as a controlling shareholder and the lack of efficient 
monitoring    
In principle, controlling shareholders are able to efficiently monitor the management of 
private companies because of the existence of owner-operated private firms, the 
disciplining role of takeovers, 191  a healthy market for managers, profit-oriented 
monitors192 and the ability of markets to generate information that helps private firms in 
monitoring processes. 193  Also, in private  companies, the strong incentives of large 
shareholders to monitor mangers derives from their cash flow rights that line up their 
interests with those of the company. 194  However, state ownership is characterized by 
weak monitoring because the shareholding politicians and bureaucrats (agents) have no 
                                                 
190 For information about  intra-group transactions see Kraakman and others (n 83) 176-7. 
191 See e.g. Shirley and Walsh, (n 172) 8. 
192 Sunita Kikeri and John Nellis, 'Privatization in Competitive Sectors: the Record to Date' '2002' World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2002, < http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-
2860> accessed 14-01-2014 
193 See .e.g. John Vickers and George Yarrow, 'Economic Perspectives on Privatization' (1991) 5 The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 111, 115. 
194 Ding Chen, Corporate Governance, Enforcement and Financial Development: The Chinese Experience 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013) 93. It may be argued that the agent might be motivated to monitor 
if they are liable for the failure of the supervisees. However, ‘it is very difficult to establish the causality 
between a company’s poor performance and monitor’s  failure in order to hold them accountable; second, it 
will encourage the agent to over-monitor and might impede managers’ discretion, which is necessary for the 
operation of the business’. ibid 94. 
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personal equity and no cash flow rights at stake in SOEs that they supervise compared with 
the majority of shareholders in private companies (sometimes referred to as the “absent 
owner problem”).195 Consequently, ‘they do not have strong personal financial incentives 
to monitor company performance closely or otherwise to exercise formal shareholder 
rights to ensure the companies operate as efficiently as possible.’196 Thus ‘they do not 
directly benefit or suffer from the performance of the company’197 that they monitor. On 
the other hand, it has been argued that citizens (in this case, Libyans) who are the real 
owners, and the ministries who hold the shares on behalf their collective benefits, are 
poorly placed to monitor the companies because of “free-rider” problems.198  
It is important to stress that a lack of monitoring by the controlling shareholders in 
SOEs raises two conflicts. Firstly, because of the fact that managers and owners have 
different objectives, and because the owner does not have complete information about the 
behaviour and decisions of the manager, there is a conflict between the management and 
the owners which falls outside the scope of our study.  Secondly, another principle-agent 
problem (the majority-minority problem) is brought about because the shareholding 
politicians and bureaucrats are not interested in monitoring the company and improving the 
performance of SOEs,199 rather they are able to use their authority to serve their own 
                                                 
195 Wong,  (n 178) 10; OECD ‘Corporate Governance, State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation’ (n 184) 
41; Chen (n 194) 93. See also Donald C Clarke, 'Corporate Governance in China: An Overview' 14 China 
Economic Review 494 . 
196 OECD (n 184) 41.  For more details see Yuwa Wei, Comparative Corporate Governance: A Chinese 
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this result is controversial, the studies that support the idea that state ownership has a positive effect on firm 
performance are very few. In this regard Shirley compared 52 empirical studies on the issue (see Shirley and 
Walsh (n 172)) 32 studies found that the performance of private and privatized firms is more efficient than 
SOEs. However, only 15 studies found no relationship between ownership and performance and only 5 
studies concluded that SOEs perform better than private firms. 
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interests, which detrimentally affects the minority shareholders. Moreover, the lack of 
accountability and transparency of SOEs substantially increases the risk of exploitation by 
self-interested politicians. 200   
Importantly, the weak control and monitoring by the state in Libya has resulted 
from several financial and administrative problems such as ‘bureaucracy, centralization of 
management, functional dissatisfaction, administrative and financial corruption, 
favouritism, fraudulence and bias, etc’. 201 In this context, some Audit Bureau reports 
indicate a lack of control and monitoring in the public sector. For example, in the Arab 
Cement CO, there was a lack of control and monitoring by the state and an absence of co-
ordination between the production units, especially with respect to purchase operations 
abroad. In addition, a lack of discipline among the employees of the Company resulted in 
the stopping of production in certain factories.  202 Also, in the General Cargo Transport 
CO., there is weak control and monitoring concerning the fixed and movable assets of the 
company, thus exposing them to damage and loss. 203  This is applicable to animal 
production projects in the agricultural sector204 and the Libyan Fishing Co,205 and it also 
applies to the banking sector where the Central Bank of Libya failed to control and monitor 
the commercial banks of which it is an entire or partial owner.206 
With the inefficiency of monitoring by the state as the controlling shareholder, it 
could be argued that Libyan banks, as the main financier of debt in Libya, should have a 
role in monitoring firms. However, the corporate governance theory that debt is a 
governance mechanism capable of providing additional monitoring over management 
                                                                                                                                                    
Although it is controversial that the SOEs perform poorly, there is no doubt that in the case of Libya, such 
enterprises suffer a lot of losses as a result of poor performance. This situation is considered a main reason 
for transferring the economy from a planned economy to a free market economy as discussed in (1.2.2).    
200 Wong,  (n 178) 10.201 Alqadhafi (n 46) 35. 
201 Alqadhafi (n 46) 35. 
202 See Report of Audit Bureau for 1989 p. 47 cited in ibid. 35. 
203 Report of Audit Bureau for 1989 p. 115 cited in ibid. 35. 
204 Report of Audit Bureau for 1989 p. 53 cited in ibid 35. 
205 Report of Audit Bureau for 1990 p. 69-70 cited in ibid 36. 
206 Libyan Audit Bureau-LAB,'Annual Report of  the Libya Audit Bureau-2013' (Libyan Audit Bureau, 
Libyan Audit Bureau 2013) 320 (in Arabic). 
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(since bank loans enables the debt-holders (the banks) to monitor the corporations directly 
and collectively)207 does not work efficiently in Libya. The Libyan government has neither 
adopted the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, which is characterised by the 
protection of investors and creditors, nor introduced a bank system that provides efficient 
monitoring of the performance of the enterprise, such as has been adopted in Japan and 
Germany. Instead, though banks are the main providers of external finance to Libyan 
companies and the relationships between banks and enterprises are naturally close, the 
banks in Libya are unable to play a role in corporate governance and monitor the firms 
efficiently.208 This is because the external finances provided by the banks represent only a 
small part of corporate financing and, as such, banks may not feel motivated to monitor 
clients effectively.209Additionally, the banks are poor governance agents and have distorted 
incentives. The loans are regulated by personal relationship rules rather than corporate 
governance mechanisms. In this context, Porter, and Yergin pointed out that: 
[B]anks [in Libya] have difficulties in assessing the riskiness of loans, 
since they lack standardized and reliable information on the financial 
conditions of borrowers, and market data. In the absence of robust 
risk assessment systems, financial institutions have adopted 
alternative procedures to mitigate lending risks. For example, Libyan 
banks disburse loans primarily to customers whom bank employees 
know personally. For customers without personal connections, banks 
demand substantial collateral—as much as 125% of the total loan 
amount in some cases. […] In the SME survey Libyan SMEs 
identified banks’ tendency to lend only to those known personally, 
                                                 
207  In this regard Berglöf and  Claessens states that  
Lending and monitoring by banks, typically the most important source of external 
finance, is of particular interest. As lenders, banks will have a direct stake in the 
governance of corporations, requiring firm behavior that assures that their loans can be 
repaid. As monitors, banks can compensate for some weaknesses in the general 
enforcement environment as they have repeated dealings, have reputation to maintain 
in lending, and can economize on monitoring and enforcement technology. The 
development of bank lending itself obviously relies on the effectiveness of the 
regulatory framework and supervision, in addition to other institutions allowing 
collateral to be collected.  
See Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens, 'Corporate Governance and Enforcement' '2004' World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3409, September 2004 
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-3409> accessed 29-10-2013, 34. 
208 See (1.3.2.2) 45ff.  
209 Erik  Berglöf, 'Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: The Theory and Its Policy Implications' in 
M Aoki and H Ki Kim (eds), Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies (The World Bank, 1995)  61. 
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and to demand large collateral, as the two main difficulties in raising 
capital from government banks.210  
 
Further, the Libyan Bank Law does not delegate any role to Libyan banks in regard 
to the obligation of firms to disclose information to the banks about the firm's major 
business and financial activities, or even to accept monitoring from the creditor bank. Also, 
the law does not grant Libyan banks the right to audit all the dealings between the firm and 
other banking institutions, or to punish the firm if there are any activities that breach the 
terms of the loan. Such rules that endorse a primary monitoring role for banks to restrain 
the inside control behaviour within large SOEs have been adopted in many other transition 
countries, such as China.211   
 Since monitoring by the state as a controlling shareholder and by the banks is not 
effective in Libya, the government has adopted another way to monitor the management of 
SOEs which falls outside corporate governance. According to Law no 19 of 2013 
Concerning the Reorganization of the Audit Bureau,212 the Audit Bureau is delegated to 
monitor the management of SOEs of which the Government owns 25% or more of the 
capital213 and enterprises that were obtained by donation or loan from the government (if 
the loan agreement stipulated that the Audit Bureau has the authority to monitor them).214 
Article 13 of Law no 19 of 2013 sets down the process of monitoring the management of 
these SOEs.215 
In short, the conflict of interests between the majority shareholders and the 
minority shareholders is particularly problematic in Libya because LEAA 2010 provides 
controlling shareholders with unrestricted control over the company and there is a 
                                                 
210 Porter and Yergin (n 55) 57. 
211  See   Jian Chen, Corporate Governance in China (Psychology Press, 2005) 54. 
212 The Libyan Audit Bureau is an independent body is guided by the legislative authority (art 1 of Law no 19 
of 2013). The Libyan Audit Bureau aims to monitor the public assets and money and reveal any financial 
violations and breaches in public institutions (art 2 (1), (3) of Law no. 19 of 2013).   
213 See Law no 19 of 2013, art 3 (2). 
214 See Law no 19 of 2013, art 3 (5). 
215  For more information see  Majdi Abdou, Subsequent Financial Oversight of The State Budget: A 
Comparative Study between Libyan law and Egyptian laws (Al Mergib University, School of Law 2006) 
270ff (in Arabic). Ch.4 discusses the process of monitoring the public institutions. 
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widespread nature of corruption within the private and public sectors.   Additionally, the 
conflict between the state as controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders differ 
from that which occurs between the controlling shareholders as an individual and the 
minority shareholders.  This is because the management, and also bureaucrats, and 
politicians who represent the state seek to serve social objectives (as, they act as agents of 
the citizens) rather than commercial goals, which are the goals of the minority 
shareholders. Also, since the representatives of the state (as a controlling shareholders)  
have no direct interest in running the company, the principal-agent issue arise from the 
assumption that politicians and bureaucrats may not perform their work either in the 
interests of the company or the state. Instead, they may run the company for their personal 
interest.  This situation contributes, among other things, to a lack of efficient monitoring.   
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I located the dimensions of the conflict of interest problem between the 
minority and majority shareholders in Libya. Having defined structures of corporate 
ownership, which is very important as it affects the nature of governance problems, the 
chapter discussed the corporate structure in Libya (a concentrated ownership structure) 
where the Libyan government retains a large ownership position in many sectors of the 
economy across both public and private commercial enterprises. Though this is a legacy of 
the socialist policies adopted from 1970 to the 1990s, the structure has not changed due to 
the inefficiency of the privatisation programmes. 
The concentrated ownership structure in Libya forms the nature of the principal-
agent problem, which is a problem of conflicts of interest between the minority and 
majority shareholders.  In this system minorities are vulnerable to exploitation and fraud by 
the majority as the shareholders with a high ownership share are capable of using their 
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position to acquire private benefits by using their voting rights to consume corporate 
resources to their advantage. However, the conflict of interests between the majority 
shareholders and the minority shareholders is particularly problematic in Libya. This is 
because LEAA 2010 provides controlling shareholders with unrestricted control over the 
company, thereby allowing for abuses and injustices towards minority shareholders. This 
situation is compounded by the widespread culture of corruption within the private and 
public sectors in Libya.  
The conflict between the state as controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders in Libya takes a specific form. This is because the state is the dominant owner 
of the most assets of public and private large companies in Libya. Therefore, the form of 
the conflict between the state as a controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders 
may occur in the two following ways: firstly, the management, (and also bureaucrats, and 
politicians) seek to achieve social objectives rather than commercial goals. Secondly, since 
the representatives of the state (as a controlling shareholders)  have no direct interest in 
running the company, so there is an assumption that they may not perform their work in 
either the interests of the company or the state especially in the absence of effective 
monitoring.  
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Chapter 3: Evaluating the Current Mechanism Employed 
in Libya: The Deficiency of the Minority Shareholders 
Actions    
Introduction  
Having determined the dimensions of the minority-majority shareholder problem in the 
previous chapter, here the study evaluates the solution to this problem currently used under 
art 159 of LEAA: the minority shareholders actions.  It is useful to note that the strategy 
adopted by UK law and Libyan Law in relation to the majority-minority shareholders 
problem differs from the one that deals with the directors-shareholders problem. In both 
countries, company directors are subject to a range of different provisions that address 
conflict of interest transactions, e.g. law duties of loyalty, statutory disclosure, and 
shareholder approval. Regarding listed companies, directors are subject to disclosure and 
approval obligations pursuant to the UK listing rules and Libyan Stock Market Regulation 
respectively. 1  However, controlling shareholders are not subject to such duties or 
obligations in either country. There are not, for either public or private companies, any ex 
ante disclosure obligations on the board or the shareholder body for matters concerning, 
for example, related-party transactions with controlling shareholders, or any approval 
requirement. 2  However, the UK Listing Rule makes an exception for premium listed 
companies: premium listed companies and their controlling shareholders must enter into a 
written agreement, under this agreement, transactions and arrangements with the 
controlling shareholder and their associates must be conducted at arm’s length and on 
normal commercial terms.   This new mechanism grants the minority shareholders a tool to 
                                                 
1 See (5.1.1). 
2 For example, there is no equivalent of a controller in section 177 and 182 of CA 2006 (and art 181 of 
LEAA 2010), board disclosure obligations for self-dealing transactions or any requirement to obtain 
shareholder approval for related-party transactions, as is required for self-dealing transactions pursuant to the 
substantial property transaction rules in sections 190-195 of CA2006 (and art 181 of LEAA 2010). 
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veto any unfair transactions between the company and controlling shareholder, as 
discussed in Ch.4.3  
Therefore, the solution adopted in both countries to deal with conflict of interest 
transactions by controlling shareholders (except in relating to the UK premium listed 
companies) is a minority shareholders action. In fact, this option is the dominant tool for 
addressing conflict of interest transactions in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
including the UK, which adopts the unfair prejudice remedy4 and Libya which adopts the 
Liability Action and the Nullification Action. 
However, Libya, like many developing and transition countries, and unlike many 
developed countries, has an inadequate legal system especially in terms of the enforcement 
court system, which is a common issue in such countries.5 Indeed, writing good laws does 
not automatically solve the majority-minority shareholders problem as there are still many 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of the majority-minority shareholder remedies even 
with existence of good law. In other words, massive expropriation by the controlling 
shareholders can occur ‘even when the law on the books is nearly optimal’.6  This is 
largely because rules and regulations are not effectively enforced by courts. This situation 
may take years to be reformed as it requires the creation of a functioning court system and 
judges to be adequately trained. Thus, currently, enforcement (rather than regulations and 
laws on the books) is the key problem in Libya.7  
                                                 
3 See (4.4.1.2). 
4 See Reinier R. Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford University press 2009) 175-
6; David Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford University Press 2012) 704. 
5 Recent research underlines the fact that enforcement of the rule of law is the central functional difference 
between developed market economies and developing economies.  Whilst in developed countries the debate 
concerns, for example, the issue of the optimal level of enforcement intensity (See for example, John C. Jr.  
Coffee and Adolf A.  Berle, ‘Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement ’ (2007) 156 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review) in transition countries, such as Libya, this is not the case, instead the debate 
concerns a lack of enforcement and how can it be enhanced, as discussed in (3.2). 
6 Jr. Jack C. Coffee, ‘Privitization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure’ 
(1999) 25 Journal of Corporation Law 1, 6. 
7 According to La Porta et al., transition countries achieve higher levels of investor rights protection on the 
books when compared to most developed economies. La Porta et al. found that transition economies score 
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The central objective of this chapter is to examine to what extent the current 
approach adopted under art 159 of LEAA 2010 to protect the minority shareholders is 
appropriate to the Libyan case. This chapter explores how a remedy can be effective within 
Libya which is currently characterised by a lack of legal enforcement. Currently, the 
Libyan courts system is ineffective and the Libyan judicial system can be considered as a 
system of non-intervention. 8  The combination of these factors prevents minority 
shareholders from suing majority shareholders for breach, misuse, wrongdoing or 
oppression. This chapter does not suggest a model of best practice that Libya could adopt 
in respect of the private enforcement of shareholders’ rights. Instead it evaluates the 
general approach adopted in art 159 of LEAA 2010 regarding minority shareholder 
protection within the context of both the lack of enforcement in Libya and the minority 
shareholders’ lack of access to the court system. 9 This is designed to provide the analytical 
context that will allow us to introduce our main argument in the following chapter, that 
self-enforcement is the most effective and appropriate solution to address this problem in 
the case of Libya.   
In order to achieve this objective, and for the sake of clarity, section (3.1) begins by 
briefly outlining some basic factors concerning how the approach outlined in art159 is 
currently operative in Libya. To that end, this section firstly discusses actions that the 
minority shareholders can bring under LEAA 2010 (3.1.1) and secondly, outlines the 
mechanisms that Libyan courts can apply to solve such conflicts (3.1.2). 
                                                                                                                                                    
3.13, compared to the French civil law family (2.33), German civil law family (2.33), Scandinavian civil law 
family (3.0) and common law family (4.0). See Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106  
Journal of Political Economy 1113. 
8 The approach in this chapter is not restricted to legal enforcement. Instead I adopt a much broader approach 
to enforcement that consists of a set of institutions that could affect negatively on minority shareholders’ 
ability to bring an action against the controlling shareholders. Following Barzel, who defines enforcement as 
‘the credible threat to induce compliance’. See  Yoram Barzel, A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal 
Rights, and the Scope of the State (Cambridge University Press 2002) 35. 
9 Here we should note that a detailed analysis of minority shareholders protection in Libya goes beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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Following this, section (3.2) undertakes an investigation that provides a theoretical 
framework for the problem of court enforcement both in transition economies generally 
and in Libya particularly. To that end, (3.2.1) begins by outlining the literature that 
engages with the problematic of effective court enforcement generally. Following this, 
(3.2.2) goes on to discuss how court enforcement is further problematized within the 
context of transition and developing economies and then (3.2.3) sites Libya as a 
particularly extreme case in terms of court enforcement.  
Having discussed the theoretical framework for the problem of court enforcement, 
the three following sections analyse the situation in Libya 10  and the difficulties and 
challenges that minority shareholders face in bringing an action against the controlling 
shareholders. Firstly, in (3.3) the study explores the general environment in Libya with 
regard to the lack of law enforcement. This section evaluates the judicial approach adopted 
by LEAA 2010 and argues that the current judicial protection for minority shareholders is 
ineffective. This is because of the negative impact on court enforcement of both judicial 
corruption (3.3.1) and the slow pace of justice (3.3.2). In addition, as an analysis of court 
efficiency needs to extend beyond the courts themselves to understand their role in the 
larger system, this section considers how other political and social factors hinder the 
efficacy of court enforcement in Libya (3.3.3). 
To extend this analysis further, in (3.4) I argue that the current Libyan courts are 
not equipped to deal with commercial cases that relate to abuse of power by the controlling 
shareholders. This is because the current judges lack the adequate experience and expertise 
to deal with such cases (3.4.1). This is especially the case as the current legal system 
                                                 
10 I consider variables that relate to the specific case of Libya (such as those associated with the Libyan 
societal structure) since every country has its own environment and preferred mix of enforcement 
technologies that vary according to the country’s characteristics. (See Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens, 
‘Corporate Governance and Enforcement’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3409, September 
2004 <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-3409> accessed 29-10-2013, 26). In 
Addition, I consider the variables that are commonly used to assess legal effectiveness. (For more 
information, see (3.2.3). 
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concerning the protection of minority shareholders is based on the wide discretion of 
judges (open-ended legal standards) rather than a set of defined legal standards (3.4.2). 
Finally, I argue in (3.5) that the approach to the protection of minority shareholders 
adopted under art 159 of LEAA 2010 has failed since the Libyan judicial system can be 
considered as a system of non-intervention.  In Libya, the minority shareholders face 
difficulties in bringing an action against the controlling shareholders (who usually also sit 
on the board of directors) because there are gaps in the law that we must look to the UK to 
fill. A derivative suit, 11 which is allowed in almost all jurisdictions, is not allowed in Libya 
(3.5.1) and there are high risks and costs attached to bringing a dispute to court (e.g. the 
court requires a deposit from the shareholders in order to bring an action against the 
majority shareholders) (3.5.2). In addition, the courts are barred from intervening in certain 
cases. For example, the minority shareholders cannot bring an action against the majority 
shareholders when the latter is in the position of a shadow director (3.5.3).  All of these 
factors lead us to conclude that the Libyan judicial system is a non-interventionist system. 
3.1. Minority shareholders’ action as a primary approach in addressing the 
majority-minority shareholders problem: overview of the case of Libya 
Before beginning the evaluation of the minority shareholders’ actions as an approach to 
dealing with minority-majority shareholders’ conflict, it is necessary to provide a brief 
overview concerning how the approach currently operates in Libya. To that end, this 
section firstly discusses actions that the minority shareholders can bring under LEAA 2010 
(3.1.1) and secondly, outlines tools that the Libyan courts apply to solve such conflicts 
(3.1.2). 
                                                 
11 A derivative suit can be relevant to the minority-majority shareholders problem for two reasons. First, the 
controlling shareholders are usually also on the board of directors, especially in Libya where the state is the 
often the controlling shareholder and owns massive assets in most of Libya’s large companies. Secondly,   
directors may abuse their power against the minority shareholders in response to majority shareholder 
pressure.     
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3.1.1. The minority shareholders’ actions under LEAA 2010  
Art 159 of LEAA 2010 addresses the conflict of interests between shareholders and clearly 
allows the minority shareholders to bring actions against the majority shareholders by 
stating that:  
Any shareholder shall not vote on a resolution when (1) he has a direct or 
indirect interest for himself, his representative (his agent) or his principal, 
and (2) the personal interest conflicts with the interest of the company. The 
violation of this rule by the shareholder makes the shareholders’ issued 
resolution actionable when (1) the resolution harms the company and (2) 
there is evidence that the vote of the interested shareholders was necessary 
to issue the resolution.  
According to LEAA 2010, there are two types of suits: Nullification Actions and 
Personal Liability Actions. When the minority shareholders seek only to invalidate the 
shareholders’ resolution, they may bring a nullification action (3.1.1.1). 12 However, if this 
cannot be achieved for some reason, or they want to pursue compensation they can bring a 
personal liability action 13 (3.1.1.2).   
3.1.1.1. Nullification Action   
In Libya shareholders have the right to challenge in court the validity of shareholder 
resolutions, if they violate the company’s regulations or the law. Under art 160 of the 
LEAA 2010, ‘resolutions of shareholders are binding to all shareholders. The board of 
directors, a watchdog committee, absent shareholders and any dissenters (including 
minority shareholders) can challenge the resolution if it contradicts law and the 
constitution of the company’.14 This action is referred to in French, Egyptian and Libyan 
jurisprudence as an invalidity/ revocation/nullification action. 
                                                 
12 Mohamed Tibar, The Theory of Shareholders' Rights in Joint Stock  Companies, vol 2 (Arab Union 
Madbaha 1998) 928 (in Arabic). 
13 ibid.  
14 The same provision is found in Egyptian Companies Act no. 159/1981, art 76 (1) which states that ‘any 
shareholders’ resolutions which are in the interest, or harm a particular group of shareholders […] are 
voidable’. 
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It is important to note that the nullification of resolutions cannot be enforced 
without litigation. This means an aggrieved party must bring a nullification action against 
the board of directors or the majority shareholders in order to have their resolution 
revoked. 15  Moreover, to nullify the majority shareholders’ resolution there must be 
evidence of abuse by majority shareholders against the minority shareholders. In other 
words, the burden of proof is on the minority of shareholders (Plaintiff) to evidence that a 
transaction is unfair.16    
The decisions that the court can make in relation to a nullification action are limited 
to either confirming the resolution or revoking it. To reach its decision, the court deals with 
three categories of rules. 17  The first are rules associated with the formality 
(process/procedure) of making resolutions. In this category, the court must revoke a 
resolution if it does not adhere to particular legal formality. For example, the decision must 
be revoked if a shareholders’ resolution has been made without the required quorum. In 
such a case, the court has no discretion, but must revoke the resolution if correct procedure 
in the decision making process has not been followed. In the second category are rules 
derived from a more general legal theory. These include principles (or doctrines) such as 
the no abuse of rights principle, fraud, bad faith, etc. In such cases the courts have 
discretion over whether they revoke resolution or not, based on these principles. The third 
are mandatory rules that relate to the object of the company, but not to legal theories or 
principles. For example, a resolution to issue shares at a price lower than the price 
determined by law 18 will be revoked.     
 
                                                 
15 See Ali Hasen Yonis, Commercial Law: Financial Companies (Madbea Wahba and Sons 1991) 484 (in 
Arabic); Esmael Kanem, The General Theory of Commitment, vol 1 (Wahba Library 2006) 279 (in Arabic). 
16 For details see  Emad Rmadan, Minority Shareholders Protection in Joint-Stock Companies (Dar alkoteb 
Alkanonia 2008)799-810 (in Arabic). 
17 Tibar (n 12) 863. 
18 For example, according to s 2 of the Resolution of Cabinet Ministers (N. 86) in 2012, the nominal value of 
shares determined by the constitution of the company must be 10 Dinar (equivalent to £5).   
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3.1.1.2. Personal Liability Actions 
The minority shareholder may not only seek to revoke the board’s decision or the 
shareholders’ resolution, via a Nullification Action, but may also seek compensation for 
the harm that results from such actions.19 To get such compensation, Libyan law allows the 
aggrieved minority shareholders to sue the wrongdoer (either the majority shareholders or 
the board of directors) under a personal liability action if the minority shareholder suffers 
personal harm as a result of an action taken by the majority shareholders and/or the board 
of directors. Accordingly, the basis of such an action is the breaching of the minority 
shareholders’ personal rights.20  The rights of the minority shareholder are not vested in the 
company. Instead the minority shareholder acquires personal rights under an agreement to 
which he is party in his personal capacity, under the company’ constitution or under 
statute’.21 
 A personal liability action is brought by the minority shareholders against both the 
majority shareholders and the board of directors. The legal source of such an action is 
derived from both LEAA 2010 and the Libyan Civil Code 1953. Under art 186 of LEAA 
2010, ‘the previous provision (art 184, Company Liability Action, which is discussed later) 
does not affect the shareholders’ right to bring an action against the board of directors to 
get compensated for any harm that has occurred to them directly due to the conduct of the 
board of directors’.  For example, if the board of directors disclosed false information (e.g. 
misleading financial statements) which led the investors to buy shares believing that their 
price would go up, under the LEAA 2010, the minority shareholders can sue the board of 
directors under a Personal Liability Action.  
                                                 
19 This kind of action may be brought either independently of a revocation action, or as the result one.   
20 Christopher Hale, ‘What's Right with the Rule in Foss v Harbottle?’ (1997) 2 Company, Financial and 
Insolvency Law Journal  219, 221.  
21 Victor Joffe and others, Minority Shareholders: Law, Practice, and Procedure (4 edn, Oxford 2011) 29 
and 89ff.  More discussion about personal rights is provided later in this subsection. 
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In addition, the minority shareholders can also bring a personal liability action against 
the majority shareholders. Whilst LEAA 2010 does not address a personal liability action 
brought by the minority shareholders against the majority shareholders, such an action 
comes from the general rule of Libyan Civil Code 1953. The origin of such an action is set 
down in art 166 of the Civil Code 1953 which states that ‘any wrong that causes harm to 
others necessitates compensation’. The ‘wrong’ noted in the article denotes the breach of a 
legal obligation22 which has two requirements.23 First, there is a tangible requirement, in 
which deviation from a legal behaviour means that the wrongdoer commits an action that 
breaches a legal obligation.24 The second is an intangible requirement of recognition. This 
means that the wrongdoer recognises that his behaviour has resulted in a wrong. Therefore, 
the source of such an action is the delictual liability25 that emanates from a civil wrong or 
injury and is based on an intentional or negligent breach of duty of care that inflicts loss or 
harm and which triggers legal liability for the wrongdoer. As such, a personal liability 
action is applicable when an intentional or negligent act gives rise to a legal obligation, 
even in the absence of a contract.26 According to Tibar, a personal liability action is a right 
delegated to any shareholders that is derived from general rules of civil law based on delict. 
The aim of such an action is to repair damage that has happened to the claimant 
shareholder to protect his personal interest.27   
Here it should be noted that Liability actions in Libya are not restricted to personal 
liability actions. There is another action called a Company Liability Action, which can be 
brought when a majority of the shareholders believe that the company’s interests as a 
                                                 
22 Mohammed Al Badawi, The General Theory of Obligations: Sources of Obligations, vol 1 (AL Markez Al 
Qawmi 2003) 292 (in Arabic). 
23 For details of these requirements see ibid 293-301. 
24 The approach adopted by CA 2006 is broader than that in Libya since the liability of unfair prejudice is not 
only based on breaching a legal obligation (as is the case in Libya) but also on a legal conduct that relies on 
legitimate expectation.  
25 Tort Liability is the equivalent legal term used in common law jurisdictions. 
26 Abu Zaid Radwan and Fair Naem, Commercial Companies (Dar Alfeker Al Arabi 2000) 643 (in Arabic); 
Yonis (n 15) 424.   
27 Tibar (n 12) 999. 
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whole are under threat because of the board of directors’ actions.  For this remedy to be 
applicable, the actions of the board must result in the breaching of corporate rights. This 
means the majority shareholders cannot bring this action without claiming that their 
corporate rights have been breached by the board of directors. Thus the function of this 
action is to enable majority shareholders, in limited circumstances, to pursue an action for 
harm done to the company per se and to seek compensation on the company’s behalf.28 For 
instance, the majority shareholders can seek to ‘enforce a right vested not in him himself 
but in the company of which he is member, for example, a claim to the company’s property 
fraudulently misappropriated by the directors’. 29  Only the majority shareholders can 
resolve to  bring a liability action against the board of directors and request 
compensation.30 Under Art 184 of LEAA 2010, ‘to bring an action that makes members of 
the board of directors responsible shall be based on a resolution issued by the shareholders 
in a general meeting’.31 This kind of action is known in French, Egyptian and Libyan legal 
jurisprudence as a Company Liability Action. A Company Liability Action is not a 
derivative action as it requires the majority shareholders to take action and issue a 
resolution to sue the board of directors; by contrast, a derivative action requires no such a 
resolution.32   
It is worth mentioning that Libyan Law contains only the two previous liability 
actions: Personal Liability Action and Company Liability Action. Consequently, it is clear 
that there is a gap between these actions. This gap is evidenced by a third scenario which 
occurs when the company’s interests (not personal interests) have been harmed by either 
an action of the board or the majority shareholders, but the majority shareholders refuse to 
take action. Here a minority of the shareholders should be able to sue the majority 
                                                 
28  ibid 955. 
29 For more information about company rights see Joffe and others (n 21) 30. 
30 See LEAA 2010, art 184.  
31 This kind of Action existed under art 543 of revoked previous Libyan Commercial Law 1953. 
32 For more analysis about a derivative action, see (3.5.1) 
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shareholders and /or the directors of the company. This action is called Personal-Company 
Liability Action and is equivalent to a derivative action in UK law. This action is 
considered both a personal action - because a shareholder brings it personally - and a 
company action, as the harm has occurred to the company as a whole. As a result all 
shareholders may receive compensation.33 However, such an action has not been adopted 
under the LEAA 2010, as will be discussed later. 34  
Thus, it is clear that the only action available to the minority shareholders against 
the controlling shareholders in Libya is a Personal Liability Action, which leaves a 
significant gap in the level of protection available to the minority and, potentially, leaves 
them open to abuse.   This is because both scenarios (Company Liability Action and the 
Personal-Company Liability Action) deal with the conflict that occurs between the 
management and shareholders. To underline this further: under a Company Liability 
Action, only the majority shareholders can bring an action against the board of directors, 
whereas under a Personal-Company Liability, which has not been adopted into Libyan 
Law, the minority shareholders can bring an action against the board of directors. Though 
discussion of such conflicts lies outwith the focus in this study, what is clear is that the 
only remedy available to minority shareholders against the controlling shareholders in 
Libya is the Personal Liability Action.  
It is worth noting that a Personal Liability Action is similar to the unfair prejudice 
remedy adopted in UK law. This remedy is applicable when the company has been run in 
‘a way that is clearly unfair in its consequence to the complaining shareholder, even if the 
respondents can claim to have acted in the best of good faith’.35 The relevant section in CA 
2006 provides that a member of a company may petition when:  
                                                 
33 Tibar (n 12) 819. 
34 See (3.5.1.1). 
35 John Birds and others, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (Jordan Publishing Limited 2011) 711. Under UK 
law, the petitioner does not have to prove that the controlling shareholder has acted in bad faith. See Re R A 
Noble and Sons (clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 273 at 290-1. 
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The company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that 
is unfairly prejudicial to the interest of members generally or of some part 
of its members (including at least himself) or (2) that an actual or proposed 
act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) 
is or would be so prejudicial.36 
 
Here we should note that s 994(1) of CA 2006 provides a greater scale of protection 
for minority shareholders since it can protect against any action that may harm the 
company’s affairs,37 either actual or proposed, and even the omission of action is within 
the scope of the provision. By contrast, currently under Libyan law the minority 
shareholders are unable to bring an action in relation to proposed actions or omissions; 
rather, the Libyan statute explicitly focuses only on actions which relate to decisions that 
have been made by the majority shareholders or the management.  
Further, in the UK the matter is different. The unfair prejudice remedy is not based on a 
civil wrong or delict, like civil law countries such as Libya. Instead it is based on a special 
statutory invention of the common law system that is set down in s 994 of CA. This section 
requires prejudice to the minority shareholders which must be unfair. This means that it is 
not sufficient if the actionable conduct satisfies only one of these requirements since the 
conduct may be prejudicial without being unfair (e.g. when the petitioner has agreed to the 
breach against which he is complaining).38 Similarly, the action may be unfair without 
being prejudicial (e.g. the court in Irvine v Irvine (No1) 39 noted the failure of the board to 
meet statutory requirements but this did not cause the petitioner any material prejudice).  
                                                 
36 CA 2006, s 994. According to Davies ‘by referring to the conduct of the company’s affairs, the section is 
clearly wide enough to catch the activities of controllers of the companies, whether they conduct the business 
of the company through the exercise of their powers as directors or as shareholders or both’. Paul Davies, 
Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 720. 
37 Brenda Hannigan, Company Law (3 ed, Oxford University Press 2012) 388. (Any action that may harm the 
company’s affairs includes anything that can be done or undone by the company or those authorised to act as 
its organ, such as the directors or shareholders’ resolution in general meeting). 
38 See e.g. Groly v Good [2010] 2 BCLC 569 at 94; Hawkes v Cuddu [2009] 2 BCLC 427 at 72. 
39 [2007] 1 BCLC 349. Also, in Oak Investment Partners XII v Boughtwood [2010] 2 BCLC 459 at 121. In 
this case there was evidence regarding unfairness by the petitioner since there was no disclosure of 
information; the situation did not cause any prejudice.  
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Thus a shareholder can establish prejudice where he can prove the economic value of his 
shares has been affected negatively.40 
Clearly, when the claimant alleges damages or jeopardy to the value of his 
shareholdings, he can bring an action on the basis of financial damages.41 However, a 
claimant does not have to establish a case based on damages or jeopardy that has happened 
to financial shareholdings. Instead he can bring an action on the basis of unfair prejudice 
even though there nothing serious has happened to the value of his shares. In Quinlan v 
Essex Hinge Co Let,42 the court held that the petitioner succeeded although the unfairly 
prejudicial conduct had no effect on the value of his shareholding since he was harmed by 
being excluded from the management.  
The test of unfairness adopted under unfair prejudice may be established for the 
purposes of CA 2006 s 994 in the two following ways: 43     
1. The starting point for the court should be to ascertain whether the act complies with an 
agreement between the shareholders (including the constitution of the company) or the 
legislation.44 In other words, the shareholders are entitled to complain of unfairness 
when there has been some breach of the agreed terms on which the affairs of the 
company are conducted. 
2. The court should take into account the informal agreements or understandings that 
result from discussing or negotiating formal agreements.45  As Lord Hoffman suggests: 
‘there will be cases in which equitable consideration makes it unfair for those 
conducting the affairs of the company to rely upon their strict legal powers.’46 Hence 
                                                 
40 See e.g. Re Brenfield Squash Racquets Club Led [1996] 2 BCLC 184. 
41 See e.g. Re Macro (Ipswich) Led [1994 2 BCLC 354, 404d. 
42 [1996] 2 BCLC 417. 
43 See e.g. Re Saul D Harrison and Sons Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 14 at 31; O'Neill v Phillips 1 WLR 1092. 
44 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 14 at 18; O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
45 See Vujnovich v Vujnovich [1990] B.C.L.C. 227; D. D. Prentice, ‘The Theory of the Firm: Minority 
Shareholder Oppression: Sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985’ (1988) 8 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 55. 
46 [1999] 2 BCLC 1 at 8.   
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these informal understandings constitute legitimate expectations, the breaching of 
which can result in oppression or unfairness. These understandings emerge exclusively 
in private companies and relate to the operating of the company; often they are based 
upon agreements between shareholders through the articles of association or a 
shareholder agreement. As Lord Hoffman explains, expectation ‘often arises out of a 
fundamental understanding between the shareholders which formed the basis of their 
association, but was not put into contractual form’.47  
Here it is worth noting that such a test is objective not subjective. In Re Bovey Hotel 
Ventures the court held that:  
‘... it is not necessary for the petitioner to show that the persons who have 
de facto control of the company have acted as they did in the conscious 
knowledge that this was unfair to the petitioner or that they were acting 
in bad faith; the test, I think, is whether a reasonable bystander observing 
the consequences of their conduct, would regard it as having unfairly 
prejudiced the petitioner’s interests.’48  
Last but not least, the distinction between the personal rights of the shareholders 
and the company’s rights is fundamental to the concept of minority shareholders protection 
since it determines the type of action that can be brought. Under LEAA 2010, the 
shareholders can bring a Personal Liability Action against the majority shareholders when 
a wrongdoing relates to the minority shareholders personally and, therefore, is not 
associated with the company’s rights.  According to Mostafa Kamal, the minority 
shareholders can pursue a personal action in cases where the harm occurs to the minority 
shareholders (one or a group) personally.49  In the UK, the matter is more complex. The 
shareholders are entitled to bring a personal action if their personal rights (as set down in 
                                                 
47 Re Saul D Harrison and Sons Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 14. 
48 Re Bovey Hotel Ventures Ltd unreported but quoted and followed in RA Noble & Sons Clothing Ltd [1983] 
BCLC 273 at 290.  
 In Re Guidezone Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 321 at 355., the court found held that O’Neil established that 
‘unfairness (…) is not to be judged by references to subjective notions of fairness, but rather by testing 
whether, applying established equitable principles, the majority has acted, or is proposing to act, in a manner 
which equity would regard as contrary to good faith’. 
49Mostafa Kamel, The Liability of the Board of Directors (Abeer lelketab 1982) 139 (in Arabic).   
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the company’s article of association50 or under statute and conferred on the individual as a 
member)51 are infringed. 52 For example, a shareholder can seek a personal action when he 
wants to enforce his right to vote.53 In other words, in a personal action, the issue revolves 
around the enforcement of the article of association 54  with a shareholder desiring to 
enforce his rights or prevent breaches of the articles by the majority, or even to prevent the 
articles from being altered. 55 However, though the unfair prejudice remedy is considered a 
personal action, it serves a different goal since it is granted when a corporate act unfairly 
prejudices the shareholders of the company. Also, whilst a personal action protects only 
personal rights, unfair prejudice protects not only shareholders’ rights but also their 
interests.56 As such, the wronged conduct does not have to be illegal to be actionable.57  
Here it is worth indicating that Unfair Prejudice and a derivative action serve 
different goals: whilst a derivative action is focused on breaches of strict legal duties owed 
by the directors to the company, the unfair prejudice remedy is provided when the wronged 
conduct of the controllers unfairly prejudices a shareholder. 58  However, the two actions 
may overlap. This is because s 994 (Unfair Prejudice) permits the possibility of addressing 
corporate wrongs in addition to personal wrong by the inclusion of the phrase "interests of 
its members generally", 59 which is applicable to such corporate wrongs as a directors' 
breach of duty. 60  In other words, both unfair prejudice and a derivative action are 
                                                 
50 Rights are usually granted to the shareholders by the article of association not by the memorandum.  
51 Joffe and others (n 21) 87 and 97. 
52 There is no comprehensive definition of a personal right of a shareholder. (See  ibid 29 and 87).   
53 See e.g. Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70. 
54 See CA 2006, s 33. 
55 Hannigan (n 37) 441. 
56 See Re A Company [1986] BLCL 376 at 378. 
57 For information about illegality see p122. 
58 For information about the distinction between unfair prejudice and a derivative action, see Joffe and others 
(n 21) 76, Jennifer Payne, ‘ Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder 
Protection’ (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 662- 4;  Rita Cheung, ‘Corporate Wrongs Litigated in the 
Context of Unfair Prejudice Claims’ (2008) 29 Company Lawyer 99, 99-100. 
59 See S Deakin, E Ferran and R Nolan, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies: An Overview’ (1997 ) 2 
Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Journal 162, 164. 
60 See e.g. O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092; Clark v Cutland [1986] 1 WLR 281. Lord Hoffmann, also, 
in Re A Company (No. 005287 of 1985), held that allegations of the directors' breach of fiduciary duties were 
capable of establishing unfair prejudice to minority shareholders in a private company or a small unlisted 
public company.    
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applicable ‘in many of cases where the allegation of unfair prejudice has been based on 
loss caused to the company by breach of directors’ fiduciary duties’.61 However, this area 
of overlap is not applicable in the case of Libya since the minority shareholders can only 
rely on personal harm to bring a personal liability action and only the majority 
shareholders can rely on corporate harm to sue the management under a Company Action 
(as there is no derivative action in Libya).   
3.1.2 Criteria Libyan courts use to solve the conflict between the minority 
shareholders and the majority shareholders 
The current judicial policy in Libya concerning the monitoring of abuses by the majority 
shareholders and the directors is neither clear nor comprehensive since it is based on 
disparate elements of different judicial practices and diverse legal concepts, rather than one 
legal policy,62 as in the UK.63 Currently, LEAA 2010 gives no specific regard to the issue 
of abuse of rights by majority shareholders. As a result, company law scholars and judges 
(perhaps lawyers as well) are free to employ three alternative approaches to address the 
same problem. Though it is common for judges to rely on a single principle, it is important 
to explore the three solutions separately. These are: good faith, the principle of equality 
and the no abuse of rights principle. In the following section, the analysis will focus mainly 
on the no abuse of rights principle, as this is the most significant of the three in the case of 
Libya.  
3.1.2.1. The principle of good faith 
 In general, the principle of good faith is one of the basic principles in civil law that has 
become accepted as an integral part of the Libyan legal systems. Libyan Civil Law adopts 
this principle and prohibits any action that contradicts it. However, it should be noted that 
Libyan Law does not define the principle of good faith but leaves that to the courts. In 
                                                 
61 Joffe and others (n 21) 312.  
62 Tibar (n 12) 820. 
63 As will be discussed later, UK law adopts specific criteria under unfair prejudice. 
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general the definition of such a principle relates to a set of general concepts such as 
honesty, integrity and sincerity. Despite the fact that there is no clear definition of the good 
faith principle, the Law imposes parties of a contract to act in good faith. Art 148 of 
Libyan Civil Code states that ‘a contract shall be implemented in a way consisted with 
good faith’.64   This means that any contractual relationship must be based on good faith, 
which results in the courts intervening in the contractual relationship of shareholders on a 
case-by-case basis without being able to consistently apply a clear definition of ‘good 
faith’.65 
In the context of minority shareholders protection, good faith is a judicial 
mechanism employed by Libyan courts to monitor the majority shareholders and the board 
of directors’ actions (whether the board of directors and/or the majority shareholders’ 
decision is in good faith or not). 66 This means, as Tibar claims, that the members of a 
company must implement their commitments and deal with each other in good faith. This 
necessitates the majority shareholders to exert a reasonable personal effort to serve the 
interests of all members of the company as whole (not only the majority shareholders’ 
interests). 67  
Under the principle of good faith, the court assumes that the parties deal with each 
other honestly, fairly, and in good faith, if there is no evidence to prove the opposite.68 In 
this situation, the minority shareholders must prove that the majority shareholders and/or 
the board of directors have acted in bad faith in order to gain compensation. In this context, 
Althiabi claims that the only way to prove good faith is through providing evidence of a 
                                                 
64 The same provision is adopted under Egyptian Civil Code art 5 and French Civil Code s 3/1134. 
65Goode Roy, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium (Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 16,31- 32; Bradgate 
Robert, Commercial Law (3rd edn, Butterworths 2000) 3-4 and 26-34. 
66 Tibar (n 12) 821.  
67 Ibid 804. 
68 Libyan Civil Code, art 969 (3). 
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bad faith act has been committed by the wrongdoer. This is because it is assumed that a 
person has acted in good faith unless there is evidence that he has not.69  
The principle of good faith and the abuse of rights principle may overlap. This 
means that bad faith can constitute the personal or intangible element of the abuse of rights, 
as discussed later.  For example, when a majority shareholder intends to harm another 
(intangible element of abuse of rights), bad faith is established. In other words, when there 
is evidence that the majority of shareholder (a user of right) acts against the interest of the 
minority shareholders, this conduct is in bad faith.70 However, it does not follow that every 
abuse of rights is in bad faith. For example, if the majority shareholder wants to achieve 
something trivial vis a vis the potential harm that may occur, in the absence of explicit 
intention to harm, the action is not in bad faith (this is discussed later in (3.1.2.3)). 
3.1.2.2. The principle of equality 
In the absence of any specific guidance in LEAA 2010, the courts have established their 
own criteria (or a new understanding of the criteria mentioned in Libyan Law) that are 
derived from other sources of law, such as Islamic principles, custom, principles of natural 
law and rules of equality.71  Therefore, the courts sometimes may rely on the principle of 
equality between the shareholders. Here, the minority shareholders can gain compensation 
if they can prove that shareholders are being treated in an unequal manner. This is 
applicable, for example, in cases where the board of directors refrain from giving the 
minority shareholders their dividends when they have been given to other shareholders 
with the same class of shares. In this case, the court can compensate minority shareholders 
on the basis of the principle of equality between the shareholders.  
                                                 
69 Saed Althiabi, ‘The Principle of Good Faith in Saudi Arabia ’ (2004) 23 Journal of Sharia Law and Islamic 
Studies 44 (in Arabic). 
70 Tibar (n 12)  804. 
71 See the sources of Libyan Civil law in Libyan Civil Code, s 1 discussed in Ch. 1 at 23ff. 
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   The breach of the principle of equality has two elements: (1) Personal privilege, 
which means that particular persons (e.g. majority shareholders) benefit more than other 
parties (e.g. minority shareholders), and (2) harm occurs to others (e.g. minority 
shareholders) as a result of the beneficial interest enjoyed by other parties (the majority 
shareholders). 72  The breach of such a principle may entitle the aggrieved party to 
compensation.73  
It is worth mentioning that although the principle of equality can be used by Libyan 
courts as an independent remedy to deal with the conflict of interest between the 
shareholders, there is a trend in judiciary and civil law Jurisprudence that the principle of 
equality constitutes a physical (tangible) component of the abuse of rights principle 
(objective tendency).  This means that breaching the principle of equality requires that 
some shareholders are harmed and other shareholders have gained some personal benefit. 
In this context, French courts held that the breach of the principle of equality constitutes an 
abuse of rights by the majority shareholders. There is no way of monitoring the majority 
shareholders in order to investigate whether there is an abuse of rights without monitoring 
all the shareholders in the company. The abuse of rights occurs when a majority 
shareholders’ resolution seeks to favour their own interest over that of the minority 
shareholders. 74 This occurrence is acknowledged in Egyptian Company Law under art 
2/76, which defines a resolution that constitutes an abuse of rights as ‘any resolution issued 
in interest of a particular group of shareholders […] or to give private benefits to one or 
more of the members of the board of directors without consideration for the company’s 
interest’. In Libya, LEAA 2010 adopts this view implicitly. Art 159 of LEAA 2010 states 
that ‘any shareholder shall not vote on a resolution when (1) he has a direct or indirect 
                                                 
72  Esmael kannem, The Theory of Commitments (Maktabat Wahba 1970) 31. 
73 ibid. 
74 See Cass, Com.18 Avr1961 J.C.P. 1961, II, 1216 cited in Tibar (n 12) 788. 
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interest for himself, his representative (his agent) or his principal, and the personal interest 
conflicts with the interest of the company’.   
3.1.2.3. The no abuse of right principle  
The most common (and most important) criterion used by courts in Libya is the “no 
abuse of right" principle. The no abuse of right principle is a long-standing principle in 
many Civil Law countries 75 which requires individuals to take care of others’ interests 
when exercising their rights in certain circumstances. 76  According to Byers, an abuse of 
right can be established ‘when the exploitation of an individual right injuriously affects the 
interests of the community’.77 In other words, no one is entitled to exercise his rights in a 
way that is injurious to others or detrimental to the public interest.78 Accordingly, the 
principle is based on two concepts: first, there are two dimensions of interests, individual 
and public; second, rights should serve interests which may be individual or collective. 
Thus, the no abuse of right principle is employed as a compromise mechanism between 
individual interests and group or public interests, in the sense that the latter must have 
priority over the former.79 In the context of minority shareholders rights, the principle 
means that the majority shareholders (and the board of directors) should not exercise their 
rights if they harm minority shareholders. The Libyan courts apply the principle to solve 
the conflict between the shareholders by restricting the majority shareholders’ freedom to 
vote in such a way as to pursue their own self-interest (and not the company’s) at general 
meetings.  
                                                 
75 Roberto G. MacLean, ‘Judicial Discretion in the Civil Law’ (1982) 43 Louisiana Law Review 42, 52. It is 
noteworthy that the old French law does not recognize this theory.  However, at the beginning of the 19th 
century, French courts started applying the principle of “Preventing the usage of rights with intention to harm 
others” which, in effect, is the same as the no “abuse of right” principle under discussion.  For details see   
Fathi Durainy, The Theory of no Abuse of rights in Islamic Law (4 edn, Moassaset Al Resala 1988) 300-3 (in 
Arabic). Also, it should be noted that the principle of abuse of rights is not so readily apparent in common 
law systems. Michael Byers, ‘Abuse of Rights: an Old Principle, a New Age’ (2001) 47 McGill Law Journal 
389; 395. 
76 MacLean  (n 75) 52. 
77 Byers, (n 75) 389. 
78 Durainy (n 75) 36. 
79 ibid 37. 
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The legal literature in civil law countries indicates two theories in regard to the 
definition of the no abuse of rights principle: 80  (1) a tangible theory which defines the 
principle as breaching the principle of equality. This means that it is enough to establish 
the abuse of rights by the majority of shareholders through proving that the majority 
shareholders seek to get personal benefits from a transaction at the expense of the minority 
shareholders, as discussed previously.  (2) An intangible theory which means that there 
must be intention to harm the other. This definition is criticised by many scholars who 
argue that there is no need to prove intention to harm in order to establish the abuse of 
rights. Instead the intention to get personal benefits (not intention to harm) is enough to 
establish such a principle. 81 
In order to define the abuse of rights, Libyan Law incorporates the two previous 
definitions, which are summarised in Libyan Civil Act as: 82 The use of a right is illegal 
when (1) its user intends to harm another, or (2) the interests that the user of the right 
wants to achieve are trivial vis a vis the potential harm that may occurred to the other or (3) 
the interests that they want to achieve are illegal. 83  
Libyan Law adopts both theories (tangible and intangible) to define the abuse of 
rights. Therefore, any resolution issued by the controlling shareholders may be 
characterised as an abuse of the rights against the minority shareholders when there is a 
breach of principle of equality (e.g. getting personal benefit, or to harm the minority 
shareholder).  Hence, there is no need to prove there is bad faith or intention to harm. 
Instead it is enough to prove the principle of equality has been breached between the 
shareholders to establish the abuse of rights.  
                                                 
80 Tibar (n 12) 793-9. 
81 ibid. 
82 It should be noted that LEAA 2010 does not set out any provision relating to the abuse of rights principle. 
83  See Libyan Civil Code, art 5. In fact, these criteria have been adopted into Syrian, Egyptian and Iraqi law 
practically verbatim. 
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In France it was the courts, rather than the legislator, that developed the doctrine of 
abuse of rights.84 The French courts adopt both the previous concepts in order to define 
what constitutes an abuse of rights. The most important judgement in this regard is the 
1961 judgement by the Commercial Court in the French Supreme Court. This court clearly 
set down the intention of controlling shareholders (intangible element) and the harm to the 
minority shareholders (tangible element) as the main elements in establishing an abuse of 
rights.85 Equally, the Egyptian Civil Act contains these provisions verbatim, as does the 
Libyan Civil Code.86 Thus it is clear that French, Egyptian and Libyan law have the same 
provisions in regard to the abuse of rights doctrine. 
In addition to the two previous concepts, to establish the abuse of rights in Libya, a 
supplementary element that relates to the effectiveness of votes must also be established. 
This means that there is no abuse of rights when the shareholders’ votes have no effect on 
the result of the resolution. For example, when a resolution is approved by 60 votes to 40, 
there is a need to investigate whether the 60 votes are subject to abuse. If it is found that 30 
votes were subject to abuse, they must be revoked. If it is found that only 10 votes have 
been, there is no need to apply the abuse of rights principle at all. Art 159 of LEAA 2010 
adopts the supplementary element through stipulating that ‘the violation of this rule [the 
conflict of interest voting] by the shareholder makes the shareholders’ issued resolution 
actionable when (…) there is evidence that the vote of the interested shareholders was 
necessary to issue the resolution’. 
The principle, as stated in Libyan statute, has its origins in Sharia law and Islamic 
jurisprudence. 87 According to Durainy, the principle of abuse of rights is rooted in Islamic 
Law and man schools of Islamic jurisprudence. He provides a full discussion in relation to 
                                                 
84 Vera Bolgar, ‘Abuse of Rights in France, Germany, and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in 
Legal Doctrine’ (1974) 35 Louisiana Law Review 1015, 1019; Joseph M Perillo, ‘Abuse of Rights: A 
Pervasive Legal Concept’ (1995) 27 Pacific Law Journal 37, 43-4. 
85 See Cass. Com, 18, Avr 191, J.C.P. 1961, II, 12164. 
86 See Egyptian Civil Code art 525. 
87  Anwar Soltan, The Theory of Obligations, vol 1 (Dar Al Feket Al Arabi 1999) 511.   
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the principle’s definition and how it derives from rules set down in the Quran and Sunnah 
(the words and acts of Prophet Muhammad).88  To give a brief example of this: firstly, an 
abuse of rights occurs when the user of the right intends to harm another and this is counter 
to Sharia since rights are not imposed for a harmful purpose and harming others is not the 
aim of Islam. The Islamic scholar Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali89mentioned this when he stated 
that ‘there may be [in relation to abuse of rights] intention to harm the others’.90 According 
to Al Shatibi’s view,91 an abuse of rights occurs when the use of an individual right 
involves negligence or a lack of precaution that results in harm to others.92 Accordingly, 
the principle may not not solely based on the fact that doing the act transgresses the 
boundaries of an individual right, but the theory also includes an intangible element that is 
based on negligence and a lack of foresight. 93  
Secondly, under Sharia, 94 an abuse of rights occurs when the achievable interests 
are trivial vis a vis the potential harm that may result. Logically, there is no need to pursue 
an interest where the harm exceeds the benefit.  In addition, the absence of benefit, or lack 
of its importance, could be a clue in proving the actor’s intention to harm. According to Al 
ez Eb Abdesalam,95 in a case where the benefits and negative consequences (harm) are 
equal, there are two options available: the actor should pursue the benefit and avoid the 
negative consequences if possible. If not, and the negative consequences are greater than 
                                                 
88  Durainy (n 75) 7. 
89 Ibn Rajab was born in Baghdad in 1335. He was highly proficient in the scientific disciplines of Hadith 
(Prophet Mohamed’s speech-peace upon him) in terms of the names of reporters, their biographies, their 
paths of narration and awareness of their meanings. Ibn Rajab died in1393 in Damascus. 
90 Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, The Compendium of Knowledge and Wisdom (Turath Publishing Ltd 2007) 265 
91 Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi was an Andalusian (Spanish) Islamic legal scholar. He died in 1388 in Granada, 
Spain. His book Al-Muwafaqaat (The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law) is one of the most 
important books in Sharia. It is on the topic of Usul al-fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) and Maqasid Al-Sharia 
(higher objectives of Sharia).   
92 Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law, vol 3 (Dar Eben Affan 
2008) 455. 
93  Durainy (n 75) 66. 
94 Ibid 320. 
95 Alez Eb Abdesalam was born in Damascus in 1181 and died in 1262 in Cairo.  
121 
 
the interest, he should avoid the negative consequences and sacrifice the potential 
benefit;96 thus avoiding the abuse of rights.   
Thirdly, using rights as a means to achieve illegal interests (for instance, donating 
money to avoid paying tax) is not permitted under Sharia.97 Accordingly, it is clear that the 
elements of the abuse of rights principle have been discussed extensively by Islamic law 
scholars and addressed by in Sharia. 
In regard to comparing the abuse of rights with unfair prejudice adopted in the UK, it is 
important to indicate that the scope of both concepts is different. The abuse of rights 
principle applies when the wrongdoer acts within his rights but an external factor turns the 
act, in eyes of the court, into an abuse of rights  and thus it is considered as a fall back rule, 
not a free standing right, as it is a response to a right that the other party already has.   
However, unfair prejudice is applicable not only when the conduct relates to an abuse of 
rights (acting within rights), but also when there is a violation of the right to act. Thus, 
under unfair prejudice, the petitioner does not have to establish the infringement of a 
shareholder’s right. This is because unfair prejudice aims to protect the interests of 
members and not merely their rights. 98  
Further, with regard to illegality (one of the criteria under unfair prejudice),99 a conduct 
is considered unfairly prejudicial if it does not comply with the shareholders agreement or 
the law.100 However, under the principle of no abuse of rights, the conduct is harmful if it 
is not consistent with legal interest. Further, under the remedy of unfair prejudice, the law 
relies on the conduct per se breaching the terms of the shareholders or the law whereas, 
                                                 
96 Alez Eb Abdesalam, Rules, vol 1 (1 edn, Dar Al Kalam 2000) 83, see also Mohamed Al Shawkany, 
Guidance to Achieve the Rights: The  science of Original Jurisprudence (Dar ALfeker 2002)  246. 
97 Durainy (n 75) 38. 
98. See Re A Company  [1986] BLCL 376 at 378. 
99 Illegality is no longer a sole requirement for unfair prejudice since the corporate act can be unfairly 
prejudicial and at the same time legal .i.e. when the act breaches legitimate expectation. 
100 However, it is not necessary to show that the act complained of is improper or illegal, for an exercise of a 
legal right may have an unfairly prejudicial effect. See Hoffman L.J. in Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc, Re 
[1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 14.  Per Hoffman J. in Re a Company (No. 008699 of 1985) [1986] BCLC 382, 387; 
Davies (n 36) 512.  
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under the no abuse of rights principle, the consequence of the conduct determines whether 
outcome of the conduct is illegal or not. 101  Notwithstanding these differences, both 
scenarios reach the same ends since a legal conduct can never achieve an illegal interest. 
The illegality of the interest will shift the conduct itself from legality (e.g. allotting shares 
by the majority shareholders) to illegality (since the real interest of the majority 
shareholders is to force the minority shareholders to sell their shares at a discount price). 
As a result, it has no material impact if we say the corporate act is unfairly prejudicial 
when the wrongdoer’s conduct is illegal (as in the no abuse of rights principle) or the 
wrongdoer breaches the shareholders’ terms or law (as in the remedy of unfair prejudice).   
Furthermore, according to the no abuse of rights principle, the conduct may be harmful 
when the wrongdoer intends to harm another. Similarly, under the UK law, if there is such 
an improper intention or purpose behind a seemingly fair action, the conduct may be 
considered unfairly prejudicial. For example, in Re Regional Airports Ltd, 102 the ulterior 
motive behind a proposed rights issue was to enhance the majority’s position and to 
increase pressure on the minority to sell their shares at a discounted valuation.103 However, 
holding that the test of unfairness under the UK Law is an objective one, which means 
unfair prejudice may be established in circumstances where the controller did not intend to 
harm the petitioner,104 does not per se contradict the previous sharia statement: the conduct 
may be harmful when the wrongdoer intends to harm another. Under Sharia and Libyan 
                                                 
101 In addition, Libyan Civil Code, art 5 stipulates that the corporate act might be illegal, and so an abuse of 
rights, when the wrongdoer’s interests are trivial vis a vis the potential harm that may be caused to the other. 
However, under the UK law the prejudice must be real rather than technical or trivial.   (See Saul D Harrison 
[1995] 1 BCLC 14 at18; Irvine v Irvine (No 1) 1 BCLC 349, 256. See, also, Re Baumler (UK) ltd [2005] 1 
BCLC 92 [180] and Re Sunrise Radio Ltd [2010] 1 BCLC 367, 7-8).  This is a different issue since under the 
Libyan law the wrongdoer’s interests (not the harm) must be trivial. It seems that the UK provision is more 
comprehensive than the Libyan provision since when the wrongdoer’s interests are trivial vis a vis the 
potential harm this includes real prejudice as well. 
102 [1999] 2 BCLC 30.   
103 See Re RA Noble and Sons (Clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 273 at 290; Re Saul D Harrison and Sons Ltd 
[1995] 1 BCLC 14. 
104 Re Bovey Hotel Ventures Ltd, unreported. July 31. 1981 cited and approved by Nourse J. in Re RA Noble 
and Sons (Clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 273 at 290, Saul D . Harrison and Sons Plc, ibid at 17, Davies (n 36) 
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law, intention is a separate element that can be used to establish an abuse of rights, 105 
whereas, under UK law, intention is not considered as a separate element. For example, 
when the majority shareholders breach the constitution of the company the minority 
shareholders can bring an unfair prejudice remedy and it is does not matter whether the 
breach occurred intentionally or not. However, under Sharia Law, the intention to harm is 
taken into account and can be relied on by the minority shareholders as an independent 
criterion to establish an abuse of rights.  
In short, art 159 of LEAA 2010 addresses the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and clearly vests the minority shareholders with the ability to bring an action 
against the majority shareholders. The form of action that is available to the minority 
shareholders is a personal liability action, the effectiveness of which I evaluate in the 
following sections. The mechanism available to the courts when considering a conflict of 
interests between the majority and the minority shareholders is not based on one single 
policy; instead courts in Libya rely on many principals in this regard. However, they most 
often rely on a principle known in Libyan jurisprudence as the no abuse of rights principle. 
3.2. To what extent the Minority shareholders’ action is effective: the 
theoretical problem of formal private enforcement 
This section discusses the theoretical issues that underpin the problem of  formal private 
enforcement. To that end, this section begins by outlining the literature that engages with 
the problematic of effective court enforcement generally (3.2.1), and then goes on to 
discuss how court enforcement is further problematized within the context of transition and 
developing economies (3.2.2). Finally, it sites Libya as a particularly extreme case in terms 
of court enforcement (3.2.3).    
                                                 
105 See Libyan Civil Code, art 5. 
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3.2.1. The general problematic of formal private enforcement   
Delivering justice is one of the state’s three fundamental functions, the others being 
security and defence. Though the judiciary is an integral part of any state system, its 
effectiveness may differ from country to country due to a number of factors, which are 
discussed below. There are some concerns that impact upon the effectiveness of formal 
private enforcement generally. The major issues facing court enforcement can be placed 
into three categories: 
 The first area of criticism relates to the ability of the court to deliver justice and fairness. 
The definition of fairness, which is a word with no single generally accepted meaning in 
law, is a further barrier within the litigious process. For example, Dammann argues that 
recourse to litigation in cases of minority-majority shareholder conflict strikes the wrong 
balance between the interests of the controller and those of the minority shareholders. 
According to Dammann, there should be a level of private benefit that the controller is able 
to extract from the corporation, which is determined by how valuable the controller’s 
presence is to the corporation and the extent to which they shoulders the costs of control 
that are not shared by the other shareholders. A liability action fails to take these factors 
into account and instead focuses on the fairness of individual transactions. 106 Moreover, 
the courts’ ability to deliver fairness is very difficult in some related party transactions, 
such as in the case of the avoidance of competition. In these cases the controlling 
shareholders may steer the corporation away from business areas where it might compete 
with the controller in order to protect his own profits.107  Additionally, there is a body of 
literature that questions the judges’ incentives to deal with lawsuits. For instance, Jackson 
and Roe provide legal academic analyses that questions ‘why private lawsuits often do not 
                                                 
106  Jens Dammann, ‘Corporate Ostracism: Freezing-out Controlling Shareholders’ (2008) 33 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 681. In this article, Dammann argues that to prevent excessive benefit extraction, the 
law should give minority shareholders in publicly traded corporations the right to force the controller to sell 
his shares in the corporation. This mechanism would ensure that minority shareholders can rid the 
corporation of any controller whose presence harms the corporation. This mechanism should be a mere 
default rule.  
107 ibid 693. 
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penalize the relevant actors, […] distort incentives, and can be inefficacious because the 
real world’s on the ground private enforcement is often misdirected’. 108  In the same 
way, Glaeser et al., indicate that in reality courts in numerous countries are ‘unmotivated, 
unclear as to how the law applies, unfamiliar with economic issues, or even corrupt. Such 
courts cannot be expected to engage in costly verification of the facts of difficult cases or 
contingencies of complicated contracts’.109    
A second area of criticism concerning court enforcement relates to the motivation 
of the plaintiff or his attorney. In terms of the plaintiff, minority shareholders have small 
investments in a company. This is, in some cases, not enough to bring an action against the 
controlling shareholders when the latter extracts excessive private benefits. Also, many 
scholars doubt the remedies available to shareholders since, though courts have the 
opportunity to solve the dispute, it is well established that the vast majority of cases settle 
prior to reaching court.110  The minority shareholders’ action can be used as a bargaining or 
                                                 
108  Howell E Jackson and Mark J Roe, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based 
Evidence’ (2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207. Section 2 of the study (at 209-210) provides useful 
literature in this regard.   
109  See Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Coase versus the Coasians’ (2001) 116 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 853, 854. Glaeser et al., provide further explanation in this regard by stating 
that  ‘[t]he interpretation of the contracts or statutes involving such terms is expensive, and requires powerful 
incentives to motivate an adjudicator to invest in understanding the case. Absent such incentives, courts often 
postpone decisions, or simply let go the potential violators of rules and contracts’. (See  ibid). Also, they 
argue that 
the society does not have full control over the incentives facing law enforcement officials. 
Its ability to reward them for “enforcing the law” is limited because “doing justice” is 
largely unverifiable. Many of the rewards that these officials receive for doing justice are 
intangible, including self-esteem and the respect of one’s peers. On the other hand, the 
government does have the ability to politicize the enforcement of particular legal rules by 
rewarding the enforcers for certain outcomes such as finding violations. We are interested 
in the conditions under which the government would choose such politicization. (ibid, 
856)  
In addition, they indicate that the government cannot increase judges’ self-esteem or long-term 
respect of their peers since it cannot verify whether the adjudicator actually searches for or makes correct 
decisions. Training judges and building up their prestige presumably raises this ability, but such policies may 
take decades to pay off. ibid. 
110 Thomas M Jones, ‘Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action 
Lawsuits’ (1980) 60 Boston University Law Review 542; Marc Galanter, ‘Reading the Landscape of 
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) about our Allegedly Contentious and 
Litigious Society’ (1983) 31 UCLA Law Reveiw 4; Marc Galanter, ‘Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to 
Teach about Legal Process’ (1984) 34 Journal of Legal Education 268; John C Coffee, ‘The Unfaithful 
Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation’ (1985) 48 Law and Contemporary Problems 
5; Coffee and Berle (n 5); Jackson and Roe (n 108);; Tamara Relis, ‘Civil Litigation from Litigants' 
Perspectives: What We Know and What We Don't Know About the Litigation Experience of Individual 
Litigants’ (2002) 25 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 151. 
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negotiating tool against the company or its controlling shareholders (sometimes known as 
strike suits). This is because they are able to blackmail the companies into a lucrative 
settlement agreement by, for example, blocking important transactions. 111  Here the 
management or the controlling shareholders sometimes accept the settlement to secure the 
reputation of the company rather than accepting that they have abused the minority 
shareholders.112 Regarding the attorney, as it has been argued that the legal system can 
create ‘misincentives’ for the attorney, a conflict can sometimes exist between the interests 
of the attorneys and their clients, thus unnecessarily frustrating the utility of private 
enforcement. 113 
The final area of criticism is associated with the operation of the company. It has 
been argued that litigation may produce unwanted publicity 114   that could affect the 
reputation of the company and therefore deter further investment. 115 Moreover, increased 
litigation may disrupt the management and result in unwanted costs.116 This situation may 
have a consequently negative effect on the performance of the management since the time 
spent on litigation would be more profitably spent elsewhere. Further the action may 
impact on profit maximization as imposing liability on directors may prevent them from 
                                                 
111 This is the reason why some countries restricted standing to sue to shareholders representing a particular 
percentage. However, a percentage requirement for the challenge of a shareholder resolution was not 
introduced in Libya, Egypt and France. In Libya, there are no restrictions to standing to sue, but the minority 
shareholders are allowed to bring such an action only when they have an interest to do so. (The origin of this 
rule is a Procedural Civil Act s 4. This rule also, can be found in Egyptian Procedural Civil Act s 3 and 
French Procedural Civil Act s 31).   
112 Coffee ‘The Unfaithful Champion’ (n 110) 17. 
113  John C Coffee Jr, ‘Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty 
Hunter is Not Working’ (1983) 42 Maryland Law Review 215;  Murray L Schwartz and Daniel JB Mitchell, 
‘Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, An’ (1969) 22 Stan L Rev 1125.   
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Shareholders Rights (6 edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010) 222; J. Paul Sykes, ‘The Continuing Paradox: 
a Critique of Minority Shareholder and Derivative Claims under the Companies Act 2006’ (2010) 29 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 205, 227. 
115  See Taylor v National Union of Mineworkers ( Derbyshire Area) [1985] BCLC 237, 254-5; Arad 
Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (Oxford University Press 
2007) 48. 
116 Jennifer Payne, ‘Shareholders’ Remedies Reassessed’ (2004) 67 The Modern Law Review 500, 503;  
Hans C. Hirt, ‘The Company’s Decision to Litigate against its Directors: Legal Strategies to Deal with the 
Board of Directors’ Conflict of Interest’ (2005)  The Journal of Business Law 159, 165. 
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taking entrepreneurial risks that could benefit the company.117 Thus minority shareholder 
actions can be seen to be problematic in several key areas; however these are exacerbated 
in the context of transition and developing economies, as I will now discuss. 
3.2.2. The lack of formal private enforcement in transition and developing 
economies  
Many transition and developing economies lack court enforcement and so cannot offer 
adequate protection to minority shareholders. 118  Such countries lack the capacity to 
implement policies and to enforce laws and regulations. Also, they are not capable of 
preventing public officials from engaging in corrupt behaviour or influential pressure 
groups from distorting economic policies.119  
The main study in this regard is Pistor et al’s 2000 study, ‘Law and Finance in 
Transition Economies’. 120 This study provides a thorough analysis of the law on the books 
in transition countries comparing it with the effectiveness of legal institutions in these 
countries. Pistor et al. found that though credit market development benefited from 
improvements in the law on the books (focusing on shareholder rights and creditors’ 
rights), the effectiveness of legal institutions has a much stronger impact on external 
finance. This conclusion supports the argument that the proposition of legal transplants and 
extensive legal reforms are not adequate to establish effective legal and market 
institutions.121 Also, whilst they could not find a positive correlation between the levels of 
                                                 
117 Paul F. Banta, ‘The New Indiana Business Corporation Law: “Reckless” Statute or New Standard?’ 
(1987)  Columbia Business Law Review 233, 236. 
118 Joachim Ahrens, ‘Governance in the Process of Economic Transformation (2007) University of Applied 
Sciences Goettingen’ (2007) University of Applied Sciences Goettingen 
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and Claessens (n 10). Also, we should note that this lack of enforcement is also an issue in developed 
countries. In Russia, for example, it has been argued that investors almost never go to court because, when 
they do so, the likelihood of success is very small.  Even if they win a judgment in their favour it is often not 
enforced. See ibid  
119 Ahrens (n 118) 10. 
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formal legal protection on the books and legal effectiveness, 122  they found that ‘the 
proportion of firms, which do not trust the legal system to protect their rights, is staggering 
in many countries’. 123  Further, although they did find that the effectiveness of legal 
institutions are strikingly different among transition economies (and the variance in these 
measures is much larger than the variance in the law on the books as measured by the 
shareholder and creditor rights indices), they are still generally low.124  
In Latin America countries, Chong and López-de-Silanes examined ‘recent trends 
of Latin America’s institutional development regarding investor protection’. They found 
that the Latin American countries generally suffer from low levels of legal protection and 
weak capital markets due to the poor enforcement of their laws. 125 In African countries, 
many studies observe that although there are laws in Africa that are intended to protect 
minority shareholders’ rights, these laws are not strictly enforced in practice. The legal 
systems remain slow and inefficient and most investors are hesitant to use the courts due to 
the length of time it takes to obtain a satisfactory resolution. 126 The same results can be 
found amongst Asian transition economies. For example, in a survey of managers of small 
start-up firms in Vietnam in 1995, McMillan and Woodruff found that the managers they 
interviewed said that they did not believe the courts could help them, 127  suggesting that 
they ‘normally just create more problems’, 128  and that ‘the court is weak and no 
entrepreneurs use it’. 129 Of those interviewed, only 9% thought that a court or other 
government agency could assist them,130 and only 2% of managers said they would take 
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Challenges in a Sub-Saharan African Economy’ (2010) 5 Journal of Business and Policy Research 110. 
127 See  John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam’ (1999) 
15 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 637. 
128 ibid  640. 
129 ibid. 
130 ibid. 
129 
 
disputes to court or appeal to local authorities.131  Similar observations were made by 
Boisot and Child in the case of China.132 
Additionally, in the majority of MENA countries, as Creane et al suggest, the 
quality of the judicial system is poor as is ‘susceptible to political pressure and long delays, 
resulting in poor legal enforcement of property rights’.133 According to this study, the 
Heritage Foundation's index of private property protection shows that from 20 countries 
studied only Bahrain has a rating of very high protection, and only the United Arab 
Emirates and Kuwait have a rating of high protection.134 Moreover, according to Alajlan, 
enforcement in Arab markets in general is not thorough and laws governing insider trading 
and financial disclosures are poorly regulated.135 Sourial examined the governance models 
in the corporate and securities sectors in the Arab Word 136  and found that: 
Most of the rules and regulations that govern the MENA region markets is 
either recently issued or updated recently in conjunction with the 
international practices. Thus, the problem of misappropriation of rules and 
regulations does not pose a significant problem. However, similar to many 
world markets, there is gap between laws and regulations and the 
effectiveness of enforcement and implementation. The width of the gap 
varies across the region.137  
 
Thus a major determinant for developing equity market in such countries is not 
primarily the law on the books, but the effectiveness of legal institutions (the law in 
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Working Paper, WP/04/201 
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practice).   In the case of Libya an extreme situation has emerged in which laws have 
become effectively meaningless due to a lack of enforcement. 
3.2.3. The problem of formal private enforcement in Libya 
As discussed previously, there are three stages that any transition economy goes through 
when transforming into a market economy: the Bureaucratic Stage, the Networks Stage, 
and the Free Market Stage. 138 Libya is still in the very early stages of transformation and is 
currently moving from the Bureaucratic Stage to the Networks Stage.139 In the early stages, 
many developing and transition economies still have dysfunctional legal systems because 
laws and rules supporting market-based transactions are incomplete and the machinery for 
enforcement is inadequate. 140   As a result, stakeholders rely on self-enforcement and 
informal constraints, such as social relationships, social norms, and personal power, as a 
means of regulating harmful opportunistic behaviours. This is referred as ‘Relational 
Governance’, which is discussed in detail in Ch.1.141   
As the enforcement of the legal system is extremely weak (as discussed below), it 
effectively prevents minority shareholders from suing majority shareholders for breach, 
misuse, wrongdoing or oppression. The infectiveness of litigation encourages the solving 
of problems outside of formal channels and leads investors to rely on social networks as an 
alternative to formal rules and legal enforcement. In other words, the real problem in Libya 
is not enacting the laws and regulation generally (although this is still a problem in 
corporate governance), 142  instead the problem is their enforcement. In 2010, Larbsh 
studied the lack of law enforcement in Libya143 and found it to be an extreme case. He 
states that ‘[a]lmost all interviewees (9 out of 10) argued that the implementation and 
                                                 
138 See (1.3.1). 
139 See (1.3.2). 
140 John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order’ (2000) 98 
Michigan Law Review 2421, 2421;  Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition’ (Annual 
Bank Conference on Development Economics). 
141 See (1.3.1). 
142 See (1.3.2). 
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acceleration of the enforcement is more problematic than establishing laws and 
regulation’. 144  He concludes that the main factor affecting the practice of corporate 
governance in Libya is the poor enforcement of law.145   
 Although there is no doubt that Libyan courts lack the capacity to enforce laws, 
which is a significant issue for corporate governance, the key question is to what extent.  
The answer to this question is complex as not only legal efficiency in general (which refers 
to outputs relative to inputs) is difficult to measure,146 but a lack of data and sufficient 
empirical studies makes the evaluation of the deficiency of enforcing institutions  a 
challenging task.147 
In the following sections, the study argues that Libya is an extreme case in terms of 
lack of court enforcement. To do so, the study uses variables that relate to the special case 
of Libya and are commonly used to assess legal effectiveness. For example, Pistor et al use 
three variables to measure the effectiveness of legal institutions in transition economies: a 
rule of law rating provided by outside expert assessment; an index of the effectiveness of 
corporate and bankruptcy law in transition economies constructed by the EBRD;148 and 
survey data on the ability of the legal system to protect private property rights and enforce 
contracts, which they call the enforcement index.149  In addition, La Porta et al use five 
indices to analyse their forty-nine countries: rule of law, the efficiency of the judiciary, the 
prevalence of corruption, contract repudiation and expropriation by the government.150  By 
comparison, Johnson et al use three indices of legal institution: efficiency of the judiciary, 
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corruption, and the rule of law.151 Accordingly, in the following sections the study will 
employ some of these categories and others that take into account the special environment 
in Libya, such as the impact on court enforcement of the tribal structure of Libyan society. 
 3.3. Lack of general enforcement environment of law in Libya 
This section evaluates the judicial approach adopted by LEAA 2010 in regard to the 
protection of the minority shareholders. Through analysing the general enforcement 
environment of law, I argue that the current system of judicial protection is not effective. 
This section discusses both the negative impact of judicial corruption (3.3.1) and the slow 
pace of justice (3.3.2) on court enforcement. In addition, as an analysis of court efficiency 
needs to extend beyond the courts themselves to understand their role in the larger system, 
the section analyses other political (e.g. government intervention) and social (e.g. the 
structure of Libyan society) aspects that hinder the courts’ enforcement of law (3.3.3).  
3.3.1. Judicial corruption 
There is no doubt that when enforcing institutions are corrupt, the level of enforcement is 
adversely affected.152 Corruption lowers enforcement effectiveness by increasing the costs 
of motivating and monitoring bureaucrats. 153 Further, even though it is lower in rich 
countries, corruption is a global phenomenon.154 However, in Libya it is endemic155 and 
therefore impacts on court enforcement generally.156 According to the last available annual 
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report on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)  in 2014, issued by Transparency 
International, Libya ranked 166th among 174 countries in the world.157  Porter and Yergin 
found in 2005 that Libya lags behind its MENA peers by a substantial margin on control of 
corruption.158 
Regarding judicial corruption in Libya, the courts face serious problems. 159  
However, an assessment of the exact level of judicial corruption in Libya is a very hard 
task since there are no empirical studies or appropriate literature. Most of the information 
concerning judicial corruption in Libya is only available in the daily newspapers published 
in Libya. Prior to the Libyan revolution at the end of 2011, no international, regional or 
NGO "watchdog" organizations were able to operate in Libya due to the closed nature of 
the Muammar Gadhafi’s regime.160                                                                                                    
Though there is a lack of studies that examine judicial corruption in Libya, it is 
commonly held in Libya that judicial corruption is widespread and institutionalised, often 
being seen as part of the local system of state governance. Martinez notes that ‘the judicial 
system lacks standards and procedures for fair and equitable trials and the judiciary is 
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perceived by the population as corrupt’.161 There is also a sense that this situation is a 
legacy of the Gaddafi regime; the International Crisis Group notes that under Gadhafi, the 
judiciary suffered from politicization of appointments and rampant corruption.162 Despite 
the change in government, judicial corruption remains a major problem. Following the 
Libyan revolution in 2011, the leader of the National Transition Council (NTC), 163   
Mustapha Abdul Jalil,164 acknowledged that it would take years to overcome the ‘heavy 
heritage’ of judicial corruption in Libya.165 Salah al-Marghani166 indicated that ‘there is 
little trust towards the judges who are still considered to be Qadhafi’s judges’.167 Mohamed 
Al Mogarif, who followed Mustapha Abdul Jalil in 2012, pointed out that ‘judicial 
corruption in Libya is a cancer that needs to be removed’.168 His statement was a response 
to the protest in Benghazi in October of that year against judicial corruption in Libya.169 
However, there is evidence that rather than improving, judicial corruption has got worse 
following the revolution. According to the international Crisis Group Report in 2013 ‘Civil 
cases […] were still rife with corruption; according to several lawyers, the situation 
worsened following Qadhafi’s fall insofar as there was less scrutiny than in the past’ .170 
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Therefore, after Gadhafi, the judicial system is still rife with corruption, a situation that is 
exacerbated by an increase in threats and physical attacks on prosecutors and judge, which 
further inhibits the rule of law. 171 This situation clearly creates distrust towards the Libyan 
judiciary. 172 
The ineffectiveness and corruption of the Libyan judicial system discourages 
minority shareholders from seeking remedies in the courts. Consequently, many people 
including investors do not go to a court; instead they create informal institutions that work 
as an alternative court. For example, the informal institution of the tribe and its justice 
system play a crucial role in solving disputes since ‘it is more accessible, quicker, more 
transparent, and less corrupt than the state courts. In addition, the tribal mediator, or sheikh, 
is felt to be better equipped to guarantee enforcement of tribal rulings’.173 This idea has 
been discussed in chapter (1) from the angle of corporate governance based on 
relationships174 and will be further discussed later in this section from the perspective of its 
impact on court enforcement.175  
3.3.2. Slow pace of justice 
In addition to an honest judiciary, speed is also important if investor remedies are to be 
meaningful. 176 Here the study argues that enforcement mechanisms function poorly in 
Libya since the machinery of justice is too slow, too cumbersome and too expensive to 
make it effective. In other words, Libyan courts are ineffective and inefficient at providing 
predictable and timely judgments. This is because the Libyan judicial oversight has 
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<http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/libya?page=2>. More details are provided in 
(3.3.3.1). 
172   Libya Herald, ‘Libyan Judicial System Needs Urgent Reform: Report’ Libya Herald (Tripoli, 17-April-
2103) <http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/04/17/libyan-judicial-system-needs-urgent-reform-
report/#ixzz2tciQizDh> accessed 20-02-2014. 
173 Jan Michiel Otto, J Carlisle and S Ibrahim, Searching for Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya. A Socio-Legal 
Exploration of People's Concerns and Institutional Responses at Home and From Abroad (Van Vollenhoven 
Institute, Leiden University, cop. 2013) 193. 
174 See (1.3.2.1).   
175 See (3.3.3.2). 
176 Bernard Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’ (2001) 48 
UCLA Law Review 781, 790-91 and 807. 
136 
 
numerous legal and physical obstacles that discourage the minority shareholders from 
bringing an action (3.3.2.1), and the current situation of a lack of security has a 
contributory impact on providing predictable and timely judgments (3.3.2.2). 
3.3.2.1. The legal and physical obstacles in Libya’s judicial system 
The effectiveness of law enforcement may depend on matters of civil procedure.177 In 
Libya, there are numerous legal procedural obstacles that hinder the minority shareholders 
in bringing an action against the majority shareholders. According to Maroof, foreign 
investors are most likely to rely on arbitration as an alternative to national courts because 
of the complexity of the national Act of civil procedure in Arabic countries such as Libya, 
and also the slowness of the procedure of litigations in these countries.178 Additionally, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) indicated that courts do not apply 
uniform procedures or case management systems, resulting in significant differences in the 
time it takes to process cases.179 
Most of the legal procedural obstacles in Libya derive from the fact that the Libyan 
Procedural Civil Act was enacted in the 1950s and there have been no serious amendments 
that reflect the new developments in Libyan society. Here the study briefly outlines these 
obstacles (since their details relate to civil procedure law, not corporate governance). The 
most important of these obstacles are as follows:   
Firstly, the law does not state the time period in which the third party (e.g. 
witnesses and external experts) must co-operate with the court.180 For example, external 
experts often fail to provide the court with requested reports on time. Though the reports of 
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external experts are not binding to the courts, in about 95% of cases the courts seek an 
opinion from such experts.181 Furthermore, the law allows the parties to extend the case for 
any reason. Often these reasons are not significant to the case but involve, for example, the 
exchanging of marginal documents between the parties, examining the documents and 
filing new documents which may have no effect on the case.182  Moreover, there are many 
problems in delivering citation notices that the law does not address. For example, the law 
does not account for the lack of house numbers and street names in Libya.  
Other contributory factors to the slowness court procedures in Libya are:  the lack 
experienced judges (as discussed later); the weak performance of the Judicial Inspection 
Institution183 concerning the observance of the litigation procedure; the length of judicial 
annual breaks (50 days a year); and the disproportionate number of cases received by the 
courts per year to the number of available judges. 184 There are also ex post reasons that 
contribute to the slowness of the pace of justice in Libya that follow litigation proceedings. 
For example, many court decisions have not been enforced by the judicial police due to 
their lack of efficiency. Further, many court decisions cannot be enforced when the ruling 
is against either a powerful public institution or a person who has political power. 185 
  As well as procedural issues, there are further physical factors that contribute to the 
slowness in the pace of justice in Libya. For example, the deterioration of the institutional 
climate under which the judges work, the failure to adopt new technologies that could 
assist in speeding up the pace of the litigation, and a lack of suitable facilities in judicial 
institutions all contribute to extending the length of the court’s proceedings.   
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Due to the combination of these factors, a commercial case in Libya may take more 
than ten years to be decided by a court.  In response to this, investors in Libya often do not 
deal with unknown persons. Instead they usually transact with people who they have a 
social relationship with. There are also other ways that have been developed that enable 
investors to protect themselves from relying on the civil law procedure of the courts. For 
example, when a civil transaction is breached a remedy can be sought under criminal law. 
An example of this might occur when an investor (or any individual) wants to borrow 
money from another investor (or individual).  In such cases it is very common that the 
creditor will request from the potential debtor a Wasel Amana (an agreement based on 
trust). The procedure of breaking the Wasel Amana is that the creditor will undertake a 
criminal procedure in order to regain the debt faster, whereas under a civil procedure even 
a simple case could take several years to resolve.  
3.3.2.2.   The lack of security undermines formal private enforcement  
On 17th of February, 2011, Libya witnessed a revolution against Gadhafi’s regime which, 
as any revolution in the world, had numerous, unforeseen consequences. One of which is 
the resultant lack of security. Numerous post-revolutionary armed groups, so-called 
“militias” (milishiat) or “brigades” (kataib), have kept their arms and their power 
following the end of the revolution and the establishment of democracy. 186  The 
government thus far have failed to exert control over these militias who themselves have 
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a mess because there’s no fear, and I think the way to bring back order is to apply the law. 
People should fear the law, not a dictator’. See International Crisis Group (n 162) 19. 
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their shared interests and political aspirations. 187 According to the International Crisis 
Group, this is because the government ‘lack[s] appropriate means to control armed groups. 
The police do not have sufficient manpower, as many officers did not report back to work 
after the 2011 war’.188 The report also notes that ‘those who remained in office tended to 
be powerless, unarmed and subservient to the will of armed brigades’.189 Thus the virtual 
collapse of the state security apparatus and the widespread availability of weapons 
constitute a vital problem plaguing the judicial system, which, as Amnesty International 
reported, is ‘virtually paralysed’.190   
In terms of the impact on court proceedings and enforcement, as Otto et al. note, 
‘judges, prosecutors and police lack the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of power 
and thus cannot enforce the law’.191 In this context, the 2012 annual report of the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office notes that: 
[T]he Libyan judicial system is not yet fully functioning, despite efforts 
made by the interim government to rebuild institutions. Many of the police 
officers, prison guards, lawyers and judges who left during the revolution 
have not returned. Court cases are often adjourned rather than dealt with 
immediately by judges, or do not progress as quickly as they should. 192 
 
Additionally, the International Crisis Group report in 2013, confirmed that ‘there is 
still no functioning court system in many parts of the country, while armed groups 
continue to run prisons and enforce their own forms of justice’. 193 The same report notes 
that ‘the absence of an effective national police force, widespread availability of weapons 
and persistent assassination of security officials have hampered the state’s investigative 
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capacity as well as its ability to carry out justice’. 194  The lack of security has led to 
lawlessness and the formulation of an appropriate and long term solution is complex.195 
The complexity comes from the conflict between the government and militias; while the 
government admits that it cannot enforce the law as long as the militias keep destabilising 
the law enforcement apparatus, the militias claim they cannot give up their positions as 
long as the state allows lawlessness and impunity.196  
The lack of law enforcement, in the context of the lack of security in Libya, takes 
the two following perspectives. Firstly, armed groups and militia consider themselves 
above the law. They, to some extent, exercise informal supervision over local police 
stations and act as judges in some situations.197 Following the revolution, the militias ‘took 
on the roles of police, prosecutors, judges and jailers’,198 which stems from the fact that the 
revolutionary camp distrust the judiciary, considering them to be Qaddafi loyalists, 199 and 
their distrust extends to the police force that worked under the Qadhafi’s as well.200 
Additionally, the lack of security in Libya significantly affects law enforcement 
through preventing many members of the judicial sector from attending work.  The U.S. 
State Department notes that “judges cited concerns about the overall lack of security in and 
around the courts as one of the reasons that they had not yet returned to work, further 
hindering the judiciary’s reestablishment”.201 Amnesty International reported that: ‘a return 
to a functioning judiciary could only happen when the security situation improves’.202  
International Crisis Group report notes that ‘in late December 2012, Mustafa Tarabulsi, 
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president of the Court of Appeals of the Jebel Akhdar, suspended all local cases “in order 
to maintain security and protect the court and its staff’.203 Also, the same report notes that 
‘in some peripheral areas, such as the town of Derna in eastern Libya and its surrounding 
region of Jebel Akhdar, courts did not function at all.’204   The 2013 report of the UN 
Secretary, also, notes that: 
The volatile security situation continued to represent a major challenge for 
the full resumption of the Libyan court system, with armed elements often 
cited by judges and prosecutors as a source of continuous threat. 
Following a number of attacks on courts, including the appeals court in the 
Green Mountain region and the office of the Chief Prosecutor in Benghazi, 
a number of senior judges threatened to suspend the work of the courts if 
their security were not guaranteed.205 
Further, it has been reported that attacks on judges and lawyers has increased. 
Amnesty International has documented cases of violence against members of the 
prosecution, threats against judicial officers and challenges faced by defence teams.206   
More than that, many judges have already been killed. 207  The situation has led the 
Supreme Judicial Council in Libya to request personal protection form the government.208 
3.3.3. Political and social hindrances to law enforcement 
Larbsh argues that a ‘system of governance that is based on law may not be effective in 
developing economies, where social connections and political intervention have a high 
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influence on the governance practice’.209 Accordingly, in this subsection I argue that court 
enforcement in Libya is not efficient since it is hindered by both the political (3.3.3.1) and 
the social (3.3.3.2) climate.  
3.3.3.1.  Political hindrances to law enforcement 
The general enforcement environment is effected by the political climate in several ways. 
For example, when most controlling owners are politicians, enforcement is weak and the 
interests of minority shareholders are less likely to be protected.210 Also, when the rich 
elite influence the path of justice, litigation does not work effectively.211  Further, political 
corruption may affect how laws are written.212 Consequently, the level of enforcement is 
ultimately a matter of political priorities, particularly when there are interferences from 
government, which is the case in Libya. To underline this, the 2012 U.S. State Department 
report suggested that ‘the interim governments took no concrete actions to reform the 
justice system, and gaps in existing legislation and unclear separation of powers among the 
executive, judicial, and legislative branches contributed to a weak judicial system’. 213 
Under Gadhafi’ regime, Gadhafi had almost unlimited power. This came from the 
fact that the “Charter of Revolutionary Legitimacy” gave him control over all of Libya’s 
political, judicial, and economic institutions. As a result, Gadhafi’s directives were 
prioritized vis-à-vis the law, including judicial rulings. 214  Also, the same Charter of 
Revolutionary Legitimacy delegated him the right to intervene in judicial issues by 
changing court judgments or obstructing the administration of justice. 215  At the 
government level, the executive authority had control over judges and compromised their 
independence. For example, the Minister of Justice directly intervened to prevent the 
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courts from enforcing rulings against the state in violation of the Code of Procedure and, 
separately, against oil companies.216  
Following the revolution there remains a lack of many relevant international 
standards for the independence of the judiciary in Libya and both the executive and 
legislative power are still able to intervene in the work of Libyan judiciary. In this context, 
International Crisis Group in 2013 ‘acknowledged the need to restore public trust in the 
judiciary and recommended reforming the judicial system to guarantee its independence, 
integrity and impartiality.’217 Martinez in 2012 indicated that ‘the revolutionary authority 
has undue influence on judges and frequently uses that power to shape rulings in their 
favour.’ 218  Also, he indicates that ‘the judicial system fails to exercise any kind of 
oversight over the regime, which is not bound to comply with judicial rulings’. 219  
Similarly, International Crisis Group expressed doubts about judicial independence since 
the council remains financially dependent on the Ministry of Justice and both the President 
of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General are appointed by the legislature 220  
following nomination by the executive authority.221 Additionally, the Judicial Inspection 
Department, whose duty it is to inspect and evaluate the work of members of the judicial 
sectors such as judges and prosecutors, is still a part of the Ministry of Justice (executive 
authority), 222  rather than being an independent institution. Moreover, the Minister of 
Justice’s presidency of the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies and the membership of the 
Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice still sit on the High Judicial Council.223   Thus, 
executive authorities in Libya still exercise institutional control over Libyan judges.  
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3.3.3.2. Social hindrances to law enforcement 
The general enforcement environment is not only effected by the political climate, the 
social climate also has a significant impact on law enforcement in Libya. Libya’s social 
environment is characterized by the extended family, clan, tribe and village. These play a 
major role in the community’s life and people’s relationships with each other.224 However, 
these relationships and social connections constitute constraints that prevent improvement 
in the general enforcement environment and implementation of public laws in Libya.  This 
is due to the fact that in tribal societies loyalty is to the family, clan, and tribe more than to 
a state and regionalism and sectarianism outweigh loyalty to profession and law.225 This 
situation is not new; strong tribes, clans, and families have always been a countervailing 
force to the state and to its efforts to establish strong state institutions.226 As Otto, Carlisle 
and Ibrahim, note: 
The bonds between tribe members are said to be generally stronger in 
eastern Libya than in the western part in and around Tripoli. Here, people 
rely in times of trouble heavily on their tribe rather than on the state. The 
state is often perceived as being tardy, inefficient, perhaps corrupt, and 
generally ineffective.227 
 
Consequently, personal relations and family ties play a major role in solving 
disputes between the members of the tribes even in business affairs 228  and the tribe 
regularly takes on the role of local arbiter and mediator.229 In fact, Libyan law per se 
acknowledges this power to the tribes by delegating arbitrating power to the sheikh (head) 
of a tribe. Reconciliation and Arbitration Committees, established by law no 74/1975 
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(amended by law no. 4/ 2010), 230   are composed of sheikhs and have power to resolve 
disputes. The parties of the dispute can bring their dispute to the official Reconciliation and 
Arbitration Committees to solve their disputes as an alternative to the courts. However, if 
the committee is unable to solve the dispute, it can transfer the parties to a court.  
The advantages of appealing to the informal institution of the tribe and its justice 
system, as Otto et al. note, is that   
it is more accessible, quicker, more transparent, and less corrupt than the 
state courts. In addition, the tribal mediator, or sheikh, is felt to be better 
equipped to guarantee enforcement of tribal rulings. These rulings are 
closer to the collective beliefs of the communities and enforced with social 
pressure. This can be found not only in the rural areas, but also in the 
urban areas where the tribal attachment and loyalty is very strong.231 
 
Therefore, though tribal and social institutions are not an alternative to the 
procedures of the state justice system, but rather are considered as a means of social 
mediation,232 they impact on law enforcement in the following aspects. Firstly, judges are a 
part of a tribal system before they are judges. Accordingly, they may have personal, or at 
least social, ties with one of parties that could result in a social pressure that affects their 
ruling. Secondly, since in Libya, loyalty to family, clan, and tribe is more than to a state 
and its law, the informal judgement of sheikhs carries a greater likelihood of enforcement 
than the formal judgment of courts. For example, when the judgments of the court and the 
tribe are in conflict, the tribal judgment is more likely to be enforced. Here Al-Tir argues 
‘when tribal loyalty encroaches upon necessary qualification, then discussing modern 
institutions becomes meaningless’.233 
                                                 
230 According to Law no.74/1975, the parties must bring their dispute to the committee before they go to the 
court and the court can reject the case if it found that the case was not brought to the committee first. 
However, under law no. 4/ 2010, this provision has changed and become a default rule. 
231 ibid. 
232  ibid.  
233  Mustafa Al-Tir, ‘ Challenges of Democratic Movement in Libya’ Al Watan al-Libiya (Tripoli, 
23/Sep/2011) cited in  Jason Pack, The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Future 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 61, (footnote 14). It is worth mention that, according to Al-Tir:  
The major urban areas developed as a result of emigration from countryside and not as a 
result of natural increase [in population]. Thus, the tribe is still present today in the 
memory of a large number of urban dwellers. Instead of those coming from the 
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3.4. The quality of corporate law judges: the deficiency of expertise in the 
courts 
It has been said that ‘bad judges may spoil good laws’,234 and currently in Libya the 
deficiency in judges’ expertise means that shareholders are not able to ensure the 
enforcement of their rights due to poor court institutions. Dulic and Kuzman suggest that 
the enforcement of laws and the quality of institutions which enforce legal norms, 
determine the effectiveness of investors’ protection independently of a formally defined set 
of laws. 235 Therefore, a lack of expertise in the courts undermines the efficiency of the 
current solution adopted in art 159 of LEAA 2010. The rationale of the argument here is 
that the law on the books is meaningless if the quality of the courts' interpretation and the 
implementation of the law are weak. When courts are unable to enforce the law as it is 
stated in the statutes, then the law will be different from that envisioned by the 
legislators.236 In other words, whereas access to court is primarily controlled by the quality 
of the law, the type of enforcement is primarily controlled by the quality of the judiciary 
system.237  
In the following analysis, I argue that the current Libyan courts are not equipped to 
deal with commercial cases that relate to abuse of power by the controlling shareholders. 
This is because the current judges lack the adequate experience and expertise to deal with 
such cases (3.4.1). This is especially the case as the current legal system concerning the 
                                                                                                                                                    
countryside integrating into the life of the city and adopting the ways and modes of urban 
life, they entered the cities …and imposed the various particulars of rural life. (See ibid 
60, footnote 13)   
234 Luca Enriques, ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence from Milan’ (2002) 3 European 
Business Organization Law Review 756, 771. 
235 Katarina Đulić and Tanja Kuzman, ‘Protection of Rights of Minority Shareholders: Legal Framework and 
Enforcement’ <http://policycafe.rs/documents/financial/research-and-publications/financial-sector-
development-in-serbia/the-protection-of-minority-shareholder-rights.pdf> accessed 12-02-1013. 
236 Luca Enriques, ‘Off the Books, But on the Record: Evidence from Italy on the Relevance of Judges to the 
Quality of Corporate Law’ in Curtis J. Milhaupt (ed), Global Markets and Domestic Institutions: Corporate 
Law and Governance in a New Era of Cross Border Deals (New York: Columbia University Press) 257-294. 
237 Zohar Goshen, ‘The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality’ (2003) 91 
California Law Review 393, 420. 
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protection of minority shareholders is based on the wide discretion of judges (open-ended 
legal standards) rather than a set of defined legal standards (3.4.2). 
3.4.1. The lack of adequate experience and expertise in dealing with cases of 
minority shareholder protection  
Although there are no international (or even national) reports that focus intensively on the 
working of the courts and the training of the judiciary,238 there are some reports that 
indicate a lack of sufficient experiences and adequate training in the Libyan court system 
generally.  The 2013 report of the International Crisis Group notes that the Libyan regime 
appointed judges without legal training.239 The same report notes that a ‘high percentage of 
untrained judges continued to man the courts’. 240 The 2012 Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Libya similarly noted that there still exists a lack of trained staff 
in the judicial sector in general.241 Additionally, Libyan lawyers interviewed in the Report 
of the AJIDIL, stress that there should be more resources and training for the judiciary.242 
Also, the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) report recognises that courts’ 
efficiency is dependent on the administrative staff (who, in Libya, receive no ongoing 
training) and the adequate resourcing of law faculties. 243 Similarly, the Report of the 
AJIDIL proposes that because of lack of qualified judges in Libya, the authorities should 
establish ‘a systematic training programme for the legal professions, including joint 
training of judges’. 244  Because of this situation, the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in their report suggest that ‘United Nations 
                                                 
238 This result is also found in  Otto, Carlisle and Ibrahim, Searching for Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya. A 
Socio-Legal Exploration of People's Concerns and Institutional Responses at Home and From Abroad  (n 
186) 35. 
239 International Crisis Group (n 162) 11. 
240 ibid. It is also noted that ‘some judges and prosecutors also lacked proper interrogation techniques and 
accepted confessions extorted under duress’. ibid 15. 
241 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (UN Human 
Rights Council, 2 March 2012, A/HRC/19/68, 2012) available at < 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ffd19532.html>   
242 Otto, Carlisle and Ibrahim, Searching for Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya. A Socio-Legal Exploration of 
People's Concerns and Institutional Responses at Home and From Abroad (n 186) 103. 
243 International Legal Assistance-ILAC (n 159) 59, 69-72. 
244 Otto, Carlisle and Ibrahim, Searching for Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya. A Socio-Legal Exploration of 
People's Concerns and Institutional Responses at Home and From Abroad (n 186) 202.  
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agencies would be prepared to provide support in developing the overall judicial 
infrastructure, including the training of judges, prosecutors and corrections officers, 
strategic planning and budgeting capacity, case management systems and legal aid services 
to the population’.245  
Even though there are attempts by the government to train judges, these are not 
sufficient to raise the standard of expertise in the Libyan courts.246 This is particularly the 
case in the field of the minority shareholders’ protection where many judges in Libya are 
still unable to deal with complicated cases that relate to issues of, amongst other things, 
securities law, merger and takeover. For example, determining the objective value of a 
transaction is a complicated process (even though judges can rely on the existence of 
professional institutions capable of providing accurate assessments) that requires a high 
degree of competence from the courts. This is because ‘such valuations involve future 
projections of different variables, all of which can affect the actual price, and the use of 
complex financial models’.247  
Though it is clear that the number of poor judicial decisions can be reduced if the 
courts are competent,248 most of Libya’s courts are not capable of dealing with cases of 
minority protection since the court system contains no specialized judges.249 Instead judges 
                                                 
245 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (n 205). 
246 For example, in 2013 The Ministry of Justice in Libya sent only 11 Libyan Judges from five different 
governorates: Tripoli, Sabha, Benghazi, Albidaa, and Darna, to the judicial training academy in Kromeriz in 
the Czech Republic. See UNDP, ‘Training programme for 11 Libyan Judges in Kromeriz’ UNDP, 27 May 
2013 <http://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/presscenter/articles/2013/05/27/training-programme-
for-11-libyan-judges-in-kromeriz/> accessed 15-03-2014;  Libya Helald, ‘Libyan Judges Receive Training in 
Czech Republic’ Libya Helald (Tripoli, 03-06-2013) <http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/06/03/libyan-
judges-receive-training-in-czech-republic/#axzz2vezzNWjr> accessed 15-03-2014. 
247 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 WL 161084  
248 Zohar Goshen, ‘Conflicts of Interest in Publicly-Traded and Closely-Held Corporations: A Comparative 
and Economic Analysis’ (2005) 6 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 277. 
249 It should be noted that there is a distinction between specialised courts (existing in Libya) and specialized 
judges (not existing in Libya). The former can be described as ‘a court or an independent division within a 
general court with limited and usually with exclusive jurisdiction in one or more specific fields of the law’. 
(See Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (1996), “Specialized Courts: A Concept Paper”, p. 1, 
cited in OECD, Corporate Governance  in Emerging Markets Enforcement of Corporate  Governance in 
Asia: The Unfiinished Agenda (OECD 2007) 62. However, specialized judges means judges who are 
qualified and expert in a speciality that falls within the court’s jurisdiction. It has been argued that specialised 
business courts can improve the enforcement of corporate governance rules through attract investment and 
contribute to economic growth. Also, it has been argued that specialised business courts can only be 
149 
 
in Libya can preside in different types of courts and consider any kind of case no matter 
the area. The judge may work for three years in a civil court and after that may work in a 
criminal court according to what has been decided by the Assembly of the court at its 
yearly meeting.  This situation may contribute to the number of poor decisions and so can 
inflict a severe blow to economic efficiency as investors will be unwilling to invest in such 
a system as a minority group.    
3.4.2. Wide discretion of judges and uncertain criteria   
Though the lack of experience in the area of minority protection is a major contributory 
factor in poor judicial decisions, this is exacerbated by wide judicial discretion. Generally, 
judges in Libya have relatively limited discretion as Libya and other civil law countries 
rely on legal rules 250  more than principles. Legal rules, as MacNeil and Braithwaite 
observe, are more speciﬁc and increase legal certainty.251 This point, in particular, has been 
noted in the case of O'Neill v Phillips where Lord Hoffmann highlighted that a balance has 
to be struck between the breadth of the discretion given to the court and the principle of 
legal certainty.252 
However, in regard to minority shareholders’ protection, Libyan corporate law 
relies heavily on open-ended legal standards, such as the abuse of rights principle that 
grants courts wide discretion in resolving minority-majority shareholders’ conflicts, rather 
than providing corporate actors with specific legal standards that promote proper behaviour.   
In other words, the current test of fairness adopted in LEAA 2010 allows the court a very 
wide discretion and “sits under a palm tree”, since it relies on a fluid notion of fairness that 
                                                                                                                                                    
successful if certain preconditions are satisfied and one of them is the condition for well-trained judges (See 
ibid 14ff).    
250 Legal rules include laws, executive regulations (Lawaeh (plural) or laeha (singular)) and executive and 
ministerial decisions. 
251 See John Bradford Braithwaite, ‘Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty’ (2002) 27 Australian 
Journal of Legal Philosophy 47, 51; Iain MacNeil, ‘Uncertainty in Commercial Law’ (2009) 13  Edinburgh 
Law Review 68, 72-76.      
252 [1999] 2 BCLC 1. 
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is based on general concepts of wrong or fraud. 253 Accordingly, the LEAA 2010 is 
consistent with the concept of a “wholly indefinite notion of fairness” that UK law has 
rejected.254  
By contrast, unfair prejudice in the UK, as discussed previously, is clearly intended 
to bring greater commercial certainty255 to the operation of the remedy 256 by referring to 
specific criteria that determine whether the remedy is available.  Unfair prejudice, therefore, 
‘withdraws from the court a general fairness review power and refers them to the specific 
legal rules that determine whether the remedy is available in relation to different types of 
corporate conduct.’257  Lord Hoffman, in addressing the issue, said that the court cannot do 
‘whatever the individual judge happens to think fair. The concept of fairness must be 
applied judicially and the content which it is given by the courts must be based upon 
rational principles.  […] The court […] has a very wide discretion, but it does not sit under 
a palm tree’. 258                               
Although the wide discretion of judges can be used in a positive way to provide the 
minority shareholders with protection when the legal system has qualified judges who are 
able to ‘create new standards themselves or extend the application of existing ones to areas 
                                                 
253 The absence of clear legal rules is costly and in addition the lack of qualified judges in commercial cases 
leads to several negative outcomes:  
‘First, it leads to variance in assessments of the legal standard and thus to divergences of 
behaviour from the social optimum. Some corporate fiduciaries may overestimate the 
legal constraints and forgo efficient transactions, while others may underestimate the very 
same constraints and carry out inefficient transactions. Second, legal indeterminacy 
creates liability risk, which risk-averse fiduciaries are in a poor position to bear. Exposing 
corporate fiduciaries to this risk makes their services more costly and less productive to 
shareholders’.  
See Ehud Kamar, ‘Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law’ (1999) 66 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 887, 889. 
254  The concept that has been rejected in Ebrahimi [1973] A.C. 360 at 379. 
255 It should be noted that there is no direct causal relationship between certainty of rules and efﬁciency (as 
there is no reason to believe that, in general, efﬁcient rules are more certain than those which are inefﬁcient) 
As argued by  George L. Priest, ‘The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules’ (1977) 6 
The Journal of Legal Studies 65, 68. 
256 Paul Paterson, ‘A Criticism of the Contractual Approach to Unfair Prejudice’ (2006) 27 Company Lawyer 
204, 214. 
257 Kershaw (n 4) 684. 
258 [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1092. 1098. 
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other than those that the codes explicitly posit’,259 the lack of experience of most Libyan 
judges renders this possibility redundant.260 Without the requisite experience, the lack of 
restrictions to judicial discretion means that the outcome of the courts’ decisions will be 
inconsistent and there will be no explanation as to why one minority shareholder's claim is 
successful and another is not. The combination of wide discretion and a lack of expertise 
and experience in commercial issues, means that the current solution adopted in art 159 of 
LEAA 2010 is undesirable and not suitable in the Libyan case.  
In conclusion, the lack of experience and expertise of corporate law judges 
constitutes another factor that weakens the efficiency of the current solution adopted in art 
159 of LEAA 2010. This is because judges are not able to enforce the law as it is stated in 
the commercial statutes. This situation is more problematic in Libya since the current 
system used to protect minority shareholders is based on the wide discretion of judges 
(open-ended legal standards) rather than a set of defined legal standards.  
3.5. Considering Libya’s judicial system as a system of non-intervention: law 
enforcement problems under incomplete law 
Here the study argues that the approach to the protection of minority shareholders adopted 
under art 159 of LEAA 2010 has failed since the Libyan judicial system can be considered 
as a system of non-intervention.  As La Porta et al. argues, a judicial system should be 
regarded as a system of non-intervention, if the courts are inaccessible. 261 This 
inaccessibility can be put down to the issue of incomplete law in Libya.262 As Pistor and 
                                                 
259 Enriques ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Matter?’  (n 234) 771-2. 
260 Some scholars argue, however, that judges could fix corporate law only in a common law system. See ibid 
261  Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of 
Financial Economics 3. 
262 K. Pistor and C. Xu define a law as incomplete when ‘law makers are unable to foresee all future 
contingencies’.  Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, ‘Incomplete Law: A Conceptual and Analytical 
Framework’ (2002) 35 New York University Journal of International Law and Politic 931. Also, they note 
that law is incomplete when all potential harmful actions cannot be clearly speciﬁed. This means that a law 
may be incomplete when the law does not address the potentially harmful act, or when it intentionally leaves 
some areas open to judicial interpretation. Ibid 
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Xu suggest, law enforcement by courts cannot be expected to effectively deter violations 
when the law is incomplete.263 
In Libya, the minority shareholders face difficulties in bringing an action against 
the controlling shareholders (who are sometimes in the position of board of directors) 
because of the incomplete nature of the law. For example, a derivative suit is not allowed 
in Libya although it is allowed in almost all jurisdictions (3.5.1). Also, there are high risks 
and costs attached to bringing a dispute to the court (e.g. the court requires a deposit from 
the shareholders in order to bring an action against the majority shareholders) (3.5.2). In 
addition, the courts are barred from intervening in certain cases, for example, the minority 
shareholders cannot bring an action against the majority shareholders when the latter is in 
the position of a shadow director (3.5.3).  All of these factors lead us to conclude that the 
Libyan judicial system is a non-interventionist system.264  
3.5.1.  The lack of derivative suits 
In the UK, minority shareholders can bring a derivative action on behalf of a corporation 
against an insider of that corporation (e.g. a director).265 However, despite the fact that 
French Law and Egyptian Law (the roots of Libyan Law) allow minority shareholders to 
bring a derivative action against the directors on behalf of the company,266 the LEAA 2010 
prohibits any shareholder (including the minority shareholders) from bringing a suit 
                                                 
263  Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, ‘Deterrence and Regulatory Failure in Emerging Financial Markets: 
Comparing China and Russia’ Weatherhead Center, Harvard University, 1-04-2013 
<http://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/deterrence-and-regulatory-failure-emerging-financial-markets-
comparing-china-and> accessed 15-03-2014. 
264 Here we should note that a detailed analysis of minority protection in Libya goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
265 CA 2006, s 260. 
266 French Company Law ( art L. 225-252) has not prevented the minority shareholders from bringing a 
derivative action since the mid-nineteenth century. (See Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholders 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 214). This is also the case in Egyptian Company Law no 159/1981 
article 102/3, Syrian Company Law article 196/2, Lebanese Company Law article 168, Jordanian Company 
Law article 188 Saudi Company Law article 78. However,  Kuwaiti Company Law, similar to Libyan 
Company Law, does not provide the minority shareholder with shuch an action.  It is important to indicate 
that s 226 of Egyptian Company Law sets no threshold on the percentage of shares an investor must hold 
before they are able to bring an action against the directors. However, under French Company Law, ( Art. L. 
225-252) only shareholders who own 5 % of the company capital are able bring an action against the 
majority shareholders.  
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without a shareholders’ resolution, even if the company has been involved in an insolvency 
procedure.267   
One potential reason for the absence of a derivative suit in Libyan law is discussed 
by Muhsen Shafiq268 and Mohamed Kamel, 269 who suggest that to bring a derivative 
action against individual directors opens the door to numerous cases that could be brought 
by any shareholder seeking compensation. 270  This, they suggest, would threaten the 
stability of the management, trust in the management, and the reputation of the company. 
However, even if this were the case, such a criticism is applicable to all liability actions 
(including Personal Action) and revocation actions. As such, the appropriate solution is not 
to only allow the majority shareholders the right to sue the board of directors but, as is the 
case in the UK, to restrict the circumstances under which the action can proceed and allow 
an action only if permitted by the courts.271   
It may be argued that there is no need for a derivative action (a company-personal 
action) in Libya since a personal action may be deemed as an appropriate alternative to a 
derivative action. Under this model, the harm to a corporation can be translated into 
personal harm (minority shareholder’s harm). 272 In this context, according to Tibar, a 
personal action is considered as an exceptional auxiliary action. This means that minority 
shareholders should pursue an action only in cases in which the majority shareholders do 
not resolve to sue the directors (a company action). 273 In fact, this is not the case as the 
two actions (derivative action and personal action) are significantly different even if they 
sometimes overlap.274 A derivative action requires a corporate basis, which is associated 
                                                 
267 LEAA 2010, art 184.  
268 Muhsen Shafiq, Intermediary  in Commercial Law, vol 1 (3 edn, Maktabt Al nahda Almasria 2006) 562 
(in Arabic).   
269 Mohamed Kamel, The Encyclopedia of Corporations (Madbaha Kased Alkir 1980) 473 (in Arabic). 
270 See also K. W. Wedderburn, ‘Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 The 
Cambridge Law Journal 194, 194. 
271 See CA 2006, s 261 (1). For more details see (5.2.2). 
272 Tibar (n 12) 820. 
273 ibid. 
274 See  (3.1.1.2). 
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with corporate rights, and its function is to enable minority shareholders, in limited 
circumstances, to pursue an action for harm done to the company and to seek 
compensation on the company’s behalf. 275  However, a personal action has personal 
grounds that relate to personal rights; hence it is a remedy for shareholders who have 
suffered personal harm.276  Moreover, it is not a decision for the minority shareholder to 
determine which action is more suitable. Rather it should be the court’s decision as to 
whether a minority shareholders' claim should be pursued on the grounds of corporate 
rights or personal rights. This is especially the case as proceedings based on corporate 
grounds bring certain advantages that are not available to proceedings based on personal 
grounds. For instance, using corporate grounds as the basis for an action allows the 
minority shareholder to use the company's name in the claim and perhaps to seek 
indemnity for costs if the case succeeds.277   
Consequently, it is clear that there is a gap between the two scenarios that LEAA 
2010 covers (Company Action and Personal Action) as discussed previously. LEAA 2010 
does not allow for the fact that the minority shareholders may wish to pursue a derivative 
action on behalf of the company when the company’s interests are harmed and the majority 
shareholders do not want to sue. This issue is particularly problematic in Libya due to the 
concentrated system of ownership, as it is highly likely that the directors and the majority 
shareholders are the same people. Accordingly, on the grounds that the action cannot be 
brought unless a resolution is issued by the shareholders, it is not logical for a shareholder 
(as the controlling shareholder) to bring an action or make a resolution to sue himself (as a 
director). As a result, the protection that the Act provides for the shareholders, in this 
scenario, is significantly lacking. The only protection that the Act does grant to the 
minority shareholders is a personal action which is still under evaluation. 
                                                 
275 Deakin and others (n 59) 164. 
276 Hale, (n 20) 221. 
277  Brenda Hannigan, ‘Drawing Boundaries between Derivative Claims and Unfairly Prejudicial Petitions’ 
(2009) 6 Journal of Business Law 606, 610-611. 
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Therefore, it is evident that the law intends here to grant the majority shareholders 
the ultimate voice in matters of dispute, rather than allowing the minority the chance to 
destabilize the company on every issue. Even in a scenario where a director is clearly 
misusing his position, only the majority shareholder has the right to question the director, 
hold him accountable and/or remove him.  Moreover, the courts, in most cases, agree with 
the majority shareholder, preferring not to interfere in the company's internal affairs. Thus, 
it is clear that the purpose of this provision is to retain the power and control over the 
company's affairs in the hands of the majority shareholders, which in most cases is the 
state.     
The current state of minority protection in Libya is strikingly similar to the 
traditional position adopted in the UK. Prior to the reform of UK Law, minority 
shareholders were not permitted to litigate for wrongs done to their company or to 
complain of irregularities regarding its internal affairs. This principle originated from Foss 
v. Harbottle 278 and is called the “proper plaintiff rule”;279 the main rationale behind this 
rule being to protect the company from unwanted and harmful litigation. 280  Similarly, the 
minority shareholders in Libya are restricted by the majority rule principle and majority 
shareholders have complete control over decision-making and litigation.  
However, this principle created significant problems in the UK (discussed below) 
and, as a result, important exceptions were developed under traditional common law281 that 
allowed a minority shareholder to bring an action when a wrong was done to the company; 
                                                 
278 [1843] 2 Hara 461. 
279 This principle was clearly stated by Lord Davey in Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, PC, and also in 
Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, where he divided the principle into two main concepts. The first 
case stated that the courts would not interfere in the internal management of companies as courts regarded the 
majority shareholders as being in a far better position than judges to decide what should be done. The second 
case found that when a wrong was done to a company, the proper claimant was the company itself and not 
any individual shareholder, namely the minority shareholder. For more details Ben Pettet, Company Law (2 
edn, Pearson Education Limited 2005) 213. 
280 See  MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13, at 25;  Andrew Dodd, ‘Directors' Duties and Derivative 
Actions’ (2007) 30 Company Secretary's Review 145, 145; Charles Wild and Stuart Weinstein, Simth & 
Keenan's Company law (Pearson Education Ltd 2011) 264. Also, according to Ben Pettet ‘ the other probably 
is that the courts dislike interfering in business decisions reached by a company and regard the shareholders 
as far better placed to decide what should be done than the judge is’. Pettet (n 279) 213. 
281 These exceptions are often described as "exceptions to the rule” in Foss v Harbottle. 
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a development that has not occurred in Libyan Law. Under traditional UK law, these 
exceptions related to acting ultra vires or illegally, 282   failing to meet the requirements of 
special resolutions,283 the infringement of members’ rights and fraud.284 Importantly, the 
most recent development into UK law is the statutory 'derivative action', which, as noted, 
allows a minority shareholder to bring a claim on behalf of the company. 
The absence of these exceptions in Libya and the resultant reliance upon the 
majority shareholders to bring a suit against the board of directors raises some serious 
issues. Firstly, adopting a shareholder resolution in a general meeting to bring an action 
against the board of directors is not possible since those who are responsible for the alleged 
wrongdoing control the voting power of the general meeting.285 As an example of this: 
when the directors committed the wrongdoing, they may not have been acting on their own 
discretion or judgment, but rather following the instructions of the controlling 
shareholders’ who sought to gain benefits without explicitly exercising corporate power 
(shadow directors).   
Secondly, in a concentrated corporate ownership system, such as the one that 
dominates Libya, majority shareholders are highly likely to sit on the board of directors. As 
such, it is unlikely that a majority shareholder would make a resolution to bear liability for 
                                                 
282 Where an action is illegal (the act is contrary to company law or the directors have abused their powers) or 
ultra vires the company (beyond the legal powers or authority of the company which are posited in the 
memorandum of association), a shareholder could sue to restrain the action, because the majority could not 
ratify acts ultra vires the company. See Rolled Steel Products v British Street Corporation [1984] 2 WLR 
908. Wedderburn (n 270) 204-205. 
283 Where an action was taken in breach of a requirement in the constitution requiring a special majority to 
authorise the action, a member could sue to challenge the validity of the resolution See Edwards v Halliwell 
[1950] 2 ALL ER 1064.    
284 Where the action amounted to a fraud on the minority and the wrongdoers were in control of the company, 
the minority shareholders were permitted to bring an action against the wrongdoers on behalf of the 
company. See Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (no 2) [1982] Ch 204 at 210-11;   
Derek French, Stephen Mayson and Christopher Ryan, Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law (28 edn, 
Oxford University Press 2012) 678; Stefan Lo, ‘The Continuing Role of Equity in Restraining Majority 
Shareholder Power’ (2004) 16 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 96, 105 
285  Libyan law does not even adopt the UK traditional rule that a minority shareholder can bring a case when 
the alleged wrongdoers have sufficient voting power to ensure that if the matter arose at a general meeting 
the members would vote to terminate the litigation. See Birch v. Sullivan [1957] 1WLR 1247 (Ch.D.);  D A 
Wishart, ‘A Conceptual Analysis of the Control of the Companies’ (1984) 14 Melbourne University Law 
Review 601, 621-2. 
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any wrongdoing. Currently, minority shareholders are unable to force a majority 
shareholder who is also a director to take an action when they simply decide to take the 
matter no further. This situation has compelled many legislative bodies to empower a 
minority shareholder to initiate an action on behalf of the company if the majority 
shareholders fail to do so.286 In so doing, this avoids the doctrine of Foss under which, it 
has been widely agreed, minority shareholders would be at the mercy of majority rule if 
there were no exceptions, such as a derivative action.287 
However, the problem of majority shareholder rule in relation to bringing a 
derivative action is more problematic in a legal system that has not adopted the rule of 
ratification by uninterested shareholders, such as LEAA 2010. Under the ratification rule, 
uninterested shareholders are entitled to vote on resolutions which enforce the company’s 
rights against wrongdoers, which can provide some protection for minority shareholders.288 
However, when this rule is not adopted, as is the case in Libya, there are no restraints on 
the power of the majority shareholders in relation to litigations.  
Finally, the application of the majority rule principle in widely held corporations is 
subject to a problem of collective action.289 A rational shareholder will not spend too much 
time and effort in bringing an action because he knows in advance that the potential 
benefits resulting from his action are negligible.290 As such, the shareholders’ collective 
action problem results in a less than optimal amount of litigation. 291  However, in 
companies owned by controlling shareholders the situation is different as there is no 
                                                 
286 For example, see arts 245 and 246 of France Company Law 1966 that give shareholders the right 
to start a derivative action; see David Sugarman, ‘Reconceptualising Company Law-Reflections on the Law 
Commission's Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies’ (1997) 18 Company Lawyer 226. 
287 Davies (n 36) 644. 
288 CA 2006, s 239 prohibits self-interested members from participating in the ratification vote. See also, 
Smith v Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 114; Taylor v National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area) [19985] 
BCLC 237. 
289 Davies (n 36) 647; Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control (Oxford University Press 2008) 
128. 
290  Kenneth E. Scott, ‘Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project’ 
(1983) 35 Stanford Law Review 927, 945. 
291 Reisberg  (n 115) 84; Davies (n 36) 647 
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collective action problem. Rather, even if the company is subject to the sort of wrongdoing 
that necessitates litigation, the majority shareholders will not litigate against themselves.  
3.5.2.  High risks and costs attached to bringing a dispute to court 
Once an existing rule is violated, the injured shareholder should have a right to access the 
court and ask for a remedy. However, the injured shareholder may hesitate to do so 
because of the risks attached to bringing a dispute to court or the high cost of litigation. 
Firstly, in the case of Libya, as discussed previously, the owner of most large private 
companies and listed companies is still the state. As this is the case, the minority 
shareholders may be hesitant to bring an action as it is widely held that the courts always 
support the state against private investors.292 This may be attributable to the fact that the 
state is able to afford professional lawyers to defend their case whereas the shareholders 
are not. Also, as Shleifer and Vishny suggest, private parties remain vulnerable to the 
threat of discretionary regulation and extortion by public officials without any effective 
legal recourse.293   This is clearly the case in Libya and, as such, private enforcement is an 
inefficient mechanism for resolving legal disputes that involve the government. 
Secondly, the costs attached to bringing a dispute to the court may be too high. 
Though lawyers’ costs are relatively affordable, art 161 of LEAA 2010 allows the court to 
require a deposit from the plaintiff (minority shareholders in our case) as a guarantee in 
case he or she causes damages to the defendant (controlling shareholders). This kind of 
precondition affects the plaintiff’s motivation to bring an action. This is because minority 
shareholders are investors before they are litigants, which suggests that they would 
probably prefer to keep their money in readiness for an investment opportunity rather than 
deposit it in the court as a guarantee.  This is especially the case when investors know in 
                                                 
292 Though there are no empirical studies or data collection to prove this, but this is a perception that very 
common in Libya. 
293 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘Corruption’ (1993) 108 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 599. 
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advance that the deposit that he will pay will be held by the court for long time because of 
the slow pace of court proceedings.  
 3.5.3.  Cases in which the courts are barred from intervening 
Libyan law prohibits courts from intervening in certain cases. First, the directors, when 
they committed the wrongdoing, may not have been acting on their own discretion or 
judgment, but rather following the instructions of the controlling shareholders’ who seek to 
gain benefits without explicitly exercising corporate power. A clear example of such 
activity would involve encouraging the board to enter into non-arm’s-length-party 
transactions with controlling shareholders. Even though such a situation is possible in 
Libya, it is not recognised as an illegal action and hence there is no protection for 
shareholders in these circumstances. By contrast, the issue of controlling shareholders 
acting as shadow directors is addressed directly in UK law. 294 Under s.260 (5) (b) of the 
CA 2006 shadow directors are equated with directors for the purpose of bringing derivative 
claims.295  Here it is important to indicate that though a shadow director does not normally 
owe fiduciary duties to the company,296 a number of specific statutory duties, in addition to 
the general duties,297 are applicable to shadow directors, all of which can be found in 
Ch3298 and Ch4299 of Pt 10 of CA 2006. Accordingly, many of the provisions concerning 
                                                 
294  See CA 2006, s 251. See also Re Kaytech International Plc ; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v 
Potier [1999] B.C.C. 390 CA (Civ Div), per Robert Walker L.J. at 401. 
295 See also Companies Act 2006 s.170 (5). For details see  Evripides Hadjinestoros, ‘Stigmata of Fiduciary 
Duties in Shadow Directorship’ (2012) 33 Company Lawyer 331, 336. According to Birds, et al: 
 CA 2006 ‘allow[s] derivative claims where controlling or dominant shareholders (or possibly senior 
managers) are involved in a director’s breach of duty to the company’ See  Birds and others (n 35) 698. 
296   Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) para 1279. 
297 In relation to the general duties, Ch2, s. 170 (5) refers to the corresponding common law rules, but, 
according to Kershaw, ‘to date there is only one reported case which addresses this issue in detail.’ Kershaw 
(n 4) 328. 
298 Ch.3 concerns the declaration of interests in existing transaction or arrangement. s 187 (1) states that ‘the 
provisions of this Chapter relating to the duty under section 182 (duty to declare interest in existing 
transaction or arrangement) apply to a shadow director as to a director…’ 
299 Ch.4 is entitled Transactions with Directors Requires Approval of Members. s 223 (1) states that ‘for or 
the purposes of— (a)sections 188 and 189 (directors' service contracts), 
(b) sections 190 to 196 (property transactions), 
(c) sections 197 to 214 (loans etc), and 
(d) sections 215 to 222 (payments for loss of office),  a shadow director is treated as a director.’ 
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shadow directors enforce liability when de jure directors (or de facto directors) breach their 
duties whilst acting under the instructions of the shadow director. 300 
Second, the Libyan courts do not recognise legitimate expectation in relation to 
small private companies. 301  At present, the Libyan courts only recognise formal and 
written agreements between the shareholders, so they are reluctant to look at informal 
agreements, even when there is strong evidence of legitimate expectation at the time of 
investing in the company, as recognized in the UK by Lord Hoffmann in O'Neil v 
Philips.302    In other words, while the Libyan courts are bound to consider rights within 
the context of the abuse of rights principle, as discussed previously, the UK courts are at 
liberty to consider rights in other ways.   Section 994 of CA 2006, adopts unfair prejudice 
to provide protection for minority shareholders from more than just a breach of their legal 
rights. In other words, unfair prejudice, as a criterion, attempts to avoid narrow rights-
based protection. 303 This point is expressly indicated in the section when it states that ‘the 
company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial 
to the interest of members’. 304 Thus the protection for the minority shareholders includes 
the interest of the shareholders, which covers both shareholders' lawful rights and also their 
legitimate expectations.  
Lastly, to bring an action by the minority shareholders against the controlling 
shareholder, LEAA 2010 only requires proof of harm to the aggrieved shareholders.305  
However, in the UK, under CA 2006, the act which results in harm must be both unfair and 
prejudicial. To prove unfairness the petitioner needs to show that there is a breach of law, 
                                                 
300  Chris Noonan and Susan Watson, ‘The Nature of Shadow Directorship: Ad hoc Statutory Intervention or 
Core Company Law Principle?’ (2006)  Journal of Business Law 763, 787. 
301 For information about legitimate expectation, see (3.1.2.2). 
302 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
303 Payne, ‘ Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of Shareholder Protection’,  (n 58) 
648. 
304 CA 2006 s 994. The fact that the word “interests” is wider than the strict legal rights of a member has 
frequently been recognised in many cases. See for example,  Re a Company (No 00477 of 1986) [1986] 
BCLC 376, 378; Re a Company (No 008699 of 1985) [1986] BCLC 382, 387; Re Blue Arrow plc [1987] 
BCLC 585, 590; Re Ringtower Holdings plc [1989] BCLC 427, 437; Re a Company (No 00314 of 1989), ex 
parte Estate Acquisition and Development Ltd [1991] BCLC 154, 160. 
305 See Libyan Civil Code, s 166. 
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shareholders’ agreements or legitimate expectation. In addition, to prove prejudice, a 
claimant must prove that there is harm caused by the conduct of the wrongdoer,306 such as 
damages to the value of his shareholdings.307  
As such, the approach adopted in the UK delivers more justice to the parties of the 
petition since actions may be prejudicial but not unfair. This can be clarified in the 
following examples. Firstly, unfairness cannot be found when the petitioner has acquiesced 
to the wrongdoings of which he now complains. In Croly v Good, the shareholders agreed 
to ignore their obligations under CA 2006 in relation to the running of the company. In this 
case, the court held that none of the shareholders were allowed to claim that the conduct of 
the other shareholders was unfair on that ground alone. 308Also, when a shareholder who 
was a party to the other shareholders’ unlawful participation in the management of the 
company (in breach of Insolvency Act 1986, s 216), he could not be protected under unfair 
prejudice since the conduct was prejudicial but fair.309 Furthermore, removing a director is 
not always unfair, when his conduct merits removal, 310  even if it is prejudicial. 
Additionally, a lack of consultation of a minority shareholder by the majority shareholders 
is not always prejudicial since this would be fair when the petitioner has preferred to 
withdraw from active involvement in the business.311Thus, according to these examples 
and others, it is not rational and fair if the aggrieved shareholders are redressed on the 
bases of mere prejudice.   
 In summary, the approach to the protection of minority shareholders adopted 
under art 159 of LEAA 2010 is inefficient since the Libyan judicial system can be 
considered as a system of non-intervention. Due to the incomplete nature of law in Libya, 
there are still some cases in which minority shareholders are prevented from bringing an 
                                                 
306 Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 3) [1994] 1 BCLC 609 (Ch D). 
307 Re a Noble (Clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 273 (Ch D), per Nourse J. 
308 See Croly v Good [2010] 2 BCLC 569 at 94, Also, Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] 2 BCLC 427 at 72. 
309 See Fisher v Cadman [2006] 1 BCLC 499. 
310 See for example Grace v Biagioli [2006] 2 BCLC 70. 
311 Re Metropolis Motorcycle Ltd, Hale v Waldock [2007] 1 BCLC 520. 
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action against the insiders. Particularly, a derivative suit which is allowed in almost all 
jurisdictions is not allowed in Libya. Furthermore, there are high risks and costs attached to 
bringing a dispute to the court (e.g. the court requires a deposit from the shareholders in 
order to bring an action against the majority shareholders). Moreover, the Libyan courts 
cannot intervene in certain cases and the LEAA 2010 does not recognize the issue of 
shadow directors or legitimate expectation.     
 
Conclusion  
As discussed, Libya is still in the very early stages of transformation from the Bureaucratic 
Stage to the Networks Stage.  As it is still in this early stage, Libya’s legal system remains 
dysfunctional since laws and rules supporting market-based transactions are incomplete 
and the machinery for enforcement is inadequate. In this chapter, I analysed how the 
minority shareholders’ actions as an approach to the protection of the minority 
shareholders against the controlling shareholders, adopted in art 159 of LEAA, is 
inefficient and ineffective due, 312 in large part, to the Libyan environment. 
Specifically, judicial protection is currently ineffective since the general 
enforcement environment is weak. Judicial corruption and the slow pace of justice affect 
the motivation of minority shareholders to bring an action against the majority 
shareholders. Also, there are significant political (e.g. government intervention) and social 
(e.g. the structure of the Libyan society) factors that hinder the courts’ enforcement of law.  
                                                 
312 As Llewellyn notes: ‘The term effectiveness relates to whether the objectives are met, while efficiency 
relates to them being met in an efficient way without imposing unnecessary costs on consumers or regulated 
firms’. (see  David T Llewellyn, ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic 
Issues’ Paper presented at a World Bank seminar, “Aligning Supervisory Structures with Country Needs,” 
Washington DC, 6th and 7th June, 2006 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPCONF6/Resources/2057292-
1162909660809/F2FlemmingLlewellyn.pdf> accessed 06-03-2014, 17. 
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In addition, the efficiency and expertise of the courts undermines the efficiency of 
the current law. The quality of institutions which implement legal norms determine the 
effectiveness of protection of investors independently of a formally defined set of laws. As 
such, the law on the books is meaningless if the quality of the courts' interpretation and the 
implementation of the law are weak.  This is more problematic in cases where the judges 
have wide discretion. 
Finally, the minority shareholders face difficulties in bringing an action against the 
controlling shareholders (who are often in the position of board of directors) because the 
law is not complete. A derivative suit, which is allowed in almost all jurisdictions, is not 
allowed in Libya and there are high risks and costs attached to bringing a dispute to the 
court. In addition, the courts are barred from intervening in certain cases, such as the 
minority shareholders not being able to bring an action against the majority shareholders 
when the latter is in the position of a shadow director.  All of these factors lead us to 
conclude that the Libyan judicial system is a non-interventionist system.     
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Chapter 4: An Alternative Solution: the Self-Enforcing 
Model 
Introduction 
Having examined the current approach adopted by LEAA 2010 for dealing with the 
majority-minority problem in Libya, and recognized that it fails to offer effective and 
practicable solutions to the problem, in this chapter the study examines an alternative 
solution that could contribute to resolving the minority-majority shareholders problem.  
Accordingly, this chapter proposes the self-enforcing model, which mainly relies on a 
voting mechanism to decrease the necessity of judicial oversight through permitting 
minority shareholders to review important transactions before they occur. In other words, 
this chapter develops a legal framework of corporate governance for a system where the 
general enforcement environment is weak and existing enforcement mechanisms function 
poorly. 
There are three departure points that should be considered before discussing the 
self-enforcing model. First, though the self-enforcing model is a practical model that 
deserves serious consideration, there are few academics that have written on the subject.1 
Second, the self-enforcing model regulates two problems, the management- shareholders 
problem and the majority-minority shareholders problem. However, this chapter focuses 
only on the latter problem since this study attempts to solve only the majority-minority 
shareholders problem.  Third, this model, as discussed in greater length in the introduction 
of the thesis, 2 is not a solution that has already been developed in established market 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Yevgeniy V Nikulin, ‘New Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law: Myth or Reality, The’ (1997) 
6 Journal of Internation Law and Practice 347; Shanthy Rechagan, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate 
Governance in Malaysia: Would the Self-Enforcing Model Protect Minority Shareholders? ’ (2007) 3 The 
Corporate Governance Law Review 1; Vlad Frants, ‘Russian Corporate Law: Is Self-Enforcement Still the 
Way to Go?’ (2008) 13 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 435; Petri  Mantysaari, 
Organising the Firm Theories of Commercial Law, Corporate Governance and Corporate,  Law (Springer 
2012) Ch. 8, 115-128.   However, though there are few studies that discuss the self-enforcing model, there is 
large amount of literature that discusses the rules proposed by the model such as the supermajority rule and 
the majority of minority shareholders rule.  
2 For details see the Introduction of the thesis at 9ff. 
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economies with a long history of commercial law. Instead, as the weakness of institutional, 
market and cultural elements combined with legal constraints associated with transition 
and developing countries make it inappropriate to import company law from developed 
countries, in this chapter, I argue for a new solution based on Black and Kraakman’s 
proposal in their 1996 article: A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law.3   
Again, the central aim of this chapter is to propose the adoption of the self-
enforcing model as an appropriate strategy to protect minority shareholders in Libya. In 
order to explicate this, section (4.1) discusses alternative strategies for solving the 
majority-minority shareholders problem in the absence of effective formal private 
enforcement in developing and transition economies.  To analyse this, (4.1.1) deals with 
these alternative strategies theoretically and (4.1.2) evaluates the potential success of 
applying these alternatives (such as forming liability actions as a means of protecting 
minority shareholders, and public enforcement as an alternative to formal private 
enforcement) to Libya.  
Having examined these strategies of addressing the majority-minority shareholders 
problem in the absence of formal private enforcement and found them inappropriate in the 
case of Libya, (4.2) introduces the self-enforcing model, which relies mainly on a voting 
system. Accordingly, this section briefly outlines the central features of the model (4.2.1) 
and the nature and scope of its rules (4.2.2).  
Also, before any analysis can be made, (4.3) continues to describe the self-
enforcing model through discussing primary procedural mechanisms of the model used to 
protect the minority shareholders. These are: the approval mechanism (4.3.2), procedure of 
the voting system (4.3.1), and the minority shareholders transactional rights (4.3.3). 
                                                 
3 Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, ‘A SELF-ENFORCING MODEL OF CORPORATE LAW’ (1996) 
109 Harvard Law Review 1911. 
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Having described the self –enforcing model in the previous sections, (4.4) 
examines the problem of majority-minority shareholders in particular corporate 
transactions and proposes that the appropriate solutions to these problems are based on the 
adoption of the voting mechanism and transitional rights of the self-enforcing model, with  
certain amendments that take in to account the specific case of Libya. These amendments 
take into account the different kinds of corporate transactions in which a company may 
engage: related-party transactions, which are mainly addressed by the majority of minority 
rule (4.4.1); merger and other central transactions, which are mainly regulated by the 
supermajority approval rule (4.4.2); the majority-minority conflict in transactions that 
effect corporate capital are addressed by the majority of minority rule, and other 
mechanisms such as pre-emptive and participation rights (4.4.3); and, finally, control 
transactions that are mainly governed by a takeout right (4.4.3). 
Finally, since Black and Kraakman do not provide a comprehensive analysis that 
justifies why the self-enforcing model is an appropriate alternative to formal private 
enforcement in emerging countries, section (4.5) provides more analysis that contributes to 
my proposal that the self-enforcing model should be adopted in Libya. In addition to the 
lack of court enforcement discussed in the previous chapter, this section argues that the 
self-enforcing model should be adopted in Libya since it contributes to companies being 
able raise capital from investors (4.5.1), and it also lowers the number of conflict of 
interest transactions, making the company’s transactions more efficient (4.5.2). Finally, the 
self-enforcing model does away with the need for external monitoring (4.5.3). 
4.1. Alternatives for solving the majority-minority shareholders problem in 
the absence of effective formal private enforcement 
Before discussing potential alternatives that may contribute to solving the majority-
minority shareholders problem in the absence of effective formal private enforcement, it is 
necessary to describe various types of enforcement mechanisms, which can generally be 
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divided into two groups: self-enforcement and third party-enforcement.4 The latter can be 
further divided into state enforcement (e.g. public enforcement) and non-state third-party 
enforcement (e.g. gatekeepers, arbitration, reputation. etc.). Also, it should be noted that 
whilst self-enforcement can be classified as informal enforcement (which is part of a 
private ordering system), state enforcement and court enforcement are regarded as formal 
enforcement (or public ordering).5 
This section discusses alternative theoretical strategies in developing and transition 
economies, which are designed to solve the majority-minority shareholders problem in the 
absence of effective formal private enforcement (4.1.1) and it evaluates the possibility and 
potential success of applying alternatives in the case of Libya (4.1.2). 
4.1.1. Alternatives for solving the majority-minority shareholders problem in 
the absence of adequate formal private enforcement:  a general discussion  
Corporate governance literature can be divided into three groups in terms of what kind of 
strategies should be employed in the absence of adequate formal private enforcement to 
address the majority-minority shareholders problem. The first group advocates the 
enhancement of public enforcement when formal private enforcement is too weak, 
believing that when small shareholders are unlikely to sue because of unreliable courts and 
a lack of enforcement, a public enforcer is needed and therefore regulatory enforcement 
presents an attractive alternative to judicial enforcement. 6 In this context, Glaeser and 
Shleifer suggest that courts are more vulnerable to subversion than regulators, especially in 
                                                 
4 This division is articulated by Barzel in  Yoram Barzel, A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal 
Rights, and the Scope of the State (Cambridge University Press 2002) 24-6. 
5 Ding Chen, Corporate Governance, Enforcement and Financial Development: The Chinese Experience 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013) 15-16. According to Chen:  
[a]ll of these enforcement mechanisms, more or less, can be found in almost every country. But 
the role of each mechanism varies significantly across countries. Even for the same country, it 
varies from time to time, from transaction to transition.  Also each means has a comparative 
advantage under different circumstances, and no single means is likely to be preferable to all 
the others all the times. (see ibid 16). 
6 Though there is a trend in various studies that suggests that a public enforcer can be an appropriate 
alternative to formal private enforcement, the efficiency of public enforcement cannot be taken for granted, 
as discussed in (4.1.2.3). 
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an environment of significant inequality of wealth and political power. Therefore, the 
switch to regulation can be seen as an efficient response to a weak judicial system.7 Pistor 
and Xu showed that when law is incomplete and violations of the law may result in 
substantial harm (as is the case in many transition economies), it is appropriate to vest law 
enforcement rights in regulators rather than courts.8  Similarly, Glaeser et al. argue that in 
emerging markets ‘where the costs of verifying the circumstances of specific cases and 
interpreting statutes are high, judges may not be sufficiently motivated to enforce legal 
rules’. 9  Therefore, ‘[e]nforcement by regulators, with more lopsided but powerful 
incentives, may then be a more efficient way to protect property rights’.10 Further, Landis 
concludes that regulation is a political response to the failure of courts to keep up with the 
peoples’ ideas of justice. This is because the remedies that are available to the courts are 
insufficient and so, in these circumstances, it is rational to switch from litigation to 
regulation.11     
The second group of scholars tends to rely on private ordering as a response to a 
weak system of private enforcement, claiming that in the absence of private enforcement, 
informal enforcement will certainly develop. Therefore, informal enforcement prevails 
when reliable state enforcement is unavailable. In this regard, Gray argues that in countries 
where formal legal systems are weak, such as in some developing and transition countries, 
‘informal legal processes may fill some gaps and permit some markets to function’.12 
                                                 
7 See Edward L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’ (2003) 41 Journal of 
Economic Literature 401.  
8 This argument has been mentioned by Pistor and Xu in several works. See  Katharina Pistor and Chenggang 
Xu, ‘Incomplete Law: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework’ (2002) 35 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politic 931; Katharina  Pistor and Cheng-Gang  Xu, ‘Beyond Law Enforcement: 
Governing Financial Markets in China and Russia’ in János Kornai, Bo Rothstein and Susan Rose-Ackerman 
(eds), Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition (Political Evolution and Institutional Change 2004). 
168-190; Katharina Pistor and Cheng-Gang Xu, ‘Law enforcement under incomplete law: Theory and 
evidence from financial market regulation’ ELS Reaserch Online, 2008 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3748/> 
accessed 12-04-2014. 
9 Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Coase versus the Coasians’ (2001) 116 The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 853, 897. 
10 Ibid. 
11 James McCauley Landis, The administrative process (Greenwood Press 1974) 97. 
12 Cheryl W Gray, ‘Reforming Legal Systems in Developing and Transition Countries’ (1997) 34 Finance and 
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McMillan and Woodruff argue that when the law is dysfunctional, as in many developing 
and transition economies, private ordering might arise in its place. This is ‘either because 
the laws do not exist or because the machinery for enforcing them is inadequate. In such 
countries, bilateral relationships, communal norms, trade associations, or market 
intermediaries may work in place of the legal system’.13 In another article, McMillan and 
Woodruff argue that in Vietnam firms are often willing to rely on private ordering by 
renegotiation following a breach, rather than go to court.14 In Arabic countries such as 
Libya, Maroof argues that foreign investors are most likely to rely on arbitration as an 
alternative to national courts because of the complexity of the national Act of civil 
procedure and the inertia of the procedure of litigation.15 In Russia, Hay and Shleifer 
suggest that private ordering has emerged as a market response to the failure of the state to 
provide and enforce its own rules, largely because of very weak incentives for the 
government to provide law and order. 16 In other words, investors in Russia refuse to use 
the official legal system 17 and therefore ‘private rather than state mechanisms are used to 
resolve disputes. These mechanisms range from social norms and pressures, to arbitration, 
to employment of private but legal protection agencies, to organized crime.’18  
The development of private ordering as an alternative to a weak system of private 
enforcement was historically also the case in both the U.S and the UK. In these countries, 
in the absence of an effective legal system, various private ordering mechanisms arose to 
compensate for a lack of formal private enforcement. In the UK, the common law, as seen 
                                                                                                                                                    
Development 14, 14. 
13 John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order’ (2000) 98 
Michigan Law Review 2421, 2421. 
14 John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam’ (1999) 15 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 637. 
15 Faraj Maroof, ‘The Role of the Judiciary in the Application and Enforcement of  International Treaties of 
Investment Disputes ’ (The Fourth Conference of Heads of Supreme Courts in Arab Countries-2013) (in 
Arabic).  
16  Jonathan R Hay and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform’ 
(1998) 88 American Economic Review 398. 
17 Ibid 389. 
18 Ibid 390. 
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in the case of Foss v. Harbottle,19 provided little protection to minority shareholders until 
the first half of the 20th century. The court, as discussed in (3.5.1.1), developed a ‘proper 
plaintiff rule’ in 1843 to address a wrong done to a company. The proper claimant in the 
case was the company itself and not any individual shareholder, especially not a minority 
shareholder.20  The lack of protection afforded to minority shareholders remained until the 
second half of the twentieth century when formal investor protection emerged.21  During 
this period (from 1843 to the beginning of second half of the twentieth century) the 
shareholders, as Frank et al. observe, relied more on informal relations of trust than on 
formal investor protection.22 Additionally, Mayer argues that at the beginning of the 20th 
century the absence of formal systems and efficient equity markets led investors to 
substantially rely on informal relationships of trust.23 Similarly, in the U.S., a combination 
of widespread judicial corruption, the inability of courts to provide adequate protection to 
minority shareholders,24 and the high level of insiders’ expropriation of personal private 
benefits,25  all contributed to stock exchanges, such as the NYSE, relying on self-regulation 
as an alternative to formal private enforcement. 26 
Finally, the third strategy considered in corporate governance literature argues in 
favour of self-enforcement as an alternative to ineffective formal private enforcement. In 
their article A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, Black and Kraakman argue that: 
                                                 
19 [1843] 2 Hara 461. 
20  See (3.5.1.1). 
21 See Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, ‘Ownership: Evolution and Regulation’ (2009) 22 The 
Review of Financial Studies 4009.    
22 Ibid. 
23 Colin Mayer, ‘Trust in financial markets’ (2008) 14 European Financial Management 617. 
24 See  Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’ (2003) 41 
Journal of Economic Literature 401; Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (Doubleday 1913) 240. Wilson 
suggests that during this period ‘[t]here have been courts in the United States which were controlled by the 
private interests. There have been supreme courts in our states before which plain men could not get justice. 
There have been corrupt judges; there have been controlled judges; there have been judges who acted as 
other men’s servants and not as servants of the public’. (See, ibid). 
25 John C Coffee, ‘The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control’ (2001) 111 The Yale Law Journal 1, 10. 
26  Chen (n 5) 52. 
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in emerging markets, a self-enforcing model of corporate law - in which 
mandatory procedural and structural rules empower […] large minority 
shareholders to protect themselves against opportunism by insiders - 
dominates both the prohibitory model and the enabling model. The self-
enforcing model minimizes the need to rely on courts and administrative 
agencies for enforcement. Thus, it is robust even when these resources are 
weak.27  
Black and Kraakman’s view of self-enforcement as an alternative for weak formal 
private enforcement has gained significant attention within corporate governance discourse. 
However, there are other potential strategies, the efficacy of which I will analyse in the 
following section before returning to Black and Kraakman’s model. 
4.1.2. Evaluating possible alternatives for solving the majority-minority 
shareholders problem in the absence of formal private enforcement: the case 
of Libya 
Having recognized that the current approach adopted by LEAA 2010 fails to deal with the 
minority-majority shareholders problem and realized that the literature offers a variety of 
strategic alternatives in the absence of adequate formal private enforcement, this sub-
section evaluates the range of solutions available to Libyan corporate law.  To that end, 
firstly this section investigates whether it would be effective to attempt to reform the 
formal private enforcement system in Libya as a means of solving the majority-minority 
shareholders problem (4.1.2.1). It then examines the non-intervention and prohibition 
models (4.1.2.2) and public enforcement (4.1.2.3) as alternatives to formal private 
enforcement. 28  However, this section argues that for various reasons none of these 
solutions are fully effective in the case of Libya. 
                                                 
27 Black and Kraakman (n 3) 1912. 
28 In addition to these alternatives, there may be other options that are less important than those options 
discussed above and so are not included in this study. For example, it may be argued that private arbitration 
may provide an alternative to the lack of court enforcement. In fact, this is not true since the nature of 
arbitration is always a default rule that can be overridden by a contract, trust, will, or other legally effective 
agreement. In other words, the problem with arbitration in company law disputes is that arbitration is 
contractual in nature, It requires parties to the arbitration to have signed up for arbitration in advance and so 
cannot be mandated, it is therefore not capable of providing effective protection for minority shareholders. 
This is because the controlling shareholders have the power to revoke the arbitration rule at any time. Also, it 
may be argued that a reputation mechanism may be a good enforcement mechanism in Libya for protecting 
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4.1.2.1. Alternative (1): Reforming the system of formal private 
enforcement in Libya as a means of solving the majority-minority 
shareholders problem   
There is no doubt that the effectiveness of private litigation adopted by art 159 of LEAA 
2010 ultimately requires that the courts function efficiently and are supported by a strong 
legal system of enforcement, neither of which currently exist in Libya. Evidently, the 
development of such a system first requires the reform of the economic, political and rigid 
social systems in Libya. As discussed in (1.3.2), Libya is in the very early stages of the 
transition from a bureaucratic stage (which characterized by hierarchical and bureaucratic 
structures and controls associated with state administrative power) to a relationship stage 
(where the dominant sources of control power and resources are associated with networks 
and relationships). This means Libya is still far from realising a market economy stage 
which occurs when there is a perfect market institutional framework, effective formal rules, 
and adequate state enforcement.   
In Libya, many changes are required before the efficient functioning of the courts 
and a strong legal system of enforcement can be achieved. For example, in order to provide 
predictable and timely judgments and so speed up the machinery of justice, the numerous 
legal and physical obstacles that currently discourage the minority shareholders from 
bringing an action (as discussed in (3.3.2)) need to be overcome. There is also an urgent 
need to reform the Civil Procedure Act and appoint an appropriate number of judges in 
order to address the disproportionate number of cases received by the courts each year. 
There is also the need for a training programme that will give judges the competency to 
deal with complex commercial cases.  
                                                                                                                                                    
the minority shareholders against the controlling shareholder. In fact, this is not a case since the controlling 
shareholder in most large companies is the state. Accordingly, ‘the controllers have little incentive to build a 
good reputation’ See Chen (n 5) 102. 
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Additionally, there are endemic issues within Libya that will require significant 
effort over an extended period to overcome. As mentioned by Abdul Jalil, the former 
Chairman of the National Transitional Council, it may take years to overcome Libya’s 
‘heavy heritage’ of judicial corruption.29  Moreover, the complex reasons behind the lack 
of security and Libya’s social environment contribute to a lack of court enforcement and 
seem to present almost insurmountable challenges to the development of formal private 
enforcement.  
In addition, reforming the system of formal private enforcement has a high cost. 
For instance, speeding up the machinery of justice is a very expensive task since it requires 
the government to train and hire numerous judges and repair the institutional judicial 
infrastructure. Also, overcoming judicial corruption requires a sustained effort and 
measures by the government including increasing the wages of judges, hiring more 
credible staff and increasing the budget of the judicial sector.    
Taking all of these factors together, the focus on reforming the judicial approach 
(minority shareholders’ actions) to protect the minority shareholders against the controlling 
shareholders in Libya is flawed, at least at this stage of market transformation, as it will 
only have a minimal effect on the minority shareholders protection system. Focussing on a 
reform of the law on the books as a means of affecting reform to the judicial approach 
(liability actions) will not deliver real world change or address the majority-minority 
problem effectively. As Coffee points out massive expropriation by the majority 
shareholders can still occur even when the law on the books is nearly optimal.30  
However, this does not mean that reforming the judicial approach should be 
ignored. Instead, as discussed in (1.3.1), Libya is moving from the bureaucratic to the 
                                                 
29  Aljazeera, Reports and Dialogues - The Demands of Purifying the Libyan Judiciary (Al Jazeera 2012) (in 
Arabic). Also see Korina Al Jadida, ‘Mustapha Abdul Jalil: Libyan Judiciary is not Purified Yet’ Korina Al 
Jadida (Al bida, 01-08-2012)accessed 20-02-2014 (in Arabic). 
30 Jr. Jack C. Coffee, ‘Privitization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure’ 
(1999) 25 Journal of Corporation Law 1, 6. 
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relationship stage where it requires Libya to develop a market institutional framework and 
abandon bureaucratic control over time by weakening the institutional framework that 
supports it. To do so, among other things, Libya is required to make formal reforms to its 
law, including the liability and revocation actions. As pointed out by Pistor and Xu: 
‘enacting law on the books is only the very first step in establishing an effective legal 
system’. 31  As discussed, statute reform will not offer an adequate protection for the 
minority shareholders on its own.  
4.1.2.2. Alternative (2): Non-intervention and the prohibition models  
Non-intervention is considered as a traditional model in which the role of the law in 
addressing a conflict of interests between shareholders is to do nothing and instead leave a 
resolution to the unconstrained forces of the market. In turn, the market determines a 
solution to the conflict transaction between the shareholders. 32  However, virtually no 
jurisdiction uses this approach since it is not rational to ignore conflict transactions and let 
the controllers ‘take the money and run’.33  Though this approach may work in a perfectly 
efficient market, where if a company provides shareholders’ protections the prices of 
securities would reflect the value of the defences shareholders carry, 34  a non-
interventionist model will not work in developing countries, such as Libya. Here, the 
market is not perfect and the different securities afforded to minority shareholders are not 
accurately priced.35 Additionally, as Djankova et al. conclude: ‘the strategy of no public 
involvement at all does not lead to more developed financial markets. The public sector 
clearly has a central role to play, but principally as the designer of the rules of the game, 
                                                 
31 Pistor and Xu, ‘Beyond Law Enforcement’ (n 8) 14. 
32 Zohar Goshen, ‘The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality’ (2003) 91 
California Law Review 393, 404. 
33 Simeon Djankov and others, ‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’ (2008) 88 Journal of Financial 
Economics 430, 431. 
34 Goshen, ‘The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing’  (n 32) 405. 
35 See ibid.  It should be noted that in a perfect market in which companies provide shareholders with 
appropriate protection, investors are willing to buy shares at an appropriate price that includes such 
protection and they will not buy shares in a company that provides no or little of protection. However, in a 
non-perfect market such a scenario does not exist. See Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, ‘Corporate 
Control Transactions’ (1981) 91 Yale Law Journal 698, 715. 
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which are then enforced by private action.’36 Thus, non-intervention cannot be seen as an 
effective solution to deal with the majority-minority shareholders’ problem in Libya. 
At the other extreme, the outright prohibition of conflict transactions is another 
alternative which is characterized as an easy mechanism for solving the conflict of interest 
problem between the shareholders since it obviates the need to perform complicated 
evaluations. As Marsh observes, the outright prohibition model is a traditional model that 
emerged in nineteenth-century corporation statutes in the U.S. and the UK.37 Under this 
model, any deal born of a conflict-of-interest vote was automatically voidable at the 
insistence of the corporation or its shareholders regardless of its terms or its desirability to 
the corporation.38 However, as Marsh also noted: ‘thirty years later [from the emergence of 
an outright prohibition model] this principle was dead’.39Currently, no jurisdiction finds it 
practical to implement this approach.40  Perhaps the strongest reason given for this was that 
outright prohibition has the potential to cause companies to lose too many efficient 
transactions that are in the interests of both the company and the insiders.41  In addition, in 
Libya, the adoption of such an approach would not work because of the extreme lack of 
enforcement. 42 In such an environment, mere prohibition would not prevent conflict of 
interest transactions. Thus, outright prohibition is not an appropriate model for dealing 
with the majority-minority shareholders’ problem.  
                                                 
36 Djankov and others, ‘The law and economics of self-dealing’ (n 33) 463. 
37 Harold Marsh Jr, ‘Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality’ (1966) 22 The 
Business Lawyer 35. 
38 Such prohibitive statutes have been adopted in the U.S and the UK. See ibid. 
39 Ibid 30. 
40  See Djankov and others ‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’  (n 33).  
41 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law’ (1988) 13 Journal of Corporation 
Law 997, 997.  
42 For more reasons see Black and Kraakman (n 3) 1931; Moeen Cheema and Sikander Shah, ‘Corporate 
Governance in Developing Economies: The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance in Pakistan’ 
(2006) 36 Hong Kong LJ 341. 
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 4.1.2.3. Alternative (3): Public Enforcement  
Public enforcement is a legal mechanism used to deter wrongdoers (e.g. a controlling 
shareholder) through sanctions such as fines and prison.43 For instance, the controller can 
face criminal sanctions for misuse of company assets or if he intentionally causes damage 
to the company.  It should be noted that public enforcement, unlike formal private 
enforcement, is not limited to one regulatory state organ. Instead, a public enforcement 
action can be initiated by a wide variety of state organs such as local prosecutors’ offices, 
national regulatory authorities that monitor corporate actions in real time44 (e.g. the Audit 
Bureau monitors the corporate performance of state owned companies and has the power 
to intervene to prevent breaches), 45  and some self-regulatory and quasi-regulatory 
authorities, such as national stock exchanges and the UK’s Financial Reporting Council.46 
Accordingly, public authorities, as with private parties, can enforce the law that protects 
minority shareholders. The key question here is whether public enforcement can 
effectively enforce the protection of minority shareholders and so provide a substitute for 
private enforcement?  
Though there is a trend in the literature that believes that when small shareholders 
are unlikely to sue because of unreliable courts and lack of enforcement, a public enforcer 
is needed, as discussed in (4.1.1), the efficiency of public enforcement cannot be taken for 
granted.  According to recent academic work, there is doubt about the capability of public 
enforcement to take this role as a substitute for private enforcement. For instance, La Porta 
                                                 
43 Public enforcement agencies normally have the power to impose fines and penalties, even though they 
cannot bring actions for damages on behalf of private parties. See Djankov and others ‘The Law and 
Economics of Self-Dealing’ (n 33). 
44 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’ 
( 2006) LXI The Journal of Finance 1; Howell E Jackson and Mark J Roe, ‘Public and Private Enforcement 
of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence’ (2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207. 
45 According to Law no 19 of 2013 Concerning the Reorganization of the Audit Bureau. The Libyan Audit 
Bureau is an independent body that is guided by the legislative authority (art. 1 of Law no 19 of 2013).  For 
more information see (2.3.2.2). 
46 Such bodies are enforcers to the extent that they are able to compel compliance with their rules ex ante or 
to impose sanctions for rule violations ex post, whether these sanctions are reputational, contractual, or civil. 
See Reinier R. Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford University press 2009) 47.   
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et al. examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries 
and found ‘little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong 
evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through 
liability rules benefit stock markets’.47 Also, Djankov et al., 48 and the World Bank49 
conclude that public enforcement is of limited value compared to private enforcement. 
Additionally, it has been argued that a public enforcement system is degraded since state 
officials have mixed and often weak incentives to perform their jobs well and because they 
often suffer from poor information concerning both the general market and specific firms’ 
conditions. 50  Also, public agencies have limited budgetary discretion and must work 
within limited resources to enforce the law adequately, and they may also lack adequate 
resources such as manpower or budgets.51 
In addition to these general drawbacks, in Libya, public enforcement cannot be 
seen as an alternative to weak private enforcement. In Libya and most developing 
countries, it is likely that regulators, in addition to courts, fail to provide adequate 
protection for the minority shareholders.52 To illustrate this, here I discuss the efficiency of 
the three organs of public enforcement in Libya: local prosecutors’ offices, the Audit 
Bureau, and the Libyan Capital Market Authority (LCMA), and argue that all of them fail 
to provide adequate enforcement to protect the minority shareholders.  
                                                 
47 La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (n 44.) abstract.  
48 They saw that to avoid self-dealing, however, it appears best to rely on extensive disclosure, approval by 
disinterested shareholders, and private enforcement rather than public enforcement. See  Djankov and others, 
‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’ (n 33). 
49   World Bank, ‘World Bank, Institutional Foundations for Financial Markets, 2006’ Financial Sector 
Operations and Policy 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPACCFINSER/Resources/Institutional.pdf> accessed 12-04-2014 
50 Jackson and Roe  (n 44) 208. 
51  Chen, (n 5) 47. 
52 This leads some scholars such as Glaeser and Shleifer to argue that the optimal policy for governments in 
countries where there is no optimal public and private enforcement is to leave the market alone and do 
nothing.  Glaeser and Shleifer ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’ (n 24) 411. Also, it is worth indicating that 
both systems of enforcement, public and private, are related in some countries. This means high level of 
private enforcement goes hand-in-hand with higher level of public enforcement. See James D Cox, Randall S 
Thomas and Dana Kiku, ‘SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry’ (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 
737, 761. 
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First, as discussed in the previous chapter, the local prosecutors’ offices, which 
form part of the judicial sector in Libya, suffer from corruption, lack of adequate training 
in commercial cases and are affected negatively by the lack of security that Libya presently 
faces. 53 Taking these factors into account, it is not possible for the local prosecutors’ 
offices to adequately enforce the protection of minority shareholders. 
 Second, the Libyan Audit Bureau 54  has an enforcement mechanism for 
monitoring public assets and money and can expose any financial violations and breaches 
in public institutions including SOEs.55 As previously discussed, it is delegated to monitor 
the SOEs of which the Government owns 25% or more of the capital56 and enterprises that 
were obtained by donation or loan from the government (if the loan agreement stipulated 
that the Audit Bureau has the authority to monitor them).57 However, the Libyan Audit 
Bureau cannot offer effective and efficient enforcement since it faces several challenges 
that undermine and hinder its efficiency.58 For example, social ties and connections affect 
its operations, these relationships and social connections constitute constraints that prevent 
the Audit Bureau’s employees undertaking objective and neutral investigations. This is due 
to the fact that in tribal societies loyalty is to the family, clan, and tribe more than to a state 
and regionalism and sectarianism outweigh loyalty to profession and law.59 Additionally, 
the lack of security in Libya significantly affects law enforcement through preventing 
many members of the Libyan Audit Bureau from undertaking many investigations. Also, 
the lack of expertise and experience of many employees and their ignorance of the laws 
and regulations related to the auditing operations contribute to the deficiency of the 
enforcement of the Libyan Audit Bureau. Finally, the lack of an adequate number of public 
                                                 
53 See (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4). 
54 For details about the Libyan Audit Bureau, see (n 45). 
55 Law no. 19 of 2013 Concerning the Reorganization of the Audit Bureau art, 2/1, 3.  
56 Law no 19 of 2013, art 3/2. 
57 Law no 19 of 2013, art. 3/5. 
58 For more details see Morajah  Al rojbani, ‘Obstacles of Effecient Performance of the Libyan Audit Bureau ’ 
Korina Al Jadida (Tripoli, 01-Jan-2013) <http://www.qurynanew.com/46966> accessed 08-04-2014 (in 
Arabic). 
59 See (3.3.3.2). 
179 
 
enforcement staff, or sufficient budget and resources both result in weak enforcement by 
the Audit Bureau.60 In such a climate, clearly the Libyan Audit Bureau is unable to work 
efficiently. This assessment is evidenced by the report issued by the Libyan Audit Bureau 
in 2012, during that year the Bureau inspected only 43 SOEs out of hundreds and it 
detected only 8 violations.61 Since only 8 violations were detected in a country that is 
ranked 166th among 174 countries in the world regarding corruption,62  at the very least, 
this suggests that the Bureau’s findings were questionable.  
Finally, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) 63 in Libya is a law enforcement 
agency (in addition to its regulating duties).64According to s 4 (7) of the Stock Market Act 
2010, the Authority is responsible for, amongst other things, receiving and following up 
complaints that relate to the activity of the Stock Market or brokers and taking appropriate 
decisions which may include undertaking investigations and imposing sanctions. Though it 
has these legal enforcing competencies, the Capital Market Authority cannot provide an 
adequate level of enforcement. This is because, firstly, the authority was only established 
in December 2013 and so is still in its infancy.65 Therefore, there is absence of self-
regulatory institutions to fill the gaps in corporate law that otherwise would protect the 
public and enhance transactional flexibility such as is the case in the UK with the British 
                                                 
60 It should be noted that studies provide two indices for measuring the intensity of enforcement: looking at 
public staff relative to population, and enforcement budget. See for example, Jackson and Roe   (n 44), La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer ‘What works in securities laws?’ (n 44).  
61 The Libyan Audit Bureau, The Libyan Audit Bureau Report of 2012 (Libyan Audit Bureau Official Website, 
2012). 
62 See Ch.3 (n157). 
63 Capital Market Authority (CMA) in Libya is similar to the SEC in the U.S and FSA in the U.K. The Stock 
Market Act 2010 established a unified regulator for all financial markets, and delegates powers to the CMA 
to supervise, manage and publish rules to regulate both financial services and the behaviour of authorised 
individuals and firms.   According to art 4 of SMA 2010, the CMA's powers are divided into three parts: (1) 
formulating regulation; (2) investigation and supervision; and (3) legal enforcement.    
64 For example, under art 4 of Stock Market Act 2010: 
Capital Market Authority is responsible for (1) regulating and monitoring issuing securities; 
(2) regulating and monitoring disclosure of information necessary for investors; […]; (4) 
collecting information and data about the Libyan Stock Market and publishing reports 
about it; […]; (10) enacting rules of corporate governance for listed companies; […]; (16) 
enacting a system to protect investors who deal with securities that set out rules of 
memberships, ways to compensate aggrieved parties. etc. 
65  Libyan News Agency, ‘Abu Fenas Announces the Establishing of the Capital Market Authority in Libya.’ 
Libyan News Agency (Libyan News Agency 30-12-2013) (in Arabic). 
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Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. Moreover, its competences are still not complete since 
the Executive regulation of the stock Market Act 2010 (Laeha), which is supposed to detail 
how the Authority will work, has not yet been issued.66 In addition, because the state owns 
the majority of shares in listed companies, there is a conflict between the state as an 
enforcer and the state as an owner of most listed equities, meaning that the state is in the 
position of enforcing itself. This, in turn, limits the ability of the Market to grow and 
undermines its enforcement mechanisms. Further, if we accept that the state, under certain 
circumstances, can enforce itself, this kind of enforcement has a limited effect in Libya 
since the Libyan Stock Market is still very small and illiquid and has not reached an 
appropriate level of maturity to make a significant contribution to the Libyan economy. 67  
Thus, the level of enforcement will necessarily be limited.  
 
In short, even though reforming the system of formal private enforcement is 
recommended, since it will constitute a step forward towards the Free Market Economy, it 
should not be undertaken as a solution to the minority-majority shareholders problem in 
Libya during this period of economic transformation. Also, traditional models of non-
intervention and prohibition are not recommended since they result in extreme outcomes. 
Further, public enforcers such as the local prosecutors’ offices, the Libyan Audit Bureau 
and the Libyan Capital Market Authority fail to provide adequate protection for minority 
shareholders in Libya. Thus, in the following sections, the study argues that self-
enforcement is an appropriate solution to the specific case of Libya. 
 
                                                 
66 For example, in the absence of detailed rules to regulate the Authority, the head of the Authority was 
appointed by the Minister of Economy in Libya. This action is not acceptable according to international 
standards which necessitate that such heads are hired by the Libyan Parliament based on a proposal of the 
prime minister or by the prime minister. Through such a procedure we can add value and independence to the 
Capital Market Authority. See Libyan stock Market, Establishing Capital Market Authority is a Wrong 
Decision Now (Libyan stock Market 2013) 10 (in Arabic). 
67  See (1.3.2.2). 
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4.2. The self-enforcing model as a solution for solving the majority-minority 
shareholders problem: the theoretical framework 
Before any analysis can be made, we should recognize what the self-enforcing model is 
and what its features are. Accordingly, this section outlines briefly the central features of 
the model (4.2.1) and the nature and scope of its rules (4.2.2) 
4.2.1. The central features of the self-enforcing model  
Generally, the self-enforcing model is a model that relies on an internal rather than an 
external enforcer, such as contract parties, customers and shareholders. 68  Any self-
enforcing model, as Mantysaari suggests, should ‘work with minimal resort to legal 
authority, including the courts; work with minimal resort to other external monitoring 
inputs; reduce internal agency problems; enable the effective coordination of activities; and 
be sustainable.’ 69 An identifying feature of the model is that the expected gains from 
obedience exceed the gain from violation. 70  In the context of minority shareholders 
protection, it means allowing large minority shareholders to protect themselves against 
insider opportunism with minimal resort to legal authority through empowering large 
minority shareholders’ voices and their ability to protect their interests by guaranteeing 
participation in corporate decision making under certain circumstances. 
The self-enforcing model, as a new strategy of corporate law for emerging 
countries, was created 71 by professors Black and Kraakman in 1996. The model provides 
appropriate solutions for corporate governance problems in Russia and other emerging 
                                                 
68 Avner Greif, ‘Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting 
Exchange’ in Shirley MM  Menard C (ed), Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Springer 2005) 756–
757. 
According to Greif, ‘self-governance entails having bodies of collective decision-making, mechanisms, such 
as judicial processes and police forces, to overcome the free-rider problem and motivate and induce members 
to participate in sanctions’. See ibid 757.  
69  Mantysaari (n 1) 119. 
70 Lester G Telser, ‘A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements’ (1980) 53 The Journal of Business 27. 
71 I use the word ‘create’ rather than develop because, as Black and Kraakman note, the ‘features of the self-
enforcing approach produce a company law that is novel in the aggregate, even though many individual 
provisions (such as one share, one vote and cumulative voting) are familiar in developed markets’. See Black 
and Kraakman (n 3) 1918. 
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economies. 72  Accordingly, proposed solutions take into account these countries’ 
environmental features that are characterized by weak judicial enforcement, the existence 
of market forces that encourage law avoidance, and cultural norms and constraints that 
inhibit free market dynamics.73 Therefore, the model provides a solution that minimizes 
reliance on official enforcement and sits between an enabling model and a prohibitive 
model.74  
In order to avoid reliance on formal enforcement, self-enforcement takes place 
primarily through a combination of voting rules and transactional rights. The voting 
elements include shareholder approval for broad classes of major transactions and self-
interested transactions. Transactional rights include pre-emptive rights, appraisal rights, 
and sell-out rights, as discussed in (4.3). 
The model in regard to the protection of minority shareholders against controlling 
shareholders sets down several measures that together should provide effective protection 
to the minority shareholders than is common in developed economies and respond to the 
frequent occurrence of conflict of interest transactions by controlling shareholders. 75  
Firstly, the model relies on direct participation to enforce shareholder protection in the 
corporate enterprise, rather than reverting to indirect participants such as judges, regulators, 
legal and accounting professionals, and the financial press.76 
                                                 
72 It should be noted that though the self-enforcing model of corporate law focusses on the case of Russia, it 
can be applicable to other emerging markets as well because they have the same attributes that distinguish 
them from the western countries. See  ibid 1911-12; Nikulin (n 1) 356. 
73 Black and Kraakman (n 3);   Nikulin (n 1) 356. 
74  In this regard, Nikulin claims that: 
‘For a long time, most of the corporate models were created around two extremes: the 
"enabling model," as the most flexible and least constraining, and the "prohibitive 
model," as the least flexible and most constraining. The self-enforcing model attempts to 
"organize" and outline something in between, emphasizing self-enforcement. This makes 
the model very special and potentially useful in a wide variety of ways: from a prototype 
for corporate laws of emerging countries to a prototype of a new model of government 
allowing more efficiency and more participation from the public’.  See Nikulin (n 1) 355. 
75 Black and Kraakman (n 3) 1916. 
76 ibid 1916. 
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Secondly, the model ‘contains more procedural protections and fewer substantive 
protections’, 77  through vesting significant decision-making power in large minority 
shareholders who have incentives to make decisions that are capable of reducing (though 
not eliminating) fraud and self-dealing by corporate insiders. 78  Hence the model 
maximizes the voice of the large minority shareholders and empowers their ability to 
protect their interests. 
Thirdly, to compensate for the weakness of formal enforcement, the model 
provides, whenever possible, a bright-line rule and strong sanctions rather than standards, 
to define proper and improper behaviour. The use of bright-line rules is advantageous 
because they are designed ‘to be understood by those who must comply with them’79 and 
so have a better chance of being enforced. By contrast, standards ‘require judicial 
interpretation’, 80 which is often unavailable in emerging markets, and problematically 
‘presume a shared cultural understanding of the regulatory policy that underlies the 
standards’.81 For example, the model can replace ambiguous terms like "fair price" with 
clearer terminology like "market value” in order to require a shareholder vote for a 
purchase or sale of assets that equals 50% or more of the book value of the firm's assets. 82 
Finally, the model also provides strong legal remedies on the books, which compensates 
for the low possibility that sanctions will be applied.83 
To achieve the bright-line rules proposed by the model, in the case of Libya, I 
propose that LEAA 2010 should adopt a non-exclusive statutory list of unfairly prejudicial 
conducts that provide both the court and the minority shareholders with a clear 
understanding of how they should respond to the controlling shareholders’ wrong. As an 
                                                 
77 ibid 1918. 
78 ibid 1915. 
79 ibid 1916. 
80 ibid. 
81 ibid. 
82 ibid 1965. 
83 ibid 1916. 
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example, the list could draw from the most common cases that have been brought in the 
UK. 84 Accordingly, the corporate act shall be unfairly prejudicial if one of the following 
conditions which are not exclusive is met: 
1. When the majority shareholder(s) has failed to provide information about how 
the company is being run.85 
2. When the allotment of shares, which is proposed or carried out in accordance 
with the provisions of LEAA 2010 but there has been a breach of duty by the 
directors of the company86 or breach of statutory requirements.87 
3. When the majority shareholders attempt to alter a company’s articles of 
association by special resolution and the resolution has been passed not bona 
fide for the benefit of the company as a whole.88 
4. When there has been a deliberate diversion of a company’s business by those in 
control to another business owned by them. 89  
5. When there has been misappropriation of company assets. 90 
6. When there is payment of excessive remuneration. 91 
7. When there is failure to pay adequate dividends payments and the conduct 
complained of was not discriminatory between shareholders. 92  
8. When there is mismanagement that can constitute a corporate wrong.93 
9. When there is an understanding that all shareholders in a company are to 
participate in management of a quasipartnership company. 94 
10. When minority shareholders are denied any dividends when the company is 
profitable and the majority shareholders are benefiting financially by having 
significant remuneration packages as directors.95 
11. When a special resolution is passed to alter the company's articles of 
association and in so doing alters the understanding of the parties that the 
petitioner would control the management of the company.96   
                                                 
84 For a rationale concerning the use of UK cases, see Introduction 11-4. 
85  Re a Company (No 00314 of 1989), ex parte Estate Acquisition and Development Ltd [1991] BCLC 154. 
86 Re a Company (No 002612 of 1984) [1985] BCLC 80,; 
87 In Re DR Chemicals Ltd [1989] BCLC 383. The allotment of shares was carried out unilaterally by the 
majority shareholder without reference to the minority shareholder, resulting in a substantial dilution of the 
minority’s shareholding. This was in breach of s 17 of the Companies Act 1980, (now s 594 of the 
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4.2.2. Nature and scope of the rules of the self-enforcing model 
In addition to the central features of the model described above, the model determines that 
corporate rules should be mandatory rather than default, which is a significant question in 
corporate law policy.97 According to the creators of the model, to place greater weight on 
the goal of protecting outside investors against insider opportunism, procedural and 
structural rules that empower large minority shareholders to protect themselves against 
opportunism by insiders must be mandatory rules. 98 This is because the model will not 
provide adequate protection for the minority shareholders if the company is constituted 
with a set of default provisions as such rules may be altered by the controlling shareholders 
to reflect their self-interest.99 
It is believed that in efficient and effective markets, a set of default rules may be 
appropriate as the controlling shareholders will adopt such rules to provide more value for 
their shares, as discussed previously.100 However, when markets are not perfect, which is 
the case in Libya, the model should be mandatory since the controlling shareholders are in 
many cases evidently willing to extract private interest at the expense of the minority 
shareholders as this will not affect the company’s share value. Thus, in the case of Libya 
(which is characterized as a business environment with a non-perfect market which lacks 
formal enforcement), if the rules of the model are positioned outside the law or as a default 
rule, it will have a minimal impact since most companies are controlled by controlling 
shareholders who are unwilling to share their own power with minority shareholders. 
In addition to the nature of the model’s rules, Black and Kraakman note that a well-
drafted law must reflect the size of the company. Therefore, the procedural protections that 
are appropriate for a company that has thousands of shareholders should differ from one 
                                                 
97  Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, ‘Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution’ NBER 
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that has few shareholders who all work in the business.101 Accordingly, their model is 
‘designed to harness the monitoring ability of large, albeit still minority, outside 
shareholders’.102 Therefore, their model focuses on companies that have large minority 
shareholders ‘where at least some shareholders do not work in the business’.103 However, 
Black and Kraakman do not discuss why their model should be limited to large companies 
that have a number of shareholders. 
In fact, there is no obstacle to applying such a model to small companies especially 
in Libya where joint stock companies must be established by at least 10 shareholders.104 If 
we assume that a small company has minimum number of shareholders (10 shareholders) 
and one or two controlling shareholders enter into a conflict of interest transaction, such as 
a self-dealing transaction, what is the reason that precludes the 9 or 8 minority 
shareholders from having the power over the transaction to approve or veto it? There is no 
doubt that the 8 shareholders are in similar position to the 100 minority shareholders in a 
large company when it comes to approving such a transaction. More than that, making an 
approval decision by the minority shareholders in small companies is cheaper and easier 
than making it in large companies.  
Additionally, small companies form about 30% of investment in Libya and large 
companies constitute about 70% of investment in Libya, the vast majority of these being 
SOEs.  Accordingly, if the model is limited to large companies it will only apply to SOEs. 
This means that minority protection will only be available to a single type of company, 
thereby excluding Libya’s growing private sector which is currently being developed 
through a privatisation policy.  
Further, is it appropriate to differentiate between a company that has capital of 
more than, for example £1 billion but only 5 shareholders who all participate in the 
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management of the company, and another that has capital of only £100,000 and more than 
1000 shareholders? According to Black and Kraakman, protection should only be offered 
to minority shareholders in the latter company, while the other does not deserve such 
protection. However, economically, minority shareholder protection should be a priority in 
the former company since it has a greater effect on the economy. Consequently, the 
number of shareholders, and whether they participate in the management, should not be an 
element in determining whether the model should apply to a company or not. Instead the 
most important element that should be taken into account is the percentage of shares that 
the shareholders should have to participate in the approval process.  For example, the 
minority shareholders who hold small amount of shares (e.g. those that do not exceed 
0.01%) should not have the right to approve or veto a transaction; this will be discussed 
further in Ch.5.105 
4.3. The primary mechanisms of a self-enforcing model used to protect 
the minority shareholders: a general discussion  
To solve such a conflict, Black and Kraakman rely on the voting system as a 
mechanism for self-enforcement, which fundamentally provides procedural mechanisms 
that allow minority shareholders (rather than indirect participants such as judges, regulators, 
and lawyers) to police the opportunism of controlling shareholders. Under this model, the 
minority shareholders can enforce the law through a combination of specific constraints on 
both the approval mechanism (4.3.2) and the procedure of the voting system (4.3.1). In 
addition, the model delegates transactional rights to the minority shareholders (4.3.3). 
4.3.1. Shareholders’ approval  
 Under the self-enforcing model, the controlling shareholders must obtain the consent of 
the minority to approve a conflict of interest transaction, which will be provided based on 
                                                 
105 The particular percentage of shares that the minority shareholder should hold in order to approve a conflict 
of interest transaction is discussed in (5.2.2). 
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the minority's subjective valuation of the transaction. This is in contrast to the judicial 
approach where the fairness mechanism employs an objective valuation which is 
determined by the courts. Under the model, when ‘the power to determine whether or not a 
transaction will be approved is given to the minority, the majority is unable to force a deal 
upon the minority’. 106  Therefore, the implementation of the self-enforcing model 
empowers the minority to take care of their own interests and ensure that they obtain the 
maximum beneficial interests.107 
According to Black and Kraakman’s model, there are two types of rules that 
developing countries can adopt to protect the minority shareholders from the expropriation 
of controlling shareholders: supermajority shareholder approval for central business 
decisions and the majority of minority rule for self-interested transactions.  In the first 
instance, the model requires that large transactions should be policed more strictly than 
those of the enabling models in order to eliminate any potential conflict of interest 
transactions. Accordingly, the law would require supermajority shareholder approval for 
all central business decisions, such as mergers, issuing shares, purchasing or selling major 
assets, rather than the simple majority approval of the enabling approach. 108  
Secondly, in self-interested transactions between the company and its insiders (e.g. 
controlling shareholders), a self-enforcing statute can replace ‘the permissiveness of the 
enabling approach (loosely policed by courts) and the ban on the prohibitory model with 
approval by […] a majority of non-interested shareholders’. 109 Here the voting mechanism 
determines the group's consent by excluding those shareholders with a conflict of interest 
from participating in the vote.110 This rule assumes that ‘only the votes of the disinterested 
members of the group are relevant to determine the group preference.’111  The analysis of 
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these rules is discussed later in the context of discussing particular corporate transactions 
in (4.4).   
4.3.2. Procedural constraints of the voting system 
To safeguard the voting mechanism, there are two relevant points regarding the procedural 
constraints of the voting system, which are the one share one vote rule (4.3.2.1) and 
confidential voting (4.3.2.2).112 
4.3.2.1. The one share one vote rule  
According to the self-enforcing model, law should require a single class of voting share 
with only one vote per share.113 It should be noted that the one share one vote rule is 
universally accepted across jurisdictions such as in the UK, the U.S., and Japan (even if it 
is not a statutory requirement), 114 and also it is required by statute in many emerging 
market jurisdictions.115   
In order to discuss this rule within the context of Libyan corporate law, we must 
first understand the system of preferred shares in Libya, which may be based on several 
elements, such as a dividend (when preferred shareholders must be paid dividends before 
common shareholders), liquidation (when the company must pay all creditors and 
bondholders, and preferred shareholders before common shareholders receive any money), 
approval (when the preferred shareholders must approve all or particular decisions that the 
shareholders take at the general meeting) or, finally, voting (when the preferred shares 
have multiple votes rather than being based on the one share one vote rule).116 Under the 
previous Libyan commercial law issued in 1953, the law allowed any kind of preferred 
                                                 
112 I exclude the procedural and structural constraints that relate to the management and shareholders problem, 
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in 9 of the I7 jurisdictions. (See ibid). 
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shares except those based on voting. Thus, the rule of one share, one vote was mandatory 
since the law banned the issuing of shares that provided their holders with multiple 
votes.117 This was because, as Madi and Aljahrawi observe, the Libyan legislator intended 
to prevent a small group of shareholders from controlling the company via multi-vote 
shares.118 However, LEAA 2010 revoked this rule and now permits shareholders to have 
preferred shares based on multi votes.119 It should be noted that the trend of allowing 
preferred shareholders based on multi-votes is similar to French and Egyptian Laws, the 
historical roots of Libyan Law.120  
In this light, it is clear that the current Libyan corporate law is not consistent with 
the self-enforcing model, and that there is a need to readopt the rule of one share, one vote. 
The rationale of this is ‘to prevent insiders from acquiring voting power disproportionate to 
their economic interest in the company’. 121 Further, the re-adoption of the rule would 
increase the possibility that corporate actions will maximize firm value. As Black and 
Kraakman claim: 
The case for the one share, one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to 
match economic incentives with voting power and to preserve the market 
for corporate control as a check on bad management. By contrast, the case 
for permitting companies to deviate from a one share, one vote rule turns 
on (i) the usual claim that informed parties will choose optimal 
arrangements on their own; and (ii) the existence of a reasonably efficient 
market, in which the proceeds that company founders realize when they 
sell their shares will reflect the voting rights that those shares carry.122 
4.3.2.2. Confidential voting 
Under the model, confidential voting is a mandatory constraint that protects the integrity 
and quality of voting from manipulation by insiders (e.g. controlling shareholders). 123 
without confidential voting, controlling shareholders can alter the minority’s voting 
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tendency directly through, for example, coercion or vote buying,124 or indirectly through 
influencing the management to fraudulently count the ballots.  
For example, in the case of Libya, bureaucrats and politicians who represent the 
state, as the controlling shareholder, may compel the minority shareholders to vote in the 
controlling shareholder’s interest by forcing them, or inducing them, to approve a 
transaction with a company that he personally owns. Also, with the wide spread of 
corruption, it is very possible that bureaucrats and politicians who represent the state can 
influence the company’s employees and so falsify the outcome of a vote.   
LEAA 2010 does not adopt mandatory confidential voting; instead it leaves it to an 
agreement between shareholders. However, in practice most of the articles of association 
provide for public voting. As such, Libyan Law lacks an important safeguard when it 
comes to qualitative voting. In order to effectively implement a self-enforcing model there 
is an evident need to adopt a rule of confidential voting since it will prevent insiders from 
knowing how a voter has cast their ballot (against him or not), meaning that insiders will 
‘lose the power to manipulate votes through rewards or sanctions’.125    
4.3.3. Transactional rights   
 In addition to a voting mechanism, the model adopts certain transactional rights for 
shareholders that are of particular importance to minority shareholders. Many of the above 
procedural and structural constraints concern majority and supermajority approvals, but not 
the rights of a single shareholder. Transactional rights give power of self-enforcement to 
each shareholder individually. These rights include pre-emptive rights which provide 
protection against under-priced share issues when a company issues new shares. Also, 
appraisal rights, which are a statutory right granted to shareholders who do not approve 
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major transactions, to have a fair stock price determined by a judicial proceeding or 
independent valuator for the purpose of exit. Finally, takeout rights are granted to minority 
shareholders when new controlling shares in the firm are acquired. Under this right, the 
minority shareholder can require the new controlling shareholder to buy their shares and so 
protect themselves against transfer of control from known and trusted hands to less trusted 
ones.126 All of these rights will be discussed in details in the following section. 
 
4.4. The mechanisms of the self-enforcing model that govern particular 
corporate transactions 
In (2.3.1.1), I undertook a theoretical analysis of the conflict of interests between the 
majority shareholders and the minority shareholders in the diversion of corporate assets, 
which include related-party transactions and restructuring ownership transactions that 
discriminate against the minority. The conflict of interests between the majority and the 
minority of shareholders may not be limited to these transactions but may also occur when, 
for example, the controlling shareholders use their votes to amend the terms of the 
constitution of the company in their interest at the expense of the minority shareholders. 127 
Further, in (2.3.1.2) I argued that the conflict of interests between the majority 
shareholders and the minority shareholders is very problematic in Libya for reasons that 
are specific to its corporate environment. 
In this section, I propose that the appropriate solutions to these problems reside 
primarily in the adoption of the voting mechanism and also in the transactional rights of 
the self-enforcing model, as discussed in the previous section, with amendments that take 
into account the specific case of Libya. These solutions, rather than being inflexible, need 
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to be responsive to the different kinds of corporate transactions in which a company may 
engage: related-party transactions, which are mainly addressed by the majority of minority 
rule (4.4.1); merger and other central transactions, which are mainly regulated by the 
supermajority approval rule (4.4.2); increasing and decreasing capital transactions, which 
are addressed by the majority of minority rule (4.4.3); and, finally, control transactions that 
are mainly governed by a takeout right (4.4.4). 
4.4.1. The mechanisms of a self-enforcing model in related-party 
transactions 
Here, this sub-section provides an overview of the problems of the Libyan legal regime in 
terms of related-party transactions (4.4.1.1), and then makes a proposal for legal reform in 
order to afford minority investors greater protection from abusive related party transactions 
through the adoption of the majority of minority shareholders rule (4.4.1.2). 
4.4.1.1. The problems of the legal regime in Libya in terms of majority-
minority conflict in related-party transactions  
The problem of related-party transactions such as self-dealing transactions and corporate 
opportunities constitute a common conflict of interests in Libya. However, the 
restructuring of corporate ownership transactions are rare, mainly because of the 
dominance of the state in Libya’s economy. 128  
Currently, the Libyan legal regime does not contain adequate safeguards for the 
prevention of the abuse of related party transactions by the controlling shareholders.  This 
is because the strategy adopted by LEAA 2010, like UK law, is separate from the one that 
deals with the directors-shareholders problem. Whilst in Libya, like in the UK, company 
directors are subject to a range of different provisions that address conflict of interest 
transactions (e.g. law duties of loyalty, statutory disclosure, and shareholder approval), 
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controlling shareholders are not subject to such duties or obligations. There are not, for 
either public or private companies, any ex-ante disclosure obligations on the board or the 
shareholder body for matters concerning, for example, related-party transactions with 
controlling shareholders, or any approval requirements.129 Instead, the solution adopted by 
Company Law in both countries to deal with conflict of interest transactions is a minority 
shareholders action. This option is the dominant tool for addressing conflict of interest 
transactions in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions. In the UK, it takes the form of 
the unfair prejudice remedy130 and in Libya it is both a Liability Action and a Nullification 
Action. 
As in the UK formal rules and state enforcement are more effective than in Libya, 
relying on the judicial approach to protect the minority shareholders is not problematic. 
However, as concluded in Ch.3, the judicial approach is very problematic in Libya. 
Therefore, there is a need to formulate a solution that can provide an effective and practical 
alternative to the judicial approach, which is the task of the following part of the thesis.  
4.4.1.2. The majority of minority rule  
Under the majority of minority rule, related-party transactions that are not done in the 
ordinary course of business or at arm’s length require the approval of minority 
shareholders by way of a special resolution.131   Libyan corporate law, unlike the UK, does 
not recognise this rule. In the UK, listed companies with a premium listing are subject to 
additional regulation in related-party transactions and are required to comply with the 
related-party transactions rules set out in Listing Rule 11. This requires ‘substantial 
shareholders’132 to obtain ex-ante disclosure and shareholder approval by the disinterested 
shareholders. 133   
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The majority of minority rule has several elements. Firstly, the consent of 
disinterested shareholders is a central aspect, as Goshen suggests: ‘a transaction can only 
be performed with the consent of the disinterested group at a price that is a function of the 
group's subjective evaluation of its worth’.134 Secondly, the transactions that come under 
evaluation by the controlling shareholders must be ‘sizeable transactions’ as only large 
transactions should require the costly additional step of shareholder approval. Here Black 
and Kraakman suggest that in the case of Russia (and it is applicable to the Libyan case as 
well), for a transaction to require the approval of non-interested shareholders, the value of 
the transaction should be more than 2% of the book value of the company's asset or 2% of 
annual revenues.135  According to Black and Kraakman, the size threshold ‘balances the 
risk that the cost and delay of a shareholder vote will block good transactions against the 
need to block large bad transactions’.136 Finally, the rule should be applied only in cases 
where the non- interested shareholders conclude that ‘the company will not receive value, 
in property or services, at least equal to the market value of the property or services the 
company gives up’.137 This requirement may give the non-interested shareholders a basis 
to intervene and evaluate whether the transaction is legitimate and value-enhancing for the 
corporation, or it is a vehicle for illegitimate expropriation of corporate value by 
management or controlling shareholders. 
Within Libyan listed companies, an interesting proposal can be drawn from the 
recent change made by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).138 The FCA enacted a 
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number of significant changes to the Listing Rules, which are designed to give minority 
shareholders greater protection. Significantly, under the new rule, premium listed 
companies and their controlling shareholders must enter into a have a written agreement, 
which included certain provisions safeguarding the company’s independence through 
imposing enhanced oversight measures.139 For example, the agreement between a premium 
listed company and its controlling shareholder needs to expressly provide that transactions 
and arrangements with the controlling shareholder and their associates are conducted at 
arm’s length and on normal commercial terms.140 This is applicable in all cases where the 
controlling shareholder acts against the interest of the minority shareholders. Clearly, such 
a measure would help to establish a standard of best practice that is fundamental to the 
independent operation of a listed company as it will provide the minority shareholders with 
a strong mechanism of protection. In other words, it will grant the minority shareholders a 
tool to veto any transactions between the company and controlling shareholder that seek to 
disenfranchise the minority shareholders and so act as a powerful deterrent to inappropriate 
behaviour by the controlling shareholders. 
 The other relevant rule aims to enhance voting control for minority shareholders in 
the election of independent directors through a dual voting structure. This means, in a 
premium listed company where a controlling shareholder is present, the minority 
shareholders are required to approve the resolution of electing those directors separately 
from the shareholder vote.141 In other words, independent directors must be separately 
                                                                                                                                                    
controlling shareholder, where one exists, via a mandatory agreement; (2) providing 
additional voting power for minority shareholders when electing or re-electing 
independent directors for a premium listed company where a controlling shareholder is 
present; (3) enhancing voting power for the minority shareholders where a premium listed 
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197 
 
approved both by the shareholders as a whole and the minority shareholders as a separate 
class.142 Therefore, the FCA allocates to independent directors a critical role in endorsing 
effective corporate governance through granting the minority shareholders a greater say in 
the election of company directors. As this rule is compatible with the model of self-
enforcement, it can be adopted by Libyan Law.  
4.4.2. The mechanisms of a self-enforcing model in mergers and other 
central transactions 
 Here, firstly, I discuss the problem of the legal regime covering the majority-minority 
conflict in mergers and other central transactions in Libya, (4.4.2.1) and then go on to 
propose the  supermajority approval of shareholders as an effective alternative for solving 
the majority-minority problem (4.4.2.2). 
4.4.2.1. The problem of the legal regime in Libya concerning the majority-
minority conflict in mergers and other central transactions  
In (2.4.1.1) I discussed the theory of majority-minority conflict in mergers and other 
central transactions such as the liquidation of a company, divisions of the company, a 
transformation of the company into another type of legal entity, the sale or purchase of 
assets, and amendments to the article of association. To address these conflicts most 
jurisdictions adopt standards that play a major role in regulating these transactions. In the 
UK, conflict of interest transactions can be evaluated by the courts through the unfair 
prejudice remedy. Similarly, in Libyan law (as in French and Egyptian law) the abuse of 
rights doctrine plays a central role in dealing with such conflicts.143  
However, although the rule of supermajority shareholders approval can be used as 
an alternative to formal private enforcement in many central corporate transactions, LEAA 
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2010 does not adopt such a technique. Instead the law adopts a simple majority rule to 
regulate the previous central transactions. Shareholders in special meetings have the power 
to approve mergers, 144 dissolution, 145  division 146  and amendments to the article of 
association.147 For the resolution of the shareholders to be valid, shareholders who own at 
least two thirds of the company’s capital must attend the meeting and the resolution must 
be agreed by at least half of the attendees.148   Furthermore, in sale of assets transactions, 
the law delegates to the board the power to enter into any transaction that would affect up 
to half of the company’s assets without the shareholders’ approval.  In any transaction that 
exceeds half of the company’s assets, the shareholders in a special meeting have an 
approval right which enables them to agree or disagree.149 Regarding the transformation of 
the company into another type of legal entity, LEAA 2010 does not regulate the 
transforming of joint stock companies to other forms of company. Instead, it regulates 
transforming other types of companies (e.g. partnerships, limited partnerships, limited 
liability companies) to joint stock companies and it requires that all shareholders of a 
company must approve the transforming transaction.150 
Returning to the majority-minority conflict in mergers, it is worth mentioning that 
minority freezeouts are not an issue in the Libyan economy since the law does not even 
allow controlling shareholders who own more than 90% of a company’s shares to 
freezeout or eliminate the minority shareholders. As Tibar notes, this is considered to 
constitute expropriating private property which is illegal.151 However, although Libyan 
Law does not allow for minority buyouts and other elimination actions, there are some 
exceptions to this principle. Libyan law allows the company to eliminate or expel any 
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shareholder under the following circumstances: (1) when the shareholder fails to pay the 
instalments of his shares;152 (2) when there is a provision in the article of association that 
allows the company to freeze out shareholders under certain circumstances (this is because 
shareholders become a member of the company according to a contract and therefore they 
are regulated by contract law as well as the commercial legal system);153 (3) when the 
duties of a shareholder cannot be performed because of a force majeure (e.g. the 
shareholder is rewarded shares as compensation for work, but illness prevents them from 
continuing to work); (4) when the dispute between shareholders is too difficult to solve. 
Under this circumstance, the court may decide that it is better that one or more of the 
shareholders leave the company rather than wind the company up.154 This comes from the 
principle that the interest of the company is of greater importance than the individual 
shareholder. 155  
In addition to LEAA 2010 failing to provide protection for the minority shareholders 
because of the absence of formal private enforcement and the lack of adopting a 
supermajority approval rule, Libyan corporate law does not provide adequate protection for 
the minority shareholders in terms of appraisal rights. This is because there is no a 
statutory right that allows all minority shareholders who oppose a central transaction to sell 
their shares. Instead, LEAA 2010 grants only the dissenting minority shareholders the right 
to exit from the company when they do not agree with the majority shareholders’ 
solution.156 This means that this right is granted only to the shareholders who object to the 
resolution at the special meeting. Therefore, neither the dissenter who failed to attend the 
meeting, nor the shareholder who attended but took no action to object to the resolution has 
the right of appraisal. It should be noted that, under this right, the company must return the 
                                                 
152 LEAA 2010, art 105. 
153 See Libya Civil Act, art 527 (2). 
154 Here the existing shareholder still has a right to demand compensation from the company if the freezing-
out causes him harm.  
155 Tibar (n 153) 913. 
156 See LEAA 2010, art 160. This provision was enacted under previous Libyan Commercial Act 1953, art 
585 (1) as well. 
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value of the minority shareholders’ shares which are evaluated under two mandatory rules: 
(1) if the shares are listed in the Libyan Stock market, the evaluation must be according to 
the average price of the shares during the last six months; (2) if the company is a private 
company, the evaluation must be based on the book value.157  This kind of evaluation is 
consistent with what Black and Kraakman propose.158 
4.4.2.2. Supermajority shareholders approval rule  
According to the self-enforcing model, the appropriate solution in mergers and other 
central transactions, discussed previously, is supermajority shareholders approval.  Under 
this rule, the threshold for shareholder approval must be high enough to guarantee that the 
controlling shareholders ‘cannot routinely complete major transactions without support 
from outside shareholders.’ 159 However, the threshold should be neither ‘so high that 
companies will often be unable to complete beneficial transactions because the necessary 
shareholder vote cannot be obtained, nor so high that it gives undue holdup power to 
outside blockholders’.160 
Libyan law, unlike the UK law, does not include the rule of supermajority 
shareholder approval for central business decisions, as discussed. Instead, in Libya the 
shareholders can make a central decision by a simple majority approval.161 Therefore, there 
is a need to adopt the supermajority approval rule. This is because a simple majority 
approval rule clearly does not provide adequate protection for minority shareholders since 
there is a possibility (one that is often the case) that a single large shareholder who owns 
more than half of the company’s capital can exploit and abuse both the management and 
the minority shareholders, especially in the absence of formal enforcement.  
                                                 
157 LEAA 2010, art 160. This provision was enacted under the previous Libyan Commercial Act 1953, art 
585 (1). 
158 See Black and Kraakman (n 3) 1195. 
159 ibid 1953. 
160  ibid. 
161 LEAA  2010, art 168. 
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The appropriate shareholder approval threshold should depend on the ownership 
structure of the majority of companies in Libya and should be high enough so that the 
controlling shareholder cannot complete major transactions without support from minority 
shareholders. Currently, the law in Libya with regard to central decision-making places the 
threshold at 50%, a level that is clearly inadequate. Though in most jurisdictions the 
threshold of 75% of shares is very common, this would also be insufficient to provide 
protection for the minority shareholder in Libya. This is because in Libya the state, as the 
controlling shareholder of most large companies, often owns more than 75% of a 
company’s shares. For instance, according to the Table no.1 entitled The Structure of 
ownership in Libyan commercial banks provided in Ch. 2, we can find that the state owns 
more than 82% of shares in most large banks in Libya (for example, the state owns 83 % of 
Gumhouria Bank, 85 % of Commercial National Bank and 82% of Al Commerce and 
Growth).162 Accordingly, the increase of shares from 51 % (the current statute) to 75% 
would be ineffective since the state would retain its control over corporate decisions. 
Therefore, the appropriate solution to include the minority, and so protect the minority 
shareholders, is to increase the percentage to 85%.163  
Also, in order to provide adequate protection for minority shareholders, the 
corporate law should permit shareholders to increase the supermajority requirement for 
certain provisions even to the level of unanimity. This would provide adequate protection 
for minority shareholders as majority shareholders would be unable to complete central 
transactions without minority shareholder approval. 
An alternative proposal that could also provide protection for minority 
shareholders, and possibly more effectively, is that instead of corporate law mandating a 
                                                 
162 See (2.1.2). 
163  Here it is worth noting that the determination of an accurate percentage of shares needs data that 
determines the structure of corporate ownership in Libya and includes the accurate percentage of shares that 
the controlling shareholders own in every company.  Such data is not available since there are no studies 
regarding corporate ownership structure in Libya; the Libyan government has also not published any data in 
this regard. 
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requirement for a particular percentage of shares, the law could require the approval of 
minority shareholders who own 5% or more of shares in any conflict of interest 
transaction. For instance, to approve a conflict of interest transaction in a company in 
which the majority owns 80% of the shares, the approval of minority shareholders who 
own 5% of shares would also be required. Also, the approval of a conflict of interest 
transaction in a company in which the majority owns 55% of shares would require the 
additional approval of minority shareholders who own 5% of shares. 
This solution is more desirable and offers a greater level of protection to minority 
shareholders. This is because of two reasons: firstly, it provides protection for the minority 
shareholders in all companies including those in which the majority shareholders own very 
large amounts of shares. Secondly, this solution provides a fairer level of protection. To 
explicate this: assume Company A has controlling shareholders who own 84.99% of shares 
and Company B has controlling shareholders who own 85% of shares. In the first instance 
the minority shareholders are protected since the controlling shareholders cannot make a 
decision without an approval from the minority shareholders. However, in the second 
instance where the controlling shareholders own 85% (0.01% more than in Company A), 
the minority shareholders are not protected since the controlling shareholders have enough 
shares that allow him to engage in any transaction without the minority shareholders’ 
consent. This is the case despite the fact that the difference in percentage in the both 
situations is minimal.164  Consequently, the approach that adopts a particular percentage 
                                                 
164 This situation is similar to how tax was imposed in the past. To illustrate this, we should understand that 
there are two methods to impose a tax: the traditional one, known as the Incremental Classes Tax, and the 
modern one known as the Incremental Sections tax. In the first scenario, for example, when the salary is 
between £1000 and £2000 the tax is 10%, when the salary is between £2001 and £3000, the tax is 20% and 
so on. This method has been criticized since a person who his salary is £2001 will pay more tax (20%) than 
someone who has a salary of £2000 (10%) even though the difference between the two salaries is only £1. 
Accordingly, the method was changed to the Incremental Sliding tax. Here if the salary is £2001, it will be 
divided into three sections. For example, the first £1000 is taxed at 10%, the second £1000 at 20% and the 
remaining £1 at 30%. This method avoids the unfairness that occurred under the traditional method.    
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threshold has the potential to not provide an equal level of protection to minority 
shareholders in all companies.165 
Regarding the sale or purchase of assets, the model proposes a hierarchy of 
procedural and structural requirements depending on the size of the transaction of asset 
sales and purchases, which are as follows: 166   
1. The management of the company have power to purchase or sell less than 25% of 
the book value of a company's assets because it is not considered to be a large 
transaction. 
2. Requires unanimous board approval to purchase or sell 25-50% of the book value 
of a company's assets. However, if the Board cannot reach a unanimous decision, 
approval must be transferred to the shareholders, presumably by a majority of votes. 
3. Requires approval by a supermajority of three quarters of the shareholders at the 
meeting to purchase or sell 50% or more of the book value of the company's assets. 
In the case of Libya, there is a need to reduce these percentages because of the 
widespread corruption by which Libya characterized. The management, for example, 
should be authorised to purchase and sell not more than 10% of the book value of the 
company’s assets and, to provide greater safeguards, the board of directors must vote to 
approve this transaction. Also, to sell or purchase between 10% and 25% of the company’s 
book value, independent directors must approve the transaction. Finally, to purchase or sell 
more than 25%, the supermajority rule under the new form must be applied since, as Black 
and Kraakman note, ‘transactions of this size can destroy a company's value with the 
stroke of a pen’.167 
                                                 
165 However, though the approach that provides the minority shareholders protection under any circumstances 
regardless of the percentage of shares that the majority shareholders own is rational, we should take into 
account that the percentage of the minority shareholders that can participate in decision-making process 
should own 5% of the shares or more. This means only large minority shareholders can have a veto power 
and approval power in conflict of interest transactions. This issue will be discussed in details in the following 
chapter. 
166 Black and Kraakman (n 3) 1955. 
167 ibid. 
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Although LEAA 2010 adopts appraisal rights and the method of assessing the value of 
a company’s shares is appropriate for the Libyan case, relying on courts to process such a 
right does not provide adequate protection for the minority shareholders because of the 
lack of formal private enforcement. Accordingly, it is rational to mandate that the dispute 
parties seek appraisal through arbitration rather than through the courts.168 
Furthermore, Libyan Law does not facilitate minority buyouts when a controlling 
shareholder owns a large percentage of a company’s share. This is appropriate for two 
reasons: first, if buyouts were allowed in Libya (where most large companies are owned by 
the state) most companies would be owned solely by the state. This is not consistent with 
Libya’s current policy of privatisation and moving towards a Free Market economy in 
which concentrated state ownership tends to be diluted in favour of the private sectors. 
However, allowing freezeout provisions will lead to the increase of state ownership at the 
expense of the private sector. 
Second, Islamic law, which is a source of Libyan law, does not allow for the 
expropriation of private property. Instead, Islamic Law adopts the ‘consent principle’ 
which means that any transaction must be based on the consent of the parties.169 The Quran 
says in this regard: ‘O you who have faith! Do not eat up your wealth among yourselves 
unrightfully,170 but it should be trade by mutual consent’.171Also, in the Sunna, 172 The 
Prophet Mohammed says ‘a Muslim is a brother of another Muslim, it is not allowed for a 
                                                 
168 Black and Kraakman propose a choice between seeking a court or an arbitrator. (See ibid 1956). However, 
in the case of Libya I propose only seeking an arbitrator because of the extreme lack of court enforcement.  
169 However, under Islamic Law there are certain specific exceptions to the principle of consent. For example, 
it allows selling a bankrupt person’s property without his consent for the interest of his creditor, selling a 
debtor’s collateral or securities without his consent for the interest of his creditor, taking expenses for a 
person’s wife or children without his consent if he does not spend enough money for his family. etc. See 
Tolba Al Kobashi, The Clauses of the Private Property Expropriation and its Limitaions in the Interest of the 
Third Parties in Islamic Law (Jameat Al Azhar 2001) (in Arabic). 
170 That is, by way of usury, gambling, usurpation, false claim, expropriating private property or any other 
illegitimate actions under Islamic Law. 
171 The Quran, Surah Al Nessa (Women) verse: 29. 
172 Sunna means ‘The traditional portion of Muslim law, based on the words and acts of Prophet Muhammad, 
and preserved in the traditional literature’. See  Dictionary.com, ‘sunnah’   
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sunnah> accessed 12-05-2014 
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brother to take anything from his brother but what he gave him with a pure consent’.173 
Thus, in Islamic Law the controlling shareholders are not allowed to freeze the minority 
shareholders out without their consent, which is also the case in Libya law. 
4.4.3. The majority-minority conflict in transactions that effect corporate 
capital  
To analyse the majority-minority conflict in transactions that effect corporate capital in 
Libya, I firstly provide an overview of the problem of the Libyan legal regime covering 
corporate capital transactions (4.4.3.1), and then makes a proposal for legal reform in order 
to provide minority investors greater protection from abusive corporate capital transactions 
(4.4.3.2). 
4.4.3.1. The problem of the legal regime in Libya concerning the majority-
minority conflict in increasing and decreasing capital transactions   
The problem of the majority-minority conflict in transactions that effect corporate capital 
can be divided into two transactions: increasing capital transactions and decreasing capital 
transactions. 174  Whilst the problem of the majority-minority shareholders regarding 
increasing capital transactions relates to share issuance when the controlling shareholder 
issues a number of shares that dilute the voting power of the minority shareholders, in 
decreasing capital transaction the conflict may occur when, for example, the majority 
shareholder decreases the capital of the company for purposes that serve his interest rather 
than the company’s interests, such as saving money to create another company rather than 
there being a real need to reduce the company’s capital. 
To address both problems in Libya, LEAA 2010 adopts a simple majority rule 
instead of the supermajority rule. Under Art 141 shareholders in a special meeting, where 
                                                 
173 The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, ‘Islam and Nationalization: Nationalization and Expropriation 
in Islamic Law’ (2014) 158 Dauat Alhak Journal 1, available at http://habous.gov.ma/daouat-alhaq/item/4047 
(in Arabic).  
174 See (2.3.1.1). 
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the owners of at least two thirds of the company’s capital are in attendance and in which a 
resolution is agreed by at least a half of the attendees, can increase the capital of the 
company through issuing new shares.175 Similarly, Art 151 allows the shareholders in a 
special meeting to decrease company’s capital in certain cases. For example, when the 
capital of the company is more than what the company needs for its operations176 and also, 
when the company has lost at least one third of its capital.177This being the case, Libyan 
corporate law fails to address either conflict satisfactorily, as it delegates the right to 
increase and decrease corporate capital to the majority of shareholders who can rely on 
only the simple majority rule, rather than requiring the supermajority rule to approve such 
transactions. 
However, though LEAA 2010 fails to address the conflict that derives from 
increasing and decreasing corporate capital transactions, it does provide protection for the 
minority shareholders in relation to increasing corporate capital by adopting a pre-emptive 
right for the minority shareholders. Under art 144, the newly issued shares must be 
distributed among the shareholders on a pro rata basis that does not exceed the number of 
shares that they applied for. If there is an excess of new shares, they must be distributed 
among the shareholders who requested to buy more on a pro rata basis. If there are still 
more shares remaining after the two previous steps, the new shares must be offered for 
public subscription. Thus, Libyan law provides minority shareholders with adequate 
protection under pre-emptive rights.   
                                                 
175 The ways that new shares can be issued under LEAA 2010 (art 144) are as follows: (1) issuing new shares 
equal to the increased capital at the par value of the shares of the company; (2) increasing the par value of the 
shares of the company; (3) transferring the bonds of the company to new shares.  
176 LEAA 2010 art 151 (2). The ways adopted in LEAA 2010 to decrease corporate capital are as follows: (1) 
exempt the shareholder from the remaining instalments of their share; (2) returning some the shareholders’ 
instalments. (See LEAA 201 art 151 (2)). 
177 See LEAA 2010 art 152. In this situation, the board of directors must call the general meeting of the 
shareholders to evaluate the situation of the company after its loss and take the suitable measures.  See ibid. 
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4.4.3.2. Mechanisms for addressing the majority-minority conflict that 
effect corporate capital in Libya  
The self-enforcing model proposes a number of substitute tools to protect minority 
shareholders against issuing new shares that are priced below fair market value or shift the 
control of a company. Primarily, under the self-enforcing model, shareholders may allow 
the board of directors to issue unissued shares.178 Additionally, the self-enforcing model 
offers a more flexible approach by imposing more limitations. First, selling shares to 
insiders is a related-party transaction that should be subject to the approval requirements of 
the majority minority rule, as discussed in (4.4.1). Also, issuing shares at under market 
value is prohibited. Further, issuing shares that are equivalent to 25% or more of the 
company’s outstanding shares should require approval by the majority of the shareholders, 
excluding the purchasers if they are already existing shareholders. Finally, shareholders 
should have pre-emptive and participation rights. Here the model ‘offer[s] to its existing 
shareholders rights to purchase newly issued shares in proportion to their prior holdings 
(pre-emptive rights)’.179 However, because this right is costly for companies with many 
shareholders and can delay time-sensitive transactions, the model allows for waivers 
including routine waivers approved at annual meetings.180  Further, the model grants the 
shareholder who waives their pre-emptive right what Black and Kraakman term 
participation rights, which ‘entitle the shareholders who hold them to buy from the 
company after the offering has been completed as many shares, at the offering price, as 
they could have bought had pre-emptive rights been available’. 181 
It should be noted that LEAA 2010 provisions are in no way consistent with the 
self-enforcing model. Firstly, the law does not address whether the shareholders can allow 
the board of directors to issue unissued shares. Also, although the law flatly prohibits the 
                                                 
178 Black and Kraakman (n 3) 1964.   
179 ibid 1965. 
180 ibid. 
181 ibid. 
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original share issuance below the par value, it does not prohibit any additional issuances to 
be below the market value.182  Further, LEAA 2010 does not require shareholder approval 
by majority of shares for any issue of more than 25% of voting stock. Regarding pre-
emptive rights, LEAA 2010 does not address this right sufficiently since it stipulates that 
‘the shareholders have the priority to buy the new shares issued by the company if the 
shareholders in general meeting agree not to adopt this provision’.183 This means that the 
pre-emptive right is a default rule that shareholders in their general meeting can agree not 
to adopt. Therefore, there is no mandated protection available to the minority shareholders, 
since the controlling shareholders can withdraw pre-emptive rights from the minority 
shareholders at any time.184 
Regarding decreasing corporate capital, Black and Kraakman do not include such a 
transaction in their model. However, when a conflict is obvious in a decreasing capital 
transaction between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders, we can apply 
the same rule of supermajority approval in order to provide protection for the minority 
shareholders. 
4.4.4. The mechanisms of a self-enforcing model in control transactions: 
takeout rights 
Here I discuss the mechanisms that could be applied to solve the problem of the minority 
shareholders and the majority shareholders in control transactions. To do so, this sub-
section examines the problem of the legal system in Libya concerning control transactions 
(4.4.3.1) and then it proposes an appropriate solution for this problem in (4.4.3.2). 
                                                 
182 See LEAA 2010, art 142 (1). 
183 See LEAA 2010, art 147 (1). 
184 This is in contrast to CA 2006 where, under section 561(1), which is a mandatory rule, a company must 
not issue shares to any person unless: (1) it has made an offer (on the same or more favourable terms) to each 
person who already holds shares in the company in the proportion held by them; and (2) the time limit given 
to the shareholder to accept the offer has expired. 
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4.4.4.1. The problem of the legal regime in Libya concerning the majority-
minority conflict in control transactions 
As discussed in Ch. 2, the majority-minority conflict in sales of control occurs when the 
acquirer enters into an agreement with the controlling shareholders of the target company 
under terms that may harm the minority shareholders. This can occur when the controlling 
shareholders extract private benefits by selling their controlling shares at a premium that 
reflects the capitalized value of the private benefits of control, rather than at the market 
value.185  Also, in Ch.2 it is recognized that control transactions are not a significant 
problem in Libya because of reasons that relate to the concentrated system of ownership, 
the illiquidity of the Libyan market, state ownership of most large companies, a policy that 
prevents companies from selling profitable equities, poor information disclosure (which is 
required to encourage potential acquirer companies to enter in to takeover transactions), 
and a complete absence of loan-financed purchases.186 
These reasons provide clear evidence that takeover transactions are not yet a real 
issue in Libya and explains why there are no adequate provisions (or a separate laws or 
acts) that set down takeover (or even merger) transactions.187 In the same context, there is 
no provision that regulates the relationship between the minority and the majority 
shareholders, or protects minority shareholders against the majority. Instead, general civil 
laws must be applied in such cases. This is the case in most Arab countries such as Egypt 
and Iraq, 188  which, like Libya, do not provide adequate protect for the minority 
shareholders in the context of corporate control transactions. As Kraakman et al. argue, 
‘the general rules of civil law are not likely to address effectively the coordination between 
the acquirer and the non-controlling shareholders […] nor the agency problem between 
                                                 
185 See (2.3.1.1). 
186 See (2.3.1.2). 
187 See Ch.2 (n 153). 
188 See Ismael  Ibrahem and Nofl Rehman  AL-Jbouri, ‘The Legal Responsibility to Acquired on Participation 
Company: Comparative Study’ (2010) 1/year 4 Journal of Legal and Political Sciences 9 (in Arabic). 
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controlling and non-controlling shareholders.’189  There are many complicated issues in 
takeover transactions that the general rules of civil law are not able to address. This 
necessitates a reform to Libyan law, which will be discussed in the following analysis. 
4.4.4.2. Takeout rights   
According to the self-enforcing model, Libyan Law could protect minority shareholders by 
adopting a mandatory bid rule which would grant them ‘takeout rights’ (a term used by 
Black and Kraakman) after a change of control. Under takeout rights, a shareholder who 
acquires a fixed percentage (often 30%) or more of the company's common stock ‘must 
offer to buy all remaining shares at the highest price he paid for any of the company's 
shares within a specified period of time (we propose six months)’.190    
In addition, there is another risk that may face the minority shareholders which 
relates to the secret accumulation of control. Here shareholders can be induced to sell 
control under the market value through numerous open market transactions. In order to 
address this, the self-enforcing model would give the shareholders an opportunity to 
negotiate a higher price by collectively negotiating a control premium, which would lead to 
other potential acquirers offering a higher price as well.191 This model, which Libya law 
should comply with, requires that first any shareholder who acquires 15 % or more of a 
company's shares must publicly disclose their identity, their shareholdings and their 
intention to buy more shares.192 Also, they must give the company 30 days’ notice of their 
intention to purchase more shares, i.e. acquire control. 193  This mechanism assists the 
management of the company by giving them  appropriate time to respond to the control 
transaction through ‘seeking a higher bidder, proposing an alternate transaction that is 
                                                 
189 Black and Kraakman (n 3) 1961. 
190 ibid. 
191 ibid 1962. 
192 ibid. 
193 ibid. 
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more favourable to the shareholders, or convincing shareholders that their shares are worth 
more than the acquirer is offering to pay’.194 
Finally, the minority shareholders may face what Black and Kraakman describe as 
a ‘prisoner's dilemma’, which describes the situation in which a shareholder ‘cannot risk 
rejecting an offer that most other shareholders accept, because the price and liquidity of the 
remaining minority shares will collapse’.195 Consequently, since the minority shareholders’ 
shares may lose their liquidity when the acquirer gets a high percentage of the outstanding 
shares, an appraisal rights remedy is an effective solution for such a problem when a 
controlling shareholder's ownership crosses 90%.196 Thus appraisal rights must be offered 
to all remaining minority shareholders by the company. 
4.5. Factors which reinforce the proposal to adopt the self-enforcing model 
in Libya 
Black and Kraakman do not provide a comprehensive analysis that justifies why the self-
enforcing model is an appropriate alternative to formal private enforcement in emerging 
countries. Instead they focus only on the lack of enforcement in these countries as a reason 
to   replace the judicial solution with the self-enforcing model. However, such an analysis 
does not provide us with the complete picture.  In fact, there are other reasons that 
contribute to my proposal that the self-enforcing model should be adopted in Libya. Firstly, 
the self-enforcing model contributes to companies being able raise capital from investors 
(4.5.1), and it also lowers the number of conflict of interest transactions and makes a 
company’s transactions more efficient (4.5.2). Finally, the self-enforcing model does away 
with the need for external monitoring (4.5.3). 
                                                 
194 ibid. 
195 ibid 1963. 
196 ibid. 
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4.5.1. The self-enforcing model’s positive impact on investor capital  
Generally, it is agreed amongst corporate governance scholars that the protection of 
minority shareholders is considered a core mechanism for attracting both foreign and 
domestic investors as it enhances the development of financial markets. 197 Therefore, 
minority shareholders will be incentivised to pay a greater sum for shares if they are well 
protected. 198 Moreover, when minority shareholders are enabled to vote on transactions in 
which there is a conflict of interests (as they would be under the self-enforcing model) this 
will encourage more the investors to raise additional capital. 
To illustrate this: in Libya, where an inefficient market is in place, it is not an easy task 
for companies to raise additional capital on favourable terms, unlike in an efficient market.  
Instead companies can only raise capital on expensive terms as minority shareholders are 
unwilling to invest additional capital in corporations where the controlling shareholders 
can extract private benefits at their expense. 199 Thus, such a market allows individuals to 
exploit small investors without suffering either market or legal penalties.200  
Further, in such a market, where the general enforcement environment of courts and 
other institutions is very weak, companies may prefer to rely on internal funds (using 
retained earnings) 201 or contributions from closely related investors, since obtaining external finance is constrained, 202especially in a weak contracting environment.203  
As a result, the only scenario in which investors and companies are able to raise additional 
                                                 
197 See the introduction p3. 
198  See e.g. Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of 
Financial Economics 3, 15.  For more information about the importance of minority shareholders in raising 
capital, see the introduction of the thesis 3-4. 
199 See  Lynn A Stout, ‘The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing 
and Securities Regulation’ (1988) 87 Michigan Law Review 613; Gilson and Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms 
of Market Efficiency’ (n 105).  
200 Alison Grey Anderson, ‘Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure’ (1977) 25 
UCLA Law Reveiw 738, 740. 
201 Zohar Goshen, ‘Shareholder Dividend Options’ (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 881, 882. 
202 Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens, ‘Corporate Governance and Enforcement’ World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3409, September 2004 <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-3409> 
accessed 29-10-2013, 12. 
203 See Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, ‘Law, Endowments, and Finance’ (2003) 70 
Journal of Financial Economics 137. 
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capital on favourable terms is through a reliance on social relationships with each other.204 
However, under the self-enforcing model, investors are willing to enter the company as 
part of the minority when they are provided with power to approve conflict of interest 
transactions. The self-enforcing model facilitates such entrance since it overcomes the 
challenges described above and encourages investors to invest in a company with which 
they have no existing relationship; which is a significant step towards the establishment of 
a free market economy.  
Additionally, the model of self-enforcement is a mechanism through which investment 
in companies that have a controlling shareholder can be increased, and it can help ensure 
the stability of such investment through encouraging the minority shareholders to continue 
investing in a concentrated ownership company long-term. According to Gutierrez and 
Saez, investment efficiency and welfare can be increased by letting the interested parties 
enter into long-term contracts that regulate private benefit extraction.205 Similarly, under a 
law (similar to a contract) that provides minority shareholders with long-term protection 
against private benefit extraction, investment efficiency and welfare will be increased. In 
the same context, the company, under this model, can survive long-term. As Mantysaari 
notes, the company can ‘benefit from a self-enforcing corporate governance model. In the 
long run, it can increase the firm’s survival chances’.206 
4.5.2. The self-enforcing model as a means of lowering the number of 
conflict of interest transactions and making controlling shareholders’ 
transaction more efficient 
Under the self-enforcing model, the conflict of interest transactions will be lower since 
controlling shareholders are provided with enough incentives to obey the rules.  They 
                                                 
204 See (1.3.2.1). 
205 María Gutiérrez Urtiaga and Maria Isabel Sáez Lacave, ‘A Contractual Approach to Discipline Self-
Dealing by Controlling Shareholders’ SSRN, 2012 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176072> accessed 18-05-2014. 
206 Mantysaari (n 1) 118. 
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know in advance that the minority shareholders have the power to reject any transaction 
that takes advantage of them. Therefore, under this model there is an increased possibility 
that controlling shareholders will not initiate any transaction that conflicts with the 
minority shareholders’ interests. In this way, whilst formal private enforcement is like a 
shield used when the minority shareholders need to defend themselves against controlling 
shareholders, self-enforcement is a sword used by private enforcers (minority 
shareholders) to deter controlling shareholders from initiating conflict of interest 
transactions. Therefore, the self-enforcing model provides the minority shareholders with a 
greater means of protection than formal private enforcement and as such can be regarded 
as a means of minimizing the number of conflict of interest transactions. 
In addition, the transfer of decision-making power to the minority under the model 
enhances the minority's ability to demand that transactions are performed efficiently.207  To 
illustrate this: the controlling shareholders will not enter into any transactions that does not 
benefit the company since they know in advance that it will be rejected by the minority 
shareholders. Consequently, the minority shareholders are better off because the model 
provides the controller with enough incentives to generate higher corporate benefits208 that 
are aligned with the desires of the small shareholders. Moreover, the model provides the 
minority shareholders with a greater means of ensuring effective transactions, as requiring 
the minority shareholders’ approval leads the controlling shareholders to enter into a 
negotiation with the minority which, as Urtiaga and Lacave note, allows both parties to 
profit.209   
However, it may be argued that the judicial approach is able to offer greater 
efficiency than the model since the judicial approach uses a fairness mechanism which 
                                                 
207 Goshen, ‘The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing’ (n 32) 413-4. It should be noted that the 
model, in contrast, may preclude efficient transactions in certain situations, such as when the minority 
shareholders attempt to extract greater personal gain in return to their approval to the transaction. This will be 
discussed in Ch.5.   
208 Gutiérrez Urtiaga and Sáez Lacave (n 205) 3. 
209 Ibid 4. 
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employs an objective valuation on the conflict of interest transaction through the courts. 
This is in contrast to the self-enforcing model where the valuation of the transaction is in 
the hands of the minority shareholders and so is subjective (enabling the minority to 
capture a greater part of valuation of the transaction under approval regardless of whether 
it is fair or not).210 This is the case when a country has efficient formal enforcement and 
their courts are able to value commercial transactions appropriately. However, in the case 
of Libya this is not applicable since there is a lack of enforcement and the quality of 
Libyan courts in dealing with commercial law and their efficiency of implementation of 
the law are still weak, as discussed previously. Thus, the adoption of the model of self-
enforcement at the expense of the judicial approach is desirable in Libya.  
 4.5.3. The self-enforcing model compensates for the need for external 
monitoring 
There are two types of financial systems: a market-based system, such as in the UK and the 
U.S., and a bank-based system, which is common in Japan and Germany. 211 Various 
studies indicate that the effectiveness of external monitoring mechanisms of these systems 
is largely determined by the ownership structure of corporations in each respective 
system.212 Firstly, the countries that follow a market-based system are characterized by the 
existence of a relatively large number of listed companies, independent boards (unity 
boards), dispersed ownership, transparent disclosure, a liquid capital market, an active 
                                                 
210 For the differences between the judicial approach and the minority shareholders’ approval approach in 
terms of the valuation of transactions, see Goshen, ‘The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: 
Theory Meets Reality’ (n 32) 408-10. 
211 This classification of the systems is based on several criteria the details of which are not in this thesis. 
Examples of such criteria are: (1) the size of the banking systems and stock markets; (2) the degree of 
external finance that results from bank and market sources; and (3) the amount of corporate equity owned by 
banks including the role of the banks in corporate governance. For details see e.g.  Ross Levine, ‘Financial 
Development and economic Growth: Views and Agenda’ (1997) XXXV Journal of Economic Literature 688; 
Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura, ‘Banks and Corporate Control in Japan’ (1999) 54 The Journal of 
Finance 319; Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, Mass. ; London : 
MIT Press 2000); Ross Levine, ‘Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is Better?’ (2002) 
11 Journal of Financial Intermediation 398. 
212 See e.g. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’ (1986) 94 
Journal of Political Economy 461; Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘Management 
Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis’ (1988) 20 Journal of Financial Economics 293.   
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takeover market, and well-developed legal infrastructure for the protection of minority 
shareholders.213  Under this system, the market can enhance corporate governance through 
facilitating the disciplinary mechanism for corporate control. 214  Here the takeover 
market 215  serves as a disciplinary mechanism when a corporation's internal controls 
become inefficient or incapacitated.216 This can occur when a corporation is mismanaged 
and its shares, as a result, fall in-line with the company’s market value.217 Under these 
circumstances the company becomes a potential target for a takeover ‘in which alternative 
management teams, who recognize an opportunity to reorganize or redeploy the 
organization's assets and hence to create new value, bid for the rights to manage the 
corporation's resources’.218 Thus the market for corporate control is capable of correcting 
the inefficiency of the management in two ways: either through imposing the threat of a 
possible takeover and therefore deterring the management from acting poorly, or through 
                                                 
213 For details see Arnoud WA Boot and Anjan V Thakor, ‘Financial System Architecture’ (1997) 10 Review 
of Financial studies 693; Levine, ‘Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is Better?’ (n 
213); Allen and Gale (n 211); Colin Mayer and Oren Sussman, ‘The assessment: Finance, Law, and Growth’ 
(2001) 17 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 457. 
214 See e.g. Eugene F Fama and Michael C Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’ (1983) 26 
Journal of Law and Economics 327; Michael C Jensen and Richard S Ruback, ‘The Market for Corporate 
Control: The Scientific Evidence’ (1983) 11 Journal of Financial Economics 5; Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. 
Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 737; Michael C Jensen, 
‘Takeovers: Their causes and Consequences’ (1988) 2 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 21. 
It should be noted that corporate control is not the only disciplinary mechanism for a management that acts 
poorly, also a management that fails to create shareholder value can be disciplined through other mechanisms 
such as closer shareholder monitoring, holding large share blocks, appointing nonexecutive directors See e.g. 
Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Luc Renneboog, ‘Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing 
Companies?’ (2001) 10 Journal of Financial Intermediation 209; Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders 
and Corporate Control’ (n 212); David Scharfstein, ‘The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers’ (1988) 55 The 
Review of Economic Studies 185. 
215 The market for corporate control is ‘often referred to as the takeover market’. See Jensen and Ruback (n 
212) 6. 
216  Eugene F. Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88 The Journal of Political 
Economy 288; Jensen, ‘Takeovers; their  Causes and Consequences’ (n 214); Michael S Weisbach, 
‘Corporate Governance and Hostile Takeovers’ (1993) 16 Journal of Accounting and Economics 199. 
It should be noted that the market for corporate control also makes it easier to tie managerial compensation to 
firm performance. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives’ (1990) 98 Journal of Political Economy 225, 242. 
217  Krishna G Palepu, ‘Predicting Takeover Targets: A Methodological and Empirical Analysis’ (1986) 8 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 3; Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, 
‘Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers’ in Alan J. Auerbach (ed), Corporate Takeovers: 
Causes and Consequences (University of Chicago Press 1988) 101–136; Mark L Mitchell and Kenneth Lehn, 
‘Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?’ (1990) 98 Journal of Political Economy 372. 
218 James P Walsh and Rita D Kosnik, ‘Corporate Raiders and their Disciplinary Role in the Market for 
Corporate Control’ (1993) 36 Academy of Management Journal 671, 673. 
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actions taken by the acquirer, after a takeover has actually been executed, to improve the 
deficiency of the previous management. 
However, the countries following the bank-based system have large effective 
banking systems, high levels of bank finance, concentrated shareholding, large equity 
holding by banks and their financial institutions are more active. 219 In such a system, 
where the rights of control are strongly concentrated, hostile takeover bids are very rare.220 
This is because hostile takeovers as a mechanism to restrain inefficient management or 
opportunism is based on the grounds of the separation of ownership and control which is 
not always the case in concentrated ownership countries.221 Thus, the holding of a majority 
of shares by a controlling shareholder coupled with the separation of ownership provides 
the company with immunity against takeovers. 222  Therefore, non-market external 
monitoring mechanisms (e.g. continuous creditor control) play an important role as a 
substitute for disciplinary control changes. 223 As Shleifer and Vishny argue, large creditors 
are similar to majority shareholders since they have large investments in the firm and 
therefore a strong incentive to monitor. Additionally, large creditors typically have a 
                                                 
219 See e.g. Mark J Roe, ‘Some Differences in Corporate structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States’ 
(1993) 102 Yale Law Journal 1927; Gregory Jackson and Andreas Moerke, ‘Continuity and change in 
corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and Japan’ (2005) 13 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 351. 
220 Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, ‘Bank Control, Takeovers and Corporate Governance in Germany’ (1998) 
22 Journal of Banking & Finance 1385, 1386. According to Becht et al., ‘[t]his mechanism is highly 
disruptive and costly. Even in the USA and the UK it is relatively rarely used. In most other countries it is 
almost nonexistent’ Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton and Ailsa Röell, ‘Corporate governance and control’ 
Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 2003 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343461> 
accessed 16-12-2013, 13.  
221  Rajeeva Sinha, ‘The Role of Hostile Takeovers in Corporate Governance’ (2004) 14 Applied Financial 
Economics 1291, 1291. ‘The study makes a distinction between the role of hostile takeovers as a mechanism 
for downsizing and exit in the process of ‘creative destruction’ and the role of hostile takeovers as a corporate 
governance mechanism for curbing managerial slack and opportunism’. 
see Jens Köke, ‘The Market for Corporate Control in a Bank-Based Economy: a Governance Device?’ (2004) 
10 Journal of Corporate Finance 53. This study attempts to answer the following question: Does the market 
for corporate control fulfil a disciplinary function in a bank-based economy? To address this question, they 
examine the frequency, causes, and consequences of almost 1000 listed and non-listed German corporations 
from 1987–1994. The study’s findings are: ‘high ownership concentration makes control changes less likely. 
This is consistent with the view that tight shareholder control acts as a substitute for disciplinary control 
changes’. Also, ‘control changes are more likely for firms under strong creditor influence. This suggests that 
creditor control and control changes are complementary’. 
222 See  Zohar Goshen, ‘Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States-Israeli Comparative Law’ 
(1998) 6 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 99. 
223 Franks and Mayer, ‘Bank Control, Takeovers and Corporate Governance in Germany’ (n 220); Köke (n 
221); Colin Mayer, ‘New Issues in Corporate Finance’ (1988) 32 European Economic Review 1167. 
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variety of control rights and therefore sufficient power to monitor,224 which may occur 
through offering financial advice to the borrower, owning shares in the company and 
acting as a proxy for its other investors at shareholder meetings.225 In other words, debt as 
a governance mechanism provides external oversight over management under which 
bankers can intervene to correct governance mistakes and monitor the corporations directly. 
In practice, this means that when managers who mismanage the company reject the 
opportunity to develop strategies to act more efficiently, banks can withhold credit.226  
Libya does not have either a market-based system because of concentrated 
ownership or a bank-based system because, as discussed in Ch.2, using banks as a 
mechanism for external corporate governance to monitor companies does not work 
efficiently in Libya. In other words, the Libyan Government has neither adopted the 
Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, which is characterised by the protection of 
investors and creditors, nor introduced a bank-based system that can provide efficient 
monitoring of the performance of the enterprise, such as has been adopted in Japan and 
Germany. Instead, though banks are the main providers of external finance to Libyan 
companies and the relationships between banks and enterprises are naturally close, the 
banks in Libya are unable to play a role in corporate governance and monitor firms 
efficiently.227 This is because the external finances provided by the banks represent only a 
small part of corporate financing and, as such, banks may not feel motivated to monitor 
clients effectively.228Additionally, the banks are poor governance agents and have distorted 
incentives. The loans are regulated by personal relationship rules rather than corporate 
                                                 
224 Shleifer and Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (n 216) 752-3. 
225 See Jonathan P. Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries 
(Oxford : Clarendon Press 1995) 35-43. 
226 Hayne E Leland and Klaus Bjerre Toft, ‘Optimal capital Structure, endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term 
structure of Credit Spreads’ (1996) 51 The Journal of Finance 987. 
227 See (2.3.2.2). 
228  Erik  Berglöf, ‘Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: The Theory and Its Policy Implications’ 
in Masahiko  Aoki and Hyung Ki Kim (eds), Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies (The World 
Bank 1995)  61. 
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governance mechanisms. Further, Libyan Bank Law does not facilitate the monitoring role 
of Libyan banks to their debtor companies.229  
In the case of Libya, the self-enforcing model compensates for the need to 
implement external monitoring provided under both the market for corporate control and 
external monitoring by banks.  The protection afforded by the market or banks is 
unnecessary under the self-enforcing model as it offers protection for the minority 
shareholders more effectively than the threat of a takeover or monitoring by banks. This is 
simply because the minority's consent is required to approve conflict of interest 
transactions, which means that the exploitation of the minority is a difficult task. 
Furthermore, the model can eliminate the agency costs of external monitoring. 
According to Mantysaari, in the case of external monitors, the firm is the principal and 
external monitors, such as banks or markets, can be regarded as the firm’s agents. Under 
this model, ‘[n]o agency costs for external monitoring will be incurred to the extent that no 
external monitors are required (no agency). This can mean savings’. 230 This is because the 
self-enforcing model relies on internal agents rather than external ones (thus making it self-
enforcing). 
 
 Conclusion  
Having examined liability actions and the other workable alternative strategies (e.g. public 
enforcement) and found that they fail to provide adequate protection for the minority 
shareholders in Libya, the chapter proposed the self-enforcing model as an effective 
alternative to deal with the majority-minority shareholders problem which, in turn, reduces 
(though not wholly avoids) the need for informal enforcement. 
                                                 
229 See (2.3.2.2). 
230 Mantysaari (n 1) 118. 
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In order to avoid reliance on formal enforcement, this chapter proposed that the 
appropriate solutions to majority-minority shareholder problems are based on the adoption 
of the voting mechanism and transitional rights of the self-enforcing model, with 
amendments that take in to account the specific case of Libya.  Such solutions differ 
according to the kind of corporate transactions in which a company may engage: related-
party transactions which are mainly addressed by the majority of minority rule, other 
central transactions (e.g. the liquidation of a company, divisions of the company, the 
transformation of the company into another type of legal entity, the sale or purchase of 
assets, and amendments to the article of association), which are mainly regulated by the 
supermajority approval rule, and control transactions that are mainly governed by a takeout 
right.  
In order to effectively implement a self-enforcing model, there is an evident need to 
adopt the rule of one share, one vote since it prevents insiders from acquiring voting power 
disproportionate to their economic interest in the company. Also, there is a need to adopt 
the rule of confidential voting since it will prevent the controlling shareholders from 
knowing how a voter has cast their ballot (against him or not), meaning that insiders will 
lose the power to manipulate votes through rewards or sanctions. Further, all the rules and 
rights of the model should be mandatory and should be applicable to both large and small 
companies. 
Finally, Black and Kraakman do not cover why the self-enforcing model is an 
appropriate alternative to formal private enforcement in emerging countries, instead 
focussing on the lack of enforcement in these countries as a reason to replace the judicial 
solution with the self-enforcing model. Therefore, their analysis does not provide us with a 
complete picture as there are other reasons that contribute to my proposal that the self-
enforcing model should be adopted in Libya. These reasons, explored in this chapter, are: 
(1) that the self-enforcing model contributes to companies being able raise capital from 
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investors, and (2), it also lowers the number of conflict of interest transactions and makes 
the company’s transactions more efficient. Finally, (3) the self-enforcing model does away 
with the need for external monitoring and is thus an appropriate solution for addressing the 
majority-minority problem in Libya.   
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Chapter 5: The Challenges of Adopting the Self-Enforcing 
Model in Libya 
Introduction  
Having examined the self-enforcing model in the previous chapter as an alternative 
solution for resolving the minority-majority shareholders problem, which relies mainly on 
a voting mechanism to decrease the necessity of judicial oversight, this chapter examines 
the challenges that face the implementation of such a model in Libya.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section (5.1) discusses the problem of 
the lack of effective disclosure and its effect on the application of the self-enforcing model 
in Libya. After providing a brief description of the legal disclosure system in Libya (5.1.1), 
this section argues that minority shareholders are likely to be provided with insufficient 
information by the company, which may prevent them from being able to recognize when 
a conflict of interest transaction has been made by the controlling shareholders. This is due 
to the lack of an effective disclosure system in Libya, which results primarily from 
incomplete mandatory requirements of disclosure and the lack of their enforcement (5.1.2). 
Accordingly, there needs to be a solution that goes beyond the reform of company law and 
depends on the minority shareholders being represented on the board of directors to ensure 
the majority shareholders can access the company’s information (5.1.3).  
Section (5.2) examines the possibility of negative actions by the minority 
shareholders against the conflict of interest transaction by the controlling shareholders. To 
do so, (5.2.1) discusses the problems of abuse of rights by the minority shareholders and 
passive minority shareholders. (5.2.2) proposes effective mechanisms to solve such 
problems, such as enhancing the role of a financial expert or independent auditor and 
employing independent directors to review a conflict of interest transaction.   
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Section (5.3) discusses the costs resulting from the reliance on a voting system 
adopted under the self-enforcing model. To that end, (5.3.1) outlines the potential costs 
that result from adopting the self-enforcing model, such as administrative costs like those 
associated with calling the meeting of the minority shareholders to vote on the conflict of 
interest transaction. In order to ensure the adoption of the model is attractive, these costs 
must be as low as possible and this concept will be analysed in (5.3.2).  
The practical challenge the study will discuss in (5.4) concerns how the model of 
self-enforcement can work without effective enforcement. In other words, how it will be 
ensured that the controlling shareholders are compelled to obey the rules of the model in an 
environment where there is an absence of adequate enforcement.  
Finally, the last section in this study discusses the potential political risk that the 
model may face. It is difficult to anticipate whether the Libyan state will wish to adopt 
such measures and reforms voluntarily because the state owns most assets in Libya as a 
controlling shareholder. I will explore the nature of this political challenge in (5.5.1) and 
then analyse the appropriate responses to such issues in (5.5.2). 
5.1. The ineffective disclosure system in Libya  
This section initially discusses how the weakness of the disclosure system in Libya is an 
obstacle to the application of the self-enforcing model (5.1.2) and then attempts to find an 
appropriate solution for this problem (5.1.3). In order to give some context, there is a need 
to provide a brief description of the legal disclosure system in Libya examined in this 
section (5.1.1).  
5.1.1. The legal disclosure system in Libya: brief legal overview 
The minority shareholders can recognize the controlling shareholders’ conflict of interest 
transaction through either direct disclosure by the controlling shareholders or through the 
management of the company. While, as discussed in Ch.3, Libyan law, like UK law, does 
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not recognize the former type of disclosure (since controlling shareholders are not subject 
to disclosure obligations for either public or private companies), the law does require the 
board of directors to disclose certain information to the shareholders, including the 
minority shareholders.   
Specifically, the Libyan legal framework identifies three types of laws that relate to 
disclosure. Firstly, LEAA 2010 requires company directors (private and public) to prepare 
a balance sheet and profit and loss account at least once a year, and also requires them to 
prepare a report detailing the company's performance.1 All these reports must be available 
to the shareholders at least 15 days before the general meeting at which the reports are to 
be attested.2 Here it should be noted that Libyan companies are not required by LEAA 
2010 to provide the information included in the annual reports to the public (e.g. potential 
investors) although  the latter may be provided with such reports if the company decides to 
disclose them (voluntary disclosure). Further, Libyan companies are required to keep 
certain records,  which are a register of members, a register of bondholders, a minute book 
of members' meetings, a minute book of director's meeting, a minute book of statutory 
auditor's meetings, a minute book of executive committee's meetings and a minute book of 
bondholders' meetings. 3  However, the members of the company can only review the 
register of members and a minute book of members' meetings.4 Additionally, LEAA 2010 
requires the board of directors to submit an annual report to shareholders at least 7 days 
prior to the general meeting. All data and details on amounts received by the board of 
directors must be included in this report,  including their salaries, bonuses, or shares of 
                                                 
1 LEAA 2010, art 226 (1)-(2). 
2 LEAA 2010, art 154 (1). 
3 LEAA 2010, art 223. 
4 LEAA 2010, art 224 (1). 
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profits of the company, as well as all benefits or advantages taken during the past financial 
year, such as housing, cars, and so on.5 
Secondly, the Libyan Stock Market Act 2010 (LSMA 2010) lays down certain 
additional disclosure requirements for public companies to ensure a high quality of 
disclosure and transparency in listed companies in the stock market in Libya. Under art.23 
of LSMA 2010: 
All companies listed on the Libyan Stock Market must submit reports 
quarterly, half-annually and annually including information on the 
overall activity and financial data that disclose the financial position; 
they must also publish a summary of these reports in two newspapers, at 
least one of them in the Arabic language. Also, all companies must 
prepare balance sheets and financial statements in accordance with the 
accounting and auditing standards prescribed by the regulations of this 
Law.  
Moreover, the Capital Market Authority6 and the Stock Market management can 
require that listed companies clarify any information that encourages investors to invest in 
these companies.7 Further, all listed companies must disclose immediately to the Stock 
Market ‘any unforeseen circumstances affecting their activities or financial positions; in 
some necessary cases this information must be published in a daily newspaper. If the 
company does not respond, the stock market will publish the information about the 
emergency circumstances in the appropriate media, at the expense of that company’.8 It is 
worth mentioning that as the Libyan legislator was late in issuing a law regulating the 
Stock Market 9 and its executive regulation (Laeha) has not been issued yet, some of its 
rules are still not applicable. 
The third type of laws that regulate disclosure belong to the Corporate Governance 
Code (CGC), issued in 2007. The rules of this manual are neither mandatory nor legally 
                                                 
5 LEAA 2010, art 183. For more information see (1.1.3.2). 
6 For information regarding the Capital Market Authority, see (4.1.2.3). 
7 LSMA 2010, art 39 (1). 
8 LSMA 2010, art 78. 
9 The first law regulating the LSM was issued in 2010. 
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binding; rather, they promote and regulate responsible and transparent behaviour in 
managing corporations according to international best practice10 for joint-stock companies 
listed on the LSM.11 However, provisions that regulate disclosure by the board of directors’ 
are mandatory.12 With respect to disclosure and transparency, the code requires that at the 
same time as the annual financial reports are issued, the following is also disclosed:13 
A. What has been applied from the corporate governance Code? 
B. What has not applied and the reasons behind that?14 
C. The names of any other companies where any of the Board of 
Director members is a member on its board. 
D. Full disclosure of the name of the chairman and other directors. 
E. Brief description of the responsibility of the sub-committees in the 
company as well as the names of the members, the name of the 
chairman and the time of meetings during the year. 
F. Listings of all remunerations and bonuses to the chairman and other 
members as well as the top management and watchdog committee. 
G. Any commercial disputes, penalty, fines or obstruction suffered by 
the company. 
H. The annual review of results of evaluation of the procedures' 
efficiency of internal audit. 
5.1.2. The problem of the weak disclosure system in Libya and its effect on   
the proposed self-enforcing model  
Generally, the gathering of information is a challenging task for minority shareholders. 
There are information asymmetries between the management and the shareholders, thus 
directors are aware of the frequency of misconduct and amount of harm caused by them, 
whereas shareholders are not. The directors and the controlling shareholders are able to 
                                                 
10 CGC 2007, art 2 (b). 
11 CGC 2007, art 2(a). 
12 CGC 2007, art 2(c). 
13 CGC 2007, art 9. 
14  This is similar to the provision adopted in the UK under the “comply or explain principle” where 
‘compliance with the codes is not mandatory, but that disclosure relating to compliance is’. The most 
important consideration behind this principle is flexibility as it is not possible to adopt a “one size fits all”. 
For more information see Iain MacNeil and Xiao Li, ‘“Comply or Explain”: Market Discipline and non-
Compliance with the Combined Code’ (2006) 14 Corporate Governance: An International Review 486, 486ff. 
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supress the information that reveals their liability. 15  However, to overcome this, as 
discussed later, in Libya as in the UK, there are limited rights granted to the shareholders 
to inspect company documents. These include, for example, the statutory registers, the 
minute books, and directors’ service agreements.16   
The self-enforcing model essentially relies on disclosure by the controlling 
shareholders or, at least, on disclosure by the members of the board (who in most cases 
represent the controlling shareholders). Without effective disclosure the minority 
shareholders are not able to recognize a conflict of interest transaction undertaken by 
controlling shareholders and, as a result, the main disclosure benefits of deterrence and a 
decrease of fraud, misappropriation by insiders and promotion of fairness to non-insiders17 
cannot be achieved. In other words, in the absence of adequate disclosure rules or the lack 
of its enforcement, the controlling shareholders and their representatives (members of the 
board) are free to choose how much to disclose, minimize particular disclosures or not 
disclose at all. Accordingly, minority shareholders may not be able to verify conflict of 
interest transactions and face a high burden of proof to prove the abuse of the conflict of 
interest transaction. The relationship between the lack of disclosure and the effectiveness 
of the self-enforcing model is apparent in the case of Russia. Here, Cunningham Jr argues 
that the self-enforcing model has not succeeded because the rules of disclosure that frame 
the model have failed:18 ‘Russian managers simply have worked harder to conceal their 
self-interested transactions, instead of disclosing them’.19 
                                                 
15 Robert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance (4th edn, John Wiley & sons, Ltd 2008) 184. 
16 See for example, CA 2006 ss 227–230 (service contracts); ss 116 and 118 (register of members); s 358, 
(Inspection of records of resolutions and meetings); s 877 (Instruments creating charges and register of 
charges to be available for inspection). 
17  See George J Benston, ‘Public (US) Compared to Private (UK) Regulation of Corporate Financial 
Disclosure’ (1976) 51 Accounting Review 483. See also, John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Private 
Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2421, 2427 
18 Richard P Cunningham Jr, ‘Corporate Governance and Foreign Investment Nightmares in Russia: A Case 
Study of Unified Energy Systems’ (2001) 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 889, 905. 
19 ibid. 
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  In Libya this problem is further complicated by two main factors:20 incomplete law 
in terms of disclosure (5.1.2.1) and the lack of enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules 
(5.1.2.2).21  
5.1.2.1. Incomplete disclosure laws in Libya 
It has been argued that when the law governing corporate disclosure is not complete, 
companies are unlikely to provide high quality information voluntarily.22 This is the case 
in most developing countries that do not have an adequate system of disclosure,23 and 
Libya is no exception. The transparency of corporate disclosure made by Libyan 
companies has always been an issue. As discussed, Libyan companies are only required to 
disclose their balance sheet, profit and loss account, and a report detailing the company's 
performance (which is not made public). Further, the shareholders are only allowed to 
review the register of members and a minute book of members' meetings. Additionally, art 
                                                 
20  There are many other factors that affect the quality of overall disclosure in Libya (the discussion of which 
falls outside the scope of this study). Examples of those factors relate to (1) competitive weakness between 
companies; (2) the cost of disclosures; (3) ownership structure; (4) size of the companies; (5) the politico-
cultural environment; (6) the absence of an effective stock market; (7) stage of economic development; (8) 
colonial background; (9) education level; (10) technological development; (11) inflation; (12) corporate 
governance practice. Generally and theoretically see Jeffrey J Archambault and Marie E Archambault, ‘A 
Multinational Test of Determinants of Corporate Disclosure’ (2003) 38 The International Journal of 
Accounting 173. In the case of Libya see, Fathi Naser Bribesh, ‘The Quality of Corporate Annual Reports: 
Evidence from Libya’ (Ph. D, University of Glamorgan 2006).  
21 It seems that the main factor that undermines a disclosure system in Libya is the structure of corporate 
ownership. Most Libyan companies are either fully or partially state-owned companies. In such an economy, 
the state as a controlling shareholder is not interested in disclosing information as maximising their market 
value is not considered to be the companies' main objective. See for example, Adel Mashat, ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility Disclosure and Accountability (The Case of Libya)’ (Ph.D Thesis, Manchester 
Metropolitan University 2005). 
22  See Rozaini Mohd Haniffa and Terry E Cooke, ‘Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in 
Malaysian Corporations’ (2002) 38 Abacus 317. 
23  For example in Egypt, see Jennifer Bremer and Nabil Elias, ‘Corporate Governance in Developing 
Economies? The case of Egypt’ (2007) 3 International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 430; (in 
Nigeria) RSO Wallace, ‘Corporate Financial Reporting in Nigeria’ (1988) 18 Accounting and Business 
Research 352; (In Tanzania) Abdiel G Abayo, Carol A Adams and Clare B Roberts, ‘Measuring the Quality 
of Corporate Disclosure in Less Developed Countries: The Case of Tanzania’ (1993) 2 Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 145; (in Ghana) Mathew Tsamenyi, Elsie Enninful-Adu and 
Joseph Onumah, ‘Disclosure and Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Evidence From Ghana’ 
(2007) 22 Managerial Auditing Journal 319; (in Zimbabwe)  Zororo Muranda, ‘Financial distress and 
corporate Governance in Zimbabwean banks’ (2006) 6 Corporate governance 643; (in Saudi Arabia) Khalid 
Alsaeed, ‘The Association between Firm-Specific Characteristics and Disclosure: the Case of Saudi Arabia’ 
(2006) 21 Managerial Auditing Journal 476; (in Bangladesh ) M Akhtaruddin, ‘Corporate Mandatory 
Disclosure Practices in Bangladesh’ (2005) 40 The International Journal of Accounting 399; (in Bahrain)   
Prem Lal Joshi and Sayel Ramadhan, 'The Adoption of International Accounting Standards by Small and 
Closely Held Companies: Evidence from Bahrain'  (2002) 37 The International Journal of Accounting  429. 
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181 of LEAA 2010 prohibits any director of the board and his relatives, agents, or 
representatives (including the controlling shareholders) from becoming involved in any 
conflict with the company.  If this happens, the director must inform the board at a meeting 
or a watchdog committee. He must also avoid becoming involved in any negotiation 
relating to the transaction or he will be responsible for any losses that result.  
Therefore, Libyan Law fails to provide adequate disclosure that enables the 
minority shareholders to know about any conflict of interest transactions made by the 
controlling shareholders. In other words, the current requirements of disclosure do not 
oblige either the controlling shareholders or the directors of the board (who represent the 
controlling shareholders) to disclose any conflict of interest transactions made by the 
controlling shareholders.24  
Academic studies in recent years support the view that Libyan companies are guilty 
of a lack of transparent disclosure because of incomplete law. 25  For example, Faraj 
Hamoda argues that Libyan laws relating to disclosure are still ineffective and do not 
follow the historical source of French Law. Also, he argues that the incompleteness of law 
in Libya is evident in terms of transparency and disclosure. 26 Ellabbar concludes that the 
information published by Libyan companies is insufficient and this is due to a lack of 
mandatory requirements. Thus the level of accounting disclosure of Libyan companies is 
low and this affects negatively on the ability of users of the reports to make precise and 
timely evaluations. 27  In the same context, Larbsh reveals that all of the interviewees in his 
                                                 
24 It should be noted that Libyan Law not only does not offer adequate disclosure in relation to a conflict of 
interest transaction, but also it does not cover other important aspects of disclosure that contribute to 
encouraging investors, such as ownership structure, key executives and their remuneration and a Cash Flow 
Statement. 
25 Most of these studies are PhD studies available at < http://ethos.bl.uk/Home.do>     
26 See Faraj Hamoda, ‘Transparency in the Company Act’ (2014) 3 Journal of Legal Sciences 65 (in Arabic).     
27 Khaled  Ellabbar, ‘Capital Market and Accounting Disclosure in Emerging Economies: the case of Libya’ 
(PhD, University of Salford 2007). One of Ellabbar’s interviewees (Prof. Altarhoune who obtained a PhD in 
Law from the UK 30 years ago and is currently a lecture at Benghazi University) remarked that ‘there is 
minimal disclosure required by the Libyan Commercial Code… but that the Libyan companies are not even 
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study support the view that there is a lack of an adequate disclosure and transparency 
system in Libya. 28 Recently, Magrus in 2012 supported the view that there are too few 
areas that are subject to mandatory disclosure in Libya. One of his interviewees, who was a 
board member in Wahda Bank, believed that:  
The disclosure of all banks does not go beyond the income and financial 
position sheets. I would hardly call this disclosure. Additionally, there is 
even deficiency in preparing those sheets. Last year's financial 
statements are yet to be provided. As for transparency, it is almost 
completely missing. Thus, there is no disclosure other than to official 
supervisory bodies.29 
Elmogla30 and Mashat31  found that low levels of disclosure in Libyan annual 
reports existed because of the absence of mandatory (i.e. statutory) disclosure requirements, 
coupled with a weak accounting profession and education in Libya. Additionally, Bribesh 
concludes that the low level of mandatory disclosure in Libya relates to the nature of 
different businesses. For example, service and construction companies scored the least, 
with the service companies sector reporting the lowest level of disclosure.32 
5.1.2.2. The lack of mandatory disclosure enforcement in Libya    
Ahmad and Nicholls argue that an inadequate regulatory framework and enforcement 
mechanism is one of the main reasons behind the low levels of accounting disclosure and 
accounting standards in developing countries.33 Also, Haniffa and Cooke argue that when 
the legal system which governs information disclosure is not enforced, companies are 
                                                                                                                                                    
complying with these requirements. There is no institute in power that enforces companies to apply these 
requirements’. Ibid 179. 
28 Mansor M Larbsh, ‘An Evaluation of Corporate Governance Practice in Libya: Stakeholders’ Perspectives’ 
(PhD, Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University 2010) 216. 
29 Abdelhamid Ali Ali Magrus, ‘Corporate Governance Practices in Developing Countries: The Case of 
Libya’ (Phd, Faculty of Business, Education and Professional Studies, University of Gloucestershire 2012) 
147. 
30  Mahmoud Elmogla, Christopher J. Cowton and Yvonne Downs, ‘Corporate Social Reporting in a 
Transition Economy: The Case of Libya’ Financial Ethics and Governance Research Group The Business 
School University of Huddersfield <http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/11933/> accessed 13/8/2012. 
31 John D Pratten and Adel Abdulhamid Mashat, ‘Corporate Social Disclosure in Libya’ (2009) 5 Social 
Responsibility Journal 311. 
32 Bribesh (n 20) 225. 
33  K  Ahmad and D Nicholls, ‘The Impact of non-Financial Company Characteristics on Mandatory 
Disclosure Compliance in Developing Countries: the case of Bangladesh.’ (1994) 29 The International 
Journal of Accounting 62. 
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unlikely to disseminate high-quality information.34 In the case of Libya, although there are 
mandatory disclosure requirements (which require very little information), the level of 
disclosure is low due to weak standards of enforcement. Kribat found that ‘Libyan banks 
failed to comply fully with mandatory disclosure requirements in any of the sample years 
(2000-2006) […] in terms of overall levels (i.e. mandatory plus voluntary) of financial 
disclosure in Libyan banks' annual reports, the figures were low’. 35 Also, he observed that 
noncompliance with mandatory disclosure reflects ‘the absence of a developed regulatory 
framework, the lack of an enforcement mechanism to monitor the implementation of these 
requirements and/or the absence of formal penalties for not fully complying’. 36 Further, 
Ellabbar and Havard showed that Libya has a lower level of disclosure compared to 
Egyptian companies. They suggest that to help Libyan companies to disclose more 
effectively, there is a need to establish domestic standards or comply with international 
accounting standards. 37 Further, Mashat argues that the main reasons for not disseminating 
the social responsibility information in Libyan companies are down to the lack of legal 
requirements and administrative difficulties.38  
Therefore, as the self-enforcing model mainly relies on an adequate disclosure 
system, if it is to work effectively there is a need to find a solution that is consistent with 
the model and accommodates the absence of adequate mandatory disclosure requirements 
and the lack of enforcement in Libya.  
                                                 
34 Haniffa and Cooke (n 22) 317. 
35 Musa M.J Kribat, ‘Financial Disclosure Practices in Developing Countries: Evidence from the Libyan 
Banking Sector’ (PhD, The University of Dundee 2009) xvi. This study also suggests that ‘the annual reports 
of Libyan banks are frequently used for making financial decisions and are in fact considered to be the most 
important source of information for making economic and financial decisions about such firms’. See ibid 334. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Khaled Ellabbar and Tim Havard, ‘The Accounting Disclosure in Developing Countries: A Comparative 
Study of Libyan & Egyptian Construction Companies’ (Association of Researchers in Construction 
Management:; ARCOM twenty-first annual conference, 2005). 
38 Mashat (n 21). 
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5.1.3.  The proposed solution for the disclosure problem in Libya 
The development of an effective disclosure system in Libya goes beyond the reform of 
company law. This is because even reforming the legal disclosure system in Libya will not 
address the weak system of disclosure effectively because the poor enforcement of law 
remains an obstacle to the application of any new laws, as discussed particularly in 
(5.1.2.2) and generally in Ch.3. In this situation, the self-enforcing model will not work 
efficiently as minority shareholders will be unable to access information concerning 
conflict of interest transactions. This is because in an environment with a lack of disclosure 
enforcement, many companies are not willing, and to some extent not obliged, to disclose 
the conflict of interests transactions made by the controlling shareholders.   
Therefore, there is a need, as Alajlan argues,  to develop the capability of the 
minority shareholders to access companies’ information away from the disclosure system 
itself, especially as the regulation of Arab markets (such as Libya) is generally poor and 
their legal rules that address disclosure and insider trading are not thoroughly enforced. 39 
Here I discuss some possible solutions that may contribute to addressing the inability of the 
minority shareholders to access key information. 
Firstly, as Black and Kraakman suggest, large minority shareholders should be 
placed on the board and this must be done by cumulative voting (which should be a 
mandatory rule).  This can provide the minority shareholders with access to the company’s 
information and gives large minority shareholders ‘a substitute for the disclosure that is 
provided in developed economies’.40 Also, they argue that ‘cumulative voting makes it 
                                                 
39 Waleed Alajlan, ‘Ownership Patterns and the Saudi Market’ in Mark Hirschey, Kose John and Anil K. 
Makhija (eds), Corporate Governance: Advances in Financial Economics, vol 9 (Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited 2004)161 – 186. 
40 Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, ‘A SELF-ENFORCING MODEL OF CORPORATE LAW’ (1996) 
109 Harvard Law Review 1911,1947 and  see also p. 1952.  
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more likely that a minority of directors is truly independent of management and [...] that 
these directors will owe affirmative loyalty to the shareholders who elect them’.41  
Secondly, sometimes the cumulative voting mechanism is ineffective because it 
only increases the minority shareholders’ chances for obtaining representation in the board 
of directors, but it does not guarantee the result. For example, in cases where controlling 
shareholders own a high percentage of shares, the likelihood of obtaining representation on 
the board of directors is low. If, for example, the controlling shareholders own 90% of the 
company shares and there are only 3 seats on the board, the minority shareholders will 
have no opportunity to gain a seat even with the cumulative voting mechanism. 
Accordingly, it is better to look for another solution that guarantees the minority 
shareholders’ a seat on the board, thereby enabling them to access the company’s 
information. I propose that the largest minority shareholder who owns most of minority 
shares should be allowed to take a seat on the board, but his shares must not be less than 
5% of the company’s shares. For example, a company has a controlling shareholder (A) 
who owns 85% of the shares and minority shareholders, (B) who owns 6% of the shares, 
(C) owns 5% and other shareholders own small fractions of less than 1%.42 (B) should 
receive a position on the board as he owns the largest portion of minority shares. I propose 
only one minority shareholder should take this position since it is not desirable for the 
board of directors to be made up of large numbers of directors and one is enough to help to 
access the company’s information. In this regard, many studies have identified a negative 
relationship between the number of directors on a firm’s board and the firm’s financial 
performance and that those large boards can be less effective than small boards.43  It is the 
                                                 
41  ibid 1947. 
42 This example is based on the assumption that the one share, one vote principle is a mandatory rule, as 
discussed in (4.3.2.1). 
43 See e.g. Martin Lipton and Jay W Lorsch, ‘A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Covernance’ 
(1992) 48 The Business Lawyer 59; Michael C Jensen, ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the 
Failure of Internal Control Systems’ (1993) 48 The Journal of Finance 831; David Yermack, ‘Higher Market 
Valuation of Companies With a Small Board of Directors’ (1996) 40 Journal of Financial Economics 185; 
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quality rather than the quantity of directors that is important. Additionally, having one 
director representing the minority shareholders will ensure the majority shareholders’ right 
to control the company.   
Finally, though there is no evidence concerning the correlation between 
independent directors and corporate performance, 44  there is no doubt that requiring 
companies to hire independent directors can generally mitigate agency problems between 
majority shareholder and minority shareholders45   and particularly address the weakness of 
the disclosure system.  Here it should be noted that even though there is only a small 
amount of literature regarding the possible interaction between corporate disclosure and 
independent directors, all of them support the positive relationship between disclosure and 
independent directors. 46 For example, Forker argues that independent directors have more 
incentive to disclose more information.47 Chen and Jaggi found that, in the case of Hong 
Kong, the total number of independent directors on corporate boards is positively 
                                                                                                                                                    
Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren and Martin T Wells, ‘Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in 
Small Firms’ (1998) 48 Journal of Financial Economics 35; Benjamin E Hermalin and Michael S Weisbach, 
‘Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A survey of the economic literature’ in 
Diance K. Denis and John J. McConnell (eds), Governance: An International Perspective, vol 1 (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited 2005) 42.  
44 See Benjamin E Hermalin and Michael S Weisbach, ‘The Effects of Board Composition and Direct 
Incentives on Firm Performance’ (1991) 20 Financial management 101; Hamid Mehran, ‘Executive 
Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance’ (1995) 38 Journal of Financial Economics 163; 
April Klein, ‘Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure 1’ (1998) 41 The Journal of Law and 
Economics 275; Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, ‘Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance’ 
University of Colorado, 2000 <http://leeds-faculty.colorado.edu/bhagat/bb-022300.pdf> accessed 18-06-
2014; Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard S Black, ‘The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and Long-
Term Firm Performance’ (2002) 27 Journal of Corporation Law 231, Victor Dulewicz and Peter Herbert, 
‘Does the Composition and Practice of Boards of Directors Bear any Relationship to the Performance of their 
Companies?’ (2004) 12 Corporate Governance: An International Review 263; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
‘Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A survey of the economic literature’ 
‘Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution’  (n 43). 
45 See for example, James A Brickley and Christopher M James, ‘The Takeover Market, Corporate Board 
Composition, and Ownership Structure: The case of banking’ (1987) 30 Journal of Law and Economics 161; 
Michael S Weisbach, ‘Outside Directors and CEO Turnover’ (1988) 20 Journal of financial Economics 431; 
Rita D Kosnik, ‘Effects of Board demography and Directors' Incentives on Corporate Greenmail Decisions’ 
(1990) 33 Academy of Management Journal 129;  Chun I Lee and others, ‘Board Composition and 
Shareholder Wealth: The case of management buyouts’ (1992) 21 Financial Management 58; Niclas L 
Erhardt, James D Werbel and Charles B Shrader, ‘Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial 
Performance’ (2003) 11 Corporate Governance: An International Review 102. 
46  See Lorenzo Patelli and Annalisa Prencipe, ‘The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and 
Independent Directors in the Presence of a Dominant Shareholder’ (2007) 16 European Accounting Review 5, 
6. 
47  John J Forker, ‘Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality’ (1992) 22 Accounting and Business 
Research 111. 
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associated with the comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. 48  Also, Patelli and 
Prencipe found a positive relationship between independent directors and disclosure.49 
Additionally, Kaplan and Reishus argue that independent directors have incentives to 
defend or build their reputation as expert monitors. 50 Finally, Beasley argues that the 
existence of independent directors in the company reduces occurrences of financial 
statement fraud.51  Therefore, the presence of independent directors on the board will help 
to solve the weak disclosure problem in Libya as they enhance the disclosure in the 
company. 
5.2. Possibility of negative minority shareholders’ actions against the conflict 
of interest transaction by the controlling shareholders under the self-enforci
ng model 
This section discusses the possibility of negative actions by the minority shareholders, such 
as abuse of rights by the minority shareholders and passive minority shareholders, against 
the conflict of interest transaction by the controlling shareholders (5.2.1) and then proposes 
effective mechanisms for solving such problems (5.2.2). 
5.2.1. The potential problems: abuse of rights by the minority shareholders  
and passive minority shareholders 
In approving or vetoing a potential conflict of interest transaction, there are two negative 
actions that the minority shareholders might take. First, under the self-enforcing model, the 
minority shareholders are given a great deal of power to approve conflict of interest 
transactions made by the controlling shareholders and, therefore, are in a similar position 
to the controlling shareholders. Consequently, there is a risk that the minority shareholders 
                                                 
48 Charles JP Chen and Bikki Jaggi, ‘Association between Independent non-Executive Directors, Family 
Control and Financial Disclosures in Hong Kong’ (2001) 19 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 285. 
49 Patelli and Prencipe (n 46). 
50  Steven N Kaplan and David Reishus, ‘Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance’ (1990) 27 
Journal of Financial Economics 389. 
51 Mark S Beasley, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and 
Financial Statement Fraud’ (1996) 71 Accounting Review 443. 
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may abuse their rights, which can be done by blackmailing controlling shareholders and 
asking them for favours or contracts to secure their votes in favour of the transactions. 
Thus, placing the decision making capabilities in the hands of the minority might preclude 
efficient transactions in certain situations, which could potentially cause hardship and 
disrupt business transactions.52 
At the other extreme, there might be passive minority shareholders who do not care 
whether the majority shareholders extract a private benefit at their expense or not.  In other 
words, a shareholder who is supposed to use his power to approve the conflict of interest 
transactions made by the controlling shareholders may have poor incentives to maximize 
the company’s wealth. This is because minority shareholders frequently do not work at the 
company, are not involved in management, have a small share in the venture and bear a 
small risk of loss. This is especially applicable to minority shareholders whose fraction of 
shares constitutes less than 5% of the company. Thus, they are the most vulnerable to 
abuse by the majority shareholders as they have very little incentive to consider the effect 
of the action on other shareholders.   
Here we should note that minority shareholder passivity is not inevitable. Instead, 
as suggested by Thamm, activity in corporate governance by the minority shareholders has 
recently increased since it leads to a significant positive increase in shareholder value.53 
Here there is a distinction to be made between two types of minority shareholders: 
portfolio investors, who may have incentives to monitor across their entire holdings, and 
shareholders who do not have such incentives. Generally, minority shareholders, including 
institutional investors, have a limited role in corporate governance. Nevertheless, such a 
                                                 
52 Mohamed Tibar, The Theory of Shareholders' Rights in Joint Stock  Companies, vol 2 (Arab Union 
Madbaha 1998) 826 (in Arabic). Tibar calls the minority shareholders who have sufficient votes to block 
conflict of interest transactions: ‘blocking minority shareholders’. (See  ibid). See also, Zohar Goshen, 
‘Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule’ (1996) 70 Southern California Law Review 
741. 
53 See Christian Thamm, Minority Shareholder Monitoring and German Corporate Governance: Empirical 
Evidence and Value Effects ( PL Academic Research 2013). Thamm concludes that the increase in the activity 
of minority shareholders is the case in Germany. See ibid. 
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role can be active in some circumstances,54 and legal intervention may play a core role in 
inducing institutional investor activism, as concluded by Hamdani and Yafeh.55 In the UK, 
under the Stewardship Code, institutional investors are required to monitor their investee 
companies 56  and, as discussed in Ch.4, in a UK premium listed company where a 
controlling shareholder is present the minority shareholders are required to approve the 
resolution of electing those directors separately from the shareholder vote.57  Also, a proxy 
voting process, when it is in place, may be used by the institutional investors in order to 
monitor the company. 58  Thus, mechanisms are now employed to mitigate investor 
passivity.  
5.2.2. The proposed solutions to mitigate the problems of abuse of rights by  
the minority shareholders and passive minority shareholders 
The self-enforcing model provides the minority shareholders with power to block conflict 
of interest transactions that are sometimes in the best interest of both the company and all 
the shareholders, including the minority shareholders. Accordingly, there is a need to adopt 
certain checks and balances to protect controlling shareholders against the minority 
shareholders’ abusing their power. In other words, LEAA 2010 should adopt particular 
measures to strike a balance between the minority shareholders protection (Agent) against 
the controlling shareholders (Principal) and providing safeguards for the controlling 
                                                 
54 It is worth mentioning that most literature regarding institutional investor activism covers the relationship 
between the management and shareholders as a whole. In other words, the activism of institutional minority 
shareholders has been discussed in terms of a dispersed ownership system, rather than a concentrated system. 
See for example, Edward B Rock, ‘Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism’ 
(1990) 79 Georgetown Law Journal 445; KJ Martijn Cremers and Roberta Romano, ‘Institutional Investors 
and Proxy Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rule’ 
(2011) 13 American Law and Economics Review 220. 
55 Assaf Hamdani and Yishay Yafeh, ‘Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders’ (2012)  Review of 
Finance 1.      
56 Stewardship Code 2012, Principle 3. 
57 See (4.4.1.2). 
58 Cremers and Romano(n 54). For more details about institutional investors activity see e.g. Rock; Roberta 
Romano, ‘Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered’ (1993) 93 Columbia Law 
Review 795.  
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shareholders against the minority shareholders to not use their rights improperly (e.g. for 
their interest only).59   
Indeed LEAA 2010 adopts the doctrine of no abuse of rights, which is applicable to 
both the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders.  Under this doctrine, when 
the minority shareholder uses his right to block a conflict of interest transaction improperly 
(e.g. to blackmail the controlling shareholders to get personal benefits), the controlling 
shareholder has a right to sue the minority shareholders on the basis of the no abuse of 
rights doctrine.60  However, such a mechanism cannot protect the controlling shareholders 
against the minority shareholders (or the minority shareholders against the controlling 
shareholders) effectively because of the general lack of court enforcement in Libya, as 
argued in Ch.3.  
Therefore, there is a need to rely on another solution to deal with the potential 
abuse of power by the minority shareholders that does not require court enforcement and 
serves the self-enforcing model. Enhancing the role of a financial expert or independent 
auditor and employing independent directors to review a conflict of interest transaction can 
be effective mechanisms to mitigate the abuse of rights by minority shareholders. In other 
words, minority shareholders should be asked to rely on independent reports made by 
independent board members, independent experts, or an independent auditor, rather than 
their own opinion, to block the conflict of interest transaction.  
Currently, independent board members, independent experts, and independent 
auditors have no statutory responsibilities to review a controlling shareholder’s conflict of 
interest transaction in Libya. With regard to independent board members, there is no 
                                                 
59 It should be noted that in ordinary situations when the controlling shareholders enter into a conflict of 
interest transaction, the agent is the controlling shareholder and the principal is the minority shareholder. 
However, this situation is reversed when the minority shareholders have the power to block such transactions. 
Here the minority shareholders become an agent and the controlling shareholders become a principal.  
60 For information about the abuse of rights doctrine, see (3.1.2.2). 
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special statutory role for independent directors on Libyan boards, and no requirement 
under the Libyan system to have independent directors. 61  By contrast, the voluntary 
Corporate Governance Code does contain a recommendation that boards of public 
companies ensure that at least one third of their members are independent, and that boards 
in any company should include at least two independent directors.62  However, no statute 
in Libyan law empowers independent directors to deal with conflict of interest transactions. 
With regard to external auditors or external experts, similarly under Libyan law, they have 
no statutory responsibilities to review conflict of interest transactions, although they are 
responsible for reviewing company accounts including their compliance with accounting 
standards on related party transactions.63 
With neither independent auditors nor external auditors (or external experts) 
playing a statutory role in reviewing or making recommendations on conflict of interest 
transactions, there is a strong need, under the proposed self-enforcing model, to put such 
transactions under the review of externals as they can offer neutral opinions or 
recommendations regarding whether the transaction is in the company’s interest. Also, 
hiring independent directors can provide a neutral opinion to such conflicts. Thus these 
mechanisms can reduce the ability of minority shareholders to abuse their right to block a 
conflict of interest transaction, since they are required by law to rely on an external 
reviewer or independent directors to block such transactions.   
However, the previous solution (the neutral perspectives of independent auditors, 
external auditors, and external experts) may not prevent the controlling shareholders from 
                                                 
61 This is similar to the French case. See OECD, Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder 
Rights (OECD Publishing 2012) 64.   
62 LCGC 2007,  art 12 (D). 
63 See LEAA 2010 art 209. One of these standards is known IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures. The aim of 
this Standard is ‘to ensure that an entity’s financial statements contain the disclosures  necessary to draw 
attention to the possibility that its financial position and profit or loss may have been  affected by the 
existence of related parties and by transactions and outstanding balances, including  commitments, with such 
parties’. For more details see IFRS, IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures (IFRS 2012) available at 
<http://www.ifrs.org/Documents/IAS24.pdf>     
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bringing an action against the large minority shareholders when the controlling 
shareholders claim that the minority shareholders have abused their rights, as the right to 
sue is considered a constitutional right that cannot be prohibited or precluded. This may 
occur, for example, when the minority shareholders block the potential conflict of interest 
transaction made by the controlling shareholders, and the latter may not wish to give up 
their interest especially if they can obtain a great deal of personal interest through such a 
transaction. Here it is very likely that the controlling shareholders will attempt to sue the 
large minority shareholders in order to get an approval for this transaction, claiming that 
the transaction is in interest of the company. Here the picture is completely changed. In 
this particular context, the minority shareholders may be characterised as agents who are 
expected to act in the principal’s (i.e., the controlling shareholder’s) best interests. That 
situation is different from when the controlling shareholders abuse the minority 
shareholders. The latter problem is addressed by the self-enforcing model as the model 
relies on direct participation by the minority shareholders to enforce shareholder protection 
in the corporate enterprise, rather than reverting to indirect participants such as judges, 
regulators, legal and accounting professionals, and the financial press, as discussed in 
detail in Ch.4. 
Therefore, there is a fundamental problem that derives from the fact that the 
controlling shareholder may sue the minority shareholders in an environment in which, as 
has already been established, the Libyan courts are an ineffective enforcement body in 
respect of corporate law and governance matters. Accordingly, there is a need to establish 
how the Libyan courts might be capable of effectively dealing with conflict of interest 
transactions brought by the controlling shareholders in such an environment.  However, 
more importantly, and more immediately, there is a need to find ways of discouraging 
litigation between shareholders and, instead, encouraging dispute settlement away from the 
court system.   
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Achieving this is central to the potential success of the self-enforcing model in 
Libya and in order to do so, Libyan law should impose some limitations and obstacles on 
the ability of controlling shareholders to bring actions against the minority shareholders 
(agents) in order to unblock the potential conflict of interest transaction. This will, in turn, 
reduce reliance on courts. As noted by Black and Kraakman, the self-enforcing model 
reduces the reliance on courts but does not eliminate the bringing of an action.64 However, 
for the model to be effective in Libya there should be clear obstacles that prevent or 
discourage the controlling shareholders from bringing an action against the minority 
shareholders in order to encourage shareholders to settle disputes directly with each other. 
To do so, I propose borrowing the procedural steps that apply to bringing a derivative 
action under UK law.  
In the UK, in order to strike a balance between protecting majority shareholders 
from multiple petty claims on one hand and providing protection for minority shareholders 
on the other,65 the court, in terms of a derivative action, must be satisfied in order to give 
its permission to the plaintiff to continue his action.  This necessitates achieving two 
procedural stages: first, the aggrieved shareholders must establish a prima facie case, 
supported by evidence, without which the court can dismiss the claim.66  If the court is 
satisfied at this stage, it may direct the company to file evidence and may adjourn the 
proceedings to enable that evidence to be obtained. 67  In the second stage, after the 
shareholder claimant has established a prima facie case, the court opens the application for 
a hearing involving both parties. Here the court determines whether or not the permission 
should be given to the claim to proceed or it refuses permission and dismisses the claim.68 
Moreover, at this point, the court has the power to adjourn the proceedings and give 
                                                 
64 Black and Kraakman (n 40) 1915. 
65 Brenda Hannigan, Company Law (3 ed, Oxford University Press 2012) 447. 
66 CA 2006, s 261 (2). 
67 CA 2006, s. 261(3). 
68 CA 2006, s 261(4). 
242 
 
directions for a general meeting to take place. This provision is designed for a situation 
where the court may not yet be in a position to evaluate whether to give permission to 
continue a derivative action, or not. 69    
The general concept of this approach should be adopted in Libya in order to 
discourage controlling shareholders from bringing unnecessary actions against the minority 
shareholders   (or even actions in which the controlling shareholders seek to extract private 
benefits from the minority shareholders). Here Libyan company law should lay down two 
procedural stages: first, the aggrieved shareholders must establish a prima facie case that 
relies on acceptable evidence, without which the court can dismiss the claim.  If such 
evidence is accepted by the court, it can give the controlling shareholders (in cases of 
minority shareholders abuse) or the minority shareholders (in cases of the controlling 
shareholders abuse) permission to proceed with the claim. However, if the court does not 
accept the evidence, it must dismiss the claim. The second stage comes when the 
shareholder claimant has established a prima facie case; here the court must open the 
application for a hearing involving both parties. 
Further, to overcome the general ineffectiveness of courts in Libya, the model 
provides, whenever possible, a bright-line rule rather than standards, to define proper and 
improper behaviour. Such rules can be easily understood by those who must comply with 
them and so have a better chance of being enforced as discussed in (4.2.1). 70 
Regarding passive minority shareholders who prefer not to take action against any 
conflict of interest transactions undertaken by the controlling shareholders, the model 
provides powers only to large minority shareholders who own 5% of the company’s shares 
to veto or approve the transaction. This percentage should be adequate to incentivise any 
                                                 
69 Alan Steinfeld QC, Martin Mann QC and Richard Ritchie, Blackstones Guide to the Companies Act 2006 
(Oxford University Press 2007)14.24; Victor Joffe and others, Minority Shareholders: Law, Practice, and 
Procedure (4 edn, Oxford 2011) 49. 
70 See (4.2.1)  
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large shareholders and make them engage actively in the dealings of the company. Also, as 
large minority shareholders will be active in dealing with conflict of interest transactions 
due to the veto power provided under the model, minority shareholder activism will be 
ensured through law. 
5.3. The costs resulting from the reliance on a voting system adopted under  
the self-enforcing model 
There is no doubt that there will be certain costs that result from adopting the self-
enforcing model since it mainly relies on a voting system (5.3.1). In order to ensure the 
adoption of the model is attractive, these costs must be as low as possible (5.3.2).  
5.3.1. Costs resulting from the adoption of the self-enforcing model 71 
It may be argued that any resolution for solving any legal issue can result in increased 
costs. The self-enforcing model is no exception. Relying on a voting system and delegating 
the power to approve or veto the conflict of interest transaction to the minority 
shareholders may result in costs that are higher than those found in the judicial approach 
(Liability actions).  Firstly, there will be administrative costs, such as those associated with 
calling the meeting of the minority shareholders to vote on the conflict of interest 
transaction (e.g. dispatching notices of an impending ballot and providing all the voting 
shareholders with background information on the transaction).72 Secondly, after providing 
the minority shareholders with the necessary material and information regarding the 
transaction, there will be a need for the minority shareholders to study such information. 
Such a process can be expensive since the minority shareholders may need to rely on 
expert’s opinion before they make a decision to approve or veto the conflict of interest 
                                                 
71 These costs do not inevitability result from a conflict of interest transaction. Instead there are many cases 
where the minority will consider the proposed transaction to be fair and acceptable while in other cases 
negotiation will yield a settlement. 
72 Zohar Goshen, ‘The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality’ (2003) 91 
California Law Review 393, 416. 
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transaction. 73   It should be noted that such costs increase when the frequency of the 
conflict of interest transaction are high, which can result in calling shareholders’ meetings 
too often. 74 
5.3.2. Reducing the costs resulting from minority shareholders’ power to      
vote 
First of all, it should be noted that high administrative cost associated with calling general 
meetings is not an issue in Libya for two reasons: firstly, most joint stock companies in 
Libya are composed of a small amount of shareholders. Secondly, with regard to large 
companies, of which the state owns the majority, the cost of calling the minority 
shareholders’ meeting in order to approve or veto a conflict of interest transaction will not 
be high since LEAA 2010 identifies newspapers and emails as appropriate tools for calling 
the shareholders’ meetings. 75  LEAA 2010 adopts this mechanism to inform the 
shareholders since there is no effective postal system in Libya.   
Regarding the costs that result from the need of the minority shareholders to study 
information, as noted in the previous section, they should rely on an independent reports 
made by externals before taking action against the conflict of interest transaction. While 
this mechanism can serve to reduce the ability of the minority shareholders to abuse their 
rights, it may also prove too expensive. The situation may lead large minority shareholders 
to not use their right to take action against the conflict of interest transactions undertaken 
by the controlling shareholders. Consequently, to deal with such an issue, the company 
itself should bear such expenses which, in aggregate, will not prove excessive since 
gaining an expert’s opinion in Libya is not costly.    
                                                 
73 ibid. 
74 ibid. 
75 LEAA 2010, art 154 (1).  
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It should be noted that the costs that result from the need to assess information 
provided by companies is also an issue under the judicial approach, since judges may not 
have the requisite knowledge to assess the conflict of interest transaction. Since they lack 
experience when it comes to commercial and business decisions, 76 Libyan courts must call 
on professional experts to guide them. In Libya the Department of Judicial Experts forms 
part of the Justice Ministry. In this department there are a number of registered experts 
who are suitably qualified and experienced in business matters from whom the court may 
seek professional opinions regarding disputed matters. For instance, the court may hire an 
accountant to review the ability of a corporation to distribute dividends. Such expenses will 
be transferred to the loser of the case once it is resolved. 
5.4. Is the model of self-enforcement workable under weak formal                
enforcement?  
As discussed in Ch.4, Black and Kraakman’s model provides strong procedural protections 
against conflict of interest transactions as well as numerous structural and procedural 
constraints to facilitate self-enforcement. As such, the self-enforcing model allocates as 
much enforcement power as possible to direct participants, such as minority shareholders, 
rather than to indirect participants, such as judges, regulators, lawyers and the press. 
Therefore, the model provides controlling shareholders with incentives to obey the rules as 
its provisions include features that demand enforcement through the actions of direct 
participants. 
Here, at the end of this study, it may be wondered whether the self-enforcing rules can 
function in an environment of weak court enforcement. In other words, will the controlling 
shareholders comply with the rules of minority shareholders’ approval and seek approval 
                                                 
76 See e.g. I J Dawson and I S Stephenson, The Protection of Minority shareholders (Tolley Publishing 
Company Limited 1993) 28; Brian R Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (15 edn, 
Oxford University Press 1997) 543. Paul Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012) 643. 
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from the minority shareholders before they enter into any conflict of interest transactions, 
or will they ignore the rules of the model as there is no real enforcement in the state?  
To answer this question, we should make a clear distinction between two situations: a 
situation in which there is a complete lack of formal enforcement, and one where weak or 
ineffective court enforcement is in place. In the former situation, any legal rules including 
self-enforcing rules will not function at all since there is no enforcer, such as the courts, to 
enforce these legal rules.  More than that, the legal rules in such a climate may not be 
called laws as one of the essential elements of law is enforcement. However, this is not the 
case in Libya since enforcement mechanisms exist, though they may be described as weak, 
ineffective or inadequate. Crucially, the self-enforcing model was designed for such an 
environment and so can still function effectively.  
To demonstrate this: under the liability action approach currently adopted in Libya 
where   a weak environment of formal enforcement is in place, the court must decide 
whether the conflict of interest transaction complies with the fairness test in the abuse of 
rights doctrine. Both the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders know that 
enforcement mechanisms function poorly in Libya as enforcing institutions are corrupt and 
the machinery of justice is too slow and affected by political and social factors. Moreover, 
there is a lack of adequate experience and expertise in dealing with cases of minority 
shareholder protection, as well as a lack of appropriate laws that provide protection for the 
minority shareholders, as discussed in detail in Ch.3. The combination of these factors 
discourages the minority shareholders from bringing an action against the controlling 
shareholders and simultaneously encourages the controlling shareholders to abuse the 
minority shareholders by entering into a conflict of interest transaction, as it is high likely 
that the minority shareholders will not bring an action against them.   
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However, the picture under the self-enforcing model is completely changed in favour 
the minority shareholders. Under such a model, the controlling shareholders take into 
account the minority shareholder’s power to veto any conflict of interest transaction. The 
controlling shareholders know in advance that if they approve the conflict of interest 
transactions (e.g. a self-dealing transaction) without large minority shareholders consent 
and then seek to implement it, the minority shareholders are easily able to block it. Also 
the controlling shareholders know that if they enter into such a transaction without the 
minority shareholders’ approval, the latter will seek a remedy against them from the courts. 
The court will be quick to revoke the transaction as there is a formal defect in a transaction 
that is approved only by the controlling shareholders without the minority shareholders’ 
consent. This situation creates a motivation for the controlling shareholders to obey the 
self-enforcing rules. However, it should be noted that when there is a stronger judiciary 
and more centralized enforcement institutions in place, controlling shareholders will have 
more incentives to obey the model’s rules.77 Accordingly, as the mechanisms of formal 
enforcement develop in Libya, so the effectiveness of the model will also increase.  
5.5. Political Challenges  
In the final section of this study, I discuss the potential political challenges that the model 
may face. To that end, firstly, I explore the nature of the political challenges that the 
proposed model may face (5.5.1) and then analyse the appropriate responses to such issues 
(5.5.2). 
5.5.1. The Political issues facing the self-enforcing model  
A major challenge that the self-enforcing proposal may face is the crucial issue of the 
political feasibility of the necessary programme of law reforms for implementing the 
                                                 
77 Vlad Frants, ‘Russian Corporate Law: Is Self-Enforcement Still the Way to Go?’ (2008) 13 UCLA Journal 
of International Law and Foreign Affairs 435, 462. This article examines the political and economic 
conditions in Russia in order to determine which corporate governance model is appropriate for Russia. This 
study argues that under President Putin the self-enforcing model is successful and remains Russia's best 
solution for developing both strong securities markets and a favorable corporate culture. 
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desired institutional measures. It is difficult to anticipate the Libyan state’s desire to adopt 
such measures and reforms voluntarily. This is because, as discussed in Ch.2, the Libyan 
state remains the predominant beneficial shareholder of the country’s most significant 
corporate enterprises and it stands to benefit from the institutional status quo. The Libyan 
law provides controlling shareholders with unrestricted control over the company.  This is 
due to the fact that the Libyan legal system generally, and the corporate legal system 
particularly, tends to protect the control of the state over the economy at the expense of 
other shareholders, as discussed in Ch.2. The existence of the state as a controlling 
shareholder in most large companies in Libya made the adoption of a "shareholder 
primacy" model of corporate governance relatively attractive. This is because it grants the 
state directly ownership and control of its companies. The application of the shareholder 
primacy model allows the state to pursue a socialist market objective by exercising 
controlling interests in most companies.78  Accordingly, the state intentionally provides 
itself with strong power and it may not need to waive such power under any circumstances. 
 The other political challenge that faces the adoption of the self-enforcing model in 
Libya is the widespread nature of political corruption. Eempirical studies undertaken by 
Caron et al., found that in countries with high levels of corruption, firms lack efficient 
corporate governance practices, including weak protection for minority shareholders. 79   
Since Libya is characterised by high levels of corruption (according to the last annual 
report on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2014 issued by Transparency 
International, Libya ranked 166th among 174 countries in the word), 80 Libya’s politicians 
and bureaucrats, as representatives of the state, may not work to adopt such a reform in 
either the legislative body or the executive body. Both officials of the government and 
                                                 
78 See (2.3.1.2)…. 
79 Michelle I. Caron, Aysun Ficici and Christopher L. Richte, ‘ The Influence of Corruption on Corporate 
Governance Standards: Shared Characteristics of Rapidly Developing Economies’ (2012) 2 Emerging market 
Journal 21. 
80 See Ch.3 (n 126).  
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members of the legislature may not be interested in adopting such a model as it will work 
against their interests if they, for example, gain direct benefit from the status quo (e.g. they 
can get some private benefits from these companies). For instance, the officials working 
for the Ministry of Economy will not propose any bill or undertake any studies in order to 
adopt such a model and, similarly, the members of Legislature are unlikely to pass such a 
model because they do not want to undermine the benefit they gain from the status quo. 
For example, the officials of the ministry of the economy or members of the legislature can 
employ their relatives in SOEs, use SOEs’ assets in line of their personal interests, and get 
loans from such companies. In this context, it is found that when most controlling owners 
are politicians (or even state representatives) the interests of minority shareholders are less 
likely to be protected. 81 This is because political corruption may affect how laws are 
written. 82  Consequently, the ability to provide strong protection for the minority 
shareholders is ultimately a matter of political priorities. In other words, politicians, as 
representatives of the state, may perform their work in their own interest, rather than in the 
interest of the state or as loyal agents of the citizens. According to Oman, ‘vested-interest 
groups that benefit from corporate control rents – at the expense of minority shareholders 
and other corporate stakeholders, both local and foreign, (…) are a major source of 
resistance to needed change’. 83 
5.5.2. The response to the political challenges   
In response to the previous issues, there is a need to understand the current situation of the 
Libyan Legislature in Libya before engaging in any discussion aimed at solving these 
problems. As discussed in Ch.3, on 17th of February, 2011, Libya witnessed a revolution 
                                                 
81 Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens, ‘Corporate Governance and Enforcement’ World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3409, September 2004 <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-3409> 
accessed 29-10-2013 (n 8) 18.  
82 ibid 30. 
83 Charles Oman, Steven Fries and Willem Buiter, ‘Corporate Governance in Developing, Transition and 
Emerging-Market Economies’ OECD Development Centre Policy Brief No 23, 2004 <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/corporate-governance-in-developing-transition-and-emerging-market-
economies_604227826337> accessed 21-11-2013, 19. 
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against Gadhafi’s regime which, as any revolution in the world, had numerous, unforeseen 
consequences. Some of which is the resultant lack of security and profound disagreements 
and disputes between the political actors. Therefore, numerous post-revolutionary armed 
groups, so-called “militias” (milishiat) have kept their arms and their power following the 
end of the revolution and the establishment of democracy.84 Further, the disagreements 
between the Libyan politicians have grown and recently resulted in dividing the official 
bodies of the state into two governments and two legislatures. 85  The internationally 
recognised government of the Council of Deputies, formerly known as the Libyan 
Government, was elected in 2014 and is based in Tobruk in the east of Libya. The other 
government is Islamist and is led by the Muslim Brotherhood in Tripoli.86  There is no 
need to discuss the current political situation in Libya in depth as this does not serve our 
argument here, but the most important thing we need to understand is the fact that there is 
no any chance nowadays for the both Legislatures to look at any proposal relating to 
economic efficiency in Libya. This is because the both bodies are focused on the political 
and safety issues that the state encounters today. Both parties are engaged in negotiations 
to solve the disputes between the two legislatures are taking place in Morocco under the 
                                                 
84 For more information about the security issue in Libya, see (3.3.2.2) 138. 
85 There is a legal issue behind these disputes and the division of the legislative body besides the political 
issue. Specifically, ‘Libya’s highest court has ruled that general elections held in June (of 2014) were 
unconstitutional and that the parliament and government which resulted from that vote should be dissolved’. 
See Theguardian, ‘Libya supreme Court Rules anti-Islamist Parliament Unlawful’ Theguardian 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/libya-court-tripoli-rules-anti-islamist-parliament-
unlawful> . See Constitutional Court 61/17, Libyan Supreme Court (11-03-2014). 
86 For more information and a complete discussion concerning the current political situation in Libya, see  
The Guardian, ‘War in Libya - the Guardian briefing’ The Guardian (The Guardian, 29-08-2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/-sp-briefing-war-in-libya> ;Frederic Wehrey and Wolfram 
Lacher, ‘Libya’s Legitimacy Crisis’ Garnegie (Garnegie, 06-10-2014) 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/06/libya-s-legitimacy-crisis/hr9j> ; Ali Shuaib, ‘Threat of Division 
Hovers Over Libya’ Almonitor (06-06-2014) <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/06/libya-
crisis-threat-division-thani-maiteeq.html> ; The Economist, ‘Libya’s Civil War: That it should come to this’ 
The Economist (10-06-2015 ) <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21638123-four-year-descent-arab-
spring-factional-chaos-it-should-come> . 
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supervision of the UN and a solution has almost been reached. 87 To the best of my 
knowledge, following the revolution, no new economic laws have been enacted.   
 Assuming that the current political issues in Libya will be resolved and there will 
be only one legislature in Libya,88 the core question here is how to respond to the previous 
problems, discussed in (5.5.1). Is there an opportunity for the Libyan Legislature to pass a 
new law that adopts the rules of the self-enforcing model even though such a proposal will 
work against the state as controlling shareholder?  
As discussed in details in (1.2.2), following nearly three decades of economic 
central planning control, the move towards a market economy in Libya began in the early 
2000s with the adoption of an economic reform programme and the launch of privatisation. 
In the 2000s, there was a marked trend towards a free market policy that represented a 
move towards a new corporate system in Libya and a desire to rectify the accumulated 
economic problems and difficulties that occurred as a result of the socialist era. During this 
time the state adopted various economic reform measures (e.g. restructuring of banking 
rules, a privatisation programme, and establishing a stock market) which have had a 
profound effect on corporate governance in Libya, as discussed in Ch.2. Therefore, 
adopting the self-enforcing model is consistent with the current ideological predisposition 
of the Libyan government in favor of market liberalisation and the advancement of Libya’s 
status within the globalised free market economy, which is arguably sufficiently powerful 
to outweigh any countervailing prudential interest in maintaining the institutional status 
quo. 
                                                 
87 Azza K. Maghur, ‘The UNSMIL Draft Agreement and International Engagement with Libya’ Atlantic 
Council (Atlantic Council, 14-04-2015) <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-unsmil-draft-
agreement-and-international-engagement-with-libya> . 
88 According to the he United Nations Support Mission (UNSMIL), the solution in Libya is close to being 
resolved. See UN News Centre, ‘Libyan Parties Open New Round of UN-Backed Political Talks Aimed at 
Restoring ‘Stability and Prosperity’’ UN News Centre (UN News Centre, 15 April 2015) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50597#.VTazlCFVhHw> .     
252 
 
Libya only moved from a planned economy to a free market economy in 2000 and 
from socialism to capitalism in 2011, following the recent revolution.  Before the 
revolution, the state still adopted many socialist economic legal policies even though there 
were reforms towards a free market economy. For example, certain laws and regulations 
still existed in Libya which were in line with socialist ideology and a planned economy, 
such as the pricing system of a very large number of goods. Further, there were many 
socialist laws, such as Law No 38 in 1977 concerning real-estate ownership, which set 
down that ownership merely for the purpose of possession is prohibited. In addition, Law 
No. 4 of 1978 concerning real estate property stated that every adult citizen has the right to 
own a house as long as he resides therein. According to this Law, a citizen is not allowed 
to possess more than one house. It also gave any Libyan citizen who lived in a rented 
house the right to own it. Also, Law No. 7 of 1986 concerning the abolition of land 
ownership deemed the land in Libya is not owned by anyone, and may not be the object of 
the actions of ownership transfer. In addition, the second article of this Law stipulates that 
every citizen has the right to possess land only in the case of use, be it in agriculture, 
grazing, or others, provided that he is exploiting only his own and his family’s efforts.  89 
Thus the policies that were introduced following the movement toward a free market 
economy and before the revolution were not comprehensive and they did little to affect 
either the privatisation programmes or the protection of minority shareholders. The general 
economic policy under Qadhafi’s regime was not seriously aimed at liberalising the 
economy. The economic reforms, as discussed in Ch.1, were only introduced as a response 
to the economic crisis faced by Libya at that time.90 Therefore, it is very unlikely that the 
previous regime would have looked favourably on the kind of economic reform proposed 
in this thesis.  
                                                 
89 see  Habib Gaboda, ‘Real Estate Property’ (2012) 3 Tripoli University Law  Journal  143 (in Arabic). 
90 See  (1.2.1) 23. 
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 However, following the revolution, the picture has entirely changed. Under the new 
Libyan draft constitution,91 there is a clear trend toward a free market economy and the 
liberalisation of the Libyan economy. For example, under art 19/1, the state intends to 
establish a diversified economy based on a private sector and adopt high standards of 
transparency, competition, quality and protection for consumers. Also, art 19/2 noted that 
‘the state shall stimulate and develop the private sectors in order to ensure competition and 
innovation’. This is further emphasised in art 21/1 which suggests that the state will 
encourage private investment to meet the needs of the society.  Accordingly, now there is a 
trend towards privatisation and free market economy, there are no longer the same issues 
facing the adoption of the self-enforcing model because as the state wishes to actively 
transfer corporate ownership into the private sector. Hence, enhancing the role of the 
minority shareholders will be highly desirable as it will attract more investment in Libyan 
companies.  
 Further, in this new era, where the capitalism is the official doctrine of the state, the 
state’s desire to operate SOEs must change. Consequently, the SOE’s goals will realign to 
reflect commercial rather than social values. In other words, the state will pursue 
commercial goals not political goals and focus on profit maximization and efficiency. 92   
This must result in adopting mechanism that enhance economic efficiency, one of the most 
important of which will be providing minority shareholders with the kind of protection 
elaborated in the model.   
                                                 
91 See The Constitution Drafting Assembly, ‘Constitution Draft ’ (The Constitution Drafting Assembly 2015)  
< http://www.cdalibya.org/> accessed 22-04-2015. 
92 See .e.g. Maria Vagliasindi, ‘Governance Arrangements for State Owned Enterprises’ World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No 4542, 2008 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102837> 
accessed 13-01-2014;   Mary Shirley and Patrick Walsh, ‘Public vs. Private Ownership: The Current State of 
the Debate’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 2420 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=261854> 
accessed 28-10-2013 (n 154) 20. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, ‘Law, Endowments, 
and Finance’ (2003) 70 Journal of Financial Economics 137. 
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 Although the state’s general policy has changed completely and there is opportunity 
to overcome the assumption that the state as a controlling shareholder may not accept a 
self-enforcing model voluntarily, the challenge of political corruption is very difficult to 
address in Libya. Despite the fact that there is a lack of studies that examine political 
corruption in Libya, as noted, it is commonly held in Libya that political corruption is 
widespread and institutionalised, often being seen as part of the local system of the state.  
Overcoming political corruption requires a sustained effort and measures by the 
government and the legislature including increasing the wages of government’s officials, 
hiring more credible staff and increasing the budget of the state, etc. It may take years to 
overcome Libya’s ‘heavy heritage’ of corruption. Therefore, there is still a risk that the 
model will not be passed by the Libyan legislature and not be proposed by Libya’s 
politicians and bureaucrats.  
 In conclusion, due to a lack of studies and data relating to the political issues, it is 
difficult to be sure that the Libyan state may reject adopting the measures and reforms 
proposed by the self-enforcing model or prove that there is a real risk that threatens the 
adoption of such a model by the corrupted politicians and bureaucrats.  Such challenges are 
still based on probability and feasibility. It may be that the real picture is the opposite. For 
example, instead of the controlling shareholders having a seat in the Libyan Legislature, 
the minority shareholders may do and thus the possibility of adopting such a model 
increases.   
Conclusion  
Adopting the self-enforcing model in Libya leads to some potential risks that can be 
reduced by adopting particular measures. These risks have been discussed in this chapter 
and solutions offered for their satisfactory resolution. Firstly, the problem of the lack of an 
effective disclosure system in Libya can impact negatively on the application of the self-
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enforcing model since minority shareholders within such an environment are likely to be 
unable to recognize any conflict of interest transaction undertaken by the controlling 
shareholders.  Accordingly, there should be a solution that goes beyond the reform of 
company law and ensures that the minority shareholders are represented on the board of 
directors to ensure the majority shareholders can access the company’s information.   
Further, there will always be a passive minority shareholder who does not mind 
whether the majority shareholders extract a private benefit at his expense or not. 
Additionally, there is a risk that the minority shareholders may abuse their rights and so 
placing a decision-making capability in the hands of the minority might preclude efficient 
transactions in certain situations.  To address such problems, there are some effective 
measures that should be adopted such as enhancing the role of a financial expert or 
independent auditor and employing neutral, independent directors to review a conflict of 
interest transaction. In addition, procedural stages should be imposed when a case goes to 
court, such as requiring that the aggrieved shareholders must establish a prima facie case 
that relies on acceptable evidence, that dictate whether he case is allowed to proceed. With 
regard to the problem of the passive minority shareholders, the model proposes that the 
minority shareholders must hold 5% of shares in order to benefit of the model and be able 
to vote against or in favour of the conflict of interest transaction. This ownership threshold 
should ensure that the minority shareholders are incentivised to engage in such transactions.  
Moreover, there will be extra administrative costs, such as costs that are associated 
with calling the meeting of the minority shareholders to vote on the conflict of interest 
transaction (such as dispatching notices of an impending ballot and providing all the voting 
shareholders with background information on the transaction), or those costs that relate to 
evaluating the conflict of interest transaction before the minority shareholders take a 
decision about it, such as hiring financial experts.  While the administrative costs are not a 
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serious issue in Libya since LEAA 2010 determines that newspapers and emails are 
appropriate tools to call the shareholders’ meeting generally, the assessment of expenses is 
an issue that can be addressed by absorbing them into the company itself. 
Additionally, the self-enforcing model can function in an environment of weak 
enforcement because the actions of the controlling shareholders are guided by the fact that 
the minority shareholders have the power to veto any conflict of interest transaction. 
Further, the controlling shareholders know in advance that any conflict of interest 
transactions made without the consent of the minority shareholders can be easily blocked. 
Added to this is the greater powers afforded to the minority shareholders by the courts who 
will immediately revoke any transaction that is approved only by the controlling 
shareholders. 
Finally, it is difficult to anticipate the Libyan state’s desire to adopt the self-enforcing 
model voluntarily. This is because, as discussed in Ch.2, the Libyan state remains the 
predominant beneficial shareholder of the country’s most significant corporate enterprises 
and it stands to benefit from the institutional status quo. Also, the possibility of adopting 
the self-enforcing model may be reduced because of the widespread nature of political 
corruption.  In response to the first issue, adopting the self-enforcing model is consistent 
with the current ideological predisposition of the Libyan government in favour of market 
liberalisation and the advancement of Libya’s status within the globalised free market 
economy. However, the second issue remains complex in the case of Libya as it is very 
difficult to overcome.  
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Conclusion 
The central goal of this research was to propose an adequate protection system for the 
minority shareholder that would contribute practically to an efficient and healthy commercial 
environment in Libya. Accordingly, throughout the study I developed a framework to 
improve corporate governance mechanisms which, I believe, satisfactorily takes into account 
the specific environment and weak system of enforcement in Libya. Corporate governance 
mechanisms in any developing and transition country ‘have to function and reform has to be 
implemented in an environment where courts and other enforcing institutions are missing or 
very weak’.1 Consequently, this study examined the current solution adopted by Libyan law 
(Liability actions) to deal with the conflict of interests between the majority and the minority 
shareholders. Using a social and economic analysis and a black letter approach, this study 
used a novel analytical framework to formulate an appropriate solution for addressing the 
conflict of interests between shareholders in Libya. 
Any reform to the legal system of minority shareholders protection in Libya that fails to 
take into account the enforcement issue will, I argue, be incapable of increasing the 
effectiveness of Libyan corporate governance. This is because writing good laws does not 
automatically solve the problem. Despite the fact that good laws can be transplanted easily 
and adopted by the legislator, it is more difficult (if not impossible) to transplant the 
institutions that enforce law such as courts or regulators. It may take many years to create the 
institutions of a functioning court system and to train judges and lawyers.  Thus ‘enforcement 
lies at the heart of the very distinction between rules-based and relationship-based systems of 
                                                 
1  Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens, ‘Corporate Governance and Enforcement’ World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3409, September 2004 <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-3409> 
accessed 29-10-2013, 4. 
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governance. It also lies at the heart of the concept of corporate governance’.2 Accordingly, 
the study highlighted the enforcement issue as a decisive factor that contributes to the 
weakness of the current approach adopted under s 159 of LEAA 2010 to protect the minority 
shareholders in Libya. 
To develop a workable reform, the study followed a logical sequence through providing a 
general overview of corporate governance in Libya (Ch.1). After which it examined the 
central issue of the study (Ch.2) and the solution adopted in Libya to protect the minority 
shareholders (Ch.3). Having concluded that such a solution has failed, the study suggested a 
proposal to deal with the conflicts between shareholders (Ch.4). Finally, the study ended by 
discussing the potential challenges and risks of the proposed solution (Ch.5).  
                     
1. A summary of the study 
It was necessary to provide in Ch.1 an overview of the general framework of corporate 
governance in Libya. The purpose of this chapter, as an introductory chapter, was to lay the 
foundation for the remainder of the thesis and examine the current position of corporate 
governance in Libya.  
                                                 
2Charles Oman, Steven Fries and Willem Buiter, ‘Corporate Governance in Developing, Transition and 
Emerging-Market Economies’ OECD Development Centre Policy Brief No 23, 2004 <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/corporate-governance-in-developing-transition-and-emerging-market-
economies_604227826337> accessed 21-11-2013. 
Challenges of the proposal  
New Proposal 
 Examining the current solution of the Problem 
The problem of the study 
General Overview  
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Having provided a brief overview of the Libyan legal system as a civil law country, 
Libyan corporate law, and the Libyan corporate governance system (1.1), the study analysed 
the development of Libyan economy (1.2). Here I showed that following the change from 
capitalism to socialism in 1969 and the adoption of a planned economy until the late 1990s, 
the government owned both the production and services sectors. However, in the early 2000s 
there was a marked trend towards a free market policy that represented a new corporate 
system in Libya. This system sought to rectify the accumulated economic problems and 
difficulties that occurred as a result of the socialist era. During this period, the state adopted 
various economic reform measures which have had a profound effect on corporate 
governance in Libya. 
Although many positive measures and procedures were implemented, which 
established new institutions of corporate governance in Libya, many difficulties and 
challenges still face the new Libyan government in developing an economic and financial 
environment in which a free market economy can operate. This situation, without doubt, 
affects the corporate governance system generally, as discussed in (1.3), and particularly the 
minority- majority shareholders relationship, as discussed in Ch.2.   
In (1.3), the study argued that the Libyan economy is currently moving from a 
bureaucratic stage to a relationship stage which means that it is still in an early stage of 
transition. This is because, firstly, there is an absence of an adequate and effective formal 
institutional framework with an appropriate set of laws, which is capable of enhancing the 
institutional framework of a market economy, and so weakening the state’s bureaucratic 
framework.  This has led to informal rather than formal institutions playing a key role in 
shaping company behaviour in Libya. Secondly, the weakness of financial institutions affects 
to a large extent the mechanisms of corporate governance in Libya which result in strong 
insider control and the absence of significant outside investors. Also, since the stock market 
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is still illiquid and small, it can only play a limited role in corporate control through takeovers 
or proxy fights.  Finally, non-completion of privatisation programme affects the corporate 
structure of ownership in Libya. This, in turn, raises two problems, a majority-minority 
problem and the problem between minority shareholders and state-owned companies being 
controlling shareholders, both of which were covered in depth in the following chapter.   
In Chapter 2, the study located the dimensions of the conflict of interest problem 
between the minority and majority shareholders in Libya. In order to locate the main issue to 
be addressed, section (2.1) discussed structures of corporate ownership as described in the 
literature and as manifested in Libya.  Here the study recognized two broad categories of 
corporate ownership: the first category is dispersed corporate ownership, and the second 
category is concentrated ownership. Whilst the former category is the dominant system in the 
U.S and the UK, the other is predominant in the rest of the world (a significant explanation 
provided in this study for the difference between concentrated and dispersed ownership 
systems). However, the focus was on the concentrated ownership system (since it is the 
dominant system in Libya), under which large shareholders who own blocks of shares that 
are large enough to give them control over the company. Today it is the Libyan government 
that retains a large ownership position in many sectors of the economy and remains a 
significant owner of both public and large private commercial enterprises. This situation, I 
argue, is the result of the socialist policies adopted during the period from 1970 to the 1990s. 
I concluded that despite the developments in the privatisation programme, the ownership 
model has not changed and the developments towards a free market economy remain 
insufficient as the privatisation programme is neither comprehensive nor efficient, and this is 
evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of Libyan firms are still owned by the state. 
In the following section (2.2), the study outlined the relationship between the patterns 
of ownership and the nature of the principal-agent problem, which constitutes the 
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fundamental rationale for this study. In this section, I highlighted the fact that in dispersed 
corporate ownership, the conflict of interests occurs between the shareholders as whole and 
the management (this falls outside the scope of the study). However, in a system of 
concentrated ownership, the conflict exists between the majority shareholders and the 
minority shareholders. This means that ownership concentration transforms the principal-
agent problem into a problem of conflicts of interest between the minority and majority 
shareholders.  This is because minorities are vulnerable to exploitation by the majority. The 
shareholders with a high ownership share are capable of using their position to acquire 
private benefits by using their voting rights to consume corporate resources to their advantage, 
an option that is not available to other shareholders. 
Having discussed the principal-agent problem and identified that the recent corporate 
governance literature indicates that the current central agency problem in corporate 
governance around the world (except in the UK and the U.S) is how to restrict the 
exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, in (2.3) the study firstly 
explored the issue of the conflict between the majority and minority shareholders both in 
theory and as it occurs in Libya. Here the study illustrated that the conflict of interests 
between the majority and the minority of shareholders can include the diversion of corporate 
assets and this can be divided into two categories: firstly, the majority-minority shareholder 
conflict in related-party transactions and, secondly, the majority-minority shareholder conflict 
in restructuring ownership transactions that discriminate against the minority. Additionally, 
the conflict of interests between the majority and the minority shareholders may not 
necessarily include the diversion of corporate assets or take either of the two forms of 
tunneling described above. Instead the conflict between the majority and the minority may 
occur in another form, such as when the controlling shareholders use their votes to amend the 
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terms of the constitution of the company in their interest at the expense of the minority 
shareholders.  
In the same section, the study indicated that the statutory provisions in Libyan 
Company Law that deal specifically with the protection of minority shareholders are very few 
and those that do exist are incomplete, ambiguous and unbalanced. This is due to the fact that 
the Libyan legal system generally, and the corporate legal system particularly, tends to 
protect the control of the state over the economy at the expense of other shareholders. The 
existence of the state as a controlling shareholder in most large companies in Libya made the 
adoption of a "shareholder primacy" model of corporate governance relatively attractive, 
since it provided a way for the state to directly own and control its companies. The 
application of such a model would allow the relevant state to pursue a socialist market 
objective by exercising a controlling interest in most companies. Further, it was believed that 
the conflict problem that derives from corporate restructurings, especially mergers and 
takeovers, are significantly less frequent in Libya.   
Furthermore, this section argued that the structure of state-owned concentrated 
ownership in Libya and the political influence exerted on corporate governance, contributes 
directly to the poor quality of corporate governance in Libyan companies.  Specifically, the 
problems are attributable to the conflict between the state as a controlling shareholder and the 
other dispersed shareholders, which results in agency issues. For example, in the structure of 
state concentrated share ownership, the state, as the biggest shareholder in both listed and 
large private companies, pursues its political goals (usually social welfare maximisation) at 
the expense of other shareholders, rather than pursuing profit maximization or efficiency. 
Moreover, the principal-agent issue may come from the assumption that politicians and 
bureaucrats (as a representative of the state) may not perform their work either in the interests 
of the company itself or as loyal agents of the citizens. Instead they may run the company for 
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their personal interest as opposed to the owner’s (the state’s) interest. Even if this is not the 
case, it may be that the politicians and bureaucrats will not run the company effectively, since 
they have no direct interest in the SOE.  
Finally, state ownership is characterized by weak monitoring because the 
shareholding politicians and bureaucrats have no personal equity at stake in SOEs compared 
with the majority of shareholders in private companies.  However, with the inefficiency of 
monitoring by the state as controlling shareholders, it could be argued that Libyan banks, as 
the main financier of debt in Libya, should have a role in monitoring firms. In fact, this is not 
true in the case of Libya because the external finances provided by the banks represent only a 
small part of corporate financing and, as such, banks may not feel motivated to monitor 
clients effectively. This situation has led the government to adopt another way to monitor the 
management of SOEs through a public organisation known as the Reorganization of the 
Audit Bureau.   
Having determined the dimensions of the minority-majority shareholders problem, 
Ch.3 evaluated the solution to this problem currently used under Section 159 of LEAA 2010: 
the Liability Action. The study found that the protection of minority shareholders adopted 
under s.159 of LEAA 2010 has failed. This is because the enforcement of the legal system is 
extremely weak, the Libyan courts system is ineffective and the Libyan judicial system can 
be considered as a system of non-intervention.  The combination of these factors prevents 
minority shareholders from suing majority shareholders for breach, misuse, wrongdoing or 
oppression. As Libya is still in the very early stages of transformation from the Bureaucratic 
Stage to the Relationship Stage, its legal system remains dysfunctional since laws and rules 
supporting market-based transactions are incomplete and the machinery for enforcement is 
inadequate. In this chapter, I analysed how the Liability Action is inefficient and ineffective 
due in large part to the Libyan environment. Specifically, judicial protection is currently not 
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an effective approach since the general enforcement environment is weak. Judicial corruption 
and the slow pace of justice affect the motivation of minority shareholders to bring an action 
against the majority shareholders. Also, there are significant political (e.g. government 
intervention) and social (e.g. the structure of the Libyan society) factors that hinder the courts’ 
enforcement of the law.  In addition, the efficiency and expertise of the courts undermines the 
efficiency of the current law. The quality of institutions which implement legal norms 
determines the effectiveness of protection of investors even independently of a formally 
defined set of laws as the law on the books is meaningless if the quality of the courts' 
interpretation and the implementation of the law are weak.  This is especially problematic in 
cases where the judges have wide discretion, which is the case in Libya. Finally, the minority 
shareholders face difficulties in bringing an action against the controlling shareholders (who 
are often in the position of board of directors) because of gaps in the law. A derivative suit, 
which is allowed in almost all jurisdictions, is not allowed in Libya and there are high risks 
and costs attached to bringing a dispute to court. In addition, the courts are barred from 
intervening in certain cases, such as the minority shareholders not being able to bring an 
action against the majority shareholders when the latter is in the position of a shadow director.  
All of these factors led us to conclude that the Libyan judicial system is a non-interventionist 
system.   
Having examined liability actions in Ch.3 and the other alternative strategies (e.g. 
public enforcement) in (4.1) and found that they fail to provide adequate protection for the 
minority shareholders in Libya, in Ch.4 the study argued that there is a strong need to adopt 
an alternative solution that can contribute to resolving the minority-majority shareholders 
problem. Accordingly, I proposed the self-enforcing model, which mainly relies on a voting 
mechanism to decrease (though not wholly avoid) the necessity of judicial oversight through 
permitting minority shareholders to review important transactions before they occur. Here I 
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adopted Black and Kraakman’ model of self-enforcement with amendments that take into 
account the specific case of Libya.  The proposed solutions differ according to the kind of 
corporate transactions in which a company may engage: related-party transactions which are 
mainly addressed by the majority of minority rule, other central transactions (e.g. the 
liquidation of a company, divisions of the company, a transformation of the company into 
another type of legal entity, such as a partnership, the sale or purchase of assets, and 
amendments to the article of association), which are mainly regulated by the supermajority 
approval rule, and control transactions that are mainly governed by a takeout right.  
In order to effectively implement a self-enforcing model there is an evident need to 
adopt the rule of one share, one vote since it prevents insiders from acquiring voting power 
disproportionate to their economic interest in the company. Also, there is a need to adopt the 
rule of confidential voting since it will prevent insiders (e.g. controlling shareholders) from 
knowing how a voter has cast their ballot (against him or not), meaning that insiders will lose 
the power to manipulate votes through rewards or sanctions.    Further, all the rules and rights 
of the model should be mandatory and should be applicable to both large and small 
companies. 
Finally, Black and Kraakman do not address why the self-enforcing model is an 
appropriate alternative to formal private enforcement in developing countries, instead 
focussing on the lack of enforcement in these countries as a reason to replace the judicial 
solution with the self-enforcing model. Therefore, their analysis does not provide us with a 
complete picture as there are other reasons that contribute to my proposal that the self-
enforcing model should be adopted in Libya. These reasons, explored in this chapter, are: that 
the self-enforcing model contributes to companies being able raise capital from investors, and 
that it also lowers the number of conflict of interest transactions and makes the company’s 
transactions more efficient. Finally, the self-enforcing model does away with the need for 
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external monitoring and is, therefore, an appropriate solution for addressing the majority-
minority problem in Libya.   
Nonetheless, any new proposed solution adopted may face some challenges and risks. 
Accordingly, the study devoted Ch.5 to addressing the potential risks and difficulties that the 
proposal may face. This necessitates requiring the formulation and adoption of new strategies 
of corporate governance to deal with such risks and challenges that are specific to Libya. For 
example, the problem of the lack of an effective disclosure system in Libya may impact 
negatively on the application of the self-enforcing model since minority shareholders within 
such an environment are likely to be unable to recognize any conflict of interest transaction 
undertaken by the controlling shareholders.  Accordingly, the solution should go beyond the 
reform of company law and enable minority shareholders’ representation on the board of 
directors to ensure the majority shareholders can access the company’s information.   
Further, there will always be a passive minority shareholder who does not mind 
whether the majority shareholders extract a private benefit at his expense or not. Additionally, 
there is a risk that the minority shareholders may abuse their rights and so placing a decision-
making capability in the hands of the minority might preclude efficient transactions in certain 
situations.  To address such problems measures, such as the appointment of a financial expert 
or independent auditor and employing independent directors to review a conflict of interest 
transaction neutrally, should be adopted. In addition, it is also necessary to impose procedural 
stages before a court case can go ahead, that requires aggrieved shareholders to establish a 
prima facie case that relies on acceptable evidence. With regard to the problem of the passive 
minority shareholders, the model provides powers only to large minority shareholders who 
own 5% of the company’s shares or more to veto or approve the transaction. This percentage 
should be adequate to incentivise any large shareholders and make them engage actively in 
the dealings of the company. 
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Moreover, the model will bring extra administrative costs, such as costs associated 
with calling meetings of minority shareholders to vote on conflict of interest transactions (e.g. 
dispatching notices of an impending ballot and providing all the voting shareholders with 
background information on the transaction), or those costs that relate to evaluating the 
conflict of interest transaction before the minority shareholders take a decision about it, such 
as hiring financial experts.  While the administrative costs are not a serious issue in Libya 
since LEAA 2010 allows that newspapers and emails are appropriate tools to call the 
shareholders’ meeting generally, the assessment of expenses is an issue that can be addressed 
by absorbing them into the company. 
The practical challenge is whether the self-enforcing rules can function in an 
environment of weak court enforcement. The study found that the self-enforcing model is 
able to function in an environment of weak enforcement because the actions of the 
controlling shareholders are guided by the fact that the minority shareholders have the power 
to veto any conflict of interest transaction. Additionally, the controlling shareholders know in 
advance that any conflict of interest transactions made without the consent of the minority 
shareholders can be blocked and that the courts will immediately revoke any transaction that 
is approved without the consent of the minority shareholders. 
Finally, it is difficult to anticipate whether the Libyan state will be keen to adopt these 
reforms. This is because, as discussed in Ch.2, the Libyan state remains the predominant 
beneficial shareholder of the country’s most significant corporate enterprises and so benefits 
directly from the status quo. Also, the issue of corruption in Libya radically reduces the 
possibility that the political establishment will look favourably on increasing minority 
shareholder protection by adopting the self-enforcing model.  In response to the first issue, as 
noted, adopting the self-enforcing model is consistent with the current ideological 
predisposition of the Libyan government in favour of market liberalisation and the 
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advancement of Libya’s status within the globalised free market economy. However, the 
second issue is more complex and will prove very difficult to resolve. 
 
2. Contribution to Knowledge 
First of all, it should be noted that although there are scholars from varying disciplines who 
have studied corporate governance within developing countries, especially North Africa and 
Middle Eastern countries, there is a lack of research on corporate governance that relates 
specifically to Libya. The corporate governance discussion has only recently started within 
Libyan legal discourse. Therefore, there are relatively few credible studies of corporate 
governance. As such, this study contributes to the very limited body of Libyan literature on 
corporate governance and undertakes an in-depth and critical examination of the dynamics of 
the Libyan corporate governance framework. More than that, to my knowledge, this study is 
the first study that has focused in-depth on minority shareholders protection in Libya. As a 
result, I hope that the study can open the door for more research in this area and also be a 
good resource not only for Libyan policy and law-makers to improve the corporate law 
framework, but also for regulators and promoters of good practices to assist them in deciding 
the areas that need improvement.  
The study concluded with a number of proposals, which are intended to be part of a 
general corporate governance reform strategy aimed at improving governance efficiency in 
Libya. The findings of the study are relevant for students, academics, policy makers, Libyan 
corporations, and Libyan regulators. Significantly, it can be introduced as a bill to the Libyan 
Parliament to reform the current system of minority shareholders protection.  Thus, it is 
expected that the study will be able to make a major contribution to legal development in 
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Libya and contribute to filling the gap in the literature concerning current corporate 
governance practices in Libya from a legal perspective. 
The study can offer both local and foreign investors an objective analysis of the current 
implementation of corporate governance standards in Libya; such information is undoubtedly 
important to investors wanting to make informed financial decisions before investing in 
organisations located within Libya.   
3. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
This study examined a specific area of corporate governance within Libya and argues against 
the current solution adopted by Libyan law (Revocation and liability actions) as the sole 
solution for minority shareholder protection. Through undertaking a social and economic 
analysis and a black latter approach, the study argued for the adoption of the self-enforcing 
model. As a result, this study should not be considered as a comprehensive study covering all 
the concepts of shareholders protection, which is a very wide topic. In other words, the study 
is a reform study that attempts to replace an inefficient solution with an efficient one. Thus 
the scope of the study is limited to a particular, narrow argument.    
There is still further research that may be undertaken in the area of shareholder 
protection in Libya under a comparative approach. Areas of further study may include an 
investigation into the extent to which UK company law, with its long commercial experience 
and knowledge, can offer further ways forward in the reform of Libyan laws, and to what 
extent UK law is compatible with Sharia principles. For example, it has been found that UK 
law can provide appropriate solutions to Libya in terms of, for example, codifying 
shareholder protection in Libyan Company Law that is capable of addressing the agency 
problem between the minority shareholders and the majority shareholders and between the 
shareholders as a whole and the minority shareholders. Particularly, under the majority-
270 
 
minority agency problem, it may be valuable to explore issues that relate to certain aspects of 
unfair prejudice, as Libyan law adopts limited criteria under the no abuse of rights doctrine. 
Accordingly, further study could usefully be made into adopting a more comprehensive set of 
criteria from UK law. Moreover, in terms of the shareholders-management problem (which is 
a core issue due to the lack of monitoring by the controlling shareholders in state owned 
companies and widespread corruption in Libya) Libyan Company Law has not adopted a 
derivative action, as such it may be interesting to investigate whether incorporating derivative 
actions into Libyan law would be effective and whether the system of UK derivative actions 
is appropriate in Libya. 
Further, due to the lack of studies of corporate governance in Libya, combined with 
the lack of development of Libyan company law (especially the economic system in Libya 
which has undergone major development),3 there are many areas open for further research. 
There are many traditional subjects of corporate governance that are yet to be examined, such 
as how to improve the enforcement of disclosure; the strength of the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
and care of directors, the improvement of independent directors; the control of management; 
how enforcement can be improved in weak environments; the quality of internal and external 
monitoring; ownership and control and the development of institutional regulatory capacity to 
meet rapid change and progress in organisations in Libya; developing self-regulatory 
corporate governance policies of Libyan corporations; the improvement of the disclosure 
system in Libya; the interaction between privatisation and corporate governance frameworks; 
specific forms of privatisation that might be more attractive in weak corporate governance 
settings; the relationships between corporate governance changes and changes in the degree 
of state-ownership of commercial enterprises; ways to incorporate an Islamic perspective of 
corporate governance inside the legal system of corporate governance.   
                                                 
3 As discussed, the Company Act in Libya only underwent minor changes from 1953 to 2010.  See the 
introduction of the thesis at 9. 
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